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 Abstract 
 
Global commodity chain (GCC) and related frameworks have generated a rich empirical 
literature on production-consumption linkages in the world economy. To date, there are few 
comprehensive studies on GCCs in fisheries products. This thesis investigates the EU-centred 
commodity chain in canned tuna, and interrogates three major themes in the literature: chain 
governance by ‘lead’ firms, regulatory mechanisms, and ‘upgrading’.  Part I traces historical 
and contemporary ‘economic’ dynamics, namely horizontal and vertical competitive relations 
among firms in the fishing (Chapter 2) and manufacturing, branding and retail (Chapter 3) 
nodes. It shows how the environmental conditions of extraction shape the commodity chain; 
that highly capital intensive fishing firms are not chain ‘drivers’; and that chain governance 
emanates primarily from supermarkets and canned tuna branded-firms. Part II examines the 
‘political’ dimensions of the chain through the mechanisms regulating resource access by EU 
fishing firms (Chapter 4) and the EU-centred canned tuna trade, especially with the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states (Chapter 5). It argues that inter-state and state-firm 
relations shape the cost structure and economic geography of the EU-centred chain both 
historically and today. Part III combines the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ through a case 
study of upgrading in Seychelles, one of the most important tuna transhipment/ landing hubs 
and sites of canned tuna production. It investigates the strategies of Seychelles governments 
to upgrade in the fishing and canning nodes of the chain and their developmental effects. 
Upgrading is explored as a combination of structural, environmental and conjunctural 
dynamics, including those of domestic Seychelles politics. The thesis concludes that 
environmental conditions of production, the historical formation of chains, and unequal 
relations between and within states and firms are important lacunae in GCC and related 
frameworks. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction and Overview 
 
 
1.1 Global Commodity Chain Analysis  
 
The study of commodities from production through to consumption – including perhaps less 
obvious aspects such as transportation networks and public and private standards – has been a 
veritable growth industry in the academy since the mid-1990s. However, a casual dip into this 
expansive (and expanding) lake of literature may well result in the reader sinking in the 
choppy waters of political-ideological contestation and disciplinary ‘ring-fencing’. 
Conceptual approaches to the study of a diverse range of commodities, from coffee to cars 
and from tourism to cinema, are variably (self-)labelled: ‘filières’ (Raikes et al. 2000, 
Bernstein 1996), ‘commodity systems’ (Friedland 1984, 2001, 2005), ‘commodity chains’ 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein 1986), ‘value chains’ (Porter 1990; Kaplinsky 2000), ‘supply chain 
management’ (Cox 1999), ‘food complexes’ and ‘food regimes’ (Friedmann and McMichael 
1989; Friedmann 1994), ‘global commodity chains’ (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz 1994; Gereffi 
1994), ‘systems of provision’ (Fine and Leopold 1993; Fine 2002), ‘global value chains’ 
(2001), ‘global production networks’ (Henderson et al. 2002), ‘global modular production 
networks’ (Sturgeon 2002), ‘networks of value’ (Smith et al. 2002), and ‘external firms’ as 
‘systems integrators’ (Nolan et al. 2002; Nolan et al. 2008), among others. For simplicity I 
refer to this diverse set of approaches as the political economy variant of ‘commodity 
studies’. This is not to suggest any coherent relationship between these approaches beyond a 
common concern with studying ‘chains’, ‘networks’ or ‘systems’ that connect production and 
consumption in contemporary capitalism. In fact, quite the opposite, as noted by Bernstein 
and Campling, the political economy variant of commodity studies  ‘has no common purpose, 
object of analysis, theoretical framework or methodological approach’ (2006a: 240).  
 
In agreement with Gibbon et al. (2008), it is argued here that the study of commodity ‘chains’ 
or ‘networks’ is a methodological tool not a theoretical framework, which goes some way in 
explaining why the ‘chain’ framework has been picked-up by such a diversity of intellectual 
traditions, including materialist political economy, institutionalist economics, international 
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business, and post-modernism.1 Nonetheless, regardless of substantial diversity in theoretical 
orientation and analytical focus, most approaches to commodity studies hold in common both 
a rejection of the static analytical grouping of commodities by ‘sector’ or ‘sub-sector’ (one of 
the many long-term problems of the ‘realism’ of mainstream economics) and the objective of 
examining empirical aspects of production-consumption linkages in contemporary and, for 
some, historical capitalism.  
 
I have undertaken in-depth reviews of the commodity studies literature elsewhere (Campling 
2004a; Bernstein and Campling 2006a, 2006b), the confined space of this thesis does not 
allow a systematic review of the various similarities and differences, controversies and 
contradictions, or emphases and silences within this literature. Instead, the thesis applies (and 
interrogates) one framework – global commodity chain (GCC) analysis – through a detailed 
empirical account of an under-researched ‘chain’: the canned tuna industry, in particular that 
which connects raw material production and processing in the Seychelles to retail in the EU, 
especially the UK. There are three reasons for selecting the GCC approach above other 
approaches to commodity studies: first, it was the approach that I had identified at the very 
outset of the research process and which most closely informed the field research design 
(Campling 2004b); second, it offers a clear set of guiding conceptual tools for the 
operationalisation of applied research (see section 1.1.2); and third, from its initial 
development, the GCC approach has tended to focus on questions to do with the political 
sociology of development and the international political economy (and the relationship 
between the two), which most clearly ‘fits’ with the lines of enquiry asked of the empirical 
research. I do not, however, accept the GCC approach uncritically and insights from other 
approaches both to multinational firms and to commodity studies informed my own 
conceptualisation of a ‘global commodity chain’ and my field research design (see below). In 
order to critically appraise and extend the GCC approach, the rest of this section takes the 
following three steps: 
1) The first sub-section summarises five political economy approaches to ‘commodity 
studies’. As we shall see, these approaches have informed each other in a broad 
chronological sequence, from the ‘commodity chain’ of world-systems theory 
sequence to the ‘global production network’ of economic geography. Each draws 
upon specific sets of theoretical and disciplinary concerns, albeit with the common 
                                                            
1 This diversity also helps to explain why a single literature review cannot adequately reflect the breadth and 
depth of the commodity studies literature. 
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objective of illuminating production-consumption linkages under global(ising) 
capitalism.  
2) Section 1.1.2 engages in more detail with three selected concepts first outlined by 
Gereffi (1994): chain governance, institutional context and upgrading. These 
conceptual elements were selected because of their resonance to mapping and 
unpacking the empirical case of the canned tuna industry and its interactions with 
Seychelles.  The section engages with different interpretations and criticisms of these 
concepts and, in so doing, lays-out my operationalisation of GCC analysis. The three 
concepts are used to structure the three parts of the thesis; the first two consist of two 
chapters and the last part one. Each concept is applied as a device to structure the 
complex political economy of the tuna industry, but each is also interrogated 
analytically through the empirical study that makes up the main body of this thesis. 
3) The final sub-section highlights three lacunae in GCC analysis that are of particular 
importance to an understanding of the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna. 
These are: a) environmental conditions of production, which are addressed in a dual 
sense both as constraints of the ‘natural’ world and as institutional conditions of 
resource access; b) the historical formation of commodity chains and its implications 
for contemporary relationships, processes and institutional dynamics; and, c) unequal 
political power among states and firms in the world system, including how this affects 
policy formulation and its enforcement (regulation), and the possibilities of 
‘upgrading’. It is argued that without sensitivity to these three dimensions, a full 
understanding of the commodity chain in canned tuna would be impossible.  
 
 
1.1.1 From commodity chain to global production network 
 
The following provides broad overviews of five frameworks in commodity studies: 
commodity chain, global commodity chain, value chain, global value chain and global 
production network approaches. These five are selected because each was developed 
sequentially in response to the prior approach (in the order listed above) and each lays great 
emphasis on the production-consumption linkages connecting the ‘global South’ to the 
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advanced capitalist world.2 The following section sketches each in turn and teases out broad 
similarities and differences between them.  
 
The first commodity studies framework is Hopkins and Wallerstein’s ‘commodity chain’, 
which they define as ‘a network of labor and production processes whose end result is a 
finished commodity’ (1986: 15). They conceptualise ‘networks of ... commodity chains’ as 
being the fabric of the capitalist world-economy’s ‘system of social production’. The 
commodity chain approach allows the researcher to trace ‘the ongoing division and 
integration of labor processes and thus monitor the constant development and transformation 
of the world-economy’s production system’ (Hopkins and Wallenstein 1994a: 17). This is all 
situated in world-systems theory’s categorisation of the capitalist world-economy as being 
socially and geographically divided into zones of core and periphery – economically and 
politically mediated by a semi-periphery (e.g. Arrighi and Drangel 1986; Arrighi 1990) – 
with the principal flow of commodity chains moving in ‘the direction periphery-to-core’ 
(Hopkins and Wallenstein 1994a: 17). The emphasis on hierarchical flows in their 
conceptualisation of a commodity chain might have been a response by world-systems 
theorists to accusations of the structural immutability of their tri-zonal division of the world 
(Bernstein and Campbell 1985: 7-8; Hobden and Jones 2001: 209; Bair 2005: 156).3 
Regardless, it was certainly devised to show the historical dynamism of flows between these 
‘zones’: 
The greatest virtue of a commodity chain approach is its emphasis on 
process. Not only do commodities move extensively through chains, but the 
chains are scarcely static for a moment. The capitalist world-economy 
reveals itself via this kind of radiography as a fast-moving network of 
relations that nonetheless constantly reproduces a basic order that permits the 
endless accumulation of capital. (Hopkins and Wallenstein 1994b: 50. 
Emphases added) 
                                                            
2 This is not the case for other approaches. Value chain (Porter 1985) and supply chain management (e.g. Cox 
1999) approaches were designed as generic strategic tools from the perspective of firm managers with little or 
no regard for the specificities of political economic context or historical change, and with absolutely no concern 
for ‘development’ outcomes in the global South. The commodity systems approach (Friedland 1984, 2000) is 
rooted in political-economy, but the emphasis is on the sociology of agriculture within national economies, 
especially the United States (e.g. Friedland 1994) – although Goss et al. (2000) apply the commodity systems 
approach to shrimp production in Thailand. 
3 Note that world-systems theorists often work with varying degrees of this typology in order to introduce 
greater levels of finesse, e.g. ‘strong’, ‘weak’ and ‘weakest’ periphery (Smith and Mahutga 2009). 
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In short, in the hands of world-systems theory, commodity chain analysis is a component part 
of a meta-theory that permits the study of process in global capital accumulation. The 
emphasis on process is an insight shared by all other approaches to commodity studies 
addressed here. However, the early empirical output of commodity chains research tended to 
focus on very long-term historical trends4 and researchers working outside of world-systems 
theory have seldom directly taken-up Hopkins and Wallerstein’s agenda. 
 
The second political economy variant of commodity studies appeared in Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz’s (1994) landmark co-edited volume Commodity Chains and Global 
Capitalism.  This collection set the research agenda for the global commodity chain (GCC) 
approach, which they defined as: 
sets of interorganizational networks clustered around one commodity or product, 
linking households, enterprises, and states to one another within the world 
economy. These networks are situationally specific, socially constructed, and 
locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic 
organization. (Gereffi et al. 1994: 2. Emphasis added) 
For Korzeniewicz and Martin, the GCC approach ‘was introduced to address a fundamental 
problem in world-system studies: How do we depict and investigate the relationships that 
sustain and reproduce core-periphery relations over time and space?’ (1994: 68. Emphases 
added). Rather than investigating the longue durée of historical capitalism, analysts working 
within the GCC framework have tended to focus on the political sociology of the 
contemporary (changing) international division of labour, its implications for capitalist 
development in the global South, and the role of lead firms (mainly multinationals) in 
contributing to these changes. To this extent, the GCC framework was directly influenced by 
debates in the late-1970s and 1980s around the ‘new international division of labour’ (see 
Gereffi et al. 1994: 1); debates that centred on the reasons for (and the effects of) developing 
countries moving from being ‘raw-material suppliers’ for the global North to ‘increasingly 
                                                            
4 In terms of its initial application, the historical period of commodity chains studied under this research 
programme was between 1590 and 1790, or, ‘the early period of historical capitalism’ (Hopkins and Wallenstein 
1994a: 20). This choice may well have been an implicit response to criticisms that world-systems theory started 
its periodisation of capitalism too early which was a result of its emphasis on relations of exchange over 
relations of production (Brenner 1977).  
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becoming the location sites of manufacturing industries for competitive production in the 
world market’ (Fröbel et al. 1978: 125).5 
 
One of the main attempts to operationalise GCC analysis was developed in Gereffi (1994). 
Initially, he outlined three components of GCCs: 
1) an input-output structure (i.e. a set of products and services linked together in a 
sequence of value-adding economic activities);  
2) a territoriality (i.e., spatial dispersion or concentration of production and distribution 
networks, comprised of enterprises of different sizes and types); and  
3) a governance structure (i.e., authority and power relationships that determine how 
financial, material, and human resources are allocated and flow within a chain). 
(Gereffi 1994: 96-7. Emphases added.)  
To these three, Gereffi later added a fourth dimension: the institutional context. This 
‘specifies the local, national and international conditions that shape each activity within the 
chain’ (Ponte 2002: 1100-1101; following Gereffi 1995). The emphasis of this fourth 
component is to take account of institutions that are not specific to the chain but that have 
discrete (and significant) effects upon it. The first two of these operational concepts – input-
output structure and territoriality – constitute largely ‘descriptive’ dimensions of GCC 
analysis. The third component – chain governance – developed two ideal-types based around 
a continuum with ‘producer-driven’ and ‘buyer-driven’ governance at either end of the pole. 
(These are each discussed in more detail below in Section 1.1.2.) 
 
Even though some of the early authors developing and applying the GCC framework were 
directly influenced by world-systems or dependency theory (e.g. Gereffi et al. 1994; 
Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994), the GCC approach has generally not been situated within an 
explicit theorisation of capitalism. As pointed out by Raikes et al. (2000: 409), the GCC 
approach is ‘some way from constituting a solid theoretical paradigm’.6 In this sense the 
approach has primarily been applied as a meso-level framework, focussing on the 
phenomenal forms of the capitalist world-economy, in particular hierarchical relations 
                                                            
5 For discussion and critique of the new international division of labour thesis from the perspective of the 
‘internationalisation of capital’, see Jenkins 1984. 
6 As we shall see, some authors working within the global value chain framework attempted to redress this 
weakness in the 2000s. 
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between firms (i.e. chain governance) and how their activities are affected by international 
trade regulation (i.e. institutional context) (Smith et al. 2002).7 
 
Gereffi’s GCC approach has been widely applied and problematised (see below) in a variety 
of detailed empirical studies of contemporary chains, especially in terms of shifts in chain 
governance. Much of the initial empirical focus of GCC studies was on industrial chains in 
the new international division of labour (Raikes et al. 2000: 410), generating a rich literature 
on basic manufactures such as apparel and footwear and complex manufactures such as 
automobiles, with a predominant geographical emphasis on East and Southeast Asia and 
Latin America (e.g. Appelbaum et al. 1994; Chen 1994; Gereffi 1994; Kim and Lee 1994; 
Korzeniewicz 1994; Lee and Carson 1994; Schoenberger 1994; Taplin 1994).8 It is important 
to distinguish within the GCC approach between this ‘US-school’ and that associated with a 
subsequent research programme at the Danish Institute for International Studies.9 This 
‘European’ school of GCC research has focused more on agricultural commodity chains, 
normally based on sites of production in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Daviron and Gibbon 2002a; 
Daviron and Ponte 2005; Fold and Pritchard 2005a; Gibbon and Ponte 2005; Ponte 2002a). 
Given that the commodity under investigation in this thesis combines elements of industrial 
and ‘agricultural’ analytical concerns, it draws directly on both of these GCC traditions. 
 
Gereffi and others working within the GCC approach referred fairly extensively to Michael 
Porter’s ‘value chain’ analysis, work which Porter undertook in parallel to Hopkins and 
Wallerstein’s commodity chain. Porter (1990: 33-51; 1985) described the discrete activities 
that constitute value chains within the firm. He situated this internal value chain within a 
(generic) firm’s external ‘vertical linkages’ upstream and downstream with suppliers and 
‘channels’ (e.g. retail) within a ‘value system’. But Porter’s firm-centric and prescriptive 
approach (Dicken et al. 2001: 97; Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 23, ftnt 5) to a generic ‘value 
chain’ is not the focus here. Instead, for our third variant of commodity studies we are 
concerned with the ‘value chain’ analysis developed in Kaplinsky (2000a) and Kaplinsky and 
Morris (2001) and associated with the UK Institute of Development Studies (IDS), which, 
like GCC analysis, focuses on the network of activities connecting firms in the international 
                                                            
7 Other questions around the state’s interaction with commodity chains – such as labour regimes, social policy 
or the use of force – have been ignored completely by GCC analysts. 
8 Some exceptions are work on US-centred GCCs in agro-exports from Latin America (Goldfrank 1994; 
Raynolds 1994) and on GCCs in service industries (Rabach and Kim 1994). 
9 Formerly the Centre for Development Research (CDR). 
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division of labour. Sharp differentiation between the GCC approach and the ‘IDS’ variant of 
value chain analysis is difficult because the latter openly acknowledges the importance of the 
former to its formation. The major difference in emphases of value chain analysis is reflected 
in the ‘twin concerns’ of Kaplinsky and Morris (2001: 25) for a focus on income distribution 
along and across chains, and the identification of ‘effective policy levers’ for developing 
country governments to improve (or ‘upgrade’) their economies’ interactions with value 
chains in the context of global trends of ‘unequalisation’ (see also Kaplinsky 2000a, 2000b; 
Wood 2001; and for an application, Kaplinsky and Morris 2008). As such, the analytical 
tendency in this approach was directed more towards economics and development policy and 
management,10 compared to the GCC emphasis on power relations, industrial restructuring 
and corporate strategy.11 On ethical and strategic levels, the concerns of value chain analysis 
with income distribution and ‘upgrading’ (see Section 1.1.2) focuses on the ability of 
developing countries to ‘make the best of globalisation’, because ‘it is less a matter of 
globalisation being intrinsically good or bad, than how producers and countries insert 
themselves in the global economy’ (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001: 15). 
 
The ‘merger’ of the GCC approach and value chain analysis into the ‘global value chain’ 
(GVC) approach is our fourth variant of commodity studies, and has been the subject of a 
detailed ‘genealogy’ by Bair (2005, 2009). In short, this merger – announced in a special 
issue of IDS Bulletin on ‘The Value of Value Chains’ in 2001 – was an explicit attempt by 
several prominent ‘chain’ researchers to set the research agenda and agree upon a ‘common 
framework’ (Gereffi el al 2001: 1). This was partly an attempt to reduce disparities between 
‘approaches’ which – on the surface alone (Bair 2005) – were merely competing over 
nomenclature. But it was primarily meant to contribute to the ‘operationalisation of concepts’ 
and theory building (Gereffi el al 2001: 2).12 Notably, one of the major gaps identified by 
researchers working with the GCC approach was the lack of quantitative ‘chain’ research 
with which, for example, to examine empirically whether or not ‘value added’13 is actually 
higher downstream a given chain (e.g. at the branding and marketing ‘node’ or link in the 
chain) than upstream (Raikes, Jensen and Ponte 2000: 403). The greater focus of value chain 
analysis on ‘economics’ (e.g. income distribution) meant that it was readily absorbed within 
                                                            
10 Areas where GCC analysis was seen as lacking by some commentators (e.g. Cramer 1999). 
11 Although Gereffi (1999) also introduces the concept of ‘upgrading’. 
12 Some researchers that had previously used the term ‘GCC’ (e.g. Daviron and Gibbon 2002b, Ponte 2002a) 
subsequently adopted ‘GVC’ (e.g. Gibbon and Ponte 2005, Daviron and Ponte 2005). 
13 Hopkins and Wallerstein argue that we should not refer to ‘value-added’ but rates of profit, as the former is 
misleading (in a Marxist sense) (1994a: 18). 
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the ‘new’ GVC approach. Another principal concern of GVC analysis is with ‘upgrading’ 
(e.g. Gereffi et al. 2001: 4-5). This is indicative of a major point of departure between the 
GCC and GVC approaches: while GCC research output could be of implicit policy relevance 
(i.e. firms, governments or activists could, and the latter certainly did, make use of GCC 
research), much of the GVC literature is explicitly orientated to policy-making and 
development ‘management’, particularly regarding factors and variables affecting the 
upgrading potential of developing country firms or the implementation of government 
policies to attract foreign investment.14 In light of this, Bair (2005) has argued that the GVC 
approach is a less radical, micro-level approach that is increasingly reliant on the mainstream 
literature on economics, international business and economic sociology, and has consequently 
lost sight of the original systems-level dimensions of chains as developed by Hopkins and 
Wallerstein. In addition, as discussed below in Section 1.1.2, different emphasises on chain 
‘governance’ can be discerned both between and within GCC and GVC approaches.  
 
The fifth and final variant is the global production network (GPN) approach. Economic 
geography has been at the forefront of the analysis of transformations (or ‘global shifts’) in 
the world economy since the 1970s (e.g. Dicken 1986, 2007). As a result it might seem 
surprising that researchers situating themselves in this discipline only began to work 
collectively to engage with the GCC framework in the early 2000s. Dicken et al. offers an 
initial appraisal of the GCC approach, praising especially its decentring ‘of the nation-state as 
a locus of economic analysis’ (2001: 100). But, they argue, it is a ‘partial, albeit extremely 
useful analytical framework’, which does not fulfil its ‘impressive and ambitious agenda’ 
(2001: 98-9), partly because most GCC researchers have focussed primarily on chain 
governance rather than its other components (see 1.1.2). Two new approaches were proposed 
that drew on the tools of economic geography in an attempt to extend the GCC approach: 
one, on ‘networks of value’, is explicitly Marxist (Smith et al. 2002) and the other – the GPN 
framework – blends elements of Marxian insights with aspects of economic sociology, 
including actor-network theory (Henderson et al. 2002; Dicken et al. 2001; Hess and Yeung 
2006). Of the two, the GPN framework has been most clearly adapted in the literature and, 
                                                            
14 For explicit GVC approaches to upgrading see Dolan and Tewari (2001), Fleury and Fleury (2001), Giuliani 
et al. (2005) and Quadros (2002). 
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like GCC/GVC, has been applied to numerous detailed empirical investigations of economic 
activities.15  
 
The GPN framework rejects the ‘chain’ metaphor ‘as being essentially vertical and linear’ in 
favour of a ‘relational, network-focussed approach’ that can incorporate horizontal, diagonal 
and vertical links in production systems (Henderson et al. 2002: 442). Authors working with 
the GVC framework agree that it focuses overly on vertical relationships between firms so 
that ‘processes of co-ordination and competition among actors operating in the same function 
or segment of a particular market are given less attention’ (Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 4). 
‘Horizontal’ (or intra-nodal) competition among firms is a central component of capitalist 
competition and competition within a node would surely affect vertical relationships between 
that node and another (and vice versa). Similarly, horizontal ‘competition’ between locations 
of production (whether at the sub-national, national or macro-regional scale) to attract direct 
foreign investment is a central feature of the international political economy and a major 
strategy of governments around the world, from tax holidays for greenfield investment 
through to full export-processing zones. 
 
The GPN use of ‘production’ (as opposed to ‘commodity’) emphasises the simultaneously 
relational and structural aspects of networks, including the allowance of ‘due attention to the 
issues of the reproduction of labour power’ (Henderson et al. 2002: 444). The GPN 
framework also problematise the GCC/GVC tendency to see lead firms as having a monopoly 
on corporate power because this can be challenged by ‘lesser firms’. Moreover, firms are 
‘territorially embedded’ in the ‘sense that they absorb, and in some cases become constrained 
by, the economic activities and social dynamics’ that exist in the places where they locate 
(Henderson et al. 2002: 450 and 452). Finally, the GPN emphasis on a multi-scalar 
perspective (Henderson et al. 2002: 447) stems, in part, from the developing concern of 
materialist geographers since the early 1980s with spatially uneven development both within 
countries as well as between them. For example, the GPN framework has placed a specific 
emphasis on ‘(subnational) regional development’ (Hess and Yeung 2006: 1196; see also, 
Coe et al. 2008: 268). More detail on selected contributions of the GPN framework and their 
implications for enhancing the GCC approach are addressed in the next section. 
 
                                                            
15 The uptake of the less theoretically coherent GPN approach over ‘networks of value’ is itself instructive of 
moments of intellectual reproduction and disciplinary ring-fencing in the academy. 
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 1.1.2 Selected concepts and interpretations 
 
Of the political economy approaches to ‘commodity studies’ discussed above, all share the 
fundamental assumption that only through understanding the complex (sometimes 
intertwined, sometimes discrete) pressures and processes in and across an entire commodity 
‘chain’ or ‘network’ can we generate convincing empirical assessments of distributional 
outcomes, power relations and institutional dynamics, and explore change in the interactions 
of producers, countries, firms and consumers within global capitalism, including dynamics of 
industrial ‘upgrading’ or ‘downgrading’ (a long-term concern of development studies and 
industrial organization). Such an analytical orientation allows us to move ‘beyond state-
centric approaches to economic development’ and, importantly, to understand the ‘structural 
limitations within which [countries and] firms, even multi-national corporations, operate’ 
(Gibbon and Ponte 2005: xi). The question follows: what prisms and concepts should be used 
to frame and engage with an analysis of a particular commodity chain? The first step in 
framing an answer is that ‘the suitability of a particular method’ should be determined by the 
demands of specific research questions (Bryman 1988: 106; see also, Devine 1995: 141). The 
following discussion suggests ways in which insights from GCC and related approaches can 
be engaged in the study of the ‘global’ commodity chain in canned tuna. In other words, it 
sets out a framework of analysis for my particular case. At points, it supplements the chain 
literature with insights from the International Business literature on multinational firms, 
especially that by Stephen Hymer.16 
 
 
a) Input-output structure and territoriality 
Two key components of Gereffi’s original operationalisation of GCC analysis are 
uncontroversial and widely accepted by competing approaches to commodity studies: input-
output structure and territoriality. The careful study of input-output structure is the first step 
to understanding how the various economic activities in a chain function as a coherent whole 
or ‘sequence’. It does however, imply difficult analytical choices. For example, where should 
                                                            
16 There have been several surveys and appraisals of his work and these will not be rehearsed here. See, for 
example, Pearce and Pananastassiou 2006; Pitelis 2002; Strange and Newton 2006. As pointed out by Levitt-
Polanyi (1982: 253-4) in the context of Hymer’s early death at the age of 39, his ‘legacy is best understood as a 
sort of intellectual sketchbook, a prelude to a more complete and coherent statement of his ... insights’. 
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research on the vertical flows of a ‘chain’ start and stop? In the case of the canned tuna chain, 
important ‘inputs’ include ship-building and tinplate manufacture, and significant ‘outputs’ 
are bycatch of fishing vessels (‘waste’ fish), by-products from processing (e.g. fish meal and 
fish oil, effluent, smell pollution, etc), and used metal cans post-consumption which can be 
re-inserted into other commodity chains through recycling. Although some of these feature in 
the thesis, they are either not central to the core dynamics of accumulation in the commodity 
chain in canned tuna or they would require additional research that is beyond the scope of a 
single thesis. Similarly, given the linearity of the chain metaphor and the reality that the flow 
of any given commodity interacts with and through multiple networks (as pointed out by the 
GPN approach), where should research on horizontal and diagonal linkages start and stop?  
 
This is a far more challenging question because the possibilities are literally endless (perhaps 
indicating a weakness in the GPN framework?). The following discussion of three concepts 
and four lacunae in GCC analysis goes some way to delineating the boundaries – empirical 
inclusions/exclusions – of this thesis, but one point worth emphasising here is a useful 
distinction made by Daviron and Ponte (2005: note 1, Xxiv; Bernstein and Campling 2006b: 
415) between a ‘global value chain for x’ and ‘x value chains’. For example: ‘“global value 
chain for coffee” . . . is used to analyse general features in relation to the movement of coffee 
from production to consumption’ while ‘“coffee value chains” . . . (is) used when a specific 
strand of the global value chain for coffee is examined (either at the production or 
consumption ends, or both) . . . such as the Uganda-to-Italy chain for Robusta coffee, of the 
Tanzania-to-US chain for mild specialty Arabica coffee’. In this thesis the focus is on the EU-
centred commodity chain in canned skipjack and yellowfin tuna, particularly that of one firm 
(controlled by the multinational firm H. J. Heinz) and interacting with one location of 
production (Seychelles). This is sometimes set in the context of interactions with the global 
commodity chain (which, in practice, simply adds the US-centred chain as all other markets 
are secondary to these two), and very occasionally makes reference to the mainly Japan-
centred commodity chain in sashimi grade tuna. 
 
Although ‘territoriality’ is a contested term in economic and political geography, Gereffi’s 
(1994) use is adequate shorthand for his concern with the geography of production and 
relative degrees of concentration of economic activities in different locations. The 
investigation of a commodity chain connecting raw material production and manufacturing in 
the global South to retail in the ‘North’ allows us to examine how dynamics of (uneven) 
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development combine with specific moments in specific places and times. A ‘chain’ 
framework, while centred on firms as the loci of capital accumulation, does not necessitate a 
firm-centric perspective. Because a chain framework also requires consideration of 
‘institutional contexts’ (see below) we are also able to look at capital accumulation from the 
perspective of different states and their relevant relationships (as this thesis does) and from 
the perspective of labour (excluded from this thesis).  
 
 
b) Chain governance 
Chain governance in GCC analysis is ‘a firm-centred conceptualization’ (Gibbon et al. 2008: 
315). Wider dynamics shaping chain activities and relationships, such as the state and 
international forms of regulation, are considered under the rubric ‘institutional context’ (see 
below).17 As already noted, governance has been the dominant analytical focus in most 
applied GCC studies. The governance of a chain by a lead firm requires a relationship of 
control, not necessarily direct relations of ownership. The major contribution of Gereffi 
(1994) on chain governance was the distinction between ‘producer-driven’ and ‘buyer-
driven’ commodity chains, where production tends to be, respectively, more capital- or 
labour-intensive. The latter refers:  
to those industries in which large retailers, brand-named merchandisers, and 
trading companies play the pivotal role in setting up decentralized production 
networks in a variety of exporting countries. … The main job of the core 
company in buyer-driven commodity chains is to manage … production and 
trade networks and make sure all the pieces of the business come together in an 
integrated whole. (Gereffi 1994: 97-9) 
‘Buyer-drivenness’ then, signifies ‘a relation of power’ (Daviron and Gibbon 2002b: 140); or 
perhaps more accurately, and through the prism of Hymer’s work, a relation of market power 
through mechanisms of control – as opposed to necessitating direct ownership. Control is 
exercised by lead firms located in nodes of a chain that are typified by concentration and 
centralisation and associated high barriers to entry (Hymer 1979a: 145; Gereffi et al. 2001: 4; 
Raikes et al. 2000: 397). In typifying buyer-driven chains, Daviron and Gibbon point to the 
emergence of new sets of lead firms which transformed ‘old trade linkages into decentralized 
                                                            
17 Chain governance is not to be confused with the broader conceptualisation of governance common to political 
science or international political economy, such as in the literature on global governance. 
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but privately controlled production networks’ and have the ‘ability to redraw continuously 
both the geography and the functional division of labour of the resulting networks’ (2002b: 
138). 
 
It is rarely acknowledged that the basic premise of a buyer-driven chain was first theorised by 
Stephen Hymer. Rather than sub-contracting leading to ‘“control over ... resources [being] 
relinquished’” (Dunning as cited by Strange and Newton 2006: 181), multinationals could 
use it to extend their control without ownership.18 On this, Hymer (1979b) pre-empts the 
distinction in the GCC approach between ‘producer-driven’ and ‘buyer-driven’ chain 
governance by lead firms. It is worth quoting him at length on this: 
[W]hen production is the crucial element, ownership of plant and equipment 
may be essential for control [i.e. ‘producer-driven’ commodity chains]. But 
where product design becomes the dominant element, investment in 
development and marketing is more important. The larger corporations might 
then prefer to allow small businesses to own the plant and equipment (along 
with the associated risks) while it concentrates on intangibles. ... A corporation 
that concentrates [in strategic nodes of a commodity chain] ... is not 
surrendering control, but is extending it more widely. Similarly, when there are 
only a few sources for a raw material, it may be necessary for a larger user to 
integrate backward to control that raw material. But if there are many sources of 
supply the corporation might welcome local participation in order to save its 
capital for other steps. (Hymer 1979b: 248-9. Emphases added)19 
Two important points stem from this: the first analytical and the second methodological. 
Hymer had clearly identified analytically the possibility of ‘lead’ (e.g. Gereffi et al. 2001)  or 
‘external’ (Nolan 2002) firms divesting ownership of production secure in the knowledge that 
they could continue to control vertical relationships with other firms –  through oligopsonistic 
(few buyers and many sellers)  and/or oligopolistic (few sellers and many buyers) market 
power. It also demonstrates the methodological adaptability of Hymer’s framework as it 
allowed him to assess different dynamics, processes and relationships of multinational firms 
                                                            
18 The identification of this rarely-cited essay by Hymer as pre-empting the concerns of global commodity chain 
analysis stems from Strange and Newton (2006), see also Bair (2009: 5). 
19 Hymer used the concrete example of Japanese firms engaging overseas through mechanisms such as 
‘production sharing, guaranteed demand contracts’, ‘joint ventures, subcontracting, etc., rather than wholly 
owned subsidiaries’, which had the potential of drawing supplier countries ‘into a system of continued 
dependency’  (Hymer 1979b: 244 and 247). 
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at different times and in different places. Hymer’s approach was able to account for firm 
strategy and, moreover, historical change based upon a combination of economic and 
political processes, institutions and relationships. 
 
Through their control over chain governance lead firms occupy strategic positions in the 
chain that allow oligopolistic rent-seeking, such as the rise of supermarket control of retail 
channels and the strategy of multinationals shedding segments of their business to 
concentrate financing on their core business where they have less competition (Gibbon and 
Ponte 2005: Ch. 1). For Hymer, this market power is based on market ‘imperfections’. These 
are not primarily to do with ‘natural’ transaction costs, but are formed as a structural 
outcome of the historical development of capitalist concentration and centralisation (‘the Law 
of Increasing Firm Size’) (Hymer 1970: 37; following Marx 1976). Hymer argued that 
multinationals generate and perpetuate oligopolistic relations because scope for competition 
is limited by the size of markets. Ever bigger firms, owning and/or controlling ever greater 
shares of production heightens the barriers to entry for competing firms (Hymer 1970; Nolan 
et al. 2002; Pearce and Pananastassiou 2006; Pitelis 2002). Hymer saw the tendency to the 
concentration and centralisation of control of production and capital as ‘so persistent’ in the 
historical development of capitalism, ‘that it might almost be formulated as a general law of 
capital accumulation’ (Hymer 1979a: 145). While these conditions are competitive, Hymer 
argued that lead firms often compete in ‘an oligopolistic rather than in a cutthroat way’ 
(Hymer 1972: 98) 
 
A concern with chain governance thus incorporates an emphasis on highly differentiated real 
markets. Rather than an abstracted notion of the firm or ‘the market’ as efficiency 
maximising institutional forms, ‘real markets’ constitute complex ‘sets of social relations 
structured by classes and institutions’ (Mackintosh 1990: 50). In other words, ‘the dictates of 
the capitalist market—its imperatives of competition, accumulation, profit maximisation, and 
increasing labour productivity—regulate not only all economic transactions but social 
relations in general’ (Wood 1999: 6-7). For the purpose of this thesis Wood’s formulation of 
capitalist ‘imperatives’ is encapsulated in the term competitive accumulation. The GCC 
approach extends an understanding of real markets through its focus on social relations along 
‘vertical’ production-consumption linkages in the (changing) international division of labour.  
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In the agri-food industries, buyers source products across the planet from a range of 
decentralised and sharply competing suppliers whose outputs are often coordinated by well 
established food safety, quality and process standards (Daviron and Gibbon 2002b: 141).20 
Importantly, control need not be a direct relationship, as private standards (the regulation of 
firms by firms) are often audited by a third party so that a lead firm maintains the ‘control of 
control’ (Ponte and Gibbon 2005: 12). As anticipated by Hymer (1979b), this allows ‘lead 
firms’ in buyer-driven chains to remove the risks associated with the ownership of the 
processing links (or ‘nodes’) of a commodity chain; instead, these risks are passed on to first- 
or second-tier suppliers (Gibbon and Ponte 2005). This entails a process of strategic 
‘externalisation’ of international production by lead firms rather than a narrow focus on the 
relative merits of a multinational firm internalising transaction-costs. 
 
Any attempt to understand chain governance through the prism of buyer- or producer-
drivenness must ask: how does one identify which firms ‘lead’ any given commodity chain 
and what mechanisms do they use to do so? The first step to an answer requires empirical 
investigation of firm activities (‘the input-output structure’) across the chain, which in turn 
necessitates an understanding of the geography and relative concentration of these activities 
(‘territoriality’). Applied GCC research on certain agri-food chains – especially fresh fruit 
and vegetables – has concluded that supermarkets play a lead firm role (Dolan and Humphrey 
2000; Gibbon 2003; Lang 2003; Fold and Pritchard 2005a). The ‘supermarket revolution’ of 
the 1980s constituted a shift in market power from branded-manufacturing firms to large 
retailers, initially in the UK and USA before moving to Western Europe and Japan, and 
eventually to much of the global South from the late 1990s (Appelbaum 2008; Aoyama 2007; 
Brunn 2006; Coe and Wrigley 2007; Myers and Alexander 2007; Reardon and Hopkins 2006; 
Wrigley 2001; Wrigley et al. 2005). Yet while there has been increasing global concentration 
of ownership in the retail sector since the 1990s (Dawson 2007; Deloitte 2008: 26, 2010: 19), 
the failed internationalisation strategies of several major supermarkets – including Wal-Mart 
in Germany and Japan – makes it clear that this process is not inevitable (Aoyama and 
Schwarz 2006; Christopherson 2006; Fernie et al. 2006; Humphrey 2007).  
 
                                                            
20 Demanding food safety standards, particularly those applied by the EU and individually by its member states, 
can be seen as either barriers to developing country producers or as catalysts for their functional upgrading 
(Henson and Jaffee 2006). Either way, public and private standards have expanded substantially in importance 
over the last 20 years. Public standards are a central regulatory mechanism in agri-food chains, and private 
standards are a key tool of chain governance by lead firms. 
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Research on supermarkets in the UK – one of the key ‘actors’ examined in this thesis – has 
attributed them with a growing degree of market power since the 1980s (Burt and Sparks 
2001; Dawson 2001). This rise can be characterised by a ‘spiral of growth’, where a 
supermarket’s increased market share and sales density generates enhanced economies of 
scale and buying power and reduced unit costs relative to competitors, resulting in an 
oligopolistic structure with high barriers to entry (Burt and Sparks 2003). General 
assessments of ‘winners and losers’ in the UK and US supermarket revolutions argue that 
supplying firms (and their workers) are among the most notable sets of ‘losers’ in the 
distribution of value across the chain, especially those based in developing countries 
(Actionaid 2007; Appelbaum, and Lichtenstein 2006; Seth and Randall 1999; Tilly 2006; 
Thrupp 1995; UK Competition Commission 2000, 2007; Vorley 2003a, 2003b; Young 2004). 
From its outset, GCC analysis has placed considerable emphasis on chain governance by 
powerful retailers in the global North over suppliers of primary commodities and basic 
manufactures in the global South. Perhaps the central rationale for much GCC analysis to 
focus primarily on personal consumption goods is that they have significant ‘developmental’ 
implications (e.g. primary commodities, apparel) and ‘fit’ within the initial research agenda 
of GCC analysis as proposed by Gereffi (1994), especially in relation to buyer-drivenness 
(Bernstein and Campling 2006a). 
 
Despite general agreement that supermarkets play a ‘driving’ role in agri-food chains it is far 
from apparent that they are the only or even the most important ‘lead firms’. As pointed out 
in Gereffi’s (1994) formulation of buyer-driven chains, ‘brand-named merchandisers and 
trading companies’ can also act as ‘core’ companies. Gibbon (2001a) established the 
dominance of international trading companies in governing certain agri-food chains such as 
cotton; a finding that was paralleled in research on the canned tuna industry where the ‘big 
three’ tuna trading companies were shown to play a ‘governing’ role both in coordinating 
industrial tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and in supplying raw 
material to tuna processors (Campling et al. 2007: Ch. 15; see also Gellert 2003 on Japanese 
trading firms in the Indonesia-Japan timber chain). Similarly, Gibbon and Ponte (2005: 27, 
see also p. 100) highlight the importance of ‘the leading food multinational corporations’ to 
the globalisation of food manufacturing, and go on to argue that degrees of ‘drivenness’ 
depend upon the specificities of the industry in question (Ibid: 80; see also Raikes et al. 2000: 
397). In different ways, Appelbaum (2008) and Sturgeon (2002) point out that the rise of 
global giant contract manufacturers may act as a (unintended) counter-balance to the 
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dominance of traditional ‘lead’ firms in buyer-driven chains. Niels Fold provides important 
critical insights into GCC governance through his identification of a ‘bi-polar chain’ in the 
cocoa-chocolate industry where two highly concentrated groups of lead firms exist at 
different nodes in the chain. Consequently he argues that ‘the crude dichotomy between 
producer- and buyer-driven chains … fails to acknowledge the more complicated patterns of 
power relations between lead firms in global chains’ (Fold 2002: 230). In light of these 
findings, we concur with Raikes et al. (2000: 410) that the producer-/buyer-driven dichotomy 
‘may be useful as a general guide at the beginning of a research project, but appears too rigid 
and uncontextualized time-wise to be used uncritically thereafter’.21 Nonetheless, ‘buyer-
drivenness’ is a useful descriptive concept to signify change in the world economy since the 
late 1970s; change that has incorporated ‘a sharp increase in supply and a secular trend 
toward a “buyer’s market”’ (Daviron and Gibbon 2002b: 152). Despite its flaws then, the 
notion of a ‘buyer-driven’ chain serves to capture these important trends in the global 
political economy over the last 30 years. 
 
One of the major weaknesses of the producer-/buyer-driven categorisation of chain 
governance is that it was established based upon empirically-driven opposite poles of a 
continuum of ideal-types. Without placing them in the concrete and complex contexts of 
particular chains in particular times and places, these categories can generate superficial 
analyses. ‘Operationalising’ governance has emerged as a key source of disagreement in the 
more recent GVC literature. Debates over governance and the extent (and ‘level’ of analysis) 
of its theorisation reveals significant theoretical divergence within the camp of – self-
professedly – ‘GVC’ analysts. For example, Gereffi et al. (2005) draws heavily on 
transaction-cost economics to build a rigid typology of types of governance.22 This has been 
widely criticised by chain researchers with an interest in questions to do with political-
economy. Gibbon et al. (2008: 333) dismisses the privileging of ‘formal model-building’ and 
Palpacuer (2008: 399) points out that, while Gereffi et al. (2005) signifies a ‘growing 
conceptual sophistication of GVC analysis’, it focuses on the ‘technical and economic aspects 
of governance, overlooking changes of a more political nature in value allocation within the 
                                                            
21 Similarly, Kaplinsky and Morris stress that there may not be a single lead firm that dominates chain 
governance, instead ‘there may be a multiplicity of nodal points of governance and coordination functions’ that 
‘may change over time’ (2001: 29). 
22 In their article on chain governance, Humphrey and Schmitz (2001: 19) also move directly into the terrain of 
transaction-cost economics through Williamson’s (1981) notion of ‘bounded rationality’. 
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chain’.23 Quite simply, the thesis does not ask the same sorts of narrow economic questions 
as Gereffi et al. (2005), so this discussion will be pursued no further. Conversely, Hymer’s 
(1979b) early indication of a similar but less rigid understanding of control by lead firms (see 
the extended quote above) than Gereffi’s earlier producer-/buyer-driven dichotomy is situated 
in a theorisation of the dynamics of competitive accumulation. This allows the recognition of 
specificity and diversity in forms of chain governance, but also maintains the importance of 
market power. Therefore, chain governance can be re-interpreted away from ideal-types to a 
conceptualisation of firm behaviour, but not as a firm-centric approach (e.g. as in transaction-
cost economics); instead one that incorporates the wider dynamics of, for example, uneven 
development, the hierarchical state system and class relations. Hymer’s insights on the 
multinational firm thus allow a re-interpretation of the meso-level GCC approach within the 
wider context of competitive accumulation where multinational firms are the most recent and 
sophisticated institutional form in the long historical ‘development of business enterprise’ 
(Hymer 1975: 49).24 
 
In the context of this discussion, I use chain analysis as an investigative tool – or 
‘methodological approach’ (Gibbon et al. 2008) – in the analysis of firm activities under 
conditions of competitive accumulation. This entails a focus on the firm as an institutional 
form peculiar to capitalism. As a result, in this thesis chain governance is understood as the 
concrete processes and relationships that allow ‘lead’ firms to shape the activities of and 
distributional outcomes for other firms in a vertical division of labour. This is achieved by 
lead firms through a combination of their relative market power, creation and enforcement of 
rules and conditions of chain participation, and their positioning in nodes of the chain that 
enjoy enhanced shares of surplus value generation or extraction (whether through profits 
and/or rents).25 This conceptualisation of chain governance does not presuppose the existence 
of ideal-typical ‘drivenness’ or formal model-building. Instead it focuses attention on 
mechanisms of market power by lead firms in their shaping of chain activities (‘input-output 
                                                            
23 See also, Ponte and Gibbon (2005) and Gibbon and Ponte (2005). For criticism of the dominance of the new 
economic sociology in GVC analysis, see Bair (2008) and Bernstein and Campling (2006a). 
24 Importantly and contrary to politically populist analyses, even though Hymer thought that multinational firms 
dominated the capitalist world-economy after World War Two, he did not think that they controlled it (Cohen et 
al. 1979: 20). 
25 ‘Rules and conditions of chain participation’ draws directly from Ponte and Gibbon (2005: 3). A lead firm’s 
enhanced profitability or rent extraction/generation is normally achieved by maintaining a position of oligopoly 
or oligopsony in a strategic node of the chain that is characterised by high barriers to entry for other firms (e.g. 
Gereffi 1999: 43-44, 2001: 1620-21). See Starosta (2010) for a theoretical discussion of this issue. 
37
structure’) and the geography and relative concentration or dispersal of production 
(‘territoriality’), but necessarily situated in a wider ‘institutional context’. 
 
 
c) Institutional context(s) 
In his 1994 chapter, Gereffi places emphasis on the role of the state and of trade policy in 
particular in shaping the geography of production in the US-centred GCC in apparel.26 But he 
did not incorporate the role of the state or the system of states in his three components of 
applied GCC analysis. He formalised the inclusion of a fourth component – ‘institutional 
context’ – in a subsequent contribution. This can be summarised as the context ‘that shapes 
the inter-firm networks that connect the various links in the chain and mediate the outcomes 
associated with the operation of the chain in different environments’ (Bair and Gereffi 2003: 
145, following Gereffi 1995).27 While state regulation and geopolitics were thus identified as 
important dynamics of chain analysis from the outset, social and institutional context has 
tended to be downplayed, underdeveloped or even ignored completely in most chain 
analyses; as pointed out by critics of the GCC approach (Gellert 2003: 59; Palpacuer and 
Parisotto 2003: 103; Patel-Campillo 2010: 77-84). 
 
In her influential survey of the chain literature, Bair (2005: 168) calls for a ‘second 
generation’ of GCC analysis that examines the ‘external’ regulatory mechanisms that are 
constitutive of chains and ‘are critical for understanding their social and developmental 
consequences’.28 Importantly, Bair explicitly attempts to overcome a false ‘internal-external’ 
dichotomy by referring to these mechanisms as constitutive of chains. Trade policy in 
particular directly and indirectly influences the geography of international production and, in 
turn, the way that a wide range of commodity chains are configured. It is important to that 
trade policy itself can be directly influenced by the configuration of chains and the 
representation of the interests of powerful firms by their ‘home’ states in trade negotiations 
(Chapter 5). As we shall also see in Chapter 5, EU trade preferences are of particular 
                                                            
26 For example: ‘The economic agents of supply and demand do not operate in a political vacuum. ... They ... 
respond to political pressures from the state’. On which he goes on to analyse the importance of state policies of 
import-substitution/export-orientated industrialisation in shaping in apparel GCC over time. (Gereffi 1994: 99-
100, see also p. 101, 114 and 116 on US import quotas.) 
27 Summarised by Raikes et al. (2000: 393, following Gereffi 1995) as the ‘national and international conditions 
and policies [that] shape the globalization process at each stage in the chain’. 
28 The GPN approach introduces a similar point on the role of the state and inter-state/international agencies 
through the category of ‘institutional power’ (Henderson et al. 2002: 450). 
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importance to the geography and politics of canned tuna production in the global South.29 
Bair’s category of ‘regulatory mechanisms’ is adopted in this thesis as an alternative 
operational concept to Gereffi’s ‘institutional framework’ and is used to frame Chapters 4 
and 5 of this thesis – on fisheries regulation and trade policy, respectively. 
 
Bair (2005: 170) also highlights the importance of the ‘structural properties of contemporary 
capitalism’ to her call for a second generation of chain research. As pointed out by Palpacuer 
(2008: 406) in her work on financialisation and corporate strategy, ‘if lead firms are 
acknowledged to play a central role in the governance process of GVCs, then the ways in 
which these firms are themselves governed cannot but exercise an influence on the whole 
chain’. Similarly, Gibbon and Ponte (2005: 11-15) identify the role of corporate 
financialisation and the ‘doctrine of shareholder value’ as key dynamics ‘driving’ the 
organisation and behaviour of ‘lead’ firms, which, in turn, have implications for first- and 
second-tier suppliers. These wider political-economic dimensions are clearly of central 
importance to an understanding of the context of any commodity chain, but they also raise 
questions around where the ‘structural’ dimensions of a chain analysis stop. If the analytical 
logic of Bair’s intervention is followed to its conclusion, the study of any commodity chain 
would simultaneously entail the study of its relation within the totality of the world economy 
and the ‘laws of motion’ of the capitalist mode of production (Starosta 2010). While the ‘dull 
compulsion’ of competitive accumulation and the tendency to concentration and 
centralisation of control of commodity chains serves as a major set of assumptions informing 
this thesis, the ‘level’ of abstraction inherent within the study of how the ‘structural 
properties of contemporary capitalism’ affect chains does not immediately lend itself to 
operationalisation in relation to a far more modest (‘meso-level’) description and analysis of 
a ‘slice’ of contemporary capitalism – production-consumption linkages in a commodity 
chain in canned tuna. Nonetheless, as we shall see in Chapter 3, different types of ownership 
of lead firms in the branded and retail nodes of the EU-centred commodity chain in canned 
tuna have important implications for their business strategies and shape the chain as a whole. 
 
Our discussion of the ‘institutional contexts’ of chain analysis so far is open to criticism of a 
‘structuralist’ or ‘systems bias’, which could lead to the obfuscation of ‘national variations in 
production and consumption’ (Leslie and Reimer 1999: 404; Cramer 1999: 1248). The 
                                                            
29 On the role of preferences in the international trade regime and their relationship to upgrading/downgrading in 
commodity chains, see Dolan and Tewari (2001), Gibbon (2002) and Gibbon and Ponte (2005: ch. 2). 
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‘governance’ of any chain cannot be limited solely to inter-firm relationships or the dynamics 
of international trade regulation because firm activities ‘are embedded in a much wider 
spectrum of social institutions and relationships’ (Taylor 2008: 23), including local power 
relations around class, gender and ethnicity (e.g. Ramamurthy 2000).30 Drawing from the 
GPN approach, the specificity of national (and sub-national) institutional and social contexts 
within which firms are embedded must be incorporated into chain analysis (Henderson et al. 
2002: 441).31 Consequently, the GPN framework 
accords a degree of relative autonomy to domestic firms, governments and other 
economics actors ... whose actions potentially have significant implications for 
the economic and social outcomes of the networks [or chains] in the locations 
they incorporate. ... All GPNs have to be regarded as multi-scalar, ranging from 
the local and regional to the national and global and back again. Such multi-
scalar networks are built-up and transformed over time by a multiplicity of 
agents with asymmetrical influence and power. (Henderson et al. 2002: 446) 
This entails a sensitivity to different ‘models’ or ‘varieties’ of capitalism (Coates 2000; Hall 
and Soskice 2009[2001]), and rejects the notion that all states are fully converging on a 
common set of (neoliberal) policies. To address this lacuna, GPN analysis offers the 
conceptual category (among others) of ‘territorial embeddedness’, which refers to the degree 
of ‘anchoring’ of a firm in different places and scales. This anchoring can work in several 
ways. The incoming firm may be attracted by national government policies, it can affect the 
developmental prospects of a location and change social relations there, and, in turn, it ‘may 
become embedded’ through absorbing (and responding to the constraints of) ‘the economic 
activities and social dynamics that already exist’ there (Henderson et al. 2002: 452). For 
example, in a study connecting timber production in Indonesia with Japanese firms and 
markets, Gellert (2003: 53) demonstrates the importance of ‘an oligopoly of timber-
producing firms’ which came to dominate and shape the ‘national’ interface with the timber 
chain through alliances with the state and powerful external players in the chain. In short, 
Gellert’s study identifies the importance of a tiny domestic elite to the institutional context of 
the chain. As we shall see in Chapter 6, Seychelles domestic political economy shaped (and 
                                                            
30 As already noted, the thesis excludes serious discussion of labour, gender and race, despite their importance to 
the global commodity chain in canned tuna (e.g. cannery managers are normally white men, while workers are 
mainly non-white women). 
31 To be fair, and as noted above, the original definitional work on GCCs saw these ‘networks [as] situationally 
specific, socially constructed, and locally integrated, underscoring the social embeddedness of economic 
organization’ (Gereffi et al. 1994: 2). 
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shapes) significantly the strategies employed by firms in the canned tuna chain. This part of 
the thesis also highlights the important strategic role that individual firm managers can play 
in these interactions. As pointed out by Taylor (2008: 21), ‘retaining a focus on the 
international (rather than global) division of labour helps to emphasise the foundational 
element of state influence over the production, reproduction and utilisation of labour’. In 
other words, social embeddedness as an ‘institutional context’ for chain activities and 
linkages matters; firms behave differently in different spaces and places and adjust their 
business strategies and day-to-day operations in relation to national (and in larger countries, 
local) governments, labour and other ‘non-state actors’, such as NGOs. As with all of the 
elements of ‘institutional frameworks’ discussed here, one of the main areas where chain 
analysts have addressed the issue of social embeddedness is in relation to ‘upgrading’, to 
which we now turn. 
 
 
d) Upgrading/Downgrading 
 
Chris Cramer criticised the GCC approach for being ‘extremely short on policy 
recommendation’ and went on to outline the potential of industrial policy, including infant 
industry protection, to industrialisation in the global South (1999: 1248 and 1252).32 This 
criticism was rejected by Gibbon as being based on a flawed understanding of GCC analysis, 
which, contrary to Cramer’s description, demands ‘case-specific account[s] of conditions for 
economic upgrading’ by focusing on ‘the opportunities and constraints presented by the 
forms of global integration of production and trade in specific commodities’ (2001a: 345). 
Moreover, subsequent to Cramer’s criticism a body of chain literature emerged that focussed 
explicitly on development policy (and its ‘management’), including a concern with 
‘upgrading’ in value chain and GVC approaches, as outlined above. For example, Gereffi 
(1999: 52) introduced the concept of ‘industrial upgrading’ to GCC analysis and outlines 
several types of upgrading that operate ‘at different levels of analysis’, including within 
factories (e.g. from simple, lower value-added products to complex, higher value-added 
ones). However, these ‘levels’ relate primarily to complex manufactures and are of little 
relevance to the commodity chain in canned tuna. A more generic understanding of 
                                                            
32 In relation to his work on the processing of cashew nuts in Mozambique, Cramer recognised the role of 
structural constraints (including world market dynamics and international financial institution policy 
conditionalities), but pointed out that this is only useful analytically ‘if structure is understood in terms of 
process, and as subject to change, including political change, rather than as static and immutable’ (1999: 1262). 
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upgrading is offered by Kaplinsky and Morris (2001). They identify four types of upgrading: 
1) improving the production process within a firm or through linkages between firms; 2) 
improving the product within or between firms, such as through product quality, design or 
marketing; 3) ‘changing functional positions’ through the  adjustment ‘of activities 
undertaken within a particular link, or moving to activities taking place in other links’; and, 
4) moving away from one chain to a completely new one (Kaplinsky and Morris 2001: 76; 
see also, Gereffi et al. 2001: 5). Kaplinsky and Morris go on to detail a set of analytical tools 
on how upgrading (or downgrading) can be researched from an explicitly functional 
perspective (e.g. how to decide whether or not a link has upgraded) and an implicitly 
strategic perspective (e.g. those policy mechanisms that can be employed in a developing 
country/firm ‘link’ to facilitate upgrading). Most of this chain research is based on the 
assumption that ‘development’ in the global South ‘requires linking up with the most 
significant lead firms in the industry’ (Gereffi 2001b: 1622; see also, Kaplinsky and Morris 
2001: 15). 
 
Much chain research on upgrading tends to prescribe a set of technical policies for firms and 
governments in the (mainly) developing world in their interactions with commodity chains 
and ‘lead firms’. As per my definition of chain governance (above), a lead firm can, in part, 
be characterised by its creation and enforcement of rules and conditions of chain 
participation. In other words, upgrading can function as a relation of power. Ponte and 
Gibbon usefully connect this aspect of chain governance to ‘upgrading’: 
‘Marginalization/exclusion and upgrading/participation are the axes along which 
(re)distributional processes take place’ (2005: 3). Of course, distributional struggles also take 
place within firms (e.g. between employers and employees33) and horizontally across nodes 
(e.g. competition between functionally-equivalent firms or between states as locations of 
production, see below) as well as vertically between nodes. Nonetheless, Ponte and Gibbon’s 
formulation forces a conceptualisation of upgrading/downgrading as a political process. As 
pointed out by Gellert (2003: 55), upgrading within or across nodes in a commodity chain ‘is 
a socio-political process rather than a purely geographical one’ that is based on distributional 
                                                            
33 For example, while upgrading may improve a particular firm’s profitability and may also enhance government 
revenue generation, it does not necessarily ‘upgrade’ workers through, for example, raising wages because these 
are normally determined by the wider labour markets of a country (Wood 2001: 44) and the country’s relative 
positioning in the international division of labour. 
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struggles over the capture of value (see also, Palpacuer 2008: 407).34 In short, the role of 
politics has been largely unexplored in chain research on ‘upgrading’, especially in relation to 
raw material production where access to natural resources very often involves contestation as 
well as collaboration in relations between firms, between states and firms, and within ‘host’ 
societies (Levy 2008; see also the edited collection by Sikor and Lund 2009). Similarly, and 
as discussed just above, local institutional context has often been ignored in chain research on 
upgrading,35 but this ignores evidence that shows how firms and governments combine to 
create competitive advantage (Porter 1990) and use institutional comparative advantages that 
are specific to different countries (Hall and Soskice 2009[2001]). Moreover, the threat of 
downgrading is often used by firms (and their ‘home’ states) to extract gains or reduce costs 
(see below). Finally, mainstream chain analysts of upgrading fetishise so-called ‘value added’ 
for local and foreign firms, but never ask the question – who benefits? Chapter 6 does not 
fully answer this question, but it does show how Seychelles government policies attempted to 
integrate with the commodity chain (sometimes successfully, sometimes not), identifies the 
conjunctural role of a small local elite (connecting back to social embeddedness), and extends 
the ‘scale’ of the concern with upgrading away from the level of the firm to examine 
employment and government revenue generation.  
 
 
1.1.3 Lacunae 
 
Despite various attempts to make commodity studies more ‘comprehensive’ in its ability to 
capture analytically the complex reality and diversity of commodity chains, several lacunae 
remain. Three gaps in particular are important to framing an analysis of the EU-centred 
commodity chain in canned tuna. These are the environmental conditions of production; the 
historical formation of chains; and unequal political power in terms of state-to-state and 
multinational firm-to-state relations. 
 
a) Environmental conditions of production 
                                                            
34 Of course, given relative shifts in economic power in the uneven world-system, just because a location of 
production industrialises it does not mean that it significantly ‘upgrades’, instead it may simply be producing 
standardised, low-profit commodities (e.g. Arrighi et al.’s (2003) critical extension of Vernon’s (1966, 1979) 
product life cycle; also Arrighi 1990). 
35 Notable exceptions are Bair and Gereffi 2003; Selywn 2008. 
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The focus of this thesis is on the relatively simple, single-stage36 manufacture (fish canning) 
of a primary commodity based on an extractive industry (industrial tuna fisheries). As such, it 
combines elements of the insights from both the ‘US’ and ‘European’ GCC research agendas 
sketched above, with the former focussed more on manufacturing and the latter on 
agriculture. However, the extractive sector has largely been ignored by GCC research. 
Notable exceptions are Gellert (2003) who uses the GCC framework and Bridge (2008) who 
uses GPN.37 Given that most chain studies are of a particular commodity, it is perhaps 
surprising that very few take seriously the particular characteristics of the commodity in 
question and the implications of these for chain activities and governance. For example, the 
particular characteristics of any natural resource are constituted through 
biological/geophysical specificities in concert with the social priorities of any mode of 
production and commodity sector (e.g. Gellert 2003; Bridge 2008). Similarly, extractive 
industries ‘face some clear limitations to spatial flexibility’, even if that resource moves, as 
fish do, it does so within its biologically specific geographical range (e.g. depth and 
temperature ranges).  This, in turn, ‘exerts a powerful influence on the location of 
competition in the production network, the form that competition takes and on relations of 
dependency between holders and seekers of resources’ (Bridge 2008: 401, 412; Ciccantell 
and Smith 2009: 362).  Environmental conditions of production are addressed in the thesis in 
a dual sense, both as natural constraints of tuna biology and population movements and the 
institutional conditions of resource access. I bridge these two ‘environmental conditions’ 
through Chapters 2 and 4 (see below). 
  
The thesis also draws on Jason Moore’s notion of the ‘commodity frontier’. This is framed 
explicitly as different to more commonly deployed notions such as a ‘resource’ frontier. A 
commodity frontier is a historically-defined term that is specific to capitalism. It is not based 
on the simple plunder of resources, but the production of commodities for exchange (Moore 
2010a: 35, 54; Marx 1976). Through this prism, capitalism is an ecological regime that 
reproduces itself through new commodity frontiers rather than simply ‘impacting’ on 
resources, which firms adopt to through new forms of organisation and techniques of 
production. This process is ‘fundamentally globalizing’ (Moore 2010b: 191) because of the 
‘dialectic between the ever-mounting material-throughput demands of an ever-growing mass 
                                                            
36 In some cases this has been split into two stages: labour-intensive butchering of tuna (or ‘loining’) in 
relatively low-cost locations of production, and capital-intensive canning in relatively high cost ones using 
imported frozen loins (see Chapter 3). 
37 See also Smith and Mahutga 2009; Ciccantell and Smith 2009; Knutsen 2000. 
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of capital and the ever-mounting biophysical degradation that ensues through the endless 
accumulation of this capital’ (Moore 2010a: 38). In other words, once ‘labouring bodies, 
mineral resources and ecosystems in any single region’ (Moore 2010b: 189) were exhausted 
to the extent that they became less profitable, new, more profitable frontiers were sought 
through a ‘commodity-widening strategy’ (Moore 2010b: 219). When profitable extraction 
begins to decline this extensive development is often also followed by intensive development 
(see also, Fine 1994), or a ‘commodity-deepening’ strategy based on socio-technological 
innovation. As we shall see in Chapter 2, Moore’s approach is a useful prism with which to 
view industrial tuna fisheries. 
 
 
b) Historical formation of chains 
Tracing the search for and appropriation of new commodity frontiers requires a historical 
approach. Jennifer Bair criticises ‘chain’ analysts for moving ‘research on commodity chains 
away from the type of long-range historical and holistic analysis characteristic of the world-
systems school’ (2005: 10). While it is unclear why ‘long-range’ holistic and historical study 
of commodities must necessarily be associated with world-systems theory,38 most chain 
research lacks sensitivity to historical contextualisation and path-dependency. In their critique 
of the GCC framework, Henderson et al. point out that 
much of the work from within the GCC tradition has been concerned with 
currently existing chains. Hardly any of it seeks to re-construct the history of the 
nature and implications of the chains. This is an important omission because the 
social relations embodied in chains at one point in time impose a path-
dependency and constrain the future trajectories of chain development (2002: 
441).  
However, economic geographers adopting the GPN approach very rarely took this call 
seriously and contrary to these criticisms, the original formulation of GCC analysis called 
explicitly for longitudinal study in order to assess change in the organisation and governance 
of chains (Gereffi et al. 1994: 10; see also, Gereffi 1994: 104). Gereffi (2001a: 30) also 
makes clear that chain governance must be understood in historical perspective, because ‘in 
any particular time period or within a given industry, new governance structures co-exist and 
                                                            
38 See, especially, Mintz (1986) on sugar and, also, the collections on coffee and on bananas edited by Clarence-
Smith and Topik (2003) and Striffler and Moberg (2003) respectively 
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interact with earlier forms of governance’. In other words, ‘lead’ firms change over time and 
their modes of control may overlap. A similar point was also made by Wilkinson in a generic 
analysis of the ‘fish’ GCC: 
in the case of long-established food chains, such as fish, where multiple actors 
both public and private have cumulatively defined and redefined policies and 
strategies, clear patterns of governance are less easy to establish than in the 
ideal-typical case of the fresh fruit and vegetables sector (2006: 139). 
While Wilkinson’s actual analysis does little to illuminate this claim in relation to the so-
called ‘fish’ chain,39 his point is an important one. As we shall see in Chapters 2 and 3 on the 
EU-centred commodity chain, market power has been dispersed among different actors at 
different times, and firms collaborate and compete within and across ‘nodes’ in distinct 
moments and places, using different strategies depending upon chain-specific and world-
market dynamics. It has only been possible to identify this complexity and change through a 
historical analysis of the formation and development of the EU-centred commodity chain in 
canned tuna and, in Chapter 6, of Seychelles interactions with and upgrading in this chain. 
This complexity may also contribute to explaining the difficulties in identifying distinct 
‘lead’ firms in the case of this chain. 
 
 
c) Unequal political power: state-to-state and multinational firm-to-state  
Due in part to the peculiarities of the global commodity chain in tuna, the role of interstate 
relations is of particular significance to this industry, especially in terms of resource access 
and trade rules. In reference to US trade preferences made available to Colombian cut-flower 
exporters, Patel-Campillo (2010) argues that GCC analysis should incorporate the geo-
political dimensions of regulatory mechanisms. While chain analysis has been very effective 
in illuminating uneven economic power between firms in the global ‘North’ and producers in 
the ‘South’, and, separately, in demonstrating the importance of the international trade regime 
in shaping commodity chains (including the rise and impacts of neoliberalism), it has been 
silent on the role of unequal political power between states in negotiating conditions of 
                                                            
39 This is because, as with agricultural products, ‘fish’ contains a very wide range of distinct ‘chains’ shaped by 
multiple processes and dynamics, from different environmental conditions of production and techniques of 
extraction to different markets and cultures of consumption.  
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commodity production and exchange.40 For example, Gibbon and Ponte (2005: Ch. 2) 
provide an exceptionally insightful overview of the relationship between commodity chains 
starting in Africa and changes in the international trade regime (see also Gibbon 2002; Ponte 
2002a, 2002b), but they do not however, examine or explain how this regime was negotiated 
and in the context of what relations of power. One of the reasons for the state being excluded 
from most GCC analyses (except for trade regulation) is that research tends to look at the 
end-product rather than raw material production and the state often plays a more direct role in 
the latter (Gellert 2003: 59). Similarly, through its multifaceted conception of a network, the 
GPN approach downplays hierarchy, but in extractive industries the state structures 
relationships and there is a ‘persistency of core-periphery structures’ (Bridge 2008: 413-14).  
 
The business strategies of lead firms are highly contingent. This necessitates the avoidance of 
an excessively functionalist conception of, for example, ‘North-South’ relations, and 
recognition of politics as making a difference. As noted by Niels Fold and Bill Pritchard in 
their introduction to Cross-continental Food Chains, commodity chains ‘are not an inevitable 
market outcome but are politically constructed economic and social formations’ (2005b: 20). 
This thesis examines how unequal inter-state power affects policy formulation and its 
enforcement (regulation). It does so through the examples of the resource access strategies of 
the EU tuna fleet which are negotiated with developing coastal states by the European 
Commission (Chapters 4 and 6) and EU-ACP negotiations around trade policy (Chapter 5). 
 
Similarly, perhaps because most chain analyses do not engage in historical accounts of chain 
formation, they also fail to capture how conditions of production are negotiated (and 
renegotiated) by multinational firms with ‘host’ states. Stephen Hymer’s insights are again 
worth noting here. In the context of the uneven world system, governments in the global 
South (especially in smaller countries such as Seychelles) are in a far weaker position to 
negotiate gains with multinational firms. For example, developing country governments are 
more likely to encounter transfer pricing than more powerful states because of the relative 
room for manoeuvre of multinational firms and the far more limited threat of government 
sanctions (Hymer 1975: 54; Hymer 1970: 447; Pitelis 2002: 18). Hymer argued that ‘a 
regime of multinational corporations would offer underdeveloped countries neither national 
independence nor equality’ (1975: 55). Similarly, in other literature on international business, 
                                                            
40 For Hymer: ‘In the last analysis, markets come out of the barrel of a gun, and to establish  an integrated world 
economy on capitalist lines requires the international mobilisation of political power’ (1972: 92). 
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Peoples and Sugden (2000) and Ietto-Gillies (2005, 2007) argue that multinational firms are 
in a strong negotiating position relative to less mobile labour and territorially fixed nation-
states, and this allows them to engage in tactics of ‘divide and rule’ to extract additional gains 
or avoid new costs such as taxation and regulation. As we shall see with the case of 
Seychelles interactions with the EU tuna fleet and with Heinz investment in tuna processing 
in Chapter 6, such strategies were used to significant effect in negotiations with the 
Seychelles state. 
 
 
1.2 Overview of the Case 
 
1.2.1  Why canned tuna? 
 
Even from the self-consciously ‘grand theoretical’ perspective of world-systems theory, 
generalisations drawn from even a comparative set of GCC studies cannot be applied to 
capitalism as a whole (Korzeniewicz and Martin 1994: 70). So why bother undertaking yet 
another empirical case study of a commodity chain? The following offers eight sets of 
explanation for the selection of the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna chain as an 
object of study.   
 
First, methodologically, canned fish is a relatively ‘short’ chain with only a few stages (or 
‘nodes’): fishing, raw material transhipment (in some cases), single- or two-stage 
manufacturing,41 and distribution and retail. This makes the global commodity chain in 
canned tuna a manageable case study for a ‘full’ GCC analysis – from raw material 
production to supermarket retail.  
 
Second, as we have seen, raw material production and its environmental conditions have 
received only minor empirical attention in commodity studies and, more specifically, marine 
capture fisheries have been excluded almost entirely. As pointed out by Campling et al. 
(2012) this lacuna is not is unique to the narrow field of commodity studies.  The prevailing 
treatment of fisheries in the social sciences as a whole is biologically and economically 
reductionist. Even within disciplines such as sociology and anthropology, researchers have 
                                                            
41 Tuna is either butchered (loined) and canned in a single factory, or loins are processed in relatively low-wage 
site of production and exported for insertion in capital-intensive canneries in relatively high-wage locations. 
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often relied on rational choice theory or models which ‘depict the individual producer as an 
autonomous isolate engaged in the technical act of catching fish’ (Pálsson 1991: 21). 
Fisheries have consequently been regarded as a ‘taxonomic misfit’ (Pálsson 1991: 21) or 
‘special case’ (Jentoft 2007: 426), with fisheries literature remaining self-referential, 
pigeonholed, and marginal to social science. It is worth quoting Eric Meuriot at length on 
these issues: 
A review of the evolution of the fishing sector must go beyond the mere analysis 
of technical and market forecast or of bio-economic model results. It requires a 
study of the relationships between the different economic agents and institutions 
involved in the fishing sector, of their organization and methods of intervention, 
of their projects and strategies. It requires also an analysis of the impact that the 
economic system and political doctrines may have on the fishing sector. This 
involves a multidisciplinary research effort. (1986: 309) 
Almost thirty years later, Meuriot’s call has remained largely unheeded, even though over 
three-fourths of the world’s fisheries now are at or beyond full exploitation, that fish is one of 
the most important sources of animal protein and essential nutrients in the developing world, 
and around 120 million people are ‘directly dependent on commercial capture fisheries for 
their livelihoods as fulltime or part time workers, including employment in the post-harvest 
sector’ (World Bank 2010, 4; FAO 2010). Conventional social science work on fisheries all 
too often avoids, if not out-rightly obscures, how capitalist relations of production (in their 
diverse and varying forms) interact with and shape the environmental and social conditions of 
fisheries systems. Notable exceptions include Mansfield (2004a; 2004b), Clausen and Clark 
(2005), Skladany et al. (2005) on how ecological change in fisheries systems is a 
consequence of capitalism. But, extending Jason Moore’s insights (2010a; 2010b) to 
commodity chain analysis, there is room for assessing whether the nature-society relations 
that drive ecological change, degradation or conservation are constitutive of capitalism in 
fisheries production-consumption systems. 
 
Third, because of its durability canned fish is extensively traded internationally and is 
important to export-orientated development in the ‘global South’ (Ponte et al. 2007; Bene et 
al. 2010; Campling and Havice 2007; Campling 2008a). In the 2000s, fish exports from 
developing countries generate a higher export value than coffee, bananas, cocoa, tea, sugar 
and tobacco combined (FAO 2010). Canned fish production was a capitalist enterprise from 
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its outset and was immediately geared to international trade. For example, canned sardines 
were exported from France to supply miners in the mid-nineteenth century gold-rushes in 
California and Australia, and canned salmon was supplied from Canada to feed the growing 
working class in Britain (Dias and Guillotreau 2005: 65-6; Muszynski 1996: 13). The dual 
demands of commodity production drove the development of the canned fish industry – with 
factory owners seeking the realisation of profit through production for exchange and a 
growing proletariat seeking a durable source of protein as means of subsistence. This core 
dynamic remains in the global commodity chain in canned tuna over 150 years later. 
 
Fourth, the international trade in tuna is the second most valuable of all seafood products 
after prawns/shrimp. As the US Secretary of the Interior stated in 1947: ‘“Tuna is a magic 
word in any community or country which looks to the sea for food and profits”’ (cited by 
Felando 1987: 96). In 1985 the global canned tuna import market alone was worth US$ 419.8 
million, and by 2004 it had become a multi-billion dollar market, valued at US$3,170.3 
million (Globefish 2006: 64-6). The focus of this thesis is solely on the commodity 
production of canned tuna, excluding all other uses of this fish. Figure 1.1 compares total 
global catch data for the main canning-grade tuna species – skipjack, yellowfin, albacore and 
bigeye – with the global volume of canned tuna production. However, only around 40 percent 
of the butchered fish is actually used in the can so the actual volume of tuna raw material 
required for canned tuna production is considerably higher than the volume used in the 
finished product.42 The trend is clear: these species are caught primarily to supply raw 
material to canned tuna production. The global capture of these species of tuna increased 
from 370,000 tonnes in 1950 to a peak of 4.31 million tonnes in 2005.43 This rapid increase 
was facilitated by the industrialisation of tuna fishing in the 1950s and 1960s – the ‘blue 
revolution’.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
42 To account for this a basic conversion coefficient is used to estimate the actual volumes of tuna required to 
produce a given weight of finished canned product. This coefficient is problematic because of its fixed 
assumptions on drain weights (i.e. volume of packing media used, such as brine or vegetable oil) and the size 
and relative weight of cans (i.e. larger cans use less steel relative to tuna, and vice versa). 
43 Production is also geared to use values other than canned tuna, these include long-line caught sashimi grade 
yellowfin and bigeye, and pole-and-line caught skipjack for katsuobushi. 
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Figure 1.1: Global tuna catch and production of canned tuna, 1950-2007 
 
Notes: Capture production includes all gear types. It only includes declared catch of the three main canning-
grade species – albacore, skipjack and yellowfin tuna – and of bigeye, which is included in the series because 
they are caught as ‘bycatch’ in purse seine sets, especially on fish aggregating devices (FADs) which attract 
juvenile bigeye. However, the majority of bigeye catch is not utilised in canned production and may also be 
recorded as skipjack or yellowfin in catch statistics. Catch volume of bigeye is considerably smaller than the 
other three species, thus their inclusion does not overinflate the time series too severely. The series on canned 
production excludes both tuna loins (as an intermediate good this would constitute double counting) and bonito 
and all fish of the genus euthynnus except for skipjack (as they are rarely used for canning for principal 
markets). The estimated volume of fish used in global canned tuna production is based on an FAO conversion 
coefficient of 1.92 (Oceanic Développement et al. 2005: 311). 
Source: FAO Fish Stat+ (accessed 2 November 2009) 
 
 
Fifth, the canned tuna industry is highly politicised. The geography of canned tuna 
production is shaped to a large extent by the import regimes of the two main principal 
markets – the European Union and the United States. The survival of canned tuna processing 
in the EU, particularly Spain, raises interesting questions about the role of tariff and other 
forms of state protection in the contemporary international division of labour.  
 
Sixth, industrial tuna fisheries are highly capitalised. As a result they are characterised by 
complex relations of resource access between boat-owning firms from the global North and 
resource ‘owning’ states in the global South. This raises several issues, including on the 
relationship between the environmental and institutional conditions of production, and the 
role of states in the global South in mediating access to the resource. 
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Seventh, linked to the last three points, export-orientated canned tuna production is an 
actually-existing case of industrial ‘upgrading’ in the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group 
of States (ACP). It is one of the very few (if not the only) success stories of industrial 
upgrading within the ‘developmental’ framework of the ACP-EU Lomé Conventions 
(Davenport et al.: 1995). Despite important questions regarding propriety and local economic 
benefits, canned tuna is in stark contrast to the vast majority of EU-centred primary 
commodity production in the ACP countries where manufacturing – so-called ‘value added’ – 
is normally undertaken externally (e.g. tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, sugar, etc).44 Combined 
with the EU market being the main source of the growth in the global commodity chain from 
the 1980s onwards, this is why the thesis focuses on the EU-centred chain in canned tuna. 
Seychelles was selected as a country case study of ACP upgrading because its waters are rich 
in tuna, it became one of the largest locations of canning-grade tuna transhipment in the 
1980s, and was host to the second largest canned tuna factory in the world by the late 1990s. 
This successful upgrading was in spite of Seychelles suffering from geographical isolation 
and high cost structures common to most small island developing states (Campling 2006; 
Campling and Rosalie 2006). Having lived and worked there for three years before starting 
the PhD, it also meant that I had contextual knowledge and improved access to key players.  
 
Finally, tuna is an interesting analytical case in and of itself because it naturally migrates 
across the jurisdiction of multiple states and also inhabits the high seas where no single state 
has sovereignty. In other words, it is a transboundary resource and, as with the issue of 
resource access, this requires consideration of (unequal) inter-state relations in tuna 
management. This is important because there is excess fishing capacity in the global tuna 
fleet (Reid et al. 2005; Bayliff and Majkowski 2007)45 and by the 1990s there were no new 
commodity frontiers for canning-grade tuna fisheries. In short, there are too many boats 
chasing too few fish. As a result of this and insufficient regulation of tuna fisheries, by the 
2000s, ‘[w]ith the exception of skipjack in some oceans, almost all of the principal market 
species of tunas are either fully exploited or overexploited’ (Joseph et al. 2009: 155).  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
44 For a succinct recent overview of this long-term trend, see Green 2004. 
45 Similar findings were apparent for the global longline fleet (Miyake 2005b). 
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1.2.2  Research questions 
 
This thesis interrogates the core tenets of GCC analysis in relation to the commodity chain 
connecting tuna fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean, processing in Seychelles and other 
ACP states, and retail in the EU. We have identified five concepts in GCC analysis (input-
output structure, territoriality, chain governance, institutional contexts and upgrading) and 
three lacunae (the environmental conditions of production, historical formation of chains, and 
unequal political power among states and firms). To examine these, the thesis asks eight sets 
of research questions:46 
1. Given that the chain is based directly on an extractive industry, what are the 
environmental conditions of production? How do these affect business strategies? 
2. What is the input-output structure of the canned tuna commodity chain (i.e. what are 
the functions or activities necessary to canned tuna production)?  
3. Who owns or controls these activities? What is the spatial dispersal or concentration 
of production? Is there a tendency to concentration in ownership? If so (or if not), 
what factors help to explain this process? In sum, what is the role of ‘territoriality’ in 
the commodity chain?  
4. How does a historical approach to GCC analysis (i.e. chain formation) contribute to 
an understanding of contemporary dynamics, processes and relationships? 
5. Which firms, if any, ‘drive’ the canned tuna commodity chain? If there are ‘lead 
firms’ in this commodity chain, what mechanisms produce and reproduce their 
relative control over chain ‘governance’? If lead firms play a role in governing the 
commodity chain, to what extent do the ways in which these firms are themselves 
governed influence the whole chain? 
6. How have the regulatory mechanisms of international trade and resource access and 
management shaped (and in turn been shaped by) the commodity chain?  
7. Have interactions with the fishing and processing nodes of the chain resulted in 
‘upgrading’ in Seychelles? Has territorial and social ‘embeddedness’ configured 
interactions and relationships between firms and Seychelles in the commodity chain? 
                                                            
46 Aside from the political economy ‘commodity studies’ literature detailed above, these questions drew 
inspiration in their formulation from Bernstein’s four ‘classic questions of political economy’ (Bernstein 2007: 
1-2: Bernstein 2010a: 22-24). 
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8. What is the role, if any, of unequal political power in mediating dynamics among 
states and firms in the commodity chain? 
Each of these questions is addressed in various sections of the thesis. To order the empirical 
investigation the thesis is divided into three parts. Each corresponds to a selected concept 
from the prior discussion of GCC analysis. The first part looks at chain activities and 
governance, the second at regulatory mechanisms, and the third at upgrading.47 In other 
words, Part I traces the ‘economic’ aspects of the chain (firm activities and business 
strategies) while Part II focuses on ‘the political’ (chain regulation and associated 
government policies). Part III brings the political and the economic together through the case 
of upgrading in Seychelles. In this way I use the GCC approach as an investigative tool and 
method of presentation. Each chapter looks at an aspect of the chain from the vantage point 
of a different actor(s) and are tied together in the introductory and concluding sections of 
chapters and in the concluding chapter of the thesis as a whole. Figure 1.2 sketches a generic 
commodity chain in canned tuna so as to  help the reader better situate the various ‘nodes’ 
and regulatory mechanisms discussed in the following more detailed structure of the thesis.  
 
 
 
                                                            
47 In addition to Gereffi (1994, 1995) and others, this draws some inspiration from Bair (2006) who uses three 
similar dimensions to set-up a comparative research framework of the clothing and textile ‘chains’: ‘production 
model’, ‘institutional context’ and ‘development outcomes’. 
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Figure 1.2: Stylised schematic of commodity chain in canned tuna and selected regulatory mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Production and flows regulated by trading arrangements and public/private standards 
Raw material production regulated by Law of the 
Sea, RFMOs and various national authorities 
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1.2.3  Structure of the thesis 
 
Part I: Chain activities and governance 
Chapters 2 and 3 present the results of detailed empirical investigation into the input-output 
structure and territoriality of the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna. We tie this 
together in Chapter 3 in a discussion of lead firms and chain governance. In this sense then, 
Part I engages with the ‘economic’ dynamics of the chain.  Chapter 2 starts with analysis of 
the biological and population dynamics of tuna and their implications for raw material 
production. It then moves to a periodisation of the development of the fishing node of the 
global commodity chain from the 1860s to the early 1980s and shows how the search for new 
commodity frontiers is a key feature of this history. This is followed by a more focussed 
discussion of the business strategies of the French and Spanish tuna fishing fleet in the 
Western Indian Ocean (where Seychelles is located) between the 1980s and 2000s. It shows 
how these strategies are conditioned by environmental conditions of production and how, in 
turn, the intensification of industrial extraction threatens the profitable maintenance of those 
conditions. Finally, we offer an account of differential levels of corporate concentration and 
industrial organisation in the European distant water tuna purse seine fleet (EU DWF) in the 
late 2000s. This sets-up important connections between the fishing fleet and canned tuna 
processors, especially around raw material supply. It also shows how analysis of firms helps 
to illuminate fisheries production dynamics as opposed to standard accounts of fisheries 
based on vessel flag. 
 
Chapter 3 turns to the manufacturing of canned tuna and its distribution and retail. The 
emphasis here is exclusively on the EU-centred commodity chain. After offering a typology 
of tuna processing firms and a description of different EU markets for canned tuna, it situates 
the EU-centred chain in the international division of labour in the 1990s and 2000s. This 
discussion shows how the dispersion of export-orientated canned tuna production has 
benefitted buyers. The next section focuses on questions of concentration, business strategy 
and competition among the main firms engaged in the EU-centred commodity chain. It 
illuminates this in more detail through a case study of the historical emergence and industrial 
organisation of Heinz European Seafood/ MW Brands (the firm that owns the cannery in 
Seychelles), and its main competitor on the UK market Princes/ Mitsubishi. The penultimate 
section turns to retail in the six principal EU markets for canned tuna. It shows how 
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supermarket concentration affects the canned tuna chain, but not in identical ways as there 
are important differences between the six markets. Part I concludes by bringing together these 
various nodes of the EU-centred commodity chain to discuss conditions of competition and 
chain governance. 
 
 
Part II: Regulatory mechanisms 
Chapters 4 and 5 address two sets of regulatory mechanisms, the ‘political’ institutional 
dynamics of the chain. Chapter 4 engages with resource regulation through the international 
Law of the Sea and regional fisheries management organisations. Together these constitute 
the institutional conditions of production of tuna raw material: resource access and 
environmental regulation. We then move to consider the various government supports to the 
EU DWF under the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, including resource access arrangements. 
Chapter 5 engages with trade regulation, especially the EU ‘tuna trade regime’, which 
includes tariffs, tariff preferences and rules of origin for the ACP.48 This is situated in the 
wider context of the World Trade Organisation, which demanded broad reform of non-
reciprocal ACP–EU preferential trade relations as well as specific rulings on the tuna trade 
regime. As we shall see, the EU tuna trade regime shaped the geography of production of 
canned tuna and is a major competitive advantage for certain states in the ACP. 
 
 
Part III: Upgrading 
Seychelles interactions with the commodity chain in canned tuna offer a fruitful case in the 
study of upgrading because the very small size of the ‘national’ economy (with a population 
of just over 80,000 people) reduces complexity and enhances the possibility of better 
isolating the contributions of these interactions to national ‘development’. Chapter 6 
explicitly address questions of upgrading and strategic policy making by the Seychelles 
government. The thesis is not concerned with what policy measures might improve the 
                                                            
48 Public standards such as EU sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures and private ones such as eco-labelling and 
the ethical requirements of UK supermarkets are excluded from the thesis due to the confine of space. For 
detailed accounts of their role in the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna, see Campling et al. (2007), 
Campling and Doherty (2007) and Doherty and Campling (2007). 
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Seychelles relative position in the commodity chain,49 but instead with the actual government 
policies (and their politics) deployed to ‘upgrade’ domestic interactions with the chain 
(successfully or otherwise). In doing so, Part III brings the ‘economic’ and the ‘political’ 
back together in an assessment of upgrading in Seychelles and the complex set of 
relationships that this entails. It does not investigate upgrading as a technical issue but instead 
as a political one that is shaped by the unequal power relations between the Seychelles and 
the EU and fishing and processing firms. It shows how the Seychelles government’s objective 
of upgrading and maintaining its developmental effects were used by powerful players to 
extract additional gains. Following Bair and Gereffi (2003), the thesis takes a historical 
approach to ‘actually-existing’ upgrading in Seychelles’ interactions with the EU-centred 
commodity chain and its consequences for development. This chapter is, in turn, situated in 
an understanding of chain activities and chain governance by lead firms (Chapters 2 and 3) 
and of the wider regulatory mechanisms that allow (and limit) Seychelles upgrading in the 
chain (Chapters 4 and 5). 
 
The thesis also contains several appendices. Far more material was collected and analysed 
than can be presented in a thesis. Given that the political economy of the tuna industry is not 
well studied, appendices establish points not published elsewhere and their function is to 
supplement evidence presented in the main body of the thesis. Where appendices are used, 
they are briefly explained in each chapter, outlining what they cover and the bases that they 
provide for what is covered in the chapter.  
 
 
1.3 Research Design 
 
1.3.1  ‘Objects’ of analysis 
 
The research design for the thesis was premised on the objective of looking at interactions 
from the vantage point of different ‘actors’ engaged directly in the commodity chain at 
different scales and with differential resources of power and control. The primary ‘objects’ of 
analysis are the vertical interactions among the EU DWF, canned tuna processing firms 
                                                            
49 Work on this issue was undertaken in a confidential study commissioned by the government of the Seychelles 
in 2008/9 to identify ways for the government and locally-owned firms to enhance net benefits from interactions 
with different segments of the tuna industry (Campling et al. 2009). 
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investing in Seychelles (primarily Heinz), EU supermarkets, the Seychelles state (conceived 
of as different government departments, parastatals and the political elite), ‘local’ or domestic 
firms in the Seychelles, and the relevant institutions of the European Union (those dealing 
with external trade and fisheries). Secondary objects of analysis are the horizontal 
interactions of these primary actors, especially: competition and collaboration within the EU 
DWF, competition among EU-centred branded canned tuna firms, competition among EU 
supermarkets, and competition and cooperation between locations of canned tuna production, 
including Seychelles and other states in the Western Indian Ocean region.  
 
In terms of the context of these actors’ interactions, the thesis situates the EU-centred 
commodity chain in several ‘moments’ in and changing dynamics of the global political 
economy, including the ‘Third Worldism’ of the 1970s, various aspects of oceanic 
governance (especially the Law of the Sea and regional institutions of tuna fisheries 
‘management’), and the institutionalisation of the World Trade Organisation. In terms of the 
effects of these interactions the principal object of analysis is the ‘economy’ of the 
Seychelles, broadly defined to incorporate government revenue (including the leveraging of 
loans), direct and indirect employment, and domestic firms. 
 
From the above it is clear that the research design is focussed on a set of relationships among 
states and firms, set in the context of a number of relevant defining ‘moments’ in the wider 
global political economy. The main ‘actor’ missing from this design is labour (e.g. crew on 
fishing boats and workers in processing facilities). This is regrettable for theoretical and 
political reasons, but the ambitious nature of the project demanded some limitations and 
labour was selected because, based on preliminary research (including living in the 
Seychelles for three years), capital-labour relations were not perceived as central to dynamics 
of change in the industry.  
 
Finally, it is important to note a major change from the initial research design. The original 
empirical emphasis of the research was a comparative analysis of two major canning-grade 
tuna fisheries (the Western Indian and the Western and Central Pacific oceans) and upgrading 
in two locations of canned tuna production, Fiji and Seychelles, which are both small island 
developing states with one major tuna factory, part of the ACP group, and (initially) focussed 
on the EU market. This was intended to develop two contributions to the commodity studies 
literature. First, GCC research very rarely offers comparative analysis of two chains in a 
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single industry (the major exception is Gibbon and Ponte 2005) and I had intended to assess 
similarities and differences between them in terms of the conditions, relations and effects of 
the activities of these two factories. Second, the cases provide an example of how countries 
can both upgrade and downgrade in their interactions with commodity chains, with Fiji 
switching from being a full tuna cannery to a specialised loining plant as a result of 
competitive dynamics in the UK market (see Section 3.5.3). This comparative analysis was 
dropped because I was able to gather considerably more original material on the wider 
dimensions of the commodity chain than initially planned for and the industry is far more 
complex and dynamic than expected. So rather than primarily being a study of the 
developmental effects of the EU-centred industry, the emphasis of the thesis has been 
reversed to become primarily a study of the EU-centred industry and its dynamics of change 
over time (Parts I and II) with a single country case study of the conditions, relations and 
effects of upgrading (Part III). 
 
 
1.3.2  A note on interviewing and interview data 
 
This thesis draws on transcripts of semi-structured interviews with 512 people in 19 countries 
over six years (November 2005 to September 2010). The vast majority of interviewees had a 
direct relationship with the global commodity chain in canned tuna, and were selected for this 
reason. They were mainly either representatives of different firms in various nodes of the 
global commodity chain or officials involved in regulation at the national, regional or 
international scales. Several key informants were consulted on multiple occasions. 
Interviewees were selected using a number of techniques: knowledge of players in Seychelles 
was developed over a period of three years living and working there, including several pilot 
interviews in 2003 and 2004; key players in the global tuna industry were identified through 
extensive research of historical and contemporary industry and grey literature, including lists 
of participants at industry conferences; and the snowballing technique was used at the end of 
each interview to generate additional possible informants. Interviewees in the Pacific islands 
were selected as part of the original research design (above), but given several similarities 
between African and Pacific island states this interview data proved supplementary to the 
Seychelles case study, and it also provided detailed insights into the global dimensions of the 
industry.  
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 Access to interviewees was often expedited by undertaking parallel consultancy projects, 
several of which are referenced in the bibliography. The most important of these was a major 
study for the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency during the principal fieldwork period 
2005-6 (Campling et al. 2007), and in 2006 the Seychelles Fishing Authority provided office 
space and helped to arrange appointments. A full list of interviewees is detailed in Appendix 
1A. Unless otherwise stated, they were formal semi-structured interviews normally lasting for 
between one and one-and-a-half hours. Specific interview sheets were developed for each 
category of interviewee (e.g. representatives of fishing, processing and retail firms, and 
government officials in fisheries and trade agencies). The formulation of questions mirrored 
the analytical concerns of the GCC approach outlined above (e.g. mapping the input-out 
structure, identifying points of chain governance, conditions and effects of upgrading, etc.), 
followed best practice in their wording (e.g. non-leading, single questions in non-technical 
language, Bryman 2004), and included several identical questions for comparative purposes 
and triangulation across transcripts. I initially digitally recorded interviews but found that 
some people refused this or asked for the recorder to be turned off to say more interesting 
things or often looked at it uneasily. I quickly switched to hand-written notes only. I saw this 
as a trade-off between quality of form (detailed transcripts) and quality of content 
(controversial information flowed more freely). Interviews were supplemented by several 
other means where I was able to gather information (such as specialist conferences and trade 
negotiations), which are also listed in Appendix 1A. 
 
Because of the relatively small size of the industry and the very small size of several of the 
countries where interviews took place, the identity of interviewees has been protected 
through full anonymisation. The following table details the categorisation and coding used 
for interview data. The specification of the type of interviewee is followed by a unique 
number (e.g. EUInd#3). Many interviews were held with two or more people at the same 
time. Where this is the case each individual is referenced with a unique number but the entire 
group is referenced as a source (e.g. EUInd#4–#6). This is done for group interviews because 
individuals almost always were in agreement (at least in front of me), often fed into each 
other’s statements, and I was often unable to specify in my interview notes which of the 
different people were speaking. Where multiple separate interviewees confirmed a point, this 
is also indicated through a range (e.g. EUInd#4–#6; #14; USInd#12). I have triangulated 
interview data in this way wherever possible. 
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Table 1.1: Categorisation and coding of interviewees50 
Key Notes 
ANZ Australia and New Zealand government officials are collapsed into ANZ to increase anonymity and 
also because differences between the two governments are of limited relevance to the final thesis. 
AGvt China, South Korea and Taiwan government officials are collapsed into ‘East Asia’ to increase 
anonymity. Japan officials have their own category. 
AInd Industry representatives from China, South Korea, Taiwan and one each from Malaysia, Maldives 
and Sri Lanka are collapsed into ‘Asia industry representative’ to increase anonymity. Japan and 
Thailand industry have their own categories. 
Int International agency (i.e. non-fisheries agencies such as ACP Secretariat, Indian Ocean Commission, 
World  Bank, Asian Development Bank, Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat, non-fisheries staff at the 
FAO) 
IntFS International fisheries specialist (includes officials at FAO, regional fisheries management 
organisations (RFMOs), Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), consultants) 
NGO NGO (environmental NGOs, trade union, advocacy organisations) 
PICInd Pacific Island country (PIC) industry representatives have been subsumed under generic 'PIC' to 
protect anonymity. These are usually locally-based foreign-owned firms. 
PICGvt Subsumes officials from the following six countries because the specificity of each is not of 
relevance to the thesis: Fiji, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga. 
xGvt x government official (i.e. EUGvt, JGvt, SGvt, USGvt, where J = Japan and S = Seychelles) 
xInd x industry representative (i.e. EUInd, JInd, TInd, USInd, where T = Thailand.) 
xVS x 'Vessel services' (i.e. provision of stevedores, fish testing, net and vessel maintenance/repairs, 
distant water fleet local agent). Interviewees were solely from Seychelles (SVS) and the Pacific 
island countries (PICVS). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
50 By category, the 512 interviewees were: 21 ANZ government officials; 12 ‘Asia’ industry representatives; 4 
East Asia government officials; 16 EU government officials; 63 EU industry representatives; 23 representatives 
of international agencies; 41 international fisheries specialists; 25 Japan government officials; 34 Japan industry 
representatives; 13 NGO representatives; 47 PIC industry representatives; 7 Pacific Island country (PIC) vessel 
services representatives; 46 Seychelles government officials; 9 Seychelles industry representatives; 16 
Seychelles vessel services representatives; 9 Thailand industry representatives; 12 US government officials; 22 
US industry representatives; 94 PIC government officials (Fiji 14; Niue 11; PNG 25; Samoa 23; Solomon 
Islands 4; Tonga 17). 
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PART I 
FIRM ACTIVITIES AND CHAIN GOVERNANCE 
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Chapter Two 
 
Raw Material Production: Industrial Tuna Fisheries with a 
focus on the Western Indian Ocean Purse Seine Fishery, 
1950s-2000s 
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
Despite Meuriot’s (1986) call for research on fisheries to incorporate the interests of 
and relationships between economic agents and institutions, and to set these in the 
context of wider political-economic systems, the vast majority of research on the 
business of fishing continues to rely on abstract economic theorising and narrow 
institutionalist accounts. By investigating the fishing node of the EU-centred 
commodity chain in canned tuna this chapter adopts a multidisciplinary approach in 
order to draw out connections and interactions between tuna ecology and the 
industrial organization and business strategies of the fishing industry. In short, this 
chapter focuses on the ‘economic’ dimensions of the fishing node of the commodity 
chain, while relevant regulatory frameworks (‘the political’) and their interactions 
with raw material production are addressed in Chapters 4 and 5. It is argued here that 
the political economy and ecology of the fishing node of the EU-centred commodity 
chain in canned tuna can only be understood through examining a complex set of 
dimensions in their combination.  
 
To do this the chapter proceeds in five sections. The first presents the biological 
particularities of tuna and the implications of this for its exploitation as raw material. 
Section 2.3 presents a periodisation of ‘territoriality’ and organisational and 
technological change in the fishing node of the global commodity chain between the 
1860s and 1980. While the focus is on French and Spanish canning-grade tuna 
fisheries, the account also takes in fleets from the United States and East Asia because 
of their significance in influencing the European industry in various ways. The main 
theme of this section is the expansion in geographical extent and industrial intensity of 
tuna fisheries through the ‘blue revolution’. Section 2.4 continues this periodisation 
into the 1980s and 1990s but does so with an exclusive focus on the French and 
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Spanish distant water tuna fleet (EU DWF). This first examines the EU DWF’s 
expansion into a new commodity frontier in the Western Indian Ocean. It then moves 
to identify and analyse the differential business strategies of this fleet in this region in 
terms of: maximising ‘fishing days’ and the associated strategic significance of 
Seychelles as a base port (an analysis that is continued from the perspective of 
Seychelles in Chapter 6); expanding vessel capacity; and expanding fishing effort. 
Section 2.5 moves away from an analysis based on vessel flag (e.g. ‘French’ or 
‘Spanish’ boats) and investigates industrial organisation and relative levels of 
concentration and control of the EU DWF by firm. This is done in order to identify 
lead firms and relations of chain governance at this node. The approach also seeks to 
overcome the ‘vertical bias’ of GCC analysis by drawing out the similarities and 
differences, and moments of competition and collaboration between firms involved in 
the same node of the chain. This chapter provides the terrain for analysis of chain 
governance in Chapter 3, where the activities of and vertical and horizontal 
relationships among the other main sets of firms in the chain are analysed – branded 
canned tuna firms and supermarkets. This chapter concludes with a summary of the 
main findings. 
 
In general this thesis refers to the EU (European Union) rather than specifying the 
European Community (which is the legally correct name for the EU in international 
treaties prior to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty) or the European Commission (i.e. the EU’s 
central institutions). When these institutions are of particular significance they are 
named individually. It also refers to the EU15 (EU membership prior to accession of 
10 countries in 2004) which remain the most import markets for canned tuna and, on 
occasion, to the EEC (European Economic Community) where historical specificity is 
of importance. 
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2.2 Biology of commercial tuna species and implications for human 
exploitation 
 
Differentiation between tuna species in terms of their biological and food commodity 
characteristics is central to an understanding of dynamics in the canned tuna chain. 
Tuna biology and its implication for human exploitation provide essential background 
to investigating business strategies and government regulation in industrial tuna 
fisheries, as well as overarching questions around resource sustainability. In other 
words, and as noted in Chapter 1, the analytical ‘starting point’ of the thesis is to seek 
‘to understand the particular characteristics of the commodity in question’, and how it 
is used at particular times, ‘because they establish the social, ecological, and 
geopolitical parameters’ of chain activities and their governance (Gellert 2003: 60).   
 
Despite their dispersal across all oceans and a diverse range of ecosystems, all tunas 
and tuna-like species (e.g. billfish such as swordfish) have a number of unique 
physiological and biological characteristics compared to most other marine fishes. 
The focus here is on the two main species used for canning for the EU market – 
skipjack and yellowfin.1 Four core characteristics are of central importance both to 
these species in their evolutionary strategy and to human strategies for exploitation.2 
 
First, tuna are top predators in the oceans that migrate across very large areas of 
covering millions of square miles. Historically, this placed a structural limit on human 
exploitation of the species. Prior to the gradual industrialisation of fishing gear 
(steam-, then, diesel-powered vessels) and the invention of on-vessel refrigeration, 
tuna fishing was limited to coastal areas. This pre-industrial limitation meant that tuna 
fisheries were generally more sustainable as fishers were not able to ‘follow the fish’. 
The wide geographical flow of tuna species led to their categorisation as a ‘highly 
migratory species’ in international law in 1982: ‘stocks or stocks of associated species 
occurring both within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and 
adjacent to the zone’ (UNCLOS 1982, Part V, Art. 63, see also Art. 64). As tuna 
                                                            
1 A third species, albacore, is of huge importance to the US market for canned tuna. Combined with the 
fact that albacore is generally caught using longline gear rather than purse seiners in different oceanic 
sub-regions to skipjack and yellowfin (and outside of the Seychelles EEZ), it is beyond the scope of 
this thesis. 
2 The following draws on FAO 2001: sections 1.4 and 1.5 
66
transcend a range of international legal boundaries the biomass cannot be unilaterally 
controlled by a single state in the modern international system of (legally) equal 
states. The gradual human enclosures of the oceans after World War II – culminating 
in the creation of 200 mile exclusive economic zones (EEZs) in 1982 – only served to 
complicate the range of social relations interacting around the extraction and 
governance of tuna fisheries (for detail see Chapter 4). Therefore, while there is some 
empirical truth in the category of ‘highly migratory’, it is more of a politico-legal 
distinction rather than a biological one because of the definitional centrality of the 
territorial boundary of EEZs.  
 
Second, tuna are characterised by a strong schooling behaviour and repetitive patterns 
of migration. With the industrialisation of fishing methods, the concentration of tuna 
in relatively narrow and predictable migratory flows across the global oceans have 
enabled the intensification of human targeting because of the relative ease of locating 
and catching the fish. The ever-deepening technological sophistication of fishing 
methods combined with growing knowledge of tuna biology through fisheries science 
has made tuna more vulnerable to exploitation (Majkowski 1998: 437). Since the 
1950s, levels of extraction have increased concurrently with the capital intensity and 
technological sophistication of the fishing methods used. Tuna fishing methods went 
through revolutionary technological change in the late 1950s with the emergence of 
long-range industrial purse seine vessels (see below). 
 
Third, tuna body shapes and physiological adaptations to their habitats are highly 
streamlined. This allows them to sustain high-speed swimming and efficient 
thermoregulation (FAO 2001). Thermoregulation is a countercurrent heat exchange 
system which permits quick movement between surface (warmer) and deeper (colder) 
waters within and, for the larger species of tuna, below the epipelagic zone, which 
reaches to 200m from the surface. Different species of tuna thermoregulate to varying 
degrees (see Appendix 2A), with implications for ‘catchability’. As the fishing 
techniques used to target tuna usually utilise surface gear types, extraction is limited 
to when tuna are feeding in upper levels of the epipelagic zone. The exception is 
longline gear which targets larger tuna species which – because of their insulating 
layer of fat (e.g. bigeye) – are able to survive at deeper levels in the ocean (Joseph 
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2004: 5). It is also their fat (toro) that makes larger, deeper swimming species the 
favoured flesh for Japanese sashimi (raw fish) consumption.3 
 
Finally, many tuna species have a large spawning potential and very rapid growth in 
their juvenile phase, both of which enable potentially high levels of reproduction of 
the biomass, subject, primarily, to the extent and intensity of human extraction as well 
as the wider human relationship to global environmental change, such as the 
acidification of the oceans. Rapidity of growth to spawning age is a centrally 
important difference between species of tuna (Table 2.1). Differential ages of sexual 
maturity and spawning duration make species biomass more or less vulnerable to 
unsustainable extraction. Depending upon the species targeted this imposes a relative 
limitation on the absolute extent and intensity of levels of fishing effort. For example, 
bigeye tuna reach maturity at 3.5 years and their spawning duration is only 3 months, 
whereas skipjack reach spawning age on an all-year basis at 1.5 years. Its rapid 
generation of biomass has made skipjack tuna an ideal species for long-term, mass 
commodity production (albeit within limits). Along similar lines, a slow growing, 
long living species such as bigeye is far less resilient to exploitation than skipjack and 
yellowfin (IOTC 2002: 62; Hampton and Williams 2003: 35). 
 
The species addressed here are considered by the FAO as ‘principal market’ tuna 
species ‘because of their global economic importance and the international trade in 
them for canning and sashimi’ (Serdy 2004: 235).4 The focus of this thesis is 
primarily on the two canning-grade principal market tuna species (skipjack and 
yellowfin) whose populations are globally dispersed along tropical latitudes, including 
in the Western Indian Ocean. As this chapter and Chapter 3 will make clear, sub-
regional fisheries are intimately connected to each other in terms of the dynamics of 
the world market for canned tuna and the business strategies of fishing fleets and 
processing firms.  
                                                            
3 Sashimi grade commodity chains are highly distinct segment compared to canning-grade chains in 
terms of techniques of production, trading patterns and cultures of consumption; albeit with important 
biological and economic interactions, such as the catch of bigeye by both longline and purse seine gear 
(although for the latter it is an incidental catch of juveniles). Due to the confine of space, the tuna 
sashimi chain is not addressed in this thesis. For overviews, see Bergin and Howard 1995; Bestor 2004; 
Campling et al. 2007: 242-261; Campling and Havice 2010c; Longo and Clark 2012; Williams 1992. 
4 Appendix 2A provides more detail on the different characteristics of the world’s principal market tuna 
species used for canning. 
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 2.3 Territoriality and technological change in canning-grade tuna fisheries, 
1860s-1980 
 
Until the 1950s, the spatial extent and extractive intensity of tuna fishing were 
constrained by the limits of fishing technology, boat size and on-board freezing 
capacity. The extent and intensity of fishing form central elements in the shifting 
‘territoriality’ of the commodity chain in canned tuna: i.e. the ‘spatial dispersion or 
concentration of production’ (Gereffi 1994: 97). This section explores these elements 
through the historical emergence and development of the French and Spanish 
canning-grade tuna fleets, which is set against the earlier development of the US and 
Japanese fleets.5 The periodisation is based upon a combination of innovation in 
fishing organisation and technology and shifts in locations of tuna fishing activities. It 
begins in the late 1860s with the first use of tuna as raw material for fish canning in 
France and ends in 1980 before the emergence of the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) as 
the most recent ‘commodity frontier’ in the territorial expansion of the EU tuna fleet.  
 
 
2.3.1  The emergence of the canned tuna industry in Europe, 1860s-1930s 
 
The extent and intensity of tuna fishing expanded significantly in the 1950s and by the 
mid-1980s had industrialised across the global oceans (Hamilton et al. 2011; Miyake 
et al. 2004; Miyake et al. 2010; this is illustrated in Appendix 2A). This development 
can be traced to the demand for tuna raw material by fish canning industries in France 
from the late 1860s and in the United States from the early 1900s, initially as a 
substitute for sardines and other fish (Miyake et al. 2004: 2; Miyake 2005a: 31; Mata 
2009: footnote 16; A. Odin (1894) as cited by Dias and Guillotreau 2005: 72; Le Roy 
2008: 130). The demands of commodity production drove the development of the 
canned fish industry from its outset – with factory owners seeking the realisation of 
profit through production for exchange and a growing proletariat seeking a durable 
source of protein as means of subsistence.6 
                                                            
5 See Appendix 2B for a comparative analysis of purse seine fleet cost structure by flag. 
6 Appendix 3A offers an overview of the historical development and modern process of canned tuna 
production. 
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 Substitutability between species was an important business strategy in the early period 
of the fish canning industry. For example, in the early twentieth-century the industry 
in Portugal shifted raw material processing between sardines, mackerel and tuna; as 
these three species were all part of the same food chain in the Mediterranean Sea, 
fishing operations had to take advantage of which of the three was relatively abundant 
(Mata 2009: 53, 50). The French fish canning industry had invested in Portugal during 
the ‘first sardine crisis 1880-1887’ (i.e. a shortage of the fish off the French coast). 
This and, especially, the ‘second sardine crisis 1902-1911’ spurred raw material 
substitution towards the canning of albacore tuna in France and continued investment 
in canned sardine production in Portugal (Dias and Guillotreau 2005: 68-9, 72). By 
the early-1910s a more specialised French tuna canning industry was being supplied 
by a French fleet of between 700-1,000 sailing boats targeting albacore off the 
Atlantic coast, mainly in the Bay of Biscay (InfFS#40; Fonteneau 2004: 1). The 
spread of production to additional locations – the expansion of the commodity frontier 
southwards down the European Atlantic coast – was a necessary response to 
ecological limits and the growing demands of canned tuna consumption in France and 
elsewhere in Europe. This expansion signalled the beginning of a central dynamic of 
change in the territoriality of the global commodity chain in canned tuna. For 
example, the southward drive of the French tuna fleet was mirrored across the 
Atlantic: by 1930 an estimated four-fifths of tuna caught by US fleets was in the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific off the coasts of Mexico and Latin America (Bonnano and 
Constance 1996: 120). Similarly, as early as 1910 some Japanese tuna boats shifted 
their offshore activities in search of new, more productive fishing grounds, and by 
1922 part of its pole-and-line fleet was firmly established in Micronesia, which would 
become a Japanese mandate under the League of Nations in 1927 (Doulman 1987c: 
36). 
 
The Spanish fishing fleet experienced a boom period after the First World War and 
expanded into new commodity frontiers off the Canary Islands and Morocco, 
including fishing for tuna. But by the 1930s rising operating costs, falling prices, a 
lack of capital and, of course, the Spanish Civil War combined in a series of 
bankruptcies in the sector; a period ‘briefly summarised’ as one of ‘low returns and 
scant possibilities of capital accumulation’ (Cantorna et al. 2007: 364, and 362-3). 
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However, after the civil war the fascist state identified fisheries as a major source of 
(import-substituting) animal protein and provided low-cost, long-term credit facilities 
to develop the sector, although these did not bear fruit until after the Second World 
War. Similarly, the Great Depression and the Second World War contributed to the 
dramatic decline of the French sardine and tuna canning industry (Dias and 
Guillotreau 2005: 72-3). 
 
The first period in the development of the EU-centred commodity chain (1860s to 
1930s) was marred by the dual problem of distance and durability – the tension 
between the organic and the synthetic – typical of agricultural commodity production 
(Friedmann 1992; Freidberg 2004). Capital seeks to control organic processes so as to 
ensure the consistency of its accumulation and reproduction over time. This tension 
had been resolved in terms of the processing node of the chain as canning allows the 
fish to be stored for long periods of time before eventual sale and consumption (see 
Appendix 3A for a short history). However, the long distances involved in tuna 
migration flows and the organic spoilabilty of catch meant that it was yet to be 
resolved in the fishing node of the chain. As a result, European tuna fleets had to 
offload to canneries in the geographical locality of the resource (Mata 2009: 46-7) 
which limited the extent to which they could ‘follow the fish’. 
 
2.3.2 The blue revolution and canned tuna ‘national production 
systems’ in the 1950s 
 
The industrialisation of tuna fisheries after the Second World War – the ‘blue 
revolution’ – was a defining historical moment. The 1950s witnessed rapid 
development in industrial tuna fisheries, sparked by military technology developed 
during the War and closely supported by ‘home’ states and scientific establishments.7 
Led by US and Japanese fishing fleets of pole-and-line boats (below), global tuna 
production doubled between 1950 and 1960. Vessels fishing under the flags of these 
                                                            
7 In the US in 1948, for example, a leading fisheries scientist employed by the US government stated 
that tuna ‘“offer the greatest possibilities for the development of valuable commercial fisheries”’ and 
listed several sets of fisheries science research needed ‘“to assist in the development of profitable 
fisheries”’ (Felando 1987: 103-4 fn 1, see also p. 95-6). The relationship between fisheries science and 
capitalist fisheries is an important sub-text of this thesis (especially in Chapter 4), but one that the 
confine of space disallows full engagement with. 
71
two countries caught 72 percent of the recorded global catch of all principal market 
species of tuna in 1950, rising to 74 percent in 1960. In comparison, France and Spain 
combined only accounted for 8 percent of global catch in 1960 (see Table 2.1 below).  
 
Pole-and-line is a surface gear where the boat follows and attracts a school of tuna by 
distributing bait fish over the side (hence also referred to as ‘baitboat’ gear, see Figure 
2.1). Fishers then use a simple pole and line to catch the fish and pull it directly 
onboard where it is stored in refrigerated fish wells. This process makes it a highly 
selective gear type with limited levels of bycatch, and fish wells allow boats to stay at 
sea for longer periods thus expanding the spatial range of fishing potential. As it is a 
surface gear the primary tropical tuna species targeted is skipjack and, to a lesser 
extent, yellowfin and juvenile bigeye as they all swim in the upper water layer 
(Doulman 1987c: 38). It is also relatively labour-intensive requiring skilled fishers, 
typically with 12-18 crew (Findlay and Searle 1998: 98). This aspect directly 
contributed to pole-and-line gear being superseded by highly productive, capital-
intensive purse seine gear from the late 1950s onwards (see below).  
 
Pole-and-line tuna fishing using diesel-powered boats first emerged in southern 
California in 1903, where albacore was chanced upon as a substitute raw material for 
canning during a shortage of sardines (Rockland 1978: 5; Joseph 2000: 3). It was not 
until after World War Two that these boats were constructed using steel hulls rather 
than wood, allowing safer and longer distance fishing trips. Larger boats were also 
installed with mechanical refrigeration and freezing systems – overcoming the prior 
constraint of limited organic durability – but because the canneries did not have cold 
stores, fish had to be defrosted on the journey back to port for offloading (Gallick 
1984: 126-7, 117). As already noted, over time this Californian fishery expanded 
southwards to tropical climes to target skipjack and yellowfin to supplement local 
supply of albacore, but San Diego remained the home port of the US tuna fleet and, 
when most canners were based on the US mainland, the ‘west coast tuna price ... was 
the major determinant of world tuna prices’ (King 1986: 13).  
 
A new American pole-and-liner cost up to US$500,000 in the early 1950s and was 
estimated to be ‘the most expensive commercial fishing craft in the world’, indicating 
the growing capital intensity of tuna fisheries after World War Two. Despite this, the 
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US fleet was wholly owned by individual vessel captains (Gallick 1984: 7, 103, 107). 
In parallel, the Japanese government financed the mechanisation of its pole-and-line 
fleet – the first engine was installed in 1903, refrigeration equipment in 1907 and 
radio in 1918 (Fujinami 1987: 58). While the catch of Japan’s pole-and-liners was 
(and is) primarily for domestic processing and consumption in non-canned tuna 
products, especially katsuobushi (see Doulman 1987d: 147; Campling et al. 2007: 
261-64), Japan did export canning-grade frozen tuna to the US from the early 1950s 
onwards and canned tuna to Europe and the US by the 1960s (Gallick 1984: 115; 
Matsuda 1987: 81; Fujinami 1987: 58-9; Section 3.3.1).  This simultaneous American 
and Japanese-innovation in fishing technology from 1903 was not adopted by the 
French (Breton) and Spanish (Basque) fleets until 1951 (Lequesne 2004: 116; Findlay 
and Searle 1998). 
 
It was not until the 1950s that the French and Spanish tuna fleets and their respective 
canning industries were revived, but now based also on a new commodity frontier – 
tropical fishing grounds off the coasts of the French colonies of Senegal and (later) 
Côte d’Ivoire (EUInd#54; Le Roy 2008: 138). The home port for most of the French 
tuna fleet was Concarneau and the small town of Bermeo for the Spanish. As pointed 
out by one industry representative: ‘Basque fishers have been looking for new oceans 
for a long time!’ (EUInd#21). The domestic sub-national politics of these two fishing 
regions is of considerable importance. Both Brittany and the Basque Country are 
perceived as economically disadvantaged and politically-sensitive regions in national 
and European politics, including in fisheries (EUGvt#15; #51; #52; Findlay and 
Searle 1998: 103). This allows these commercial fishing interests to punch above their 
relative economic weight in relations with and representations by government.  
 
In 1953 French cannery owners funded exploratory fishing by Basque and Breton 
pole-and-liners in the Eastern Tropical Atlantic, and by 1957 around 90 boats were 
active in the area (IDDRA 2004: 6-7).  Given the colonial context and the lack of any 
international legal framework governing the extraction of fisheries resources beyond 
coastal waters, these two fleets were able to access the resource without the payment 
of ground rent (see Chapter 4). The fleet was accompanied by substantial French and 
Spanish investment in canning capacity in Dakar between 1955 and 1957, including 
by the firm Saupiquet, a major French branded-processor (see below and Chapter 3), 
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and a group of canning interests from the Basque Country (Le Roy n.d.: 5). 
Importantly, exports from Senegal entered the French market duty free. The French 
(and the US) canning sector had historically been protected from foreign competition 
by high tariffs, albeit with fluctuations in their level (Dias and Guillotreau 2005: 69-
70). Canneries in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire (see below) were locked into the France-
centred commodity chain through colonial (and post-colonial) tariff preferences for 
canned tuna and rules of origin limiting which boats could supply raw material (see 
Chapter 5). The geographical shift to colonial West Africa extended and consolidated 
the French national production system.  
 
‘National production system’ is used in this thesis as a proximate concept. Each of the 
early canned tuna industries – in France, Spain, Japan and the United States – was 
built around a national fishing fleet. These fleets generally trade the majority of their 
catch – but not all (see below) – with ‘national’ processors, which, because of 
regulatory mechanisms, include those based in colonial and post-colonial territories. 
Following the integrated analytical logic of the global commodity chain approach, 
these interlocking ‘national’ industries need to be assessed in their entirety, because 
despite the ‘spatial dispersion’ of their territoriality (e.g. to West Africa), they are 
connected by ‘national’ fishing-processing-market linkages and ‘locked-in’ by a range 
of regulatory conditions. For example, the general manager of Saupiquet in the early 
1990s considered the canneries in francophone West Africa to be fully integrated with 
the French production system (Antonietti 1993). 
 
The EU-centred commodity chain has been typified by a system of tariffs and related 
regulatory mechanisms from the outset; mechanisms that ‘lock-in’ processors based in 
colonial/post-colonial sites of production to source supply from European boats 
(Chapter 5). In Japan, a different set of formal and informal regulatory mechanisms 
mean that domestic canned tuna and katsuobushi processors rely extensively on tuna 
supplied by Japanese vessels (JInd#21–#28). Similarly, canneries in the US mainland 
and overseas territories (American Samoa and Puerto Rico) relied on the US fleet for 
the majority of tuna raw material needs, which is similarly ‘locked-in’ by a range of 
trade policies and legal measures (Campling and Havice 2007; Doulman 1987d: 150; 
Schug and Galea’i 1987: 191-2; Hudgins and Fernandez 1987: 289). These national 
production systems do, of course, interact directly and indirectly, were never a 
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completed project and, in some cases, were so eroded by foreign competition and 
cross-penetration of capital that it no longer useful to consider them ‘national’ even in 
the limited sense of the word used here (e.g. US processors in the 1980s onwards and 
the US fleet from the late 2000s) (Campling et al. 2007; Havice 2010).  
 
In sum, ‘national production system’ is a proximate conceptualisation of the 
inextricable linkages between industrial tuna fishing and ‘national’ canned tuna 
processing by European, Japanese and US interests; but of course, each ‘system’ also 
contained several commercial tensions and competitive contradictions. National 
production systems in canned tuna production were in existence from as early as the 
1880s in France, but they were cemented during the ‘blue revolution’ in the 1950s, 
with important implications both for why EU ‘tuna trade regime’ is structured as it is 
(Chapter 5) and for the imperative of ‘upgrading’ by preference receiving countries 
such as the Seychelles (Chapter 6).  
 
 
2.3.3 The rise of the global tuna purse seine fleet in the 1960s and 1970s 
 
The dual problem of distance and durability was partially resolved by US boat owners 
through the development of industrial tuna purse seine vessels combined with onboard 
freezer technology in the late 1950s.8 Given that tuna purse seining is a US 
innovation, we consider the basics of its development there and its up-take in East 
Asia before moving to the EU fleet. There has been very little written on the early 
historical development of the Spanish tropical tuna purse seine fleet, so this is partly 
supplemented here by literature on the French, US and East Asian (especially 
Japanese) equivalents. In addition, because Japan’s canned tuna production was the 
main supplier to import-dependent European markets until the mid-1980s and 
Taiwanese boats were the leading suppliers of fish to export-orientated canned tuna 
production in Thailand (see Chapter 3), the development of the East Asian purse seine 
fleet is important to a historical understanding of the competitive dynamics 
influencing the European-centred commodity chain. Before moving to this historical 
outline a short overview of purse seiner technology is necessary. 
                                                            
8 For a technical overview of tuna purse seine gear and associated labour processes, see SEAFDEC 
(2004). 
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 Purse seiners use an ‘active’ fishing gear where the net is towed around a school of 
tuna by a small boat or ‘skiff’ (Figure 2.1). The gear gets its name from the 
mechanism of the net which acts like a purse: when the net is closed and the fish are 
surrounded, a ‘purse’ wire at the bottom of the net runs through loops; when pulled, 
the entire net is contracted (see (a) in Figure 2.1). The catch is normally too heavy to 
haul directly aboard, so it is either scooped aboard using pan nets or pumped onto the 
vessel (Jennings et al. 2001: 94 and 103). This combination of processes has two 
negative effects on the quality of the fish. First, it leads to severe distress and/or death 
by suffocation for a large proportion of the fish (like sharks, tuna gill systems mean 
that they cannot breathe without swimming): the flesh of tuna killed slowly under 
stress undergoes chemical change – known as ‘burning’ – degrading the quality of the 
meat (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 11). Second, the fish are crushed against the side of the 
net or against each other, especially those in the lower levels of the net, which results 
in bruising of the flesh.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Illustrations of pole-and-liner and industrial purse seiner 
 
 
 
Source: FAO 
 
 
Modern purse seiners targeting tropical tuna are extremely large (see below) and are 
able to catch entire schools of skipjack or yellowfin, the target species for this gear. 
Larger boats are able to catch a higher proportion of mature yellowfin because this 
species swims at deeper levels.9 This is important to the economics of the commodity 
                                                            
9 For example, the estimated catch composition of the Japanese purse seiner fleet under 499GRT (gross 
registered tonnage) operating in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was roughly 70 percent 
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chain: larger tuna command a higher price because of improved labour productivity in 
processing, while smaller fish yield less edible meat and result in a lower yield of 
canned product per ton of fish (e.g. Rockland 1978: 6; King 1987b: 71). This simple 
commercial equation is of particular relevance to the US-centred commodity chain as 
skipjack and yellowfin are mixed as ‘lightmeat’ canned tuna. In the EU-centred 
commodity chain by contrast, canned yellowfin commands a higher price, especially 
on Italian and Spanish markets, and is thus routinely sorted from skipjack (USInd#3; 
#4; Chapter 3). Unlike pole-and-line, purse seines are an indiscriminate gear so 
incidental catch and bycatch are common occurrences (see below). Modern purse 
seiners are among the largest and most expensive fishing boats in the world. The cost 
of a 1,200 to 1,500GT (gross tonnage) purse seine vessel equipped with skiff and a 
helicopter was estimated at around US$20 million in the mid-1990s (Joseph 1996: 8). 
 
Once on deck the fish is transferred to freezers in the hull – by conveyor belts in 
modern vessels – and sorted by species and size along the way. The freezers use 
seawater mixed with a high concentration of salt (brine). This allows a temperature of 
around -18C without block freezing the brine as this would result in complications 
and delays in storing later catch and in off-loading (IntFS#37; #38; direct observation 
on EU purse seiner in Port Victoria, 2009; see also Goulding 2000; SEAFDEC 2004). 
Storage in brine for long periods of up to several months at sea results in salt seeping 
into the flesh of the tuna, degrading its quality and raising the salt content of the final 
canned meat. The damaging effects of capture and storage in brine on the quality of 
the meat mean that purse seine-caught tuna is only generally ‘suitable’ for human 
consumption as canned product.10 In other words, the design and technology of 
industrial purse seining means that it is structurally inserted into producing for the 
global commodity chain in canned tuna; its raw material production rarely contributes 
to other use values.11  
 
In the late 1950s the US fleet of pole-and-line boats was converted to house 
mechanised purse seine gear which served to significantly increase fishing 
                                                                                                                                                                          
skipjack and 30 percent yellowfin, while larger vessels averaged 60 percent skipjack and 40 percent 
yellowfin and other deep-sea pelagic species (Doulman 1987c: 39). 
10 Or similar ‘ambient’ or ‘shelf stable’ products that preserve the product in airtight containers, such as 
aluminium pouches, plastic pots, etc. 
11 There is a minor – but profitable – exception to this with -40º and -60ºC holds which allow less 
damaged tuna to be inserted into the ‘steak’ or katsuobishi chains. 
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productivity. Given this success, between 1961 and 1966 a single new purpose-built 
industrial purse seiner was rolled out each year. This subsequently grew 
exponentially: from 1967 to 1976 between 5 and 17 new vessels were constructed 
every year to a total of 105 new boats, trebling the catching capacity of the US tuna 
fleet and leading Edward Gallick to periodise this as the beginning of the ‘modern 
purse-seiner period’ (1984: 22-3, 128, 142; confirmed by JInd#7; #8; Felando 1987: 
99; Rockland 1978: 5). The average carrying capacity of the more advanced classes of 
this boat – 1,000 short tons – was five times larger than that of a pole-and-liner; for 
some purse seiners it was as high as 2,100 short tons (Gallick 1984: 22; Rockland 
1978: 5). Given the high labour productivity of purse seiners, it is no surprise that 
their rise was paralleled by an 80 percent decline in the US pole-and-line fleet 
between 1970 and 1985, and by 76 percent for the Japanese fleet between 1973 and 
1981 (Doulman 1987d: 154 fn 3). 
 
While pole-and-liner captains wholly owned their boats, because purse seiners were 
so expensive – around four to five times more than a pole-and-line boat12 – their 
purchase was normally part-financed or guaranteed by US canning firms in the 1960s 
and 1970s. US processors typically held at least a 20 percent share, and over 55 
percent for the larger vessels (Garrick 1984: 21, 25-6, 54-60, 76; Doulman 1987d: 
144). Consequently, in the 1970s US canning firms owned or controlled around 80 
percent of the US purse seine fleet; this integration gave these firms additional 
security of supply. Vertical integration was a similar path for part of the French and 
Spanish fleet of purse seiners (see below), but these fishing firms would also rely 
heavily on government subsidies for the purchase and modernisation of boats (see 
Section 4.3.1). The large volumes of deliveries in the ‘modern purse-seiner period’ 
meant that canneries had to install cold storage capacity in-plant (Garrick 1984: 85, 
111, 117). This innovation completed the cold chain for the direct offloading of fish 
and also gave processors greater bargaining power over boat owners as they were able 
to maintain inventories of raw material during shortages (see Chapter 6). Throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s the US purse seine fleet was the largest in the world of this gear 
type, it was active mainly in the Eastern Tropical Pacific and the US was the second 
largest tuna fishing nation in the world, after Japan (Table 2.1). 
                                                            
12 Average construction costs for a purse seiner were US$1.9 million in the early 1970s (Gallick 1984: 
74). 
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 Japan’s national production system for canned tuna was closely supported by the state 
and, until the mid-1950s, was geographically limited by the US occupying authority. 
World War Two had decimated Japan’s distant-water fishing fleets and a combination 
of post-war domestic food shortages and a government intent on export-orientated (re-
)industrialisation resulted in a range of measures to support tuna fleet development 
(Barclay and Koh 2008: 143-150; Bergin and Haward 1996; JInd#7; #8; #16–#18; 
#32; #33). Rising per capita incomes spurred domestic demand for tuna sashimi and 
katsuobushi, while US and Western European demand for canned tuna and the 
Japanese government’s policy of generating foreign exchange had sparked the 
development of a large export-orientated fishing and processing capacity by the 1960s 
(Fujinami 1987: 58-9, 69 fn 3; Doulman 1987d: 134; Haward and Bergin 2001: 91). 
After initial adaptation of US design and technology in a fleet of Japanese purse 
seiners in the 1960s, the Japanese government went on to support the further 
development of a tropical purse seine fleet in the mid-1970s (Doulman 1987d: 134; 
1987c: 37).13  
 
In the 1960s and early 1970s Japan was the primary exporter of canned tuna to 
import-dependent Western European markets such as the UK and Germany, although 
by the mid-1970s Taiwan had entered the highly price-sensitive German canned tuna 
market with product priced below the Japanese equivalent (Fisheries Development 
Ltd c.1975/6: 43; see Chapter 3). The large Japanese fleet was mainly owned by 
individuals or fishing cooperatives, with some small fleets of three or four boats 
owned by corporations specialised in seafood (Doulman 1987d: 144; JInd#7; #8; #10–
#14; #21–#26; NGO#10).14 In the 1970s Japanese trading firms provided financing to 
Korean and Taiwanese tuna fishing companies (which received substantial 
government support), which were locked in through fixed supply contracts and/or 
loans repaid in fish. This practice meant that trading firms were assured of regular 
supply for their Japanese clients (AInd#2; #3; #7–#9; JInd#4–#8; #21–#26; Comitini 
1987: 265; Haward and Bergin 2001: 96; Chang et al.  2010: 542; Li 2000). This 
                                                            
13 It had been spurred by the proven labour and fuel efficiency of the US purse seiner fleet compared to 
pole-and-line, the continued growth in demand for canned tuna in the US and Western Europe, and the 
problem of the availability of bait for pole-and-line fishing. 
14 For example, in the 2000s, Kaimaki (Japan Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing Association) had 23 
members which owned 35 vessels. 
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practice declined in significance with the boom in global purse seine capacity (and 
tuna supply) by the early 1980s onwards (see the following section). Nonetheless, 
Taiwan and South Korea had rapidly developed to become among the leading tuna 
producers in the world (Table 2.1; Chang et al. 2010; Haward and Bergin 2000; Hong 
et al. 2000; Hamilton et al. 2011; NGO#10).  In particular, the emergence of a large 
fleet of South Korean and Taiwanese purse seiners in the 1970s and 1980s 
respectively (Chou 2006; Lee 2006; Li 2000; Park 2004; Tsai 2002) became the main 
source of supply for export-orientated production in Thailand which, in turn, became 
a major player on both EU and US markets from the mid-1980s onwards (Chapter 3). 
 
The productivity of European fishing firms based in West Africa was rapidly 
enhanced with the introduction of purse seiners from 1964 onwards (Allen 2010: 18; 
Albacora 2010). The catch of the French and Spanish tuna fleets trebled between 1960 
and 1980 (see Table 2.1), perhaps aided by the departure of the Japanese DWF from 
West African waters which reduced competition in fishing grounds (JInd#7; #8). The 
1960s also saw the rolling out across the industrial Spanish fishing fleet of ‘on-board 
freezing and advanced systems for fish detection and navigating at sea’, including on 
purse-seiners (Cantorna et al. 2007: 367). The shift in fishing grounds from the Bay of 
Biscay to the Eastern Tropical Atlantic was also evident in the species composition of 
catch. Between 1950 and the mid-1960s French tuna catch was predominantly sub-
tropical albacore (67% albacore and 30% yellowfin in 1960), but by 1965 yellowfin 
had emerged as the largest share. A similar shift occurred in the composition of 
Spanish catch, but not until the mid-1970s because of the ongoing importance of the 
Atlantic albacore fishery. By 1980, the catch composition for France had shifted to 
59% yellowfin, 28% skipjack and only 5% albacore; and for Spain 38% yellowfin, 
26% skipjack and 24% albacore (FAO FIGIS, 22 November  2007).15 
 
 
                                                            
15 It was not until the mid-1990s that skipjack became the largest share of the catch composition of both 
fleets: 42% skipjack and 40% yellowfin for France in 1995; and 43% skipjack and 36% yellowfin for 
Spain, by this year albacore was only 7% of the total Spanish catch of tuna. 
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Table 2.1: World tuna catch by Top 12 vessel flags, includes all principal market species and all gear types, 1950-2000 (metric tonnes) 
Vessel Flag 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Japan 114,600 456,081 501,600 723,374 653,883 621,458 
Taiwan 5,000 8,700 96,053 112,903 277,803 435,946 
Indonesia 2,200 14,500 21,050 77,057 204,207 412,600 
Spain 32,871 37,920 47,410 106,363 259,652 289,454 
Philippines 0 0 52,000 77,505 180,807 206,398 
Korea, South 200 0 25,626 110,483 232,617 218,197 
Papua New Guinea 1,000 1,500 2,428 33,994 0- 68,817 
Ecuador 2,900 19,100 16,010 16,450 57,875 171,499 
France 17,056 29,450 48,055 92,795 155,440 151,951 
Mexico 0 3,900 10,400 34,380 125,728 120,422 
Maldives 9,500 10,000 30,849 27,836 66,858 91,866 
USA 177,410 135,252 214,000 225,735 232,581 152,361 
Top 12 total 362,737 716,403 1,065,481 1,638,875 2,447,451 2,940,969 
Top 12 fishing nations as % of World total 90% 90% 91% 89% 86% 80% 
USA as % of World total 44% 17% 18% 12% 8% 4% 
Japan as % World total 28% 57% 43% 39% 23% 17% 
France and Spain as % World total 12% 8% 8% 11% 15% 12% 
Taiwan as % World total 1% 1% 8% 6% 10% 12% 
World total 403,893 799,881 1,166,922 1,842,536 2,832,591 3,694,334 
Source: FAO FIGIS time-series query 22 August 2007 <http://www.fao.org/figis/> 
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The French branded- manufacturer Saupiquet took-over most of the tuna canneries in 
Senegal and between 1962 and 1966 it concentrated 70 percent of tuna catch landed at 
Dakar. The other main canneries in Dakar were operated by the branded-processors 
Pêcheurs de France and Pêche et Froid, established in 1966. All three firms were 
established in West Africa solely to export canned tuna to France (Section 3.3). From 
1966 fishing effort shifted south-east to the Gulf of Guinea and in 1970 landings in 
Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, were greater than those in Dakar. In 1971, Saupiquet opened 
an additional factory in Abidjan and by 1974 the French fleet had moved its base 
there; for a time, the Spanish remained predominantly in Dakar (Dias and Guillotreau 
2005: 73-4; NOAA 1981a, 1981b; Le Roy 2008: 131-2; IDDRA 2004: 5; Golub and 
Mbaye 2002: 13-14). The general shift to Côte d’Ivoire was sealed in 1978 when 
Pêche et Froid also set-up a cannery in Abidjan having established its own purse seine 
fleet in 1973 (Pêche et Froid 2010). In short, the ‘big three’ branded-processors of the 
time – Saupiquet, Pêche et Froid and Pêcheurs de France – functioned as an oligopoly 
in the France-centred commodity chain (Dias and Guillotreau 2005: 74; Antonietti 
1996: 89-90; AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 26). In addition, French and Spanish activity 
made the port of Abidjan ‘the most important transshipment center for tuna in Africa, 
and is among the most important in the world’ (NOAA 1981b: 24).  
 
In response to the enhanced market power of the vertically-integrated branded-
manufacturers, French boat owners collaborated in 1959 to form a collective trading 
entity called Sovetco.16 It grouped Concarneau-based boat owners in response to the 
earlier pooling of cannery owners in an industry association (Le Roy el al 2008: 4-5). 
By the 1990s, almost all French boat owners channelled all of their catch through 
Sovetco for sale to processors (see below). Similarly, when an important new French 
fishing firm called Cobrecaf was established in 1964 it combined from the outset tuna 
fishing and the transportation of frozen tuna on cargo reefers (Guillotreau and Le Roy 
2001: 3; Le Roy el al. 2008: 4).17 Where a boat owner was not tied-in to a processor 
through financial mechanisms of control or through supply contracts, the innovation 
of introducing reefers opened-up the possibility of transhipping catch to wherever the 
price was most advantageous. In other words, the use of reefer vessels to transport 
                                                            
16 Société de Vente de Thon Congelé (Sovetco). 
17 Compagnie Bretonne de Cargos Frigorifiques (Cobrecaf, Breton Company of Cargo Reefers). 
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fish – reportedly converting vessels previously used to transport fruit (SVS#15) – 
elongated the cold chain.  
 
The transhipment of tuna on reefers transformed the EU-centred commodity chain. It 
provided processors based in France and Spain with a regular source of supply 
without boats having to make expensive trips to port for direct offloading, and also 
laid the basis for the emergence of specialised tuna trading companies. Firms 
engaging in reefer transhipment use any combination of direct ownership of reefers, 
chartering/leasing, and/or purchasing space on them in the spot market (Aind#12; 
JInd#4–#6; EUInd#53; #55–#60; TInd#8). The introduction of reefers allowed the 
development of transhipment hubs in the locality of capture (in port or at-sea), rather 
than steaming long distances to offload directly to domestic processors (as in the 
Japanese model into the 2000s) or offloading to a cannery in the locality of capture 
(as, for example, with American Samoa, Ecuador and West Africa in the 1950s and 
1960s onwards). In short, reefer transhipment allowed industry to overcome all 
limitations on the location of production imposed by geographical distance and 
organic durability.18 This permitted or facilitated the bypassing (in some cases) of sets 
of regulatory mechanisms associated with ‘national production systems’, such as rules 
allowing only nationally-flagged vessels to offload domestically (in the US case) or 
an informal ‘understanding’ between government and fishing industry to offload catch 
domestically (as in the Japanese case) (JInd#21–#28; Campling and Havice 2007; 
Doulman 1987d: 147). As a result of this organisational and technological 
development and the vertical disintegration of tuna fishing and processing nodes in 
the US-centred commodity chain in the early 1980s (see below), by the 2000s tuna 
trading companies emerged as major players in their own right in the WCPO, with 
only three firms controlling the vast majority of the distribution of canning-grade tuna 
in the WCPO (AInd#1–#3; #9; EUInd#53; #57–#60; JInd#4–#8; PICInd#4; PICVS#1; 
USInd#1; #22; TInd#2–#8; for analysis, see Campling et al. 2007: 226-234; Campling 
and Havice 2010b). Only one of these firms, Tri Marine International, played a 
significant role outside of the Pacific and is also the only one of these three firms to 
                                                            
18 Although it does have implications for quality as the fish is transferred a minimum of three times 
rather than once directly from boat to cannery. Dehydration during cold storage and drip loss on 
thawing for transfer reduces eventual yield, and fish often freeze together or against the side of the hull 
leading to damage when released – normally with a crowbar! (Goulding 2000; SVS#15; EUInd#56). 
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play a direct role in the EU-centred commodity chain.19 (The trading node of the EU-
centred chain is discussed further below and in Chapter 3.) 
 
While French and Spanish firms dominated tuna fishing from the ports in Dakar and 
Abidjan, US interests were moving into Ghana. One of the largest US branded-
manufactures, Starkist, entered into an agreement with the newly independent 
government of Ghana in 1958/9 to develop a locally-based tuna fishing and 
processing industry (Iverson 1987b 20-1; IDDRA 2004: 10). Starkist was acquired by 
Heinz in 1963. It quickly became the most important foreign customer of the French 
fishing firm Cobrecaf and in 1978 Heinz bought a 36 percent share of Cobrecaf (Le 
Roy et al. 2008: 6). After the restructuring of the US canned tuna market in the early 
1980s (see below and Chapter 3), Heinz bifurcated its commercial presence in canned 
tuna to also include the EU-centred commodity chain (see Chapters 3 and 6). In 
addition, its eventual effective control of Cobrecaf between 1994 and 2006 would 
emerge as a key source of commercial tension in the EU DWF (see below). 
 
 
2.3.4  Summary discussion 
 
In summary, tuna fleet development proceeded in several stages, each of which 
progressively solved the dual problematic of distance and durability in the fishing 
node of the commodity chain. First, there was a shift from large fleets of wind-
powered boats to steam-powered fishing vessels in the mid-nineteenth century which 
reduced fishers’ dependence on the rhythms of the tides and the vagaries of wind, and 
speeded travelling times to and from fishing grounds.20 Diesel-powered pole-and-
liners in the early twentieth century were superseded in the ‘modern purse-seiner era’ 
from the mid-1960s. Finally, the emergence of an elongated supply chain through 
transhipment on reefers allowed processors to overcome geographical limits on their 
location of production and also transmitted crises of oversupply in one location to 
                                                            
19 Privately owned by four individuals (two Italian, two Taiwanese), Tri Marine used to be an Italian 
parastatal operating out of Singapore (EUInd#53).  
20 Cantorna et al. (2007: 359) provides a detailed history of the industrialisation of the Spanish fleet. 
See Smith (2000) for a general account of the ‘industrialisation of the world ocean’. 
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another (see below and Appendix 2C).21 The blue revolution dramatically increased 
productivity per fishing trip, albeit within ecological limits that became increasingly 
apparent in the late 2000s with the decline of CPUE in the WIO, despite on-going 
technological and organisational innovations (see below and Chapter 4).  
 
 
2.4 The French and Spanish purse seine fleet: From the Atlantic to the Indian 
Ocean in the 1980s and 1990s 
 
We now turn to focus on the EU DWF, its entry into the Western Indian Ocean 
(WIO), environmental conditions there and the fleets’ core business strategies. The 
first sub-section provides a historical overview of the move to this new commodity 
frontier, identifies the major firms involved (possible only for the French fleet), and 
highlights some key interactions with the global commodity chain (mainly the US-
centred industry). In so doing it continues the periodisation of the prior section. 
Section 2.4.2 examines the strategic importance of Port Victoria, Seychelles to the 
activities of the EU DWF in the WIO, emphasising again the centrality of 
environmental conditions of production and explaining the notion of ‘fishing days’. 
The third sub-section identifies productivity enhancing measures differentially 
employed by the EU DWF in the 1990s, especially vessel capacity and artificial fish 
aggregating devices (FADs).  
 
 
2.4.1 The Western Indian Ocean in the 1980s – A new commodity frontier 
 
From 1976 onwards coastal states declared exclusive economic zones (EEZs) which 
provided sovereignty over marine resources in waters up to 200 nautical miles from 
their coasts. This radically transformed distant water fishing operations as boat 
owners now had to negotiate terms of fisheries access with coastal state resource 
‘owners’ (see Chapter 4 on this regulatory mechanism and the EU response). Chapter 
                                                            
21 Previously, for example, boats selling to Portuguese tuna canneries in the first years of the twentieth 
century would leave late at night and return early the next morning to conserve the quality of the fish 
(Mata 2009: 47). Other forms of preservation such as salting, pickling and drying (all of which could 
be done at sea) were not suitable for raw material for canning. 
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6 details how interventions by the post-colonial Seychelles state after 1977 established 
the necessary conditions for domestic tuna-related development (‘upgrading’), 
including the construction of an industrial port, the creation of parastatals to provide 
services to fishing vessels, and the enactment of relevant laws and regulatory 
institutions. But, of course, Seychelles government policy did not determine the rise 
of tuna fisheries in the region.22 The driver for the industrialisation of tuna fisheries in 
the WIO was a result of two interconnected factors. The first was the combination of 
the ecological limits of and human impacts on tuna biomass in the Eastern Tropical 
Atlantic. Of central importance here was the decline in daily ‘catch per unit effort’ 
(CPUE) for high-value yellowfin tuna, which had fluctuated between 5-6mt in 1972-
1979 but dropped to an average of 3.3mt per day in 1983 and for skipjack was only 
2.8mt/day during 1980-83. In contrast, in 1984-5 the average catch per day in the 
WIO was 5.8mt per day for yellowfin and 5mt for skipjack (Marcille 1987: 45). 
Second, a global crisis of overcapacity of industrial purse seiners and the associated 
temporary oversupply of canning-grade tuna in the early to mid-1980s affected vessel 
profitability on a global scale (see below) because, in existing fisheries, more boats 
were chasing the same volume of tuna biomass (Joseph 2003; and Reid et al. 2003 on 
the WCPO).23 The downward trend in profitability was probably compounded for the 
French and Spanish vessels in the Eastern Atlantic because of the drop in catch of 
valuable yellowfin. 
 
In the early 1970s, a report by a French engineering-consultancy firm had stated that, 
given increasing world demand for tuna and that ‘“since 1969 there has been a 
stagnation in the catches [sic]”’ (presumably in reference to French tuna fishing in the 
Eastern Atlantic), it was ‘“of the highest interest to examine the situation in the Indian 
Ocean”’ (Societe Centrale Pour l’Equipement du Territoire (SCET) International as 
cited by Moal 1973: 40). Between 1977 and 1981 the Seychelles EEZ became the 
focus for several marine resource surveys by foreign research vessels. These included 
experimental fishing and stock estimates of the distribution and abundance of pelagic 
                                                            
22 Until the 1980s, the Indian Ocean as a whole accounted for less than eight percent of global tuna 
extraction, and this was mainly artisanal and small-scale fishers in, for example, Sri Lanka and the 
Maldives, and distant water longliners (Joseph 2000: 10). 
23 Two key indicators of the profit squeeze in the early 1980s were that the average US purse seiner 
was operating at a loss since 1979, which was probably also true for French and Spanish vessels; and, 
new vessels were no longer being built, ‘which is a sure indicator of poor profitabililty’ (Parker 1986: 
2-3). 
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species, including tuna (Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 177).24 These experimental fishing 
trips included unsuccessful trials with pole-and-liners by French and Spanish interests. 
The Western Indian Ocean purse seine fishery was pioneered in 1978 by Japan 
(Miyake et al. 2004: 39), followed in late 1979 by a Mauritian-flagged vessel owned 
by a Mitsubishi joint-venture cannery in Mauritius (Appendix 3D). There is very little 
information on these early experimental trips, but they ‘are believed to have extended 
as far east as Sumatra’ (Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 178; Lawson et al. 1986: 8).25 
 
In the context of the CPUE decline in the Eastern Atlantic, the squeeze on profitability 
because of this and the decline in profitability in the purse seine industry as a whole, 
and early indications that the WIO fishery included a high proportion of higher value 
yellowfin, French and Spanish purse seiner owners began to shift the concentration of 
their activities to the WIO from 1980 and 1983 respectively. Importantly, the 
composition of the French fleet had shifted to a larger class of boats between 1974 
and 1980 (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 91) – a period of constant renewal in vessel 
capacity throughout the global purse seine fleet. These larger boats were better able to 
steam the long distances required to follow the fish in the WIO compared to the 
Atlantic.   
 
Exploratory purse seine fishing in the Seychelles EEZ began in December 1980 with a 
single French vessel, which was ‘told it wouldn’t work’ (EUInd#4). The results of 
four months fishing showed that purse seining operations from Port Victoria were 
commercially feasible (FAO/AfBD 1983: 11; Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 178). This 
was followed in 1982 with a further pilot venture by another one or two French purse 
seiners that ‘conclusively demonstrated’ the viability of a tuna fishery from a base in 
Seychelles (Nageon de Lestang 1986: 7; 1988a: 178; Harris 1988: 195).26 As a 
consequence of these results and the continuation of poor catch rates in the Eastern 
Atlantic, four French purse seiners managed by the French Consortium for Fisheries 
Development (‘Cofrepeche’) arrived in the Seychelles in late 1982. Cofrepeche was 
                                                            
24 Payne and Savini (1978: 3-4) list several additional resource surveys undertaken between 1968 and 
1977 by Japanese, Australian, Soviet and FAO vessels, as well as a tuna-specific survey in 1972. 
25 An influential tuna fisheries scientist provides the start date of the fishery as 1980, which is 
supported by IOTC data on purse seine catch (Marsac 1988: 14; see also FAO/AfDB 1983: 11). 
26 The number of vessels varies between the two authors, with Nageon de Lestang detailing the 
specifics of one vessel (e.g. vessel name, length, etc) and the Harris simply noting that two boats were 
active. 
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established in 1980 by a partnership of ‘professionals of the fisheries sector’ and the 
public research institute ‘Ifremer’ (the French Research Institute for the Exploitation 
of the Sea) to carry out scientific and economic assessments of fisheries potential.27 In 
other words, the French fishing industry was directly supported by its home state in 
the development of the WIO fishery – another indication of the dynamics of a 
‘national production system’. Cofrepeche vessels accessed the EEZ under a special 
six-month arrangement with the Seychelles government to immediate commercial 
success (FAO/AfDB 1983: 6; EIU 1983: 35; Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 178). 
 
Canning firms quickly followed this successful fishery. In the late 1980s, two of the 
‘big three’ French branded-processors consolidated their oligopolistic position 
through joint ventures in 1987 in Seychelles (by Pêcheurs de France) and in 1989-
1991 in Madagascar (by Pêche et Froid). The latter cost ECU 14.5 million to build 
and was funded by the European Investment Bank and Caisse Centrale de Cooperaton 
Economique (AfDB/INFOSIH 19991: 129); again indicating the centrality of the 
French state to the ‘national’ production system in Africa. As Catarchi (2004: 9) put 
it: ‘The EU and ACP developed an integrated industry for tropical tuna’. A cannery 
had already been established in Mauritius in the early 1970s by Mitsubishi, but it was 
focused on the UK-centred commodity chain, eventually through the Princes brand 
(see Chapter 3). As in West Africa, the EU DWF and the canneries based in the WIO 
were propped-up by the EU trade regime for tuna (see Chapter 5).  
 
Catch by the French purse seine fleet doubled over the nine year period 1980-1988. 
Of the 31 French boats operating in 1988, 21 were based in the WIO (all but one of 
which were boats between 750 and 1,250GRT) and only ten were in the Eastern 
Tropical Atlantic (five of which were under 750GRT in size). This distribution of 
vessel capacity indicates that the WIO was the more profitable fishery. Throughout 
the 1980s most of the French catch was traded internationally – supplying canneries in 
West Africa, Italy, the Indian Ocean, Thailand and the United States – and by the late 
1980s only five percent was transhipped to canneries based in France 
                                                            
27 Information on IFREMER (Institut français de recherche pour l'exploitation de la mer) is available 
here: http://www.ifremer.fr/ and on COFREPECHE (Consortium Français pour le Développement des 
Pêches) here: http://www.cofrepeche.fr  
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(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 28, 85, 95: Josupeit 1993: 19-20).28 Ownership or control of 
80 percent of French boats in the late 1980s was concentrated in only four firms:  
 Cobrecaf had ten large purse seiners all of which were operating in the WIO. 
At this time Cobrecaf was part controlled by the branded-processor Pêche et 
Froid as well as Heinz; 
 CMB (Chevannes-Merceron-Ballery) operated eight medium sized boats in 
both oceans; 
 Saupiquet had four boats which continued to supply its processing facilities in 
West Africa; and, 
 France Thon GIE – a new joint-venture between Concarneau-based ship-
owners Mr Kuhn-Ballery and Mr Le Garrec – owned three boats that were 
operated by CMB. 
Two other players controlled the remaining five boats, one of them, the Dutch firm 
Jackzon Group (see below), had complex financial and operational connections with 
Cobrecaf, the dominant player in the French DWF by a large margin 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 92-3). In 1991 Cobrecaf controlled 46.8 percent of frozen 
tuna production by the French fleet, Saupiquet 20.8 percent, and CMB 19.7 percent 
(Le Roy et al.  2008: 7). By the early 1990s Cobrecaf was operating solely in the WIO 
and only Saupiquet kept its entire fleet in the Atlantic so as to supply its canneries in 
West Africa (Josupeit 1993: 18). These three firms continued to be the main players in 
the French fleet in the WIO in the late 2000s (see Section 2.5). 
 
Catch by the Spanish fleet doubled in only seven years, from 1980 to 1986, and unlike 
the French fleet the majority flowed to Europe – mainly Italy, Spain (40 percent in 
1991) and, to a lesser extent, France – but some also went to canneries in West Africa, 
the WIO and the US (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 29, 85, 95; Josupeit 1993: 47). 75 
percent of the Spanish catch in 1980 was in the Eastern Tropical Atlantic (the 
remainder was in the Bay of Biscay); by 1988 this was only 52 percent, with 32 
percent caught in the WIO and the remaining 16 percent in the Bay of Biscay 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 106; see also, Josupeit 1993: 46). So while the Spanish fleet 
                                                            
28 In 1988 French canneries imported 77 percent of their tuna raw material from Venezuela and the 
United States (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 28). 
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had followed the French fleet into the WIO, the majority of its operations continued to 
be based in the Atlantic in the 1980s. Ownership of the Spanish fleet was highly 
fragmented across several family firms at this time, as it would be into the late 2000s 
(see below), but no details are available for the 1980s.  
 
Expanded fishing capacity and productivity based upon new commodity frontiers in 
the WIO and the WCPO generated a temporary period of global oversupply of 
canning-grade tuna in the early to mid-1980s (see below). However, rapid growth in 
canned tuna consumption in the EEC from the mid-1980s absorbed this supply, with 
rising production in Italy, France and Spain and a 50 percent increase in extra-EEC 
imports between 1984 and 1989.29 This resulted in investment in a new class of 
‘super-seiner’ from 1989 onwards ‘after many years of stagnation in the international 
vessel construction business’ (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 17, 28; Josupeit 1993; 
Appendix Figure 2C.2). Vessel construction is a sure indicator of increased 
profitability in the fishing node of the chain, but the new wave of increased purse 
seining capacity in the 1990s eventually contributed to a second period of oversupply 
in 1999-2000 (Appendix 2C.2).  
 
Figure 2.2 compares skipjack and yellowfin catch data in the Eastern Central Atlantic, 
the WIO and the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO) between 1950 and 
2005; it includes the WCPO because it is the largest purse seine fishery in the world 
and has been the largest source of global growth in skipjack tuna supply since 1985 
onwards. The rise in extraction of skipjack and yellowfin from the WIO was due 
almost exclusively to the introduction of the French and Spanish purse seine fleet 
from 1980 onwards. Figure 2.2(b) also makes clear that the WIO is a major global 
source of supply of the commercially more valuable yellowfin tuna. It is important to 
note that that over 50 percent of the total catch of ‘IOTC species’30 is taken by 
artisanal fisheries. This estimate includes catch for the Western and Eastern Indian 
                                                            
29 Imports rose from 9.5 million standard cases of canned tuna in 1984 to 18.8 million in 1989. France, 
the UK and Germany combined imported 80 percent of this (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 27). 
30 The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission monitors tuna and tuna-like species in the Western Indian 
Ocean and Eastern Indian Ocean – FAO statistical areas 51 and 57 respectively, as illustrated in figure 
2.3. (See section 2.5.1 on IOTC.) The ‘IOTC species’ are yellowfin tuna, skipjack tuna, bigeye tuna, 
albacore, Southern bluefin tuna, longtail tuna, kawakawa, frigate tuna, bullet tuna, narrow-barred 
Spanish mackerel, Indo-Pacific king mackerel, Indo-Pacific blue marlin, black marlin, striped marlin, 
Indo-Pacific sailfish, and swordfish (Marashi 1996). The most commercially important (‘principal 
market’) are the first four species of tuna and swordfish. 
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Ocean, with the latter region (incorporating Indonesia and the Philippines) the main 
location of artisanal catch. Nonetheless, due to the problems of data-collection from 
‘artisanal’ fleets ‘there is a high level of uncertainty with respect to the total catch’ 
(Anonymous 2009: 14).31 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Global skipjack (a) and yellowfin (b) catch by all gear types and by 
major oceanic region, 1950-2005 
 
(a) Skipjack 
 
 
 
(b) Yellowfin 
 
 
 
Source: FAO FIGIS time-series query 22 August 2007 <http://www.fao.org/figis> 
 
 
                                                            
31 Anonymous (2009) report also cites IOTC data to show the average industrial/artisanal split (p.15). 
For an overview of tuna fishing in Indonesia and the Philippines see Gillett (2005). 
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In the late 1970s and early 1980s the growth of tuna fishing capacity and the 
emergence of new fisheries in the WIO and WCPO (Figure 2.2) combined to generate 
a storm of competition between increasingly productive fleets active across the global 
oceans. This resulted in a (temporary) ‘global overproduction of tuna’ (Fujinami 
1987: 64). Facing a squeeze on profits in 1980-84 – and net losses for some boats – 
due to low cost imports, US processors realised that ‘they could buy frozen tuna on 
the international market at a lower cost than their own vessels could produce it’ (King 
1986: 15).32 Given the context of oversupply, backward integration into fishing was 
no longer necessary to ensure a strategic source of supply so US processors divested 
ownership of boats and, importantly, reinstated profitability in 1985 (Iverson 1987: 
283). This vertical disintegration was interpreted by Bonnano and Constance (1996) 
as an instance of post-Fordism in the ‘global’ tuna industry, but it was a contingent 
response by processors based on changed world-market conditions and it applied only 
to the US-centred commodity chain. In addition to overcapacity in the fishing node of 
the chain, an investigation by the US International Trade Commission identified 
overcapacity in processing facilities and inventories as causes of the decline of the US 
purse seine fleet and the mainland-based processing industry (Southwest Fisheries 
Center 1985: 20).33 But in parallel was the sharp rise of competition in the new 
international division of labour, especially from manufacturers in Southeast Asia 
(Chapter 3). 
 
With the 1981-84 recession in the US canned tuna industry with losses incurred by 
almost all branded-firms and the subsequent restructuring of the US-centred 
commodity chain, boat ownership became highly fragmented by individuals or small 
family firms,34 and prior orders for new boats by US interests were sold abroad 
(Doulman 1987d: 144: King 1987a: 281, 1987b: 71; Iverson 1987a: 274; Iverson 
1987b: 35, 37-8). The US purse seine fleet declined rapidly from a peak of 138 
                                                            
32 The crisis of the US national production system of the early 1980s can be starkly illustrated by the 
sharp drop in price for imported canned lightmeat, which dropped from US$30.38 per case in 1981 to 
US$19.06 in 1985 (Iverson 1987: 282). 
33 In 1982 there were 12 canneries based on the US mainland, by 1986 there was only one (Floyd 
1987a: 86). 
34 For example, in an anti-trust case filed in 1985 by boat owners against the three largest US 
processors at the time, the 24 plaintiffs represented 54 tuna purse seiners (Iverson 1987: 10). 
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vessels in 1976 to 68 in 1986 (King 1986: 12),35 spurred by a 20-30 percent drop in 
landed tuna prices in 1984 which saw several boats sold or chartered to foreign 
interests (Southwest Fisheries Center 1985: 20). Those boats that did survive, often 
having transferred operations to the WCPO, dealt with the crisis by shifting their sales 
to export markets, primarily to European canneries. The annual average of 2,888 short 
tons exported in 1979-1983 by the US fleet rocketed to 29,570 short tons in 1984. At 
the time this was seen as ‘the internationalization of tuna trade in general’ (Southwest 
Fisheries Center 1985: 21). The effect was to cheapen the raw material prices for 
European canneries, to squeeze the profitability of the French and Spanish fleets, and 
to encourage Heinz to look to the EU market for canned tuna as a new source of 
profitability. While the US production system on the mainland was almost completely 
eroded with the closure of all but one cannery, its regulatory mechanisms remained 
and part of the mainland’s production shifted to canneries in the US overseas 
territories of American Samoa and Puerto Rico. But US demand also fed the growing 
giants of non-branded canned tuna production in Southeast Asia, especially Thailand 
(Chapter 3).  
 
 
2.4.2 Seychelles and the Western Indian Ocean: Fishing/steaming days 
 
Unsurprisingly, a core strategy for the owners of industrial fishing vessels is the 
maximisation of profit from their investment in constant and variable capital. What is 
interesting is the specific nature of how this is done in industrial fisheries – the 
centrality of fishing and steaming ‘days’. To illustrate the point concretely a highly 
stylised movement of tuna populations in the WIO is depicted Figure 2.3. The 
direction of this flow traces typical purse seine fishing effort at monthly locations. 
Again, the environmental conditions of production – in this case tuna population 
flows – are central to understanding business strategies. Port Victoria,  Seychelles has 
been the central transhipment point for the EU DWF purse seine fleet since the 
emergence of the WIO fishery in the early 1980s. The economics of purse seining 
                                                            
35 The US fleet active in the WCPO fell from 62 boats in 1983 to only c.12 by mid-2006 (Campling et 
al. 2007: 279-80). However, reinvestment by processors led to its renewal to 39 boats by late 2009 
(Havice 2010: 983). 
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demand that vessel owners/managers try to tranship from the nearest available port.36 
(Assuming that there is sufficient infrastructure and the domestic social and political 
situation permits, thereby discounting transhipment from the Somali coast since 1993 
and problematising Antsiranana, Madagascar in light of political conflicts there in the 
2000s.) The strategy allows vessel owners to maximise productivity as boats are able 
both to reduce operating costs (especially labour and fuel) and to increase returns to 
constant capital through faster return journeys between port and fishing grounds (i.e. 
the maximisation of ‘fishing days’ and minimisation of ‘steaming days’).  
 
The historic prevalence of tuna flows in and around the Seychelles EEZ also explains 
why the Seychelles has been the centre of the EU DWF fisheries access strategy in the 
WIO (see section 4.3.2).37 Despite these advantages, Seychelles suffers from a high 
cost structure compared to Côte d’Ivoire and Port Victoria is geographically more 
distant from European canning-grade tuna markets than Abidjan. In short, 
transhipment costs for frozen tuna to anywhere outside of the WIO are ‘much higher 
as are costs of supplies to vessels’, which led to the argument that yellowfin catches 
would have to remain higher (see below) in the WIO than the Atlantic ‘in order to be 
economically attractive’ (Marcille 1986: 45). As it turns out, just over twenty years 
later Marcille was proven right. After two years of poor yellowfin catches in the WIO 
from 2007 at least three Spanish boats had left for the Eastern Atlantic because the 
steaming days are less, the seas are calmer and operational fees are lower 
(EUGvt#15). 
  
                                                            
36 Purse seiners can tranship at sea if environmental conditions allow (i.e. if the oceanic conditions are 
not too rough). However, the regulatory mechanism of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 
bans transhipment at sea except for an exemption for longliners (see Section 4.2.2 on IOTC). 
37 Seychelles’ first commercial purse seine access arrangements were agreed with the EEC 
(representing the French fleet) and the government of Spain in 1983 and 1984 respectively. 
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Figure 2.3: Schematic of Western Indian Ocean tuna migration 
 
Notes: The lines in the sea surrounding land mass depict territorial seas (12 nautical miles from shore) 
and national exclusive economic zones (up to 200 nautical miles from shore). BIOT = British Indian 
Ocean Territory (UK overseas territory). 
Source: John Pearce, MRAG  
 
 
The natural flows of tuna in the WIO contribute to making Seychelles one of the most 
important tuna transshipment/landing hubs in the world. Transhipment and landing 
volumes by purse seiners active in the WIO between 2000 and 2008 (which includes a 
small number of non-EU owned boats) are as follows: Port Victoria accounted for 88 
percent of total known transhipment/landing volumes throughout the entire period, 
this was followed by Antsiranana, Madagascar with six percent, five percent in 
Mombasa, Kenya, 0.6 percent in Port Louis, Mauritius, and 0.04 percent in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania (SFA database). The implications of this economic activity for 
Seychelles ‘upgrading’ in the commodity chain are addressed in Chapter 6.  
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Purse seine fisheries catch a mixture of tuna species, but the WIO fishery is unusual 
because of the high ratio of commercially more valuable yellowfin to skipjack since 
the industrialisation of the fishery in the early 1980s (see Appendix 2C.1).  The ratio 
of yellowfin to skipjack in the WIO compared to the WCPO – the only other canning-
grade tuna fishery with room for growth – is illustrated visually in Figure 2.2 above 
(compare catch volumes in (a) and (b)). The WIO in the 1980s was the only purse 
seine fishery in the world where skipjack did not constitute the greatest proportion of 
catch (Joseph 2000:10).  
 
The EU DWF has dominated the WIO purse fishery since its emergence with 
experimental fishing at the beginning of the 1980s.38 The mechanisms involved in this 
resource access strategy are detailed in Chapter 4. For the period 1984-2007, a total of 
92 percent of catch in the entire WIO purse seine fishery was by European-owned 
boats (Figure 2.4). The fleet also dominated the Seychelles in-EEZ purse seine fishery 
with 93 percent of all catch over the same period. The WIO purse seine fishery grew 
rapidly in importance in the late 1980s when the number of vessels expanded from 38 
in mid-1988 to 51 by mid-1989 (Nageon de Lestang and Lablache 1989: 3). This 
move was motivated by the constant increase in WIO catch since 1983, and it made 
clear that sufficient intelligence was available to vessel managers/owners to make 
them relatively assured of its continuation. It is however, almost certainly 
commercially unviable to undertake purse seine operations in the WIO without access 
to the Seychelles EEZ (see above). It is this strategic consideration, combined with the 
expanding presence of DWFs, that motivated an – eventually failed – initiative of 
independent coastal states to cooperate to maximise benefits from the resource in the 
late 1980s (see Chapter 6 on this moment of South-South cooperation).  The sharp 
drop in catch in 2007 in Figure 2.4 is discussed in Section 4.2.2. 
  
                                                            
38 Attempts by a Soviet firm to enter the fishery with the backing of the Soviet state (e.g. fisheries 
cooperation and access arrangements) barely made a dent, see Chapter 6. 
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Figure 2.4: Comparing EU purse seine catch with total purse seine catch in the 
WIO and in the Seychelles EEZ, 1984-2007 (in mt) 
 
 
Notes: EU catch includes vessels flagged by France, Italy and Spain, and Spanish-owned vessels 
flagged by Belize, Dutch Antilles and Seychelles. Spanish-owned vessels were also registered in the 
Cayman Islands and Panama in the mid-1980s, but data on these vessels are available because it is not 
known for certain if all Panama-flagged vessels were Spanish-owned and there are no entries for 
Cayman Island vessels in the SFA database. (Lawson et al. 1986: 9; and multiple interviews and 
person. comms. 2006, 2008 and 2009.) 
Sources: Calculations using FFA database (EEZ data is confidential) 
 
 
2.4.3 Enhancing productivity in the 1990s and its environmental effects: 
Vessel capacity and artificial fish aggregating devices 
 
Capacity-enhancing measures39 
Larger vessels are able to stay at-sea for longer periods and over longer distances. 
With larger fish-holds they are also able to carry larger absolute volumes of tuna per 
fishing trip. This commercial logic explains the construction of ever-larger boats 
active in the EU DWF (and elsewhere) in the 1990s and 2000s. Gross tonnage (GT) is 
a universally-available measure of vessel capacity. Vessels over 2,000GT are 
categorised here as ‘super-seiners’ and those over 3,500GT as (rather awkwardly) 
                                                            
39 Fleet or vessel or fishing capacity is potential fishing effort, whereas fishing effort is actual activity 
to catch fish (e.g. the setting of a purse seine net). In terms of data that are widely available, capacity is 
best measured by tonnage and power rather than the number of boats as the former two are far better 
indicators of productivity/extractive potential. While superior measures are possible, including 
indicators of technological change, these are not available in a uniform format (Villasante and Sumaila 
2010: 271). 
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‘super super-seiners’.40 As is made clear through the trends illustrated in Figure 2.5 
there are important differences within the EU DWF. Spanish purse seiners constructed 
after 1995 are considerably larger than the (depreciating) French fleet.41 Larger 
vessels consume larger absolute volumes of gasoil and, of course, have a higher initial 
purchase cost.42 Consequently, fish extraction from capital invested needs to be higher 
for ‘super super-seiners’ to pay off larger loans and achieve profitability. Capital 
depreciation costs are also higher. As we shall see, the business model for managing 
the new Spanish vessels is ‘tighter’, leading to the deepening of the competitive drive 
to maximise catch and minimise costs. The ecological implication is that the larger 
and newer vessels in the EU DWF are deepening pressures on the resource and 
heightening tensions in negotiations with the Seychelles government over (and 
compliance with) resource access arrangements (Chapter 6).  
 
Figure 2.5: Year of vessel construction and gross tonnage (GT) for global EU 
distant water purse seine fleet active in 2007 
 
*Includes data for 55 EU flagged vessels, 22 French and 33 Spanish. 
Source: Oceanic Développement (2008) database. 
 
                                                            
40 This is an arbitrary classification. During the 1980s a vessel classed as a ‘super-seiner’ was only 
>1,000GRT (Doulman 1987d: 140).  
41 New vessels introduced into the French fleet from 2009 onwards are excluded from the thesis.  
42 For example, Doulman (1987d: 154 fn 15) points out that the ‘super-seiners’ of the time (>1,000GRT 
boats) were designed in the early 1970s when the global oil price was relatively low. He went on to 
argue that the oil price rises (i.e. in 1973 and 1979) and the emergence of EEZs ‘eroded the operational 
advantages of superseiner class vessels’. 
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While there is popular opposition to the new class of ‘super super-seiners’ (e.g. 
Greenpeace 2010), it was claimed by one Spanish boat-owner that ‘these boats engage 
in a different type of operation’ compared to smaller vessels: ‘the net size is similar, 
[and] the fuel to catch ratio is lower on bigger boats, thus better for the environment, 
and of course for owners’ businesses, they are [also] safer for the crew ... [with] 
wider, better working conditions’ (EUInd#13–#15). The main commercial advantage 
of these boats is that the fish holds are larger allowing the maximisation of fishing 
days before steaming to port to offload. However, while the fuel to catch ratio of 
‘super super-seiners’ may well be more efficient, their operations are also more 
sensitive to fuel price rises (Miyake et al. 2010: 42-3). A corroboration of this finding 
can be found in the fuel buying strategies of Spanish vessel owners compared to their 
French counterparts: the former are more concerned about benefitting from short-term 
price fluctuations and the latter preferring a stable price that might not reflect potential 
gains if the world-market price declines (SVS#13–#16). In addition, during the 
heights of the oil price hike in 2007/8, some Spanish boats operating in the WIO were 
reported to have cut their engines and drifted while waiting for signs of fish grouping 
around their fish aggregating devices (SGvt#43).  
 
Another source of differentiation in the EU DWF in terms of capacity-enhancing 
measures is the use of ‘supply vessels’, which are solely employed by Spanish firms. 
First introduced to the WIO in the mid-1990s and more intensely used in the 2000s, 
these are normally converted pole-and-line vessels with 7-10 crew. Their principal 
activity is to deploy, maintain and monitor fish aggregating devices, and inform 
purse-seine captains when tuna are present. Their secondary role is to deliver supplies 
and transfer injured crew (Roberto et al. 2007: 2; Miyake et al. 2010: 44; EUInd#40). 
Both of these roles allow the supported purse seiner to maximise fishing days and 
minimise steaming days. Six supply boats were estimated to be active in 1999, 
peaking at 15 in 2004 and settling at 13 in 2005 and 2006 (Roberto et al. 2007: 7, 
Pianet et al. 2009: 1). Individual supply boats normally provide dedicated support to a 
large Spanish purse seiner, but occasionally one will work with two seiners. 
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Effort enhancing measures 
The extent and intensity of fisheries exploitation must also be understood in terms of 
the technological and organisational changes that enhance fishing effort (Miyake 
2005: 24-6). Modern industrial purse seiners utilise cutting-edge technology to locate 
and hunt fish, especially in the EU DWF, so while physical vessel capacity might be a 
constant (e.g. in GT or kW) the efficiency and effectiveness of a vessel’s ability to 
catch fish can change. These effort enhancing innovations are known as ‘effort creep’. 
Techniques used in the 2000s include vertical and horizontal sonar and hydro-
acoustics, satellite imaging of oceanographic conditions such as temperature 
(including through cloud cover), satellite imaging of plankton concentrations, bird 
radar (birds prey on small fish driven to the surface by feeding tuna below, introduced 
in 1987), and the first-hand spotting of schools using small on-board helicopters 
(Hampton and Williams 2003: 16; Hill and Hammann 1998; Holmquist 2002; Gaspar 
2000: 181; Jennings et al. 2001: 96; Miyake 2005a: 26; Prado 2000: 176; SEAFDEC 
2004; and direct observation of vessels and multiple interviews, 2006 and 2009). 
Many of those who first board a modern purse seiner and inspect the control deck 
comment on its similarity to the ‘Starship Enterprise’ or the like. 
 
Differences within the EU DWF can also be identified in techniques and technology 
employed in fishing operations in the WIO. Before the 1990s the EU DWF would 
hunt for fish in the WIO by: a) scanning the horizon for birds which are attracted to 
tuna feeding frenzies or searching for a school from the air using a helicopter (known 
as catching on ‘free schools’), or b) engaging in a ‘hunt for logs’ (Sibert 1987: 44) 
because tuna aggregate under floating logs or other debris (‘log-school’). Until the 
early 1990s tuna ‘FAD fisheries’ were mainly log-schools, including in the WIO 
(Miyake et al. 2010: 29).  Subsequently, artificial fish aggregating devices (FADs) 
rapidly became an important source of ‘effort creep’.  
 
FADs were introduced en masse into the Atlantic and Indian oceans in the 1990s and 
directly contributed to an increase in CPUE (Hinton 2007: 4), with fishing around 
logs and artificial FADS constituting around 50 percent of the global catch of tropical 
tunas since the 1990s (Fonteneau, Pallares and Pianet (2000) as cited by Fauvel et al.  
2008: 2). FADs employed in the purse seine fishery are normally drifting rafts 
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equipped with transmitting positioning buoys situated in zones where principal market 
tunas are believed to migrate.43 Tuna aggregate around the FAD as it mimics natural 
floating objects, such as logs, on which smaller fish feed. By the mid-2000s, a FAD in 
the WIO typically used ‘a GPS satellite receiver and a transmitter, a thermometer to 
measure water temperature, a system to gauge the state of the batteries and a 
microprocessor to control these systems’ (Roberto et al. 2007: 4). By the mid-2000s 
some FADs were also equipped with expensive sounders to detect and estimate 
volumes of fish to a depth of up to 400m (direct observation on docked vessel, 
Seychelles January 2009). In the mid-2000s the French fleet was releasing around 130 
FADs per year and the Spanish over 300 (Moreno et al. 2007 as cited by Miyake et al. 
2010: 44).44 
 
Over the period 1990-2008 the Spanish DWF caught a total of 2.4 million tons of 
skipjack and yellowfin tuna and the French 1.6 million. Broken down by fishing 
technique: the Spanish caught 71 percent on FADs (a ratio of roughly 2: 1 skipjack to 
yellowfin) and 29 percent on free schools (1: 2 skipjack to yellowfin); and the French 
caught 58 percent on FADs (2.5: 1 skipjack to yellowfin) and 42 percent on free 
schools (1: 3.5 ratio skipjack to yellowfin) (analysis based on data reported in de 
Molina et al. 2009: 3-4 and Pianet et al.  2009: 9; see also Figure 2C.2 and discussion 
in Appendix 2C.1). Contrary to the generalisation of many observers that the French 
fleet can be typified by free-school fishing (EUInd#5; IntFS#37; #38), it is clear that 
this fleet also makes extensive use of FADs, albeit significantly less so than the 
Spanish.  
 
Fishing with FADs is a technique which results in a high proportion of skipjack; also, 
yellowfin catch on FADs tend to be smaller juvenile fish which are less valuable. 
Given that yellowfin caught on a free school tend to be mature, and thus larger sized 
fish, they command a higher price because of improved recovery rates (see above and 
Appendices 2C.2, 3A.2 and 3B). Therefore, while the French DWF can be 
characterised as consisting of smaller vessels than the Spanish, and thus having a 
                                                            
43 In the WIO they are normally bamboo rafts with nets hanging underwater (Fauvel et al. 2009: 2), 
although various other materials can be used (de San and Pages 1998: 24, see also for a technical 
review of FAD use in other types of WIO fisheries).  
44 Before Moreno et al. the actual ‘number of FADs used by the [WIO] purse seine fleet [was] not 
known precisely’ (Mina et al.  2002: 336). 
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lower fuel to catch ratio, smaller fish-holds and a reduced maximum number of 
fishing days, this is compensated for by a strategy of some boats targeting free schools 
to extract higher value raw material. French purse seiner captains also appear to be 
more effective in catching yellowfin on free school sets than the Spanish equivalent as 
they record a significantly larger ratio of this species to skipjack. Conversely, the 
larger and more numerous Spanish boats predictably caught 35 percent more tuna 
than the French between 1990 and 2008.  
 
The increase in FAD use raises three major ecological concerns. The first is the 
sustainability of tuna biomass because of the juvenile yellowfin taken in association 
with FADs. The exploitation of immature fish cuts these individuals out of the 
reproduction cycle (‘yield per recruit’) (Joseph et al. 2007: 155; Joseph 2000: 19; 
Int#12). Second, the use of FADs leads to the increased incidence of bycatch. By the 
mid-1990s FAD utilisation in the WIO purse seine fishery had developed widely, 
resulting, for example, in nearly 40,000mt of bycatch of small bigeye tuna (Miyake et 
al.  2004: 39; IntFS#3).45 Third, fisheries science research indicates that FADs can 
artificially shift the migration patterns of tuna populations from areas where rich 
foraging is in evidence (e.g. near natural logs) to other areas that may not be 
favourable for tuna feeding, leading to a deterioration in population health; known as 
the ‘ecological trap thesis’ (Hallier and Gaertner 2008; Marsac et al. 2000; Fauvel et 
al. 2009).  
 
Despite these concerns over the impact of FADs on the long-term sustainability of the 
resource and, in turn, the commercial survival of the fishery itself, they continue to be 
used because they enhance profitability. However, even this narrow commercial logic 
contains a contradiction. The roll-out of FADs across the world’s tuna purse seine 
fisheries in the 1990s has increased fishing effort and led to more canning-grade tuna 
on the world market. It is widely believed that this has depressed prices and ‘eroded 
profit margins’ (Mills 2001: 27), which, in the context of continued rises in constant 
capital costs (e.g. steel for vessel holds and fuel), puts pressure on vessel owners to 
catch ever more fish. As one specialist put it: ‘Purse seiners at the moment need FADs 
                                                            
45 It should be noted that this is the main interaction between the Japan-centred commodity chain in 
sashimi grade bigeye tuna and the global commodity chain in canned tuna, where the former is 
supplied by specialised long-line vessels. 
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because there are too many boats and the value added is not enough. There is too 
much capital chasing too few fish’ (Int#13).  
 
 
2.4.4  A note on the environmental sustainability of tuna fisheries 
 
The most important dynamic of the GCC in canned tuna is the sustainability of 
current levels of exploitation of the resource itself. Table 2.2 summarises the 
population status of those tuna stocks that are relevant to this analysis, which (it 
should be emphasised) are probably conservative estimates. The central point here is 
that almost all stocks of yellowfin tuna cannot be fished any more than the current 
levels, including in the most recent commodity frontiers in the WIO and WCPO. 
Capital is well aware of this problem, even though some representatives claim that 
stock fluctuations are solely due to environmental conditions such as shifts in 
oceanographic conditions (see Chapter 4). In 2007 cannery managers in the Pacific 
islands and Western Indian Ocean all reported problems in sourcing sufficient supply, 
including for skipjack,46 which is the main explanatory variable for the rapid increase 
in skipjack price for this year (Appendix Figure 2C.5). In a comprehensive global 
study, the same problem was reported in most major locations of canned tuna 
production in 2010 (Hamilton et al.  2011). 
 
 
Table 2.2: Exploitation status of tuna stocks used for canning 
Species Ocean Sub-area Exploitation status 
Skipjack Atlantic Eastern Fully 
 Western Not fully 
Indian NA Not fully 
Pacific Eastern Not fully 
 Western Not fully 
Yellowfin Atlantic NA Fully 
Indian NA Fully 
Pacific Eastern Fully 
 Western Fully 
Source: Hinton 2007: 8 
 
                                                            
46 Discussions in 2007 with industry representatives at meetings in Port Vila, Vanuatu (March), Port 
Louis, Mauritius (May), Le Morne, Mauritius (July), and multiple person. comms. via email. See also 
Globefish tuna market reports, various issues (2007) which report similar supply constraints on a global 
level. 
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2.5 Corporate Concentration and Industrial Organisation of the European 
Tuna Fleet in the Western Indian Ocean in the late 2000s 
 
This section shifts tone and emphasis to examine the firms involved in the EU DWF. 
In so doing it implicitly takes the prior periodisation into the 2000s (the cut off point 
of the research was 2009/10) but narrows this down into one geographical area, the 
Western Indian Ocean. This is the first known firm-centred analysis of industrial tuna 
fisheries. It is undertaken to identify levels of corporate concentration and industrial 
organisation so as to better understand the EU DWF in its own right, but also to locate 
‘lead firms’ in the fleet, moments of wider chain governance and business strategies 
employed to counter the market power of other players in the commodity chain, 
especially branded-manufacturers, which are addressed in the next Chapter. 
 
 
2.5.1 The European distant water tuna fleet in the 2000s – an overview 
 
The combined French and Spanish share of total EU tuna catch of all species and by 
all gear types was 83% in 1950 and 96% in 2000. In short, these two players are the 
European tuna fleet. As we have seen, the main fishing grounds of the EU DWF are 
the Eastern Tropical Atlantic (since the 1950s) and the Western Indian Ocean (since 
the early 1980s). Spanish-owned vessels are also active in the Eastern Tropical 
Pacific, often using foreign ‘flags of convenience’. But while the combined catch of 
all species of tuna by France and Spain is the second largest in the world (Japan leads, 
with Taiwan in third position, see Table 2.1 above), EU DWF activity in the WCPO – 
the largest tuna fishery in the world (Figure 2.2 above) – is marginal.47 
 
Tropical tuna purse seiners are the largest segment of the entire EU external fleet in 
terms of vessel power (kW) (Oceanic Développement 2008: 3). For general 
discussion, the European tropical tuna purse seiners are best categorised as the ‘EU 
distant water tuna purse seine fleet’ (EU DWF), rather than by national flag as 
                                                            
47 Only the Spanish purse seine fleet is active in the WCPO. Spain had between 6-12 purse seiners 
active in the WCPO between 1999-2001, but in 2002 it had only one and in 2010 it had four vessels 
registered (registration does not mean that they actually fished) (SPC 2003: 103; FFA database, 2006 
and 2010). 
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‘Spanish’, ‘French’ or ‘Italian’ (IntFS#22).48 Since Spain’s accession to the EEC in 
1986, these ‘national’ fleets are all regulated by the European Commission, receive 
substantially the same benefits under the Common Fisheries Policy and the EU trade 
regime (see Chapters 4 and 5), and are active largely in the same fishing grounds. In 
other words, they are all part of the same ‘EU production system’. Nonetheless, as 
will be shown below and in Chapter 3 there are important national- and firm-level 
differences in terms of ownership structure, industrial organisation and markets.  
 
From the late 1980s to 2010 combined French and Spanish interests controlled the 
largest purse seine fleet in the world. In 2000 it constituted 18 percent of world purse 
seine vessel capacity with only 11 percent of world vessels, indicating a fleet of larger 
sized vessels (Committee on Fisheries 2003: 15-16).49 In 2007 European firms 
controlled an estimated 84 boats of a global purse seine fleet of c.450 vessels at 
>500GT;50  of these, 57 vessels were actually flagged by EU Member states (Oceanic 
Développement 2008; SFA vessel license database 2008).51 The EU-flagged boats 
were estimated to have an annual turnover of more than €400 million (Goujon and 
Riva 2009: 3).  
 
In the late 2000s, the majority of foreign flagged Spanish-owned purse seines fly the 
Seychelles flag and those of several Latin American countries (see Table 2.3 below 
for a full break-down of the fleet by firm). In the case of the French-owned purse 
seine fleet only two used a ‘foreign’ flag in 2007 – that of Mayotte, a French 
collectivité d'outre-mer (Oceanic Développement 2008). European vessel owners are 
                                                            
48 There was only one Italian-flagged vessel by 2007 and because of connections with Heinz/MW 
Brands (which owns the cannery in Seychelles), it is considered here under the French fleet. Even when 
Italy was the world’s third largest producer of canned tuna in the late 1980s and early 1990s, it still 
relied almost exclusively on imported raw material (Josupeit 1993: 2, 32-4; AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 
28) 
49 The second largest distant water purse seine fleet is owned by Taiwanese interests, estimated to total 
55 boats in mid-2010 (33 Taiwan-flagged, 18 registered in Vanuatu, and 4 in Marshall Islands). All of 
these vessels operate in the WCPO (Hamilton et al. 2011) 
50 The average EU purse seiner has a mass of 2,099GT and power of 3,191kW. Oceanic 
Développement (2008). 
51 A database created by Oceanic Développement (2008) details a grand total of 56 vessels, but an 
additional Spanish-flagged vessel (Txori Gorri) is known to have been in operation in the Seychelles 
EEZ in 2007 (SFA licensing database, 2008) and is included in the DG MARE Fleet Register (call 
sign: 3-BI-21-07). The French industry association, ORTHONGEL, estimated that the EU fleet totalled 
84 boats in 2008/0: 33 Spanish, 21  French, 1 Italian and 29 FOC vessels owned by Spanish interests, 
of a total global purse seine fleet of 450 boats  of >550GT (Goujon and Riva 2009: 3). Despite these 
differences, all agree that EU interests control the largest fleet of purse seiners in the world.  
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not alone in using flags of convenience (FOC). For example, a large fleet of 
Taiwanese-owned longliners are flagged by Indonesia (the third largest individual 
catching nation in Table 2.1, above) and purse seiners by the Marshall Islands and 
Vanuatu, however the Taiwanese government has little power to regulate this activity 
(IntFS#3; AGvt#4; AInd#5; NGO#10; JInd#7; #8; #16–#18). The FOC issue serves to 
highlight the complexity and problems involved in analysing ‘national’ catch data and 
its relationship to the ‘nationality’ of capital invested under multiple FOC (several 
countries do not permit the use of their flag as a FOC).52 
 
The French and Spanish DWF is organised under three national ‘producer 
organisations’ (industry associations). Their role is primarily a commercial one, using 
collective bargaining power in fleet relationships with ‘home’ states, the European 
Commission and governments in regions of fishing activity.53 Since 1992 the various 
owners of the French purse seine fleet have been represented by a single producer 
organisation – ORTHONGEL.54 Representation of the Spanish fleet is divided into 
two producer organisations: OPAGAC and ANABAC.55 The main players in 
OPAGAC are vertically-integrated into processing (i.e. the firms Albacora and Calvo, 
see below), while ANABAC members are mainly specialised boat owning firms. 
These three producer organisations are partly organised around their relationship to 
the EU fisheries subsidy and tuna regimes (see Section 4.3 and Chapter 5). They also 
act as lobby groups at the levels of their ‘home’ states, the Commission, in diplomatic 
negotiations over fisheries access arrangements with third countries, and as collective 
operational representatives in third countries (e.g. OPAGAC employs a permanent 
representative in Seychelles). 
 
 
                                                            
52 The broad complexities and debates over  FOC and ‘national’ data in economic analysis and applied 
fisheries management cannot be addressed here. On the politics and political economy of flags of 
convenience in maritime industries, see DeSombre (2006), EJF (2009) and Lillie (2006).  
53 The first formal recognition at the EEC of producers organisations in the fishing industry was in 
1971 (Council Regulation (EEC) No 171/71), introduced three months after the setting-up of the 
common organisation of the market in fishery products (Council Regulation (EEC) No 2142/70). See 
also, for example, Council Regulation (EEC) No 105/76 and Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000. 
For a brief history of French producer organisations in the tuna industry as a basis for the EU model, 
see Le Roy (2008: 132-137) and Lequesne (2004: 44-8, 84). See also Meuriot (1986). 
54 Organisation des Producteurs de Thon Congelé. Until then they were organised under the Syndicat 
National des Armateurs de Thoniers Congélateurs (SNATC) (Le Roy et al.  2008: 4). 
55 Organización de Productores Asociados de Grandes Atuneros Congeladores and Asociación 
Nacional de Buques Atuneros Congeladores y la Organización de Productores de Túnidos Congelados.  
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2.5.2 Control of the EU DWF licensed to fish in Seychelles in 2008 
 
Almost all known analyses of industrial fisheries focus on the ‘nationality’ of the 
vessel by its flag and, in some cases, by assumed ‘national’ ownership.56 For the small 
minority of analysts and commentators that even consider questions of the political 
economy of vessel ownership and control, the limitation of incomplete data is 
normally cited as a barrier to such analysis. In order to interrogate levels of effective 
control of fishing activities and their various relationships to the rest of the EU-
centred commodity chain, Table 2.3 presents vessel ownership at the level of the firm 
for the global EU DWF; an estimated 88 purse seiners owned or controlled by EU-
based firms. The table combines data for two years: all data are for 2008 except for 
areas of operation which are based upon interviews and personal communications on 
fleet status in 2010. The main point of difference is that 54 EU-owned boats were 
licensed to fish in the WIO in 2008 (although all vessels were not necessarily active 
there), and in 2010 active vessels had dropped to 47. This shift was due to two key 
factors – a decline in catch rates, especially of yellowfin (see above and Section 
4.2.2), and the impact of Somali piracy on fishing vessel operations which worsened 
from 2009 onwards and, while of considerable economic and political importance, is 
excluded from the thesis due to limits of space (for overviews, see Campling 2008g, 
2008h; Havice and Campling 2009). While the following draws out some elements of 
the EU DWF as a whole, the focus is on those firms licensed to fish in Seychelles 
EEZ in 2008 (see Appendix 2D for details), which, as we have seen, means by default 
that they were the only EU purse seiners fishing in the WIO as access to Seychelles 
waters is a commercial necessity for this gear type in the region. 
 
The most important difference between the French and Spanish DWFs in terms of 
ownership and control is that the former is highly concentrated through only three 
firms/consortiums of firms. Conversely, control of the Spanish fleet is highly 
fragmented and are all family-owned firms (EUInd#12–#17; #21–#24; #55; #56; 
EUGvt#15; IntFS#37; #38; SGvt#14).57 We address the firm-composition of the 
French fleet first: Cobrecaf, the consortium of Kühn-Ballery, France-Afrique and 
                                                            
56 Le Roy and Guillotreau (2001), Le Roy (2008) and Le Roy et al. (2008) are notable exceptions, 
albeit empirically limited to the French purse seine fleet up until the 1990s. 
57 See Puig and Pérez (2009) on the internationalisation of Spanish family firms, including in the food 
industry. 
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CMB, and Saupiquet. While share ownership may have changed, to a large extent the 
same firms concentrated the French DWF in the 2000s as they did in the 1960s, albeit 
in different combinations. In the late 1980s for example, Cobrecaf, CMB, Saupiquet 
and France Thon (part owned by Kühn-Ballery) were the major players (Section 2.4.1 
above).  
 
In 2008 the consortium of the firms Kühn-Ballery, France-Afrique and CMB – 
‘Kühn-Ballery et al’ for short – owned four of the 19 French purse seiners licensed in 
Seychelles EEZ in 2008. All four of these vessels were constructed after 1994, 
indicating a medium-term commitment to fishing in the WIO.  The consortium’s 
vessels are leased to France Thon, a Groupement d'intérêt économique (GIE, or 
Economic Interest Group), which under French law is an entity created by two or 
more persons or entities for the purpose of the development of their activities.58 
 
Cobrecaf is by far the largest French purse seiner firm, but it is addressed second 
because of cross-financing with Kühn-Ballery et al. In 2008 Cobrecaf owned ten of 
19 French vessels licensed in Seychelles EEZ. In mid-2008, the largest share of 
Cobrecaf (38 percent) was owned by Kühn-Ballery et al, 36 percent by MW Brands 
and 25 percent by Jaczon Group (a Dutch fishing and shipping firm).  Except for MW 
Brands (Heinz European Seafood until 2006), which controlled canneries in Ghana 
and the Seychelles and major EU canned tuna brands (see Chapter 3), none of these 
firms was vertically integrated into the processing or branding of canned tuna. Like 
Kühn-Ballery et al. with France Thon, Cobrecaf uses a financial subsidiary – 
Cobrepeche. This is a vessel ‘leasing’ firm and functions to limit taxation by the 
French state (EUInd#5; #9; #38; #39). (See below for more on Cobrecaf.) 
 
The significant third entity is Saupiquet, which owned three purse seiners active in the 
WIO. Saupiquet is a vertically-integrated branded-manufacturer owned by the Dutch 
consumer goods marketing firm – Bolton Group (Chapter 3). Saupiquet markets 
canned tuna and ‘value added’ tuna products in France and Germany under the 
Saupiquet brand of processed fish products: a diversified product range that includes 
                                                            
58 Under Ordinance No. 67-821 of 23 September 1967 (OJ 28 September).  Definition obtained from 
the online Dictionnaire du droit privé français. Available at: http://www.dictionnaire-
juridique.com/definition/group-d-interet-economique.php 
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canned sardines and mackerel. Bolton Group is the lead branded firm on the EU 
canned tuna market (see Chapter 3).  
 
There were 28 Spanish owned purse seiners licensed to fish in Seychelles EEZ in 
2008, the majority of which are owned by four firms. Albacora is the only purse seine 
firm in the world to operate in all tropical tuna fisheries and is probably the world’s 
largest.  It is vertically integrated into Salica – a mid-range branded-processor – and 
an estimated 60 percent of its catch goes to its own factories in Ecuador and Spain 
(EUInd#13–#15; see Section 3.4.1). Like most other vertically-integrated firms, 
Albacora is a member of the OPAGAC producer organisation. It uses both Spanish 
and Seychelles flags and had a total of eight boats licensed to Seychelles in 2008, of 
which three were ‘super super-seiners’ constructed between 2000 and 2004, indicating 
a long-term strategic investment in tuna fishing with expectations of future 
profitability. It is worth noting that the firm Calvo, like Albacora, is a member of 
OPAGAC and is vertically integrated into branded-manufacturing. Its brand is the 
largest in Spain. However, its two purse seiners based in the WIO left in 2007 due to 
poor fishing and shifted their activities to the Eastern Tropical Atlantic, and its best 
and biggest boats are based in the Eastern Tropical Pacific (EUGvt#15; EUInd#16).59  
 
After Albacora, the next largest four players in the Spanish-owned DWF in the WIO 
were all members of ANABAC: Inpesca, Atunsa, Echebastar and Pevasa. These four 
are also among the top seven largest players in the global EU DWF and, as shown in 
the next section, they have ties through their tuna trading activities. Inpesca’s 
activities are concentrated in the WIO and its number of boats based there remained 
stable at six between 2008 and 2010. Atunsa also has the majority of its boats based in 
the WIO. Both Echebastar and Pevasa’s entire fleets – six and five boats respectively 
– were based in the WIO in 2008 and remained there in 2010.  
 
 
                                                            
59 As a result it is excluded from further analysis here, which deals solely with vessels licensed in the 
Seychelles EEZ in 2008. 
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Table 2.3: EU-owned distant water purse seine fleet in 2008 (areas of operation – 2010)  
Controlling 
firm(s) 
Vessel flags EU 
industry 
assn. 
 Boats by area of operation Gross tonnage (GT) Average year 
of 
construction 
Atlantic Indian Pacific Not 
known 
Total Total 
fleet 
% of 
Total EU 
DWF 
Average 
per vessel 
Albacora 
Group* 
Spain (6); Seychelles (3); 
Ecuador (3); Panama (3); 
Netherlands Antilles (1) 
Opagac 3 6 6 1 16 46,699 25 2,919 1989 
Cobrecaf France (7); Mayotte (2); 
Italy (1) 
Orthongel 0 10 0 0 10 21,741 11 2,174 1992 
Inpesca Spain (7); Seychelles (1) Anabac 1 6 0 1 8 19,052 10 2,382 1986 
Atunsa Spain (5); Seychelles (1) Anabac 2 4 0 0 6 15,490 8 2,582 1992 
Echebastar Spain (3); Seychelles (3) Anabac 0 6 0 0 6 14,843 8 2,474 1995 
Calvo Group El Salvador (4); Cap 
Verde (2) 
Opagac 2 0 4 0 6 12,821 7 2,137 1988 
Pevasa Spain (5) Anabac 0 5 0 0 5 11,222 6 2,244 1992 
Kühn-Ballery, 
France-Afrique 
and CMB 
France (7) Orthongel 2 4 0 1 7 10,131 5 1,447 1993 
Garavilla 
Group** 
Spain (2); Ecuador (2) Opagac 0 0 4 0 4 9,558 5 2,389 1993 
Bolton Group 
(Saupiquet) 
France (5) Orthongel 2 3 0 0 5 8,354 4 1,671 1983 
Jealsa-
Rainxeria# 
Guatemala (2) -- 2 0 0 0 2 4,218 2 2,109 1992 
MW Brands Ghana (5) -- 4 0 0 1 5 4,198 2 1,050 1980 
Others## Spain (6); France (2) Misc. 5 3 0 0 8 11,106 6 1,778 1982 
Total EU flag (56); Other (32)                     23 47 14 4 88 189,433 100 2,310 1988 
Notes: averages are not always precise because data for three boats is for GRT rather than GT, and data for the tonnage for one vessel and for four construction years is missing (which are excluded from averages).         
* Two boats are permanently based in the WCPO; ** 2 boats fish in the WCPO for c.20% of their activity; # a vessel included here sank in 2009; ## ‘Others’ includes the following firms and their number of boats: 
Nicra-7 (2 boats); Petusa (2); Compania Europea de Tunidos (1); Pebertu (1), reported in receivership in 2010; and Sapmer (1), which has since bought at least two new boats. Sources: estimates based on multiple 
interviews and person. comms. in 2006, 2009 and 2010; company websites; FIS website; FFA, IATTC, ICCAT, IOTC and WCPFC vessel registries and databases; CIMB 2010.  
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Given that Cobrecaf is the largest firm in the French fleet and of central importance to 
the business strategy of Heinz European Seafood/ MW Brands, which owns the 
cannery in Seychelles (see Chapters 3 and 6), the history of its ownership is worth 
some elaboration. From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, the control of Cobrecaf was 
a major site of struggle between more specialised boat-owners and vertically-
integrated branded-processors, especially Heinz. The outcome of this struggle was 
that between 1994 and 2006 Cobrecaf was effectively controlled by Heinz European 
Seafood through its 36 percent share combined with a 32 percent share owned by the 
Moroccan group ONA, which itself had taken control of one of the ‘big three’, Pêche 
et Froid (Le Roy 2008: 137, 139; Guillotreau and Le Roy 2001: 3-4). This alliance 
allowed these two firms to close factories in France to focus on production in West 
Africa and the WIO while remaining assured of supply from the French DWF which 
was necessary to enter the EU duty free from these locations of production (see 
Section 5.4 on EU preferential rules of origin).  In effect, throughout this period these 
two firms controlled over 50 percent of the French DWF by gross tonnage (Table 
2.3). Sovetco continued to sell to other firms, but this strategic control gave Heinz and 
ONA-Pêche et Froid improved supply when raw material was tight (Guillotreau and 
Le Roy 2001: 4). The 36 percent was transferred with Heinz European Seafood’s sale 
to Lehman Brothers in 2006 and placed under the management of MW Brands, so it 
‘still has clout for supply’ (EUInd#61; also, EUInd#49; #50; SGvt#1).  
 
In late 2008 MW Brands sold its share of Cobrecaf to Kühn-Ballery et al.60 This left 
the Kühn-Ballery et al. consortium with a controlling share and represented a major 
shift in the control of France’s largest DWF from a vertically-integrated branded-
processor to a specialised boat-owning consortium.61 MW Brands divested its 
minority shareholding because of ‘insufficient flexibility’: as it no longer had majority 
control it could not drive price or a ‘cost plus formula’ for supply. Nonetheless, after 
the sale it did maintain a five-year supply contract with Cobrecaf vessels providing 
MW Brands with first refusal on price negotiations, accompanied with a one year get-
                                                            
60 MW Brand’s 36 percent was divided among Kühn-Ballery et al.  as follows: Kühn-Ballery (18%), 
France-Afrique (16%) and CMB (2%) (CREFMPM 2008). 
61 On 1 January 2011 a new company was established – Compagnie Francaise du Thon Oceanique – 
which represents the set of interests identified as Cobrecaf and Kühn-Ballery et al. The combined fleet 
size has been reduced from 17 to 13 purse seiners and the average age of the vessels is now 1997 rather 
than 1993 (EUInd#5).  Nonetheless, Compagnie Francaise du Thon Oceanique remains the dominant 
entity in the French DWF, the second largest firm in the EU DWF, and one of the largest in the world. 
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out clause. However, MW Brands would like to have its own boats and ‘it is ready to 
jump into another formula if the appropriate situation arrives’ (EUInd#6).62 (Heinz 
European Seafood/ MW Brand’s strategy of vertical integration is discussed in detail 
in Section 3.4.3.) 
 
There are important relationships between vessel construction yards and domestic 
fishing firms in the French and Spanish ‘national production systems’. For example, 
all Spanish-owned purse seiners were built in Spain, and it is known that the ship-yard 
in Concarneau receives vessel construction subsidies to build purse seiners for French 
firms (EUInd#8). Due to limits of space, the vessel construction node of the canned 
tuna chain is excluded from this thesis, but it is clearly an important part of the EU-
centred commodity chain.63 
 
 
2.5.3  Industrial organisation of EU DWF active in Seychelles in 2008-9 
 
Having detailed ownership and relationships of commercial control of the EU DWF, 
the following highlights four dynamics in its industrial organisation: producer 
organisations, vertical integration (or not), flags of convenience, and fish sales. 
 
Producer organisations 
The Spanish boats under the OPAGAC producer organisation are perceived by some 
as being more ‘modern’ or ‘internationalist’ in their approach to business because of 
their vertical integration into processing, whereas ANABAC members were seen as 
more ‘traditional’ due to their specialisation in boat-ownership and fishing 
(EUInd#10; SGvt#14).  
ANABAC members have different behaviour. They’re more old 
fashioned, they talk about themselves as ‘fishermen’. Whereas OPAGAC 
are business men (‘we’re in it to make money’). They [ANABAC] didn’t 
want canneries, but they’re changing now. (EUGvt#15) 
                                                            
62 MW Brands did buy two more boats in 2008 as sole-owner, but they were active in the Eastern 
Atlantic supplying its cannery in Ghana, the firm’s only other non-EU factory (MW Brands 2008). 
63 The relationship between boat building and ‘national’ fishing fleets is also important to the United 
States, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and China. 
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More experienced EU industry representatives dismissed this distinction, stating that 
it was more a question of particular business strategies (EUInd#5; #7). The main 
exception to the ANABAC-OPAGAC distinction based on industrial organisation and 
associated business strategies is the Echebastar fleet which has a 25 percent share of a 
processing facility in Mauritius (Thon des Mascareigne) – the only ANABAC 
member with known interests in processing (EUInd#7; #40; #54; SGvt#14). As we 
have seen, the main ANABAC members are most focussed on the WIO and they are 
only active there and the Eastern Tropical Atlantic, whereas OPAGAC members are 
also active in the Pacific, primarily to supply their processing facilities in Latin 
America (Table 2.3 and Section 3.4). There are also important differences among 
OPAGAC membership: Albacora is more specialised in the fishing node, Calvo and 
Garavilla’s main business is branded-processing but it also has significant purse seine 
fleets, and Jealsa is a minor player in tuna fishing (Table 2.3 and Section 3.4). 
 
Under EU regulations on producer organisations, one national association normally 
represents the entire segment of a country’s domestically registered industry. The 
division of the Spanish fleet into two national producer organisations is reported to 
stem from a dispute between vessel owners in ANABAC which resulted in Albacora 
leading the splinter to form OPAGAC (EUInd#51; #52;#54; EUGvt#15). Most agree 
that this split has weakened the collective voice of the Spanish DWF. Nonetheless, the 
Spanish DWF is ‘a powerful lobby and we can negotiate for licenses with the EU 
authority for fishing.  The association is the way for us to have a voice’ (EUInd#54). 
 
Vertical integration 
 
When asked about the importance of vertical integration, one very experienced 
interviewee argued that:  
It’s a question of culture. It depends a lot upon the leader of the company. 
The business of boats is very specific. You can make money and lose huge 
amounts of money. You need a big heart for fishing. ... It’s a strategy and 
[its existence is] evidence that you can make money. (EUInd#7) 
Vertical integration into fishing by processing firms ‘to guarantee part of their needs’ 
(EUInd#7) is thus an additional corporate driver for vessel ownership along with the 
maximisation of rates of return on vessels discussed earlier. It also has implications 
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for fish procurement at the Seychelles-based cannery (see Chapter 6) as the priority of 
the vertically-integrated fleets active in the WIO – especially Albacora, Echebastar 
and Saupiquet – is to supply their own processing capacity. For example, while 
Albacora is known to supply the Seychelles factory (EUInd#14; #15), there are also 
known flows of WIO-caught tuna ‘traded’ by Salica (Albacora) to its processing 
facility in Ecuador (confidential industry database).64  
 
In the context of the problem in the 2000s of global overcapacity in canning plant (see 
Section 3.3.5), ensuring supply through the control of purse seine capacity (whether 
through direct ownership, effective control, financial linkages or medium-term supply 
contracts) is a major strategic consideration in the commodity chain. This explains 
why Heinz European Seafood/MW Brands was vertically integrated into fishing with 
the TTV fleet in Ghana and through control of Cobrecaf (see Section 3.4.3). However, 
this is far from a universal strategy in the industry. As we saw with the restructuring 
of the US-centred commodity chain in 1981-4, and as pointed out by a representative 
of an EU-centred firm specialising in the marketing of canned tuna: ‘why own boats 
when there is a global tuna price? Plus the risk taken if price drops?’ (EUInd#11). 
Given that it no longer had effective control over Cobrecaf, it is precisely this logic 
which seemed to push MW Brands to sell its share in late 2008. 
 
Flags of convenience 
A regulatory mechanism to reduce costs is to use non-EU flags, or flags of 
convenience (FOC). As a result of a decline in international tuna prices in the early 
1990s (Appendix Figure 2C.5),65 the then general manager of Saupiquet noted that ‘to 
reduce costs drastically’ some EU DWF owners transferred ‘to non EEC flags with 
less European crews’ (Antonietti 1993: 62). Combined with a strategy to increase 
catches, this resulted in an average cost saving of 15 to 20 percent for the French fleet. 
By 2008, the French DWF no longer used FOC, but Spanish boat owners used them 
widely (Table 2.3). All of Pevasa’s boats are Spanish-flagged; while 50 percent of 
Echebastar’s fleet are Seychelles-flagged which allows it to overcome the cap 
                                                            
64 It is not know if the fish was caught by Albacora vessels, but it is very likely. 
65 This was the result of the ‘tuna-dolphin issue’ in the US market in 1990. Consumption in the US 
declined because of the widely reported incidence of dolphin mortalities in the Eastern Tropical Pacific 
purse seine fishery – a major source of supply for the US-centred commodity chain.  
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imposed by the EU on the total size of its distant water fleet and also avoid several EU 
regulations. As one EU official put it ‘flags of convenience are much better because of 
less regulations’ (EUGvt#15).  Despite this, at least for the Spanish fleet and Mayotte-
flagged French vessels, ownership connections means that these FOC vessels are still 
supported by national producer organisations even if they are not formal members 
(EUInd#10). (See Chapter 6 for more on the use of Seychelles flags by some Spanish 
firms.) 
 
Raw material trade 
Boat owners do not wait to offload to sell their catch, they start negotiating while at 
sea (EUInd#11; #35; USInd#5; #10; #11). This is a complex process especially if the 
boat is only part of a small fleet and has limited bargaining power. Some of the 
Spanish firms own their own reefers, e.g. Atunsa has one reefer based in the WIO 
which can carry the catch of 1.5 purse seiners (EUInd#37), but except for a huge fleet 
such as Albacora, the volumes will always be relatively small and when that reefer is 
full and on route to a buyer, the firm must sell in-port either to local processors, cold 
stores or reefers. A key feature of the French DWF in the WIO is that, except for the 
Saupiquet fleet, all vessels were operationally managed by CMB and sell their catch 
to processors through the ‘Sovetco’ trading company (IntFS#37; #38; SGvt#14; 
Guillotreau and Le Roy 2000; Le Roy et al. 2008: 5; see Figure 2.5).  
 
Soveto is a public limited, not-for-profit entity that is ‘in charge of selling at the best 
price’ (EUInd#7). It buys at a provisional price and the final allocation depends upon 
actual sales (Josupeit 1993: 19). The scale of the collective sales of the vast majority 
of the French DWF gives Sovetco enhanced bargaining power. Sovetco sold solely to 
canneries in France in the 1960s when the French fleet and processors formed a clear 
national production system. By 1988 this was reduced to nominal amounts and instead 
the French DWF catch was sold around the world throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
albeit largely to EU-centred canneries based in Africa (EUInd#5; #38; #39; Le Roy 
2001: 4-5; Guillotreau and Le Roy 2008: 134; AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 28).66 For 
                                                            
66 France-based canners source their raw material internationally – mainly from Latin American and 
US fleets (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 95) – as whole tuna imports into the EU are not subject to tariffs or 
rules of origin if they are to be reprocessed into canned tuna (see Chapter 5 on tariff escalation in the 
EU tuna trade regime). Since the mid-1990s however, France-based canneries have relied increasingly 
on tuna loins (Section 3.3.3). 
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example, of total Sovetco trade flows from the WIO in the mid-2000s, less than 5 
percent went to France, 23 percent to Spain and Italy and 15 percent to Columbia (re-
exported to the EU as tuna loins, see Chapter 3). The vast majority of these flows was 
yellowfin; while the remaining catch (mainly skipjack) went to Thailand (around ten 
percent) and over 35 percent to WIO-based canneries (confidential industry data). 
Sovetco’s sales to Thailand-based processors are handled by a subsidiary called 
Interpral (IntFS#37; #38). Before the rapid rise of the Taiwanese fleet in the WCPO 
Interpral had a 20-30 percent share of the tuna trade with canneries in Thailand in the 
mid-1980s (Comitini 1987: 264), and in 1992 the EU DWF as a whole (including that 
registered as coming from ‘Seychelles’) still accounted for 20 percent of Thailand’s 
skipjack supply  (Sribhibhadh 1993: 28) 
 
The largest and fourth largest firms under ANABAC – Inpesca and Pevasa – use a 
cooperative trading arrangement through a non-profit entity called Peva Eche 
(EUInd#12). Peva Eche owns at least three reefers for the transhipment of its 
members’ catch (EUInd#40; EUGvt#15), thereby allowing the fish to be sold to the 
highest bidder rather than selling in-port.  According to one EU official, Peva Eche’s 
consolidation of catch for international trade gives its members a ‘more powerful 
structure, they’re less influenced by the canneries’ (EUGvt#15). Echebastar used to be 
included in this relationship but pulled out in September 2005 (EUInd#7; #40). Other 
ANABAC members simply trade their catch as individual firms (EUInd#12). The full 
details of OPAGAC trading arrangements are not known, but it is known that the 
Albacora Group sends around 40 percent of its fish to its own plant in Ecuador, its 
tropical Atlantic catch goes mainly to Spain and its WIO catch is mainly sold ‘locally’ 
(i.e. to Madagascar, Mauritius and  Seychelles) (EUInd#13–#15). Also, Calvo and 
Garavilla boats – while not active in the WIO – primarily supply their own plants 
(EUInd#16; #21; #22; see Section 3.3. and Table 3.2). Spain-based canneries invoice 
Spanish boat owners directly and there is little room for specialised trading 
companies, although Tri Marine does do some business there, albeit mainly supplying 
tuna loins (EUInd#17–#20; #55; #56). 
 
It appears that types of ownership influence, to a degree, the organisational structure 
of the EU DWF. On the one hand, ownership of the French DWF is highly 
concentrated and ‘collective’ in orientation. Boat owners cooperate very closely, both 
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through a complex interplay of ownership and control and mutual management in the 
case of the CMB-managed fleet, and through effective day-to-day cooperation in the 
context of the ORTHONGEL producer organisation (Direct observation in 2009; 
EUInd#5; #9).67 Relationships between ANABAC members, on the other hand, are 
reported to be marred by personal politics and histories, with the vast majority of boat 
owners originating from the small town of Bermeo, which has only 17,000 
inhabitants. Some interviewees even commented on the role of personal rivalries since 
school years and of inter-marriage between the families of ANABAC vessel owners 
as playing a dynamic part in inter-firm relationships (EuInd#51; #52). Members of the 
OPAGAC producer organisation, by contrast, are focussed on supplying their own 
processing facilities for the branded-manufacture of canned tuna. 
 
 
2.6 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter has made clear that the environmental conditions of production are the 
starting point of any analysis of capture fisheries. We saw how tuna biology in general 
and population dynamics in the WIO in particular determine the available range of 
business activities and industrial organisation of firms engaged in fishing for this 
species. We also saw how the relationship between cultures of consumption – the 
preference for skipjack or yellowfin – shape strategies of exploitation, with the 
smaller vessels of the French fleet placing greater emphasis on targeting this more 
valuable species. Conversely, the Spanish fleet has invested in larger boats to increase 
maximum fishing days per trip which brings with it additional pressure to reduce the 
risks of hunting for fish, including those associated with setting on free schools, which 
the introduction of FADs (sometimes supported by service vessels) since the 1990s 
seemed to have solved. However, the unintended consequences of these productivity 
enhancing measures appear to include negative effects on the environmental 
conditions of production. As we shall see in Chapter 4, disputes over the causes of 
declining catch rates have resulted in the impotence of the one institution in a position 
to regulate this fishery. 
  
                                                            
67 For example, the CEO of ORTHONGEL was a senior Saupiquet representative in 2009 despite its 
minority representation of the French DWF. 
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The periodisation developed in this chapter has outlined several dynamics of 
technological change and ‘territoriality’ in the fishing and processing nodes of the 
EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna. Driven by the imperatives of 
competitive accumulation, innovation in fishing technology and industrial 
organisation allowed the opening up over time of new commodity frontiers in tuna 
raw material: from the coastal waters of France and Spain to Portugal and North 
Africa from the 1880s to the early twentieth century, and from West Africa in the 
1950s to the Western Indian Ocean in the early 1980s. This was a necessary response 
to the market compulsion of following and extracting tuna raw material to supply the 
expanding market for canned tuna in Europe and elsewhere. Each of these capital 
flows was quickly followed by investment in new canning capacity, initially 
concentrated in the ‘big three’ French branded-manufacturers – Saupiquet, Pêche et 
Froid and Pêcheurs de France – the ‘lead firms’ of the time. The regulatory 
mechanism of French and then EU trade policies (see Chapter 5) allowed the spatial 
extension of the French ‘national’ production system. We also saw how technological 
and organisational innovations in fishing gear, refrigeration and reefer transhipment 
eventually allowed firms to overcome all prior limits to geographical distance and 
organic durability in the global commodity chain. As Chapter 3 shows, the rise of 
export-orientated Taiwanese and South Korean purse seine fleets and emergence of 
reefer transhipment laid the basis for important shifts in the global commodity chain, 
especially the emergence of Thailand as the world’s most important location of 
canned tuna production. 
 
Concentration in the processing node of the France-centred commodity chain was met 
by concentration in the fishing node, which became dominated by four main firms 
Cobrecaf, France Thon, Saupiquet and CMB. Similarly, Soveto was established 
explicitly as a source of collective bargaining power with the ‘big three’ French 
manufacturers. This trend is an example of the ‘cascade effect’: where lead firms 
‘stimulated industrial concentration across the whole supply chain’ (Nolan et al. 2008; 
see also, Hymer 1975; Gibbon and Ponte 2005).  However, the French national 
production system was also influenced by dynamics at the world scale. Changes in the 
US national production system in the early 1980s led to Heinz turning its commercial 
gaze to France and, eventually, the UK. Heinz already had a foothold in Cobrecaf 
since the mid-1960s, but we saw how it took effective control of the lead firm in the 
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French fleet in the mid-1990s so as to ensure strategic supply for Heinz European 
Seafood.  
 
The Spanish DWF is far more fragmented, not only in terms of ownership and 
control, but also in terms of the main model of industrial organisation, with 
specialised boat-owning firms grouped in the ANABAC production organisation and 
firms vertically-integrated into branded-manufacturing in OPAGAC. While this 
weakens the full collective potential of the Spanish fleet’s lobby power in some fora, 
it does cooperate effectively against ‘external’ threats to its position, such as changes 
to trade rules (Chapter 5) or relations with the Seychelles state (Chapter 6). Moreover, 
the sub-national politics of the ‘home’ region of this fleet in the Basque Country gives 
it additional political leverage in Madrid and Brussels, connecting with the GPN 
emphasis on the role of social and territorial embeddedness of commodity chains. As 
with the French DWF, we were able to identify the most important players in the 
Spanish purse seine fleet at both the global scale and in the Western Indian Ocean 
region (i.e. Albacora, Inpesca, Atunsa, Echebastar and Pevasa). While the French 
production system was geographically extended from as early as the 1950s to 
incorporate francophone West Africa, similarly protected by high tariff peaks, the 
Spanish production system continued to grow domestically until it would become by 
far the most important production location in the EU-centred commodity chain, as 
Chapter 3 explores.  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Manufacturing and Retail of Canned Tuna in the EU-
centred Commodity Chain: Firm Activities, Concentration and 
Business Strategies, 1990s-2000s    
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter engages with the ‘classic’ concerns of GCC analysis – manufacturing and 
retail activities and vertical relationships between these two nodes, particularly the role of 
‘supermarket power’. The analysis continues to be framed by an appreciation of the 
historical formation of the EU-centred commodity chain and emphases horizontal – or 
intra-nodal – competition among branded-firms and among supermarkets and its effects. 
The following account starts in the 1980s with the reconfigurations in the global 
commodity chain outlined in the last chapter, especially overcapacity in the global purse 
seine fleet and the wider effects of the recession in the US-centred chain. Historically and 
analytically the focus is on the EU-centred chain and shifts in the international division of 
labour in the 1990s and 2000s, which is followed by a detailed account of corporate 
concentration and competition in the latter decade. The primary purpose is to identify and 
explain lead firms and dynamics of ‘drivenness’ in the chain. Secondary purposes are to 
highlight the importance of regulatory mechanisms (especially the EU tuna trade regime, 
Chapter 5) and the industrial organisation and business strategies of Heinz European 
Seafood/ MW Brands, which controls the tuna cannery in Seychelles (Chapter 6). 
 
The first section develops a typology of firms in tuna processing and offers a basic 
account of differences in principal EU markets for canned tuna. Section 2.3 focuses on 
the international division of labour, delineating dynamics according to the French and 
Spanish ‘national’ production systems and extra-EU locations of production primarily 
engaged in supplying the EU market. This section argues that the EU tuna trade regime 
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directly shapes this division of labour and that the dispersal of export-orientated canned 
tuna production is of considerable benefit to buyers at branded-firms and supermarkets. 
 
The third section (3.4) focuses on the branded-manufacturing node of the commodity 
chain, starting with a detailed account of Heinz’s initial entry into the EU-centred chain 
in 1981 through its purchase of a major French branded-processor and its eventual take-
over of leading brands in Italy and the UK in the mid-1990s. In addition to brand 
ownership, the analysis places particular emphasis on Heinz’s backward integration into 
the fishing node and on its manufacturing strategy based on factories in Ghana and 
Seychelles. This is followed by an explanation of Heinz’s sale of its European tuna 
business in 2006 to an investment fund controlled by Lehman Brothers and the effects of 
this shift in ownership on business strategy. This firm-centred account continues into the 
next section with an overview of the horizontal competitive conditions in which Heinz 
European Seafood’s successor – MW Brands – operates. Lead branded-firms in the 
principal EU markets are identified and similarities and differences are highlighted. A 
short sub-section on non-branded manufacturers follows as these firms are important 
suppliers to supermarkets for their own-brand (‘private label’) canned tuna. 
 
The role of supermarkets in the principal EU markets for canned tuna and their 
relationship to branded-firms is discussed in Section 3.5, starting with a general overview 
of supermarket power and the retail distribution of canned tuna, and followed by an 
account of this market power based upon relative levels of supermarket and branded-firm 
concentration. This sub-section shows that the tendency to supermarket power cannot be 
generalised across EU principal markets as important differences are demonstrated. This 
section ends with a focus on the UK market to discuss two important elements: the 
commercial implications of oligopolistic relationships in branding and retail and the 
impact of intra-nodal competition in retail on downgrading/upgrading for locations of 
production in the global South. Section 3.6 summaries the chapter and offers some 
concluding reflections on conditions of competition, lead firms and ‘drivenness’ in the 
EU-centred commodity chain. Substantial supplementary material is provided in the 
appendices to this chapter which serve to support empirically several statements made in 
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the main body, including the canned tuna production process (Appendix 3A) and the 
comparative cost structure of locations of tuna processing (Appendix 3B). 
 
 
3.2 The EU-centred Commodity Chain in Canned Tuna: Definitional Issues 
 
3.2.1  Typology of tuna processing firms  
 
This sub-section lays out a typology of firms involved in the processing node of the 
commodity chain. It draws upon interviews in 12 countries with representatives of 21 
firms directly involved in the processing of canned tuna.1 The purpose is to situate the 
industrial organisation of the branded-manufacturing firm most important to this thesis – 
MW Brands (Heinz European Seafood prior to 2006) – in comparative context. Two 
main categories of firms are identified, branded-firms and non-branded manufacturers, 
each with two sub-categories. 
 
Branded-Firms 
There are two main types of branded-firms in the canned tuna GCC: 
1. Full branded-manufacturers are often also integrated backward into fishing; these 
firms rely in large part on own-manufacturing for supply. This category of firm 
also normally sources product from non-branded manufacturers (see below). The 
primary commercial rationale for (part) ownership of processing facilities is to 
produce for their brands. But these facilities also process ‘private label’ (or 
‘supermarket own-brand’) products. Heinz European Seafood/ MW Brands is the 
closest example of this type of firm discussed in this thesis.  
                                                     
1 Interviews in Fiji in 2006 (Pafco), France in 2007 and 2009, Mauritius in 2007, the Netherlands in 2010, 
Seychelles in 2006 and 2009 and the UK in 2007 (Princes, MW Brands), Mauritius in 2007 (Thon des 
Mascareignes), Japan in 2006 (Hagoromo), Papua New Guinea in 2006 (RD Tuna Canners, Frabelle, 
Southseas Tuna Corporation), Singapore in 2009 (Tri Marine), Solomon Islands in 2005 (Soltai), Spain in 
2010 (Calvo, Jealsa Rianxeira, Garavilla, Salica), Thailand in 2006 (Thai Union, Kingfisher, JMB 
International, StarKist, Tri Marine, Maldives Industrial Fishing Company), and the United States in 2006 
(Bumble Bee, Chicken of the Sea, StarKist). See Appendix 1A for detail. 
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2. Marketing companies generally rely on non-branded manufacturers and contract 
processors to supply their branded product (see below). The strategic focus is on 
marketing and total supply chain management/coordination, and profits derive 
primarily from the rent from the brand. Princes and Bolton Group are the closest 
to this type of firm discussed is this thesis, although both do also own processing 
facilities. 
 
Non-Branded Manufactures 
This category of firm may own a ‘brand’, but it would normally be orientated to the 
domestic or other minor sub-regional markets. Local brands tend to contain lower quality 
product (i.e. dark meat, see Appendix 3A.2), which is not suitable for principal market 
consumer ‘tastes’. While often important to the profitability of these firms’ particular 
production models (i.e. it allows the maximum utilisation of the fish), these minor brands 
are not important to the GCC as a whole, and as such are not considered here. There are 
two sub-categories of this type of manufacturer: 
1. Referred to as ‘co-packers’ by US industry,2 non-branded manufacturers receive 
a contract to produce private label (supermarket own-brand) and/or principal 
market brands according to buyer specifications. Sometimes they are integrated 
backward into fishing and therefore active participants in the chain, from fishing 
through to eventual sales to importing firms in principal markets. Jealsa in Spain 
and RDTC in PNG are the closest to this type. Thai Union used to be in this 
category until it bought the US Chicken of the Sea brand in 2000 and, in July 
2010, MW Brands. 
2. Contract processors never own the fish. Instead, tuna trading companies normally 
play a central role in terms of supply, procurement and, in some cases onward 
sales of finished product (loins and canned). Two state-owned enterprises, Pafco 
in Fiji and Soltai in Solomon Islands,3 fit this category in their processing 
                                                     
2As argued by one very experienced Thai industry representative: ‘“Co-Packing” [as a term] is only really 
used to denote someone supplying fish and you just “pack”, such as Pafco’ (TInd#8). 
3 Each was initially established as a joint-venture with Japanese multinationals in the 1970s. 
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contracts with the US branded-manufacturer Bumble Bee and the specialised tuna 
trading companies Tri Marine and FCF respectively. 
 
 
3.2.2 Principal EU markets for canned tuna 
 
There are important similarities and differences among EU principal markets for canned 
tuna. Spain, Italy, the UK and France are all above the EU15 annual average per capita 
consumption of canned tuna, which was 1.53kg in 2000/25. Germany registered only the 
tenth largest per capita consumption, but because of the sheer size of the market (the fifth 
largest in the EU15 in absolute terms), it is considered here as one of the five principal 
EU markets.   
 
 
Table 3.1: Canned tuna consumption per capita by principal EU market, mid-
1970s-2008 
 Mid-
1970s 
(kg) 
1980 
(kg) 
1985 
(kg) 
1990 
(kg) 
2003 
(kg) 
2008 
(kg) 
2005 
consumption, 
in tons# 
Spain 1.9 2.0 -- 3.7 2.79 3.1** 143,000 
Italy 1.1 1.5 1.5 2.4 2.24 2.33 138,000 
UK 0.02* 0.4 0.54 1.7 -- 2.15 129,000 
France 1.6 2.0 1.1 2.4 2.21 1.93 128,000 
Germany 0.35 0.5 0.29 0.9 0.87 -- 61,000 
* average over 1969-1974; ** 2007; #Total EU15 consumption of canned tuna (net weight) was 690,000mt. 
Sources: Data for mid-1970s from Fisheries Development Ltd (c.1975/6: 43-6); for 1980 and 1990 from 
Josupeit (1993: 1); for 1985 from Elsy (1987: 94); 2003 from Trovamala (2004: 112); 2008 from Commere 
(2009); all other data Valsecchi (2007: 143). 
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Differentiation between EU15 markets is based upon two main criteria. The first is 
between import dependent markets, such as the UK and Germany, and countries where 
domestically-based firms produce a large proportion of national supply (Spain and Italy). 
France is an intermediate market under this criterion having long combined domestic 
production with a national production system that incorporated Senegal and, then, Cote 
d’Ivoire. In 2002, for the first time the majority source of supply for the EU15 volume 
market for canned tuna shifted from domestic production to imports from extra-EU 
countries (Figure 3.1). The declining share of domestic production of total EU supply 
stabilised in 2004 at around 45 percent, but as illustrated in Figure 3.1, this was of 
considerably larger absolute market volume. Behind this broad trend are significant 
losses in market share for canned tuna production based in France and Italy, but not for 
the major Spanish processors which have successfully expanded their export markets in 
Italy and France (see below). 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Domestic production vs. imports in total supply of canned tuna to EU, 
1996-2008 
 
Source: author’s calculations based on Commere (2009) 
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The second criterion of differentiation of EU markets is by product type, already noted in 
Chapter 2. The southern European market can be typified by consumption of canned 
yellowfin in olive oil (especially Italy and Spain), and Northern Europe by lower cost 
skipjack canned in brine or vegetable oil where competition is primarily on price rather 
than quality (especially in Germany). Again, France straddles this second criterion as an 
‘intermediate’ market in terms of product quality, where the main product is ‘raw pack’ 
or thon au naturel (tuna in brine that is only cooked once, in the can, see Appendix 3A.2). 
As we shall see, the five principal EU markets are structured by varying degrees of 
corporate concentration by major canned tuna branded-firms and by supermarkets. 
 
 
3.3   The EU-centred Commodity Chain and the International Division of Labour in 
the 1990s and 2000s 
 
Canned tuna manufacturing centred on EU markets can be broadly categorised as that 
based around ‘national’ production systems in Spain, Italy and France, and extra-EU 
production focussed on the main import markets in the UK, France and Germany. These 
two categories of production locations are shaped both by the competitive conditions of 
the new international division of labour of manufacturing in the global South (imported 
‘loins’ for EU-based production and competing export-oriented firms) and the regulatory 
mechanism of EU tariffs and trade preferences. As we shall show here and expand upon 
in Chapter 5, the EU national production system is a central political-economic 
justification for the maintenance of high tuna tariffs, despite opposition from other EU 
member states, which in turn shapes the conditions of production for extra-EU export-
orientated production. In other words, without successful national production systems 
within the EU the commercial logic for tariffs and thus trade preferences is largely 
eroded. 
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3.3.1  Overview of the EU-centred commodity chain in the 1980s 
 
In the search for new commodity frontiers the EU tuna fleet moved southwards from the 
Bay of Biscay to West Africa in the 1950s and the Western Indian Ocean in the early 
1980s. As we saw in Chapter 2, the blue revolution, colonialism and post-colonial trade 
preferences facilitated the creation of canning capacity in coastal areas in these two 
regions of Africa. Factories in Dakar, Senegal and Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire were 
established by the ‘big three’ French branded-processors – Saupiquet, Pêche et Froid and 
Pêcheurs de France, all of which were integrated backward into fishing through the 
ownership of purse seiners and each also had a cannery in France.4 By the end of the 
1980s, Pêche et Froid and Pêcheurs de France had also established new factories in 
Seychelles and Madagascar respectively.  In 1991 their shares of the French canned tuna 
market were Saupiquet (23.5 percent), Paul Paulet (16.8 percent, owned by Heinz, see 
below), Pêcheurs de France (4.6 percent) and Pêche et Froid (4.2 percent), although the 
last had a leading (and growing) share of the French supermarket own-brand (‘private 
label’) market (Josupeit 1993: 27). Raw material supply for these France-centred 
canneries and for production in Spain, Italy and France (see Figure 3.2) was supplied by 
the highly concentrated French DWF and the more fragmented Spanish fleet. 
  
                                                     
4 Along with Paul Paulet/Heinz which owns the Petit Naivre brand (see below), these were the largest four 
of 19 tuna canneries based in France in 1991 (Josupeit 19993: 24). 
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Figure 3.2: Global canned tuna production by major producing country (in mt) 
 
 
Source: Globefish 2006: 78-9 
 
In parallel to these developments in the French and Spanish ‘national’ production 
systems, the growing demand for canned tuna elsewhere in Western Europe was being 
met by Japan, which dominated the UK and German import markets in the 1970s 
(Fisheries Development Ltd. c.1975/6: 43). When Japanese canned tuna production ‘first 
started it was export orientated, then we started focusing on the domestic market’ 
(JInd#2; #3). Throughout the early 1980s Japan was the second largest producer of 
canned tuna in the after world the US (Figure 3.2; King 1987b). Unlike the US though, 
Japanese canned tuna production was partly export-orientated: at the peak of its 
production volume, in 1984, 35 percent was exported (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 44, 31, 
43; Ashenden and Kitson 1987a: 246-7, 1987b: 118). Japan accounted for over 50 percent 
of the UK market for canned tuna in 1978 and continued as one of the leading supplying 
countries until 1985. In (then) West Germany, Japan also led the market in 1971 with 81 
percent share, but was displaced by Taiwan which supplied 64 percent in 1980 but began 
to decline afterwards (Elsy 1987: 96; Josupeit 1993: 28; AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 57).  
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Japan and Taiwan’s decline was paralleled by Thailand’s rise. Australian and Japanese 
investment in canned tuna production in Thailand began in the early 1970s, including by 
the sogo shosha (giant trading companies) Mitsui and Mitsubishi (see below on the latter 
firm). Foreign capital flowed there because of its relatively low-wages, liberal economic 
environment and government incentives.5 Thailand also benefitted from the rise of tuna 
transhipment on reefers and the emergence of new commodity frontiers in the WIO and 
the WCPO in the early 1980s; ‘a whole industry was built on low-priced skipjack’ 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 17; TInd#2–#4; #8). In 1985 Thailand overtook Japan as the 
world’s largest exporter and in 1986 became the second largest producer 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 44, 51; Figure 3.2).6 By the late 1980s exports from Thailand 
accounted for almost 60 percent of the UK market and the UK was its second most 
important market after the US (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 29, 60, 101). These export-
orientated manufacturers were  competing for share of a global import market for canned 
tuna worth US$ 419.8 million in 1985, rising to US$ 1,578.7 million in 1994, and U$ 
3,170.3 million in 2004 (Globefish 2006: 64-6). The principal import markets are the US 
and EU, with the latter valued at €1,666.4 million in 2004 (see Table 3.2 below). Western 
Europe was the driver of growth in the export-orientated global commodity chain in the 
1980s with imports of 9.4 million standard cases of canned tuna in 1984 rising to 21.3 
million cases in 1989 (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 90). 
 
With the restructuring of the US-centred commodity chain in 1981-84 (Chapter 2), the 
US production system fragmented: branded-manufactures divested financial connections 
with the US purse seine fleet and increasingly relied on imported canned light-meat, ‘co-
packed’ by non-branded manufacturers in Thailand.7 By the late 1980s the US was 
                                                     
5 For detailed analysis of Thailand’s historical emergence and competitive advantages in the global canned 
tuna industry, see Campling et al (2007: 336-350), Campling and Doherty (2007) and Crough (1987a, 
1987b). 
6 Japan’s declining canned tuna production into the 1990s and 2000s was dominated by branded-firms 
(especially Hagoromo) solely supplying the domestic market (Campling et al 2007: 264-270; Ashenden 
and Kitson 1986: 17, 75-6). 
7 US production is exclusively for domestic consumption, and even though the US (mainland and overseas 
territories) was one of the largest canners in the world into the 2000s, it relies on additional supply from 
low cost regions either through long running relationships with non-branded manufacturers or through US 
industry-owned or managed production (see Appendix 3.D for an overview of the US industry in the mid-
2000s). 
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Thailand’s largest export market, followed by the UK and West Germany; at this time 
Thailand had the largest share in all three of these major import markets 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 60, 31). In 1991, Thailand alone accounted for 40 percent of 
canned tuna exports to Europe (Josupeit 1993: 8). Despite their successes, Thai non-
branded manufacturers were unable to penetrate the main other European canned tuna 
markets in the 1980s (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 31), primarily because highly protected 
French, Italian and Spanish branded-firms already had sufficient productive capacity 
domestically and, for the French, in Africa too. 
 
In short, Thailand’s rise to become the largest producer of canned tuna in the world in the 
1980s cannot be explained simply as an uncontested outcome of the new international 
division of labour in manufacturing, not least because France, Italy, Japan, the US and 
increasingly Spain continued to be major producers into the 2000s, protected behind 
significant tariff barriers (see Chapter 5 on the EU and Campling et al.  2007: 12-21 on 
the US and Japan). Thailand did, however, temporarily become the lead supplier in EU 
import markets. But as we shall see, the combination of EU protectionism and 
interconnected preferential trade arrangements and investment in Africa and Latin 
America soon eroded Thailand’s lead position and continued to shape significantly the 
geography of the EU-centred commodity chain in the 2000s. 
 
 
3.3.2  EU ‘national’ production systems in the 1990s and 2000s 
 
Ownership of canned tuna production in France and Spain has become progressively 
concentrated. The number of tuna canneries in Spain shrank from 463 in 1974 to 187 by 
1987 (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 107). While by the late 2000s only a handful of Spanish 
firms dominated production there (Section 3.4.1), the industry ‘continued to be very 
divided between small firms’: 
The future of small firms is concentration, with a focus on only one centre 
of production. The small fishing canneries of Galicia and the Basque 
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Country and small brands are already gone. It is clear that this will deepen. 
(EUInd#16; see also ANFACO 2010 data; EUInd#55) 
The French industry has already been through this transition. The number of canning 
firms based there declined from around 200 in the 1950s to only 18 factories by 2002 
(Catarchi 2004: 23; Le Roy 2008: 130-1). In the 1980s the key players were ‘the big 
three’ firms engaged in Africa plus Paul Paulet, but by the 2000s only three firms 
remained – Heinz (Paul Paulet), Bolton Group (Saupiquet) and Thunnus Overseas Group 
(see below), none owned by French capital.  
 
Spain is the most important producer of canned tuna within the EU, accounting for 59 
percent of production in 1998 and 68 percent in 2007. It is also the world’s second largest 
producer of canned tuna after Thailand, having overtaken the US in 2004. Spain’s 
production peaked in 2002 at 251,000mt; it has since declined, but production in 2007 at 
216,400mt was still 13,000mt higher than in 1998 (Figure 3.3). Given highly competitive 
conditions in the Spanish market, this indicates the effectiveness of tariff protection and 
the various productivity-enhancing strategies of firms (see below). Italy is the second 
largest producer in the EU (Figure 3.3), but production is traditionally for domestic 
consumption and is in significant decline, from 24 percent of total EU production in 1998 
to 19 percent in 2007.8 Canneries based in Spain are leading suppliers to the Italian 
market (Section’s 3.4.1 and 3.5.1). As such, production in Italy is not significant for the 
focus of the thesis and so is not considered further.  
 
While France is the minor player of the three EU ‘national’ production systems it is 
important both to the business strategy of Heinz/MW Brands which owns a processing 
facility there and to extra-EU imports from the ACP (see below), and is thus of greater 
significance to the thesis. Production in France has remained relatively stable, falling 
from 12 percent of the total in 1998 to 10 percent in 2007.9 Importantly, ready-made tuna 
salads constituted 70 percent of all domestic production of ‘ambient’ tuna products in 
                                                     
8 Italy did start to export to other EU markets in 2005 (see Table 3.2 below). 
9 The fourth location of EU production is Portugal, which had a six percent share of the EU total in 1998, 
falling to four percent in 2007. 
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France in 2002 (Catarci 2004: 23).10 This aspect neatly encapsulates the international 
division of labour in tuna processing: this product type is considerably more profitable 
because of the significantly reduced use of the highest cost raw material (the tuna itself, 
see Appendix 3B), and is the main explanation for the survival of ‘ambient’ tuna 
production in France. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Canned tuna production in Spain, Italy and France, 1976-2007  
 
Note: EU production excludes Portugal 
Sources: FAO Fishstat+ and Globefish (2010: 75) 
 
 
All of the top five Spanish firms have at least two processing facilities based in Spain 
(see Sections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 on these firms). In general terms, the basic business model 
for each firm is to have one plant specialised in the production of canned tuna, and the 
other in various seafood products; although some firms have shifted production of the 
latter overseas in recent years (i.e. Jealsa and Garavilla). The comparative cost structure 
                                                     
10 In the UK, ‘ambient’ product (‘shelf-stable’ in the US) refers to traditional canned products, as well as 
tuna in pouches and other so-called ‘value-added’ tuna products that can be kept in nonrefrigerated 
conditions for long periods of time (i.e. on the supermarket shelf). 
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of canned tuna production in Spain is reduced through a number of business strategies 
and competitive advantages. These revolve around fish purchasing strategy and recovery 
rates, automation, competitiveness on cans, and ‘the logic of loining’.  
 
Relatively high labour costs in the EU mean that cannery managers require large sized 
whole round fish (e.g. yellowfin over 10kg) to enhance labour productivity through high 
recovery rates: the average recovery rate for a large yellowfin is 48.5 percent, but it can 
reportedly go up to 51 percent, whereas for skipjack it ranges from 37-40 percent 
(EUInd#23; #24; #55). In other words, unlike factories in relatively low wage sites of 
production, EU industry pays greater attention to the ratio of labour time/cost to fish 
yield. In Thailand, for example, more effort is placed on gaining additional yield by 
‘throwing labour’ at the process because ‘a one percent better yield directly translates to a 
one percent increase in profit margin’ (EUInd#11; broadly confirmed by IntFS#3; #5; 
PICInd#45–#47 and direct observation, canneries in Thailand and Spain, 2006 and 2010). 
Given relatively high wages compared to locations of production in the global South, 
Spanish industry unsurprisingly also invests heavily in the automation of production 
wherever possible and cost effective, and is a world leader in advanced process 
technology (Valsecchi 2006: 141; Eurofish Magazine 2010). However, as discussed in 
Appendix 3A.2, the lack of uniformity in fish size prevents mechanised butchering, so 
this element of production necessitates ‘living’ labour-power. 
 
A major competitive advantage of Spanish industry is the industrial cluster in Galicia. 
This region is home to a wide range of seafood canning firms (66 of a national total of 
147 companies), including the five major branded- and non-branded-manufacturers 
detailed below. Historically and today, these are mainly family owned companies (Table 
3.2; Josupeit 1993: 48; Alimarket 2010; EUInd#13–#16; #21–#24; #55; #56). As a result 
of this distinctive combination of fragmented ownership and geographical clustering, 
Galicia-based canneries benefit from locally-based, sharply competing can-producing 
firms and thus have ready access to relatively low priced cans (EUInd#23; #24).11  
                                                     
11 Including the multinational firm CarnaudMetalbox; the French multinational Impress, which bought a 
small Spanish firm (‘Megasa’) in 2009 and which also has a close relationship with Heinz/MW Brands (see 
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Spanish firms also benefit from the specificity of the Spanish and Italian market 
‘preference’ for 80gm sized cans, which compare with 185gm size in the UK.12 With 
relatively low steel prices in Spain compared to import-dependent developing countries 
and a higher ratio of tinplate per volume of drained weight tuna (1: 1.8g of fish, 
compared to 1: 4.3gm for 185gm size cans), Spanish firms are well positioned to fend off 
competition from the global South. In other words, margins are based on the size of the 
can, smaller cans are more profitable because tuna raw material – the most expensive 
input13 – costs the same per gram. This is what Brus (2004: 120) calls the ‘Tinplate-Tuna 
factor’ – a business advantage that was confirmed in multiple interviews (EUInd#57 –
#60; TInd#9; USInd#18).  As one industry representative put it:  
This is a major source of protection for the EU industry versus the Thais –
national specialities of various products. They’re different in France, Spain 
and Italy, which would push Thai production line costs right up. 
(EUInd#55)  
In addition, as the EU is a large (and highly subsidised) producer of olive oil, this packing 
medium is readily available domestically. These economies of scale and the purchase of 
large fish explain why the Spanish production system survives in the face of duty-free 
imports from the ACP and elsewhere. 
 
 
3.3.3  The ‘logic of loining’ in the 1990s and 2000s 
 
Before moving to specific components of the EU-import market for canned tuna it is 
essential to emphasise the strategic commercial importance of trade preferences to the 
ACP and Andean countries. Exports of canned tuna and tuna loins from the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) to the EU benefit from duty-free access 
                                                                                                                                                              
Chapter 6); and, Mivisa, Spain's leading manufacturer of tinplate cans for the food industry and the third 
largest in Europe (EUInd#23; #24; company websites). 
12 Around 80 percent of tuna sold in Italy is in cluster packs of two to four cans, which is almost equally 
divided between 170g and 80g sizes (Brus 2002: 95). In Spain, almost 95 percent of product is sold in 
80gm cans (Brus 2004: 120). 
13 See discussions in Appendices 2C.1 and 3B. 
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subject to rules of origin and other conditions. The Andean countries of Latin America 
also receive duty free market access, subject to slightly stricter rules of origin, under the 
EU’s Generalised System of Preferences Plus (GSP+). Other developing countries only 
benefit from the EU’s standard GSP, which imposes a tariff of 20.5 percent; and if a 
country cannot meet the GSP rules of origin (as with tuna raw material supplied by the 
Taiwanese and other non-EU fleets to Thailand), then the ‘most-favoured nation’ tariff of 
24 percent is applied. (This regulatory mechanism is the subject of Chapter 5.) The 
competitive advantage of this trade preference is made clear when comparing the 
estimated full manufacturing cost per case (48 cans) by region of production with the 
landed cost in the EU (Appendix 3B). On a three-year average, full manufacturing cost 
per case is around US$ 25 in Southeast Asia and $32 in the Indian Ocean ACP. The 
average EU customs duty of US$ 6 applied to Southeast Asian product (plus freight) is 
thus a fundamental competitive advantage for the ACP. As will be argued in detail in 
Chapter 5, the regulatory mechanism of EU trade preferences is perhaps the most 
important factor in explaining the location of canned tuna production in coastal areas of 
the ACP (or their ‘upgrading’). 
 
Cleaning and butchering the fish into loins is the most labour-intensive process of canned 
tuna production (Appendices 3A and 3B). To reduce labour-power costs in canneries 
based in France and Italy, firm managers began to import vacuum-packed frozen tuna 
loins in the mid-1990s; these are defrosted and packed into cans. By 2005 loins 
constituted the majority of raw material imports in both of these countries. The Spanish 
began to follow suit in the early 2000s (Figure 3.4).14 The ‘logic of loining’ is a reflection 
of the international division of labour as canned tuna manufacturers search for low wage 
cost sites of production for labour intensive aspects of the production process.15 It is 
however, not solely a question of international wage differentials, but also one of 
                                                     
14 EU import data for loins for reprocessing underestimate actual flows as customs agencies often count 
them as canned tuna as they receive the same tariff treatment (IntFS#22). 
15 The only remaining cannery on the US mainland relies exclusively on imported loins for tuna raw 
material. It can be categorised as a ‘canning only’ plant (interviews, US, 2006; direct observation, Bumble 
Bee cannery, Sante Fe Springs, 2006; for an overview of its production model, see Campling et al 2007: 
285-288). There is also an increase in demand by the remaining canneries based in Japan for tuna loins. 
One industry manager stated that ‘loins are a logical choice for Japanese production in the future’ (JInd#2; 
#3). 
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production efficiencies as more loins can be stored in available cold storage than whole 
tuna and production capacity can be more quickly met because they simply need to be 
defrosted rather than butchered first. Transportation costs are also reduced as firms are 
not importing ‘waste’ (EUInd#17–#20; #23; #24; #55; #56; IntFS#2).  
 
As with the formerly French-owned canneries in West Africa, imported loins are a major 
direct interaction between EU national production systems and extra-EU locations of 
production. This has resulted in a number of specialised loin processing facilities being 
established in coastal tropical regions, including direct investment in loining facilities in 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala and Mauritius by Spanish firms (see below). Imported 
loins are subject to the exact same tariffs and trade preference as canned tuna, which 
explains Spanish investment in these GSP+ and ACP countries. EU-based processors also 
procure loins under supply contracts, such as with the tuna trading company Tri Marine 
International, the primary supplier of loins to the Bolton Group’s factory in Italy and a 
major supplier to Spain. It manages or effectively controls loining plants in Kenya, 
Solomon Islands and Trinidad and Tobago, all of which benefit from the ACP preference.  
 
In 2005, 58.9 percent of EU loin imports were sourced from GSP+ countries, and 16.2 
percent from the ACP (based on Globefish 2006: 36).16 This tendency is met by 
important counter-tendencies. While Spanish firms want to reduce the scope of their 
production in Spain they have encountered opposition from trade unions and the Spanish 
Department of Labour and Works (IntFS#22). In addition, unlike in France and Italy, 
production in Spain is unlikely to become ‘canning only’ (i.e. based on the import of all 
raw material as loins). As noted, the optimum production strategy of some Spanish 
canneries is to process big yellowfin from whole round fish and, because it is a smaller 
fish, skipjack from loins (the labour time/cost-fish yield ratio). In addition, there are 
specialised firms that produce fresh loins from butchering the fish in Spain, reportedly 
run by owners of the Spanish DWF (EUInd#17–#20; #23; #24; #55; #56; direct 
                                                     
16 Due to the relatively high cost of labour in Seychelles and a controversial exclusivity agreement with 
Heinz (see Chapter 6), it has not significantly interacted with this segment of the EU-centred commodity 
chain. 
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observation, Jealsa cannery, 2010). This results in a product of higher quality as there is 
no need to freeze and defrost the fish.  
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Figure 3.4: Selected EU imports of tuna and tuna loins for canning, 1988-2005 
 
 
 
Source: GLOBEFISH database   
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3.3.4  The EU import market for canned tuna, 1990s-2000s 
 
We have identified the role of French investment in canneries in West Africa and the 
Indian Ocean, and pointed out the importance of imported tuna loins to the EU 
production system since the mid-1990s. This section establishes shifts in share of 
locations of EU-centred canned tuna production from the late 1980s to 2009.  
 
The EU import market for canned tuna was valued at €1551.1 million in 2006, rising 
from ECU323.5 million in 1988 (Table 3.2). The top six principal markets accounted for 
almost 90 percent of EU15 volume imports in 2005: the UK 21 percent, France 19 
percent, Italy 18 percent, Germany 13 percent, Spain 11 percent and the Netherlands 8 
percent (FAO Fish Stat+ 2007). As we saw in Section 3.3.1, Japan used to be the main 
supplying country, but was displaced by Thailand in the 1980s. Table 3.2 details the 
changing share of the EU volume market for imported canned tuna by supplying country 
over the period 1988-2009. Suppliers include the top-ten non-EU producing countries and 
the main three producing countries involved in intra-EU trade (Spain, France and, from 
2005, Italy). Several broad trends are identified (all data are based on Table 3.2 unless 
otherwise specified). 
 
The most important regulatory aspect of the EU canned tuna import market is the trade 
regime. Spain first dominated the EU import market in 2009 with a 14 percent share, 
demonstrating the importance of tariff protection for the EU-based production system. 
Except for the three Southeast Asian countries (Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia) 
which only potentially benefit from the EU’s standard GSP (subject to rules of origin), all 
other non-EU supplier countries have duty free access to the EU market (ACP and GSP+ 
preferences).17 
 
For francophone West Africa, average annual share of the EU import volume market 
from 1988 to 1991 was almost 40 percent; 27 percent Cote d’Ivoire and 12 percent 
                                                     
17 Note that the ACP arrangement changed to sub-regional Interim Economic Partnership Agreements 
(IEPAs) in 2008, but the preference regime remained largely the same (see Chapter 5). 
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Senegal. France was consistently the principal market for this production. As noted in 
Chapter 2, French investment shifted with the centre of EU DWF operations from 
Senegal to Cote d’Ivoire in the 1970s. Senegal’s share of the EU market consistently 
declined year-on-year throughout the period 1988-2009 and its absolute volume of 
exports declined similarly. This was in spite of receiving export subsidies from the 
Senegalese government to the tune of 10 percent of the value of canned tuna exports 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 122). Cote d’Ivoire is a different story: while its relative share 
declined from the mid-1990s onwards, its absolute volume was relatively stable until the 
mid-2000s (averaging 46,600mt between 1995-2004), but declining then onwards 
(average production of 33,800mt between 2005-9).  
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Table 3.2: Share of EU import market for canned tuna by supplier country, every third year, 1988-2009 (all in % of volume 
market unless otherwise specified)* 
 Tariff regime 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 
 Spain   N/A 3.3 5.4 5.0 10.4 14.8 10.3 12.0 14.1 
 Ecuador   GSP+ 0.2 1.5 2.4 4.0 5.3 7.0 10.8 12.2 
 Thailand   GSP 22.0 21.1 19.7 12.0 6.4 9.1 14.5 12.0 
 Philippines   GSP 1.9 4.1 7.2 7.5 7.9 8.0 7.9 10.3 
 Seychelles   ACP 3.4 3.2 2.1 4.8 11.0 10.6 10.3 8.1 
 Mauritius   ACP 2.9 2.8 2.6 3.5 4.2 5.9 6.5 6.8 
 Côte d'Ivoire   ACP 29.8 24.1 20.3 14.2 11.9 8.7 5.4 6.0 
 Ghana   ACP 0.2 0.0 1.1 6.6 6.4 5.9 4.4 5.1 
 France   N/A 5.1 2.4 1.7 3.4 3.3 4.4 2.4 2.3 
 Italy   N/A * * * * * * 2.8 2.1 
 Indonesia   GSP 0.9 1.6 2.1 2.4 2.5 1.8 1.4 2.1 
 Madagascar   ACP 0.0 1.4 4.4 3.4 2.7 4.8 3.0 1.4 
 Senegal   ACP 14.7 9.7 7.4 5.4 1.8 1.8 0.5 0.3 
Total volume market share of top-13 
suppliers (%) 
84.3 77.1 76.0 77.6 78.2 78.3 81.8 82.8 
Total volume (1,000mt)** 124.3 192.4 257.9 317.9 405.9 483.9 586.9 523.7 
Total value (€/ECU million)** 323.5 447.3 610.3 909.8 994.3 1214.3 1551.1 nd 
Notes: N/A = not applicable, intra-EU trade; Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) = 20.5% tariff; African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and Generalised 
System of Preferences Plus (GSP+) = 0%; GSP regime and ACP  preference subject to rules of origin, if latter not met most-favoured nation tariff of 25% 
applies; nd = no data. * Excludes known re-exports among EU countries (i.e. Netherlands, Germany – the former is a major EU re-export base). Data for France 
and Italy may include re-exports; ** Value and Volume totals include all 'other' countries 
Source: Globefish (2010: 40-1); and FAO database (2008:18-9) for volume and value 1988-1997
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Several factors explain the relative and absolute declines of exports from West Africa. 
Its canned tuna was reported to be relatively highly priced in the late 1980s 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 29), which may contribute to explaining the failure to 
penetrate EU markets other than France (where close commercial relations locked-in 
this location of production). Côte d’Ivoire’s absolute decline in the mid-2000s can be 
explained by Bolton Group (which owns the Saupiquet brand) selling its factory there 
in 2005 (see Table 3.3 below). In cooperation with Tri-Marine International, it shifted 
the centre of its procurement strategy away from Africa to Latin America and 
Southeast Asia (EUInd#9; #57; Atuna 2010). Another factor is the rise of production 
in the island states of the Western Indian Ocean. 
 
The case of the Indian Ocean ACP was an inversion of the trend in West Africa. 
Investment in enhanced processing capacity by Princes and Heinz in Mauritius and 
Seychelles respectively (see below and Chapter 6) both came online in 1999 and 
resulted in significantly increased EU-centred output. EU-centred investment by 
Heinz in Ghana in 1994 had a similar effect on this country’s share of the EU import 
market (see Table 3.3 and below). Seychelles, the existing factory in Madagascar 
(built by Peche et Froid in 1989-91), and the rising export-orientation of Spanish 
production, combined to displace West African exports to France in the 2000s (see 
data in Globefish 2010: 51). More broadly, the annual average share of the three 
Indian Ocean ACP sites of production in the EU import market was 9.6 percent 
between 1990-9, and peaked at 20 percent over between 2000-6, before declining to 
16.1 percent between 2007-9. The Heinz/MW Brands factory in Seychelles peaked in 
2006 with an EU-centred production of 61,000mt of canned tuna – the only year when 
it had largest share of the EU import market. Mauritius peaked at 41,000mt in 2007, 
while Madagascar experienced year-on-year declines from a peak of 23,000mt in 
2003. (Chapter 6 discusses competitive dynamics between Mauritius and Seychelles.) 
 
Sites of EU-centred production in Southeast Asia went through dramatic shifts in 
market share from the 1980s to the late 2000s. The period of relative dominance was 
between 1988-1998 when Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia had a combined 
share of the EU import market of 28 percent, and also peaked in their individual 
market shares: Thailand in 1992 with 25.2 percent; the Philippines in 1993 with 15 
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percent; and Indonesia in 1998 with 3.4 percent. However, during the period of the 
Indian Ocean ACP’s ascent, in 2000-6 the combined Southeast Asian share of the EU 
import market fell to only 18 percent.18 It subsequently rose again to almost 23 
percent between 2007-9. Given that the price of Thai canned tuna imported into the 
EU was consistently lower than that from the African ACP (see Annex 3B),19 it is 
clear that the tariff preference available to the latter played a central role in its 
industrial ‘upgrading’ (see Chapter 5). 
 
 
3.3.5  The dispersal of export-orientated canned tuna production 
 
This sub-section ties together the preceding discussion and draws out several 
implications of the international division of labour in the global commodity chain in 
the late 2000s. This also serves to situate Seychelles’ relative position in the canning 
industry. Figure 3.5 provides a snap-shot of this division of labour in the mid-2000s. 
The square symbols represent primarily ‘canning only’ locations of production, the 
triangles represent specialised loining locations, and the circles represent full 
manufacturing from loining to canning. Canning only locations are all in the global 
North and specialised loining only takes place in the South.  The figure depicts 
estimated production capacity of factories across the planet based upon volume of 
tuna raw material needs (i.e. whole fish or equivalent in loins of all canning-grade 
tuna species); thus not necessarily actual output. Larger capacity is depicted with 
black symbols, and symbols for less significant locations of production are white. It 
should be emphasised that this aspect of the new international division of labour is not 
solely about the search for cheap labour-power, but also for ready access to tuna 
fisheries (as with Seychelles, see Chapters 2 and 6), more lax labour standards and 
environmental regulations, and, importantly, access to EU and US trade preferences 
and US fiscal advantages (for American Samoa and Puerto Rico). 
 
                                                     
18 This was not an outcome of the 1997/8 so-called ‘Asian’ crisis as the Thai tuna industry was largely 
unaffected and probably in fact benefitted because the devalued Baht made Thai exports more 
competitive internationally (Yamao 2000; Subhapholsiri 2000b). 
19 This was the case throughout the period 1992-2008 with the sole exception of 1993, based on annual 
average price of imported canned skipjack (US$ /carton 48x6.5oz cans). Over this 17 year period, the 
Thai-EU price averaged US$  20.6 per carton and the ‘ACP’ price was 20 percent higher at US$ 25.6 
per carton (see Appendix 3B).  
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Export-orientated production of canned tuna and tuna loins is highly dispersed. For 
example, in regard to the EU-centred commodity chain, in the 1970s the main 
locations of production were in Japan, West Africa and the EU itself. The 
manufacturing node of this commodity chain became increasingly geographically 
dispersed from the early 1980s onwards due to a combination of factors. These 
included (neoliberal) policies of export-orientated industrialisation, new commodity 
frontiers in the WIO and WCPO, new industrial purse seine fleets divorced from 
supplying their own ‘national’ production systems (especially boats owned by 
Taiwanese and South Korean firms), and technological and organisational change 
(such as the emergence of a global trade in tuna using reefers, of particular importance 
to Thailand given the lack of a large tuna fishery close to its shores). These combined 
to facilitate the emergence of new locations of production in Southeast Asia, the 
Indian Ocean and the Pacific islands; where factories very often received substantial 
state subsidises, including through joint-ventures with foreign firms (e.g. in 
Seychelles). This in turn, resulted in widely recognised global overcapacity in 
processing. Global processing capacity in 1991 was estimated at 183.3 million cases 
of canned tuna, when actual consumption was only around 128 million cases. In 1999 
a global capacity of 227.5 million cases supplied consumption of about 161.3 million 
cases (StarKist 2001: 10). In other words, throughout the 1990s there was a 30 percent 
gap between potential production and actual consumption. This worsened in the 2000s 
with investment of US$ 0.5 billion in new processing plants in the three-year period 
2006-8 (Hamby 2009: 15), while consumption declined in the US and levelled off in 
the EU (Hamilton et al. 2011). 
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Figure 3.5: Global production capacity of canned tuna and tuna loins in the mid-2000s 
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The dispersal and overcapacity of export-orientated production provides an important 
advantage to branded-firms as they came to rely upon an increasing number of non-branded 
manufacturers for supply of canned tuna. This provided the opportunity for branded-firms to 
divest direct ownership of production facilities, as happened with much of the industry based 
on the US mainland in the 1980s, in Puerto Rico in the early 1990s and in American Samoa 
in the late 2000s (King 1987b: 67; COS 2001: 5; FFA Fisheries Trade News May 2009).20 It 
also gives supermarket buyers of private label product the stability of ‘ensuring regular 
supply ... because of the possibility of sourcing from so many places around the world’ 
(EUInd#25). Alternatively, branded-manufacturers became able to source intermediate goods 
(loins) from a range of potential suppliers in the South, as in the case of France, Italy, Japan 
and one firm based on the US mainland. In addition, given the importance of regional 
fluctuations in raw material supply (e.g. declining catch rates, occasional El Nino events, the 
impacts of piracy in the WIO), their temporary effects on sub-regional raw material prices, 
and wider local political-economic dynamics (e.g. labour struggles, political crises, violent 
conflict), a branded-firm or a supermarket procuring private label became able to quickly 
source from a range of firms in several locations of production across the world.  
 
In addition, supermarket buyers in an increasingly concentrated grocery sector (see below) 
are able to play an ever-increasing number of non-branded manufacturers – and branded-
manufacturers who produce private label – off against each other in price negotiations. 
Leading branded-firms have similar advantages due to the tendency to concentration in the 
number and market share of canned tuna brands (see below on the EU). Along with 
productivity-enhancing technologies in tuna fisheries (e.g. the rising use of artificial fish 
aggregating devices in the 1990s), these new competitive conditions of production help 
explain why the price of canned tuna in the US declined by 68 percent in real terms between 
1980 and 2004 (Lischewski 2006: 11; see also, Binotto 2004: 99; COS 2001: 9-10 and 
Exhibit 4; 2010b: 17-8 and Exhibit 1; Lischewsky 2000: 90).21 This evidence supports the 
notion of a fallacy of composition, where multiple locations of production engage in the same 
functional node of export-orientated production with a dampening effect on terms of trade 
(e.g. Mayer 2002), a particular problem for highly standardised manufactures such as canned 
tuna (e.g. Arrighi et al. 2003). In other words, branded-firms and supermarket buyers had 
                                                     
20 At its height, the US industry owned five canneries in Puerto Rico and two in American Samoa (Doulman 
1987: 157, fn. 28). 
21 The top-ten US supermarkets accounted for 38.9 percent of national grocery sales in 1987, but by 2002  
they held 69.6 percent market share (Binotto 2004: 99-100). 
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adopted a type of ‘spatial fix’ through establishing a ‘global ocean strategy’ (see below).22 
Not only do these conditions serve to ensure supply of competitively priced product, they 
offer firm managers the strategic threat of relocation between sites of production as a 
disciplinary mechanism in negotiations with governments and workers in the new 
international division of labour (IntFS#31; USInd#22; see Chapter 6 on Seychelles 
government negotiations with the EU DWF and Heinz/MW Brands; see also, Peoples and 
Sugden 2001; Ietto-Gillies 2007). 
 
 
3.4 EU-centred Canned Tuna Manufacturers in the 2000s: Corporate 
Concentration, Business Strategies and Competition 
 
This section focuses on the branded-manufacturing node of the EU-centred commodity chain, 
with a discussion of a firm-level case study of industrial organisation that connects directly to 
the prior discussion of the international division of labour. It also provides necessary context 
for Chapter 6 on Seychelles ‘upgrading’ in the canning-node of the chain as Heinz was the 
most important player in developing this interaction. The following sub-section looks at 
horizontal dynamics of competition between branded-firms in principal EU markets and 
identifies and differentiates the leading players. This is followed by a short overview of 
French and Spanish non-branded manufacturers who specialise in supplying supermarket 
own-brand (‘private label’) canned tuna, which feeds directly into Section 3.5 on 
supermarkets and canned tuna in the EU. 
 
 
3.4.1 The case of Heinz European Seafood: Brand ownership, ‘global ocean’ 
strategy and vertical integration (1990s to 2006) 
 
The food multinational H. J. Heinz had extensive experience in the canned tuna industry 
through its ownership of the branded-manufacturer StarKist since 1963, the largest firm in the 
highly concentrated US-centred chain.23 StarKist’s tuna and tuna-related products (e.g. pet 
                                                     
22 One manager called this a ‘multi-regional strategy’ (USInd#22). 
23 Starkist and Chicken of the Sea controlled around 60 percent of canned tuna sales between 1972 and 1985 
(King 1986: 70; Gallick 1984: 81, 88). StarKist had a 36 percent share of the US market in 1986, 40 percent in 
2001 and 37 percent in 2005 (Iverson 1987: 281; FDM (Food and Drug Mass Channels, minus Wal-Mart) data 
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food) averaged 19 percent of Heinz’s consolidated sales in fiscal years 1984-86 and was 
reported to be one of this corporation’s most profitable businesses (Iverson 1987a: 275-6, 
272; Iverson 1987b: 12-13). Under Heinz, StarKist was the first branded-firm to implement a 
genuinely ‘global ocean’ procurement strategy for canned product.24 It owned US-centred 
factories on the US mainland (in Terminal Island from 1950 to its closure in 1984); in 
Mayaguez, Puerto Rico from 1960, which was estimated to have been the largest cannery in 
the world until its closure in 2001; in American Samoa between 1963 and 2010 (the world’s 
second largest); two plants in Ecuador (in Guayaquil and Manta); and, importantly for the 
following account, in 1976 it bought 50 percent of the Pioneer Food Cannery plant in Ghana 
in a joint venture with the domestic firm Mankoadze Fisheries, establishing the only US-
owned tuna cannery in Africa (Southwest Fisheries Center 1985: 20; StarKist 2001: 13; 
StarKist 2010; Iverson 1987a: 272; Doulman 1986: 18; Doulman and Kearney 1987: 23; MW 
Brands 2011; Iverson 1987b: 20-21).25 In addition, StarKist had an equity interest in a fleet of 
almost 50 purse seiners, reduced to 15-20 by the mid-1980s after the restructuring of the US 
production system (Iverson 1987b: 9, 12). 
 
There are three major components to Heinz’s entry into the EU market: the purchase of 
leading branded-firms, which in one case came with processing capacity; investment in 
canned tuna production capacity in ACP countries; and effective financial control over a 
large part of the French DWF. (A schematic of this industrial organisation is provided in 
Figure 3.5.) In short, it pursued a similar form of industrial organisation as its US-centred 
activities with StarKist. Heinz first entered the growing EU market for canned tuna at the 
beginning of the 1981-84 recession in, and subsequent restructuring of, the US-centred 
commodity chain (Chapter 2).26 Heinz’s choice was either to ‘advertise heavily under the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
supplied by Bumble Bee in 2006). StarKist developed as a family-owned firm that benefitted from government 
contracts to supply US troops in World War One and Two (StarKist 2010). 
24 A strategy reflected in a corporate statement from 1977: ‘“Star-Kist is prepared to make commitments in any 
part of the world that will maintain its position of leadership and will aid in local fishery and economic 
development”’ (as cited by Iverson 1987b: 20). This was re-iterated almost twenty years later, but now without 
the ‘development’ rhetoric: ‘StarKist’s future thinking is simple and direct. StarKist will manufacture at 
locations which provide the most advantageous cost competitive environment’ (StarKist 2001: 28). 
25 The US fleet began fishing off the West African coast in 1958 and StarKist entered into an agreement with the 
Ghanaian government to established Ghana as a tuna hub (Iverson 1987b: 20-1; ADB/INFOFISH 19991: 124). 
(Felando (1987: 99) dates this from the late 1960s.) 
26 Another major interaction between the US and EU-centred commodity chains is the effect of shifting 
consumption in the former. Given that the US is the world’s largest single import market for canned tuna, small 
declines in per capita consumption result in the flooding of the world-market. For example, between 1981-82 
US consumption dropped from 1.4kg per capita to 1.2kg per capita, contributing to a seven percent decline in 
international tuna prices (King 1987b: 64; King 1987a: 287-8).  
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Heinz brand (very expensive) or buy brands’ (EUInd#61). Heinz took the latter option and 
bought the French firm Paul Paulet in 1981 (H. J. Heinz 2005: A-8). It owned the leading 
brand Petit Naivre (established in 1932) and three factories in France, including one in 
Douarnenez, the former ‘European capital of canned fish’ (MW Brands 2011).27  
 
While the restructuring of the US-centred chain  contributed to recovery in profitability in 
1985, US consumption of canned tuna decreased by an average 0.5 percent per annum from 
1990-1999. Conversely, the EU market grew by 3.8 percent per year over the same period 
and 1991 was the first year that EU15 consumption of canned tuna exceeded that of the US 
(StarKist 2001: 7; Peckham 1996: 122; Lischewski 2000: 87; see also Munoz 1996: 104-6; 
Table 3.1).28 The UK was the largest source of this growth: imports of canned tuna grew by 
six and a half times between 1980 and 1993, from 11,000mt to 71,600mt, making it the 
second largest volume import market in the world by 1989 (AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 101, 45; 
Globefish 2010: 47; see also Appendix 3C; Josupeit 1998: 119; and Elsy 1987: 104), and as 
noted above, it is a mid-priced market for canned tuna.29 The combination of market size, 
growth and relatively high retail price provided further incentive for Heinz to deepen its 
positioning in the EU-centred chain through the UK market. In 1997 Heinz bought John West 
from another multinational, Unilever (H. J. Heinz 2005: A-8; Catarchi 2004: 36; EUInd#49). 
Established in 1888, John West was a market leader for canned fish in the UK, the 
Netherlands and Ireland in the 1990s and 2000s.30 But John West was primarily a marketing 
company – it ‘used to work effectively as a merchant’ – and did not own tuna processing 
capacity (EUInd#49). In 1996 Heinz also entered the Italian market through the purchase of 
the Mareblu branded-firm. Unlike the Petit Naivre and John West brands, having only been 
established in the 1970s Mareblu was a minor player in the Italian canned tuna market at the 
time with around fourth largest branded market share.31  But because of the relatively high 
                                                     
27 This factory had initially been set-up by the Paulet family in 1963. Two of Paulet’s French factories were 
closed by Heinz: one in mid-1988 and another (in Pornic) in 1994 (MW Brands 2011; ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 
96). The funds raised through the closure of the Pornic plant were invested in the US$ 10 million modernisation 
of the PFC factory in Ghana (Guillotreau and Le Roy 2001: 4) 
28 Between 1975 and 1985 west European import of canned tuna experienced 51 percent growth, driven by 
France, the UK and Germany (Elsy 1987: 91-2). 
29 The relatively UK high price compared to the German market might also be explained by the fact that canned 
tuna was first introduced in Germany as a ‘discount item’ with a very limited role for brands, while it was first 
introduced to the UK in the 1960s as a ‘delicatessen item’ (Brus 2002: 96, 2004: 118). 
30 The firm started as an importer of canned salmon from North America and first sold canned tuna in 1952 
(John West 2010). It had around 35 percent share of the UK canned tuna retail market in the mid-1980s (Elsy 
1987: 96). 
31 It had 11 percent share of the very high retail value Italian market in 1989 and was owned by Simmenthal 
Monza in 1990, which was in turn ‘connected’ with a multinational (ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 104). 
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profits to be made in Italy (see below) and consistent growth in per capita consumption 
(Table 3.1) this brand gave Heinz a vehicle for growth (Valssecchi 2007: 144).  
 
Rather than rely on non-branded manufacturers from Southeast Asia which would have 
exposed the new giant firm Heinz European Seafood to procurement risks (EUInd#50), Heinz 
drew on its experience with StarKist and established a new global ocean supply strategy for 
its EU-centred brands. In 1993 Heinz bought-out Mankoadze Fisheries to take full ownership 
of the Pioneer Food Cannery (PFC) in Ghana and invested in enhanced production capacity 
(Antonietti 1993: 63).The new PFC plant opened in 1994 and is the largest cannery in Ghana 
with an annual turnover of around US$ 57 million and accounts for around 70 percent of the 
country’s canned tuna exports (Catarchi 2004: 21). In the following year Heinz bought 60 
percent of the (now) Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT) cannery in Seychelles, established by 
Pêcheurs de France in 1987. The remaining 40 percent was owned by the Seychelles 
government. Heinz subsequently invested heavily in expanding IOT’s production capacity 
(see Chapter 6 for a detailed account of IOT). This meant that Heinz controlled canneries in 
EU preference receiving ACP countries on the Eastern Atlantic and Western Indian oceans. 
As the former general manager of Saupiquet put it, these ‘are the two plants of Starkist to 
dominate the E.U. market’ (Antonietti 1998: 80). As one MW Brands representative32 made 
clear: ‘In 2006 we’ll process around 102,000 tonnes of raw material and around 40-45,000mt 
in Ghana. Thus our consolidated position must be considered in any analysis’ (EUInd#49).  
 
With this model of industrial organisation Heinz was able to shift emphases of production 
according to fluctuations in raw material availability and prices, exchange rate shifts, and 
domestic political-economic dynamics. For example, in the first half of the 2000s, production 
at PFC in Ghana was split roughly 50:50 for the EU and US markets (EUInd#6; #7). But 
when conditions changed in the Western Indian Ocean in 2007 onwards with declining catch 
rates and the rise of piracy (see Chapter’s 2 and 6) the availability of raw material supply to 
IOT at ‘the right price’ lessened. MW Brands responded by increasing EU-centred 
production at PFC and reducing it at IOT (EUInd#35; Daily Guide, 2008). Raw material 
prices are normally lower in West Africa because the fishery is closer to shore (EUInd#11; 
Appendix Table 3B.2). This decision was also partly motivated by movements in exchange 
                                                     
32 I refer to MW Brands rather than Heinz because interviews were all done after Heinz European Seafood’s sale 
to Lehman Brothers in February 2006. However, as management did not change, this does not misrepresent 
Heinz strategy, not least as several interviews were done only a few months after the buy-out in September 
2006. 
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rates. Because Ghana is a ‘dollar cannery’ and IOT buys tuna raw material and sells finished 
product in euros, the relatively lower priced dollar at the time made PFC more profitable 
(EUInd#7; see also EUInd#34). Exchange rate shifts in favour of the US dollar were seen by 
UK buyers as a general ‘barrier’ to canneries trading in Euro (such as the Spanish industry) 
(EUInd#25). (See Chapter 6 for more on IOT’s fish procurement strategy in the context of 
regional competition, especially from Princes in Mauritius.)  
 
Heinz entry into the EU-centred commodity chain and its purchase and expansion of the 
canneries in Ghana and Seychelles meant that some strategic control over raw material 
supply became paramount,33 especially given EU rules of origin which mean that both plants 
have to buy from the EU DWF or ACP-owned vessels.  As we saw in Chapter 2, Heinz had 
already bought a 36 percent share of the French purse seiner firm Cobrecaf in 1963. In 1994, 
through a strategic alliance with ONA-Pêche et Froid, Heinz wrestled effective control of this 
leading French purse seining firm (see Section 2.5.1). The PFC factory was supplied by a 
fleet of locally-based purse seiners owned by Heinz (the TTV fleet, see Table 2.5; Antonietti 
1996: 89), which gave around 50 percent of raw material needs (EUInd#6; #7). Even though 
the CEO of MW Brands was also the Chairman of Cobrecaf, this effective control apparently 
did not reduce the price paid for tuna raw material (EUInd#50). According to a representative 
of MW Brands: 
There’s no different in price for Cobrecaf, we pay the market price. Vertical 
integration is just profit and loss. We can’t cross-subsidise as we will get 
worse fishers. We have to pay for performance based upon the market. 
(EUInd#7) 
This was re-iterated by another MW Brands manager: ‘Our simple logic is from boat to 
brand. But a chain is only as strong as one link. If you allow fishing companies to go belly up 
…’ (EUInd#49; a separate vertically-integrated firm agreed with the need for boats to operate 
as independent profitable entities, EUInd#53).  
 
It may well be the case that raw material prices paid to Cobrecaf boats were at the world-
market rate as they were negotiated by Sovetco (Guillotreau and Le Roy 2001: 6; see 
Appendix 3B on raw material and canned tuna prices). But it is likely that the intensity of 
                                                     
33 As pointed out by the former Saupiquet executive: ‘Professionals are more and more conscious of the 
necessity either of a vertical integration from fishing to packing, or even from fishing to marketing’ (Antonietti 
1998: 81). 
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price negotiations with the wholly-owned TTV fleet is minimal; instead, a cross-referenced 
‘market’ price is probably paid. In addition, if one of the operations experiences financial 
difficulties it is likely be cross-subsidised. For example, representatives of one Japanese 
multinational pointed out that, while  
most of our fish is purchased through auction, there are rough times for our own 
ships, so when price at auction is very low ... at risk to [our] buying section we 
will buy at a higher price, keep fish in cold storage and sell when the market 
price rises. This is a fifty-fifty risk. But it does keep the vessels afloat. (JInd#28–
#29) 
Nonetheless, the core business rationale for control over the Cobrecaf fleet was certainly 
strategic access to raw material supply. As one Heinz employee put it: the ‘controlling stake 
[of Cobrecaf] via the other partner [meant that we] could guarantee supply’ to factories 
(EUInd#61; see also discussion of Sovetco in Section 2.5.2). Additional raw material needs of 
Heinz’s canneries are communicated to and centralised in the firm’s Paris headquarters. It 
procures on the spot market based on real-time knowledge of regional pricing trends 
(EUInd#7; #46–#49). Again, Heinz’s economic scale and associated market power provides 
an advantage: ‘Heinz was making bulk purchases for [canneries in] Portugal, France, 
Seychelles and Ghana, so it had a lot of clout’ with vessel owners (EUInd#61). Information 
and other market power advantages are central to the business strategies of major branded-
firms (see Section 3.4.3); for example, the factories in Ghana and Seychelles benefitted from 
discounted ocean freight rates made available to Heinz (EUInd#49). 
 
Together, these three major brands, two factories and control of the (then) largest firm in the 
French DWF constituted the core business of Heinz European Seafood (see Figure 3.6).  
Along with StarKist and more minor businesses in Australia, New Zealand and elsewhere,34 
by the late 1990s Heinz was indisputably the largest canned tuna firm in the world (e.g. 
Krampe 2000: 116). But in the more narrow terms of the EU, Heinz was only the second 
largest with an estimated 9.4 percent of the total market; Bolton Group (see below) led with 
13.1 percent market share (Trovamala 2004: 114), which, as we shall see, is primarily due to 
its dominance of the Italian market.  
                                                     
34 Heinz had also entered canned tuna markets in Australia in 1974 through the purchase of the leading 
Greenseas brand and its canneries, and in New Zealand in 1992 through the purchase of the leading brand 
Wattie (Crough 1987c: 229; US Department of Labour 2001b: 5). 
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Figure 3.6: Flows, ownership and control in Heinz European Seafood’s EU-centred canned tuna chain in 2005  
 
 
 Notes: a) Except for TTV, flows of fish from EU DWF are never solely to IOT and PFC, the figure only illustrates potential sources of supply; b) not known whether PFC supplies all three of Heinz 
national brands or what other major players it packs for (e.g. supermarkets in whatever countries); c) excludes Heinz Portugal plant because it does not manufacture tuna products. 
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3.4.2 From Heinz European Seafood to MW Brands   
 
The ‘tuna sector’ was ‘one of Heinz’s  fastest growing global businesses’ according to its 
Annual Report for 2000. However, the firm’s President, Bill Johnson, claimed that 
‘StarKist and Heinz Pet Products have a been a keen disappointment and a drag on 
earnings for fiscal year 2001’ (StarKist 2001: 12-13). The rising relative market power of 
supermarkets and competition between brands – including the purchase in 2000 of the 
number two brand Chicken of the Sea by the giant non-branded manufacturer Thai Union 
– ‘created serious margin deterioration’ in the US-centred chain, as indicated by 
declarations of bankruptcy in the late 1990s by StarKist’s two main competitors (StarKist 
2001b: 21). Given that the US was a mature canned tuna market as early as the 1980s, 
and began to decline in the 1990s, it was more difficult for firm managers to generate 
shareholder value through continuous increases in growth and profitability (Krampe 
2000: 116). In this context, StarKist began to divest tuna-related assets: its can 
manufacturing assets were sold to Impress but continued to supply StarKist plants; its 
facilities in Ecuador were sold (apparently losing US$ 30 million in its operations there) 
but it maintained a tightly controlled supply agreement with the buyer; a fleet of eight 
purse seiners was sold but, again, a supply contract was maintained; and the cannery in 
Puerto Rico was closed (USInd#1; #20; StarKist 2001). Except for the Puerto Rico 
cannery, all of these divestments were motivated primarily by Heinz’s concern with 
demonstrating a stronger financial statement  – to ‘improve upon its overall ROA [return 
on assets]’ (StarKist 2001: 27). This is a clear example of ‘corporate financialisation’ 
(Gibbon and Ponte 2005). As it turns out, this restructuring seems to have been motivated 
by a desire to strip assets and improve financial statements for StarKist’s sale. It was 
acquired by Del Monte Foods Company (USA) in 2002 in a reverse take-over35 (Del 
Monte Foods Company 2005: 4; H. J. Heinz Company 2005: 11). 
 
Shortly afterwards in 2005 Heinz European Seafood was put up for auction by its parent 
firm (Wiggins 2005). It was purchased by Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking (in 
                                                     
35 This method was used mainly because of complications regarding Heinz stock ownership (USInd#5; #10; 
#11). 
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combination with other private institutional investors and five former Heinz employees36) 
in February 2006 for €425 million (Lehman Bros. 2006; USInd#1; EUInd#49).  43 
percent of the purchase price was reportedly paid in cash (a very high ratio for a 
leveraged buy-out) making the new business ‘strongly capitalised’ (EUInd#6), which was 
opportune given the fate of Lehman Brothers (see below). Lehman’s formed a new entity 
‘MW Brands’, but the management team and assets remained the same (EUInd#10). Why 
did Heinz sell? The short answer is provided by the CEO, Chair and President of Heinz, 
William R. Johnson:  Heinz’s global strategy was to focus on building profitability and 
‘innovation’ in the three ‘core categories’ where it has strong brands and which totalled 
around 90 percent of its total profits in 2005: infant nutrition, ketchup and other sauces, 
and meals and snacks (e.g. soup) (Frozen Food Europe 2006; Nathanson 2006). This was 
echoed in the explanations of executives at a number of branded-firms. One stated that ‘It 
wanted to focus on ketchup and Weight Watchers. The only sections of value [in Heinz 
European Seafood] are John West, Petit Naivre and Mareblu’ (USInd#22). Another 
elaborated on its core category focus: ‘Heinz is going to concentrate on running its new 
acquisition – HP. It perhaps sold Seafood Europe to raise capital for this core aspect of its 
market’ (EUInd#25). In other words, it sold one part of its business to fund the deepening 
of its market power over another, more profitable, segment – ketchup and other sauces.37  
 
The strategy of focussing on core categories was mirrored by several other food 
multinationals in the 1990s, and is driven, for Gibbon and Ponte (2005: Ch. 1), by 
oligopolistic rent-seeking (see below on this issue). In short, while Heinz European 
Seafood was no doubt profitable, it did not comply with ‘Heinz’s investment policy of a 
return of 30 percent’ (EUInd#61). As one US industry executive pointed out: in 2004, 
Heinz demanded earnings (measured by earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization, or EBITDA) at least twice as high as those of other US canned tuna firms 
(USInd#11). EBITDA developed as an accounting measure in the 1980s wave of mergers 
                                                     
36 Three of whom are: Dave Williams, Chair of MW Brands, who was also on the board of Lehman 
Brothers in Europe (and a former Heinz executive who came up through Starkist), Adolfo Valcessci, head 
of Heinz European Seafood/ CEO MW Brands, and David Bentley, manager of the Ghana and Seychelles 
factories. 
37 It paid US$ 855 million to buy HP Foods and Lea & Perrins sauces businesses from Danone in June 2005 
(Atuna 2005). Heinz dominates the UK tomato ketchup market with 80 percent share (Smithers 2011) 
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and acquisitions in order to assess the firm’s ability to service debt. In short, it is a 
financial measure and an element of corporate financialisation, to which we turn. 
 
Aside from the ‘internal’ logic of enhancing profitability through limitation of branded 
competition on the supermarket shelf, Heinz was also, of course, motivated by wider 
dynamics. As pointed out in Chapter 1 in the discussion of Bair’s (2005: 170) call for 
incorporation of the ‘structural properties’ of capitalism in chain analysis, how lead firms 
are themselves governed is important (Palpacuer 2008: 406). Of particular relevance here 
is the role of ‘corporate financialisation’, where even non-financial firms are compelled 
to perform to the indicators used by the financial sector either to access loans or to 
comply with the ‘doctrine of shareholder value’ (Gibbon and Ponte 2005: 11-15). As we 
saw in relation to Heinz’s stripping of several of StarKist’s productive assets, it was 
motivated by the financial objective of improving return on assets (or return on capital 
employed, Gibbon and Ponte 2005). As one executive put it:  
Heinz wants low debt on its balance sheets and high value businesses with 
low working capital. … as financiers prefer higher returns/ less risk, it’s 
difficult for Heinz to grow in the [seafood] sector. (EUInd#49) 
This dynamic provides an additional explanation why Heinz divested from the tuna 
industry, but it had also shaped the terms of its joint venture with the Seychelles 
government in 1995. The government’s 40 percent share consisted of fixed assets such as 
the building and the land which are of limited ‘value’ on Heinz’s profit and loss accounts 
(see Chapter 6 for more detail). Moreover, and for the same reason, Heinz sold its 
investment back to the government and then leased it as ‘a strategy to influence share 
price’ (EUInd#61) as Heinz did not have to show a profit on these fixed assets.   
 
On announcing Heinz’s strategy of focussing on its three core categories, its CEO 
William R. Johnson stated that: “‘We are going to place our focus and resources on our 
big brands with number-one and number-two market positions’” (The Manufacturer, 
2005). However, Heinz was the world’s largest firm in the global commodity chain in 
canned tuna, owning premier brands in the three principal import markets (US, UK and 
France), and was thus in an oligopolistic position of rent extraction. There may also then 
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be additional, industry-specific explanations for its divestment from the chain. Two seem 
to be of particular importance. The first is the unpredictability of raw material supply, and 
its ecological limit: ‘where can you expand?’ (USInd#5; #10; #11). The environmental 
conditions of production in capture fisheries, especially a highly migratory resource like 
tuna, generate several risks for a firm like Heinz which is focussed on achieving 
consistently high profitability, which is the second explanation: A bad tuna fishing season 
‘can see financial results drop off’ (EUInd#35). Heinz European Seafood’s gross profit 
margin decreased from 38.5 percent in fiscal year 2004 to 36.1 percent in 2005, which, in 
a context of ‘struggles for profits amid heavy price discounting from retailers’ (Wiggins 
2005), was ‘primarily related’ to lower volume sales, but also ‘increased commodity and 
production costs, particularly in European seafood’38 and greater spending on seafood 
advertising (H. J. Heinz 2005: 14, 17). The latter was probably to increase market share 
to enhance balance sheet value in anticipation of the sale of its subsidiary.  
 
A multinational like Heinz, which can ‘almost see the world’ (Hymer as cited by Pearce 
and Papanastassiou 2006: 151), was certainly in a position to understand the broad 
concerns of more forward-looking industry executives interviewed for this research. The 
ecological limits of tuna fisheries and the associated long-term upward pressure on raw 
material costs in a market segment that is stagnating in principal US and EU markets 
necessitate either an increase in retail prices (with its associated risk of product 
substitutability by consumers with other canned fish or animal protein more broadly), 
which is difficult without the connivance of US and EU supermarkets through 
simultaneous price increases of private label product,39 or a further squeeze on profits for 
branded-firms. As it turns out, Heinz’s sale of its subsidiary was prescient as tuna raw 
material prices rocketed in 2007-08 (Appendix Figure 3B.1). 
 
The next question, then, must be why did Lehman Brothers buy Heinz European 
Seafood? The simple answer is that: ‘Lehman Brothers have got to invest somewhere!’ 
                                                     
38 Tuna raw material prices were at their highest in 2004-05 since 1998 (Appendix Figure 3B.1). 
39 A strategy they are unlikely to pursue given the highly dispersed supply base of non-branded 
manufacturers (see above) and that canned tuna is a core category product for increasing wider grocery 
sales (see below). 
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(USInd#5; #10; #11). Investment banks do not need to report the same level of 
profitability as that demanded by Heinz. On the operational side of the business, with the 
levels of turnover generated by a mass commodity like canned tuna, ‘even if you only 
make three percent [profit] it’s still good’ (EuInd#61). Moreover, the former Heinz 
management involved in the buyout believed that they could develop MW Brands, in part 
because they could make more focussed decisions and better promote product through a 
dedicated sales force (EUInd#49), and, of course, they were not fettered by Heinz’s 
constraint of fulfilling ever expanding ‘shareholder value’ at a level above the norm. 
From the outset, Lehman Brothers Merchant Banking’s strategy was to increase the sale 
value of the tranche of investments of which MW Brands was a part within four or five 
years. A central component of MW Brands’ remit was thus unsurprisingly to ‘expand the 
business’ and ‘improve earnings’ (EUInd#49; USInd#1). The means for doing so was to 
expand the share of the John West and Petit Naivre brands through aggressive advertising 
and promotional campaigns and to lay emphasis on the Mareblu brand in Italy which had 
the largest room to grow (EUInd#6; #7; #49; #50). (See Section 3.5.2 on branded retail 
share.) A major problem, according to industry insiders, was that Lehman Brothers paid 
well above the market price (TInd#1; USInd#5; #10; #11). Responses to questioning on 
this claimed it was ‘gossip’ and ‘speculation’, with the insight that: ‘We wouldn’t pay 
more than the market price if we didn’t see growth’ (EUInd#49). This indicates that a 
high price was paid, but based on the assumption that its business strategy would be a 
success.  
 
The impact of MW Brands’ strategy was mixed. For example, an expensive advertising 
and, moreover, promotional campaign by John West certainly contributed to a US$ 4.95 
million loss in 2008 for this arm of MW Brands. John West managed to generate a US$ 
2.14 million pre-tax profit in the following year, but by focussing on lower volume sales 
of premium canned fish (predominantly tuna) (IntraFish, 11 September 2009). In France, 
the CEO of MW Brands emphasised his firm’s promotion of Petit Naivre through ‘store 
theatre’ such as end-of-aisle counters taking up 200-300 square metres (Valssecchi 2007: 
146).  Competitors complained about this ‘battle for market share’ as ‘getting out of 
hand’ (EUInd#35). Another said:  
158
  
I worry about venture capitalists in the food industry. They have different 
horizons and planning scope. … they [MW Brands] are over-investing in ads 
and promotions. We’re locked into seeking commercial advantage. … 
They’re pursuing very aggressive strategies – less than BOGOF [buy one get 
one free]. This is suicidal, as BOGOF is bad. (EUInd#34) 
Another strategy was to peddle so-called ‘value added’ products. This was a broad 
success in the UK, even if only in a small portion of the market.40 In 2008 and 2009 John 
West sold over 85 percent of ‘value added’ ambient tuna products in the UK, while 
Princes had only 6-7 percent share of this niche market (IRI Grocery Outlets). MW 
Brands also sold its share in Cobrecaf in October 2008 (Chapter 2), and procured from 
this firm on a five-year supply contract in which MW Brands had first refusal on price 
negotiations (EUInd#6). This mirrors the Heinz strategy of selling unnecessary low profit 
assets before it auctioned StarKist. Combined, these elements meant that in fiscal year 
2009/10, MW Brands turned a total profit of €36.6mn (CIMB 2010). 
 
The collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 had no real effect on MW Brands. The arm of 
Lehman’s managing the fund that included MW Brands was not at the centre of the 
collapse and because Lehman’s had invested less than ten percent of the value of the 
holding company, with the rest held by ‘pension funds, public administrations – all secure 
investors’, and Rabobank provides credit lines (EUInd#6; Freitas 2008; Cox and Arnold 
2009; Real 2010). MW Brands was simply transferred to the successor fund manager, 
Trilantic Capital Partners, formed by former principals of Lehman Brother’s Merchant 
Banking. It started proceedings to sell MW Brands just over four years after its 
acquisition (i.e. within the planned range of four to five years) and in 2009 its earnings 
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) were far from the heights 
demanded by Heinz (noted above). MW Brands was purchased in July 2010 by the 
largest canned tuna firm in Thailand, Thai Union, for €680mn (including €295.9mn in 
debts) (CIMB 2010). It is widely recognised that this will provide Thai Union with far 
greater market power in global raw material markets (EUInd#13–#15; #17–#20). The 
                                                     
40 As one UK buyer pointed out: ‘We had promoted pouch range but UK consumers didn’t take to it 
(EUInd#25). 
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meteoritic upgrading of Thai Union to become the most important branded-firm in the 
global commodity chain by 2010 and its implications for the industry in general and 
Seychelles in particular are beyond the scope of thesis.  
 
 
3.4.3 Branded-manufacturers and marketing firms: Corporate 
concentration and business strategies 
 
Excluding the Spanish production system, three branded-firms dominate principal 
markets in the EU in the 2000s – Bolton Group, MW Brands, and Princes (Mitsubishi).41  
Until the 1990s, Spanish firms were focussed on the domestic market, but with a series of 
take-overs in the 1990s and 2000s, primarily of Italian firms, Spain became the leading 
supplier to the EU15 import market. Table 3.3 provides overviews of the EU’s top-six 
branded canned tuna firms. Taking seriously horizontal competition between branded 
firms in EU principal markets is necessary to understanding MW Brands relative position 
in the EU-centred commodity chain. As we shall see, the business strategies of leading 
branded-firms cannot be understood by looking at one ‘national’ market.  
 
Through the take-over of major brands of canned fish in the 1980s and 1990s, Heinz’ 
business strategy straddled the British, French and Italian markets (see Table 3.4 below 
for branded market share). So while Heinz/MW Brands has no direct interaction with the 
Spanish market, it is in direct competition with Spain’s exports to the Italian market. It is 
primarily a branded-manufacture but also supplies supermarket own-brands (‘private 
label’) with canned tuna. The Netherlands-based Bolton Group – a consumer goods 
marketing firm – pursued a similar strategy.42 It penetrated the French market through the 
purchase of Saupiquet in 2000 and the Italian market through the purchase of the 
dominant national brand (Rio Mare).  
 
                                                     
41 Like Heinz, Mitsubishi has been directly involved in shaping the global commodity chain in canned tuna 
(see Appendix 3D). 
42 A privately held (and secretive) company, whose representatives in the Netherlands and Italy refused 
interviews on two occasions 
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Bolton (via the Saupiquet fleet) and MW Brands (via control of Cobrecaf and ownership 
of the TTV fleet in Ghana) are both vertically integrated into fishing. This is an important 
similarity to the industrial organisation of the three Spanish firms, each of which own 
fishing capacity, albeit to widely varying degrees: Salica’s parent company Albacora 
owns 16 purse seiners (the largest known purse seine fleet in the world), while Garavilla 
owns four boats (see Section 2.5 on corporate concentration and industrial organisation in 
the EU DWF). Princes has no backward integration into the fishing node. For both Bolton 
and Princes vertical integration into canned tuna manufacturing is not a key component of 
their highly diversified businesses. For example, Princes owns only one factory 
producing canned tuna and Bolton sold its factory in Cote d’Ivoire to a major non-
branded-manufacturer in 2005 (see below). In fact, Bolton, Princes and MW Brands 
consistently source finished product from non-branded manufacturers to supplement 
production in their own factories, including Thailand for the latter two (see Annex 3.C).  
 
Calvo is the most important producer of canned tuna within the EU. It is also estimated to 
be among the five leading canned fish firms in the world, of which around 75 percent of 
sales are tuna, 20 percent sardines (in Brazil) and five percent other products (EUInd#16; 
Calvo 2010). The Calvo brand is the volume market leader in Spain and its Nostromo 
brand is now second in Italy, which Calvo pushed from being in fifth position in 1989 
(EUInd#17–#20; ANFACO 2010; AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 104; Table 3.4 below). Over 
50 percent of Italian consumption of canned tuna is imported from Spain. Unlike MW 
Brands and Princes, Calvo does not produce private label. The Spanish firm Garavilla 
does produce for private label, but it is not a strategic part of its business which is 
focussed on the major Spanish brand Isabel (EUInd#16; #21; #22). Calvo and Garavilla 
have been leaders of the Spanish branded market since at least the late 1980s (Josupeit 
1993: 49; AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 105). Salica is a new entrant (founded in 1991) and is 
controlled by the Albacora Group, which used to be a specialised fishing firm (IntFS#22; 
Section 2.5). It is Spain’s number three branded-manufacturer and produces canned tuna 
to be sold in Spain under the Conservas Campos, Bachi and Salica brands (ANFACO 
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2010; Albacora 2010; Alimarket 2010).43 As discussed below, the Italian market is 
typified by a high retail price: in 2003 it was worth an estimated €750 million on final 
sales of around 97,000mt; for comparison, France had a very similar sales volume – 
95,000mt – but was only worth around €565 million (Trovamala 2004: 113). In short, 
Garavilla’s business strategy is to further expand into the highly profitable Italian market, 
not least given the highly competitive conditions in the Spanish market (see below).  
                                                     
43 Number five if non-branded manufacturers are included, see Section 3.3.3. 
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Table 3.3: Europe’s top six canned tuna branded-firms in the late 2000s 
Branded-firm 
(Ownership) 
Purse 
seiners 
Production locations and product* Notes 
MW Brands 
 
5 
 
 
France  (330,000 cans of various seafood per day);  
Portugal (350,000 cans of sardines & mackerel per day) 
Ghana, since 1994 (800,000 cans of tuna and 20mt loins per day);  
Seychelles, since 1995 (1.5mn cans of tuna per day) 
Former Heinz European Seafood. Owns leading brands 
of canned fish (including tuna) in the UK, France and 
Italy: John West, Petit Naivre and Mareblu respectively. 
In fiscal year 2009/10 total profit was €36.6mn 
Controlling share of Cobrecaf fleet until 2008 
Bolton Group 
(Mr Nissim 
100%) 
5 Quimper (France, canned tuna and misc seafood for Saupiquet brand)  
Cermenate-Milan (Italy, canned tuna for Rio Mare brand) 
Sold Saupiquet factory in Côte d’Ivoire in 2005 
Bolton was connected to Rio Mare since at least 1990 
and bought Saupiquet in 2000, leading brands in Italy, 
France, Germany and Belgium. 
Saupiquet turnover: €210mn in financial year 2008/09 
Princes  
(Mitsubishi since 
1989) 
None Princes Tuna Mauritius (PTM):  Annual raw material production 
capacity 60,000mt canned skipjack 
Controlling share of PTM bought by Princes Ltd. in 1999.  
Princes is a leading brand in the UK and the 
Netherlands. Its Vier Diamanten brand is number one in 
Austria. 
Calvo Group 
(78% Calvo 
Pumpido family) 
 
6 
Spain (Carballo plant: 80% tuna; 20% misc. others) 
Spain (Esteiro plant: 20% tuna products; 80% mussels, salads, bean-
based products) 
El Salvador (80% loins for Spain; 20% tuna for US and Latin America) 
Brazil (75% canned sardines; 25% tuna) 
Owns Calvo and Nostromo – leading brands in Spain and 
in Italy (latter was purchased from parent company 
Safica in 1993). 
Canned fish production:149,000mt (2009) 
Net sales: €353 million (2007) and €427million (2009) 
Garavilla Group 
(Garavilla family 
and MCH Private 
Equity since 
2010) 
4 Spain (El Grove plant: tuna) 
Spain  (Mundaka plant: tuna and various seafood) 
Ecuador (tuna and loins since 1976) 
Morocco (various seafood) 
Owns the Isabel brand, significant in Spain 
Canned fish production: not known 
Net sales: €215 million (2006) and €240 million (2009) 
Salica** 
(Albacora Group) 
16 Spain (tuna) 
Spain (added value tuna, various seafood) 
Ecuador (20% tuna; 80% loins) 
Owns the Spanish Conservas Campos, Bachi and Salica 
brands. 
Canned tuna production: 45,000mt capacity 
* ‘tuna’ = canned tuna and other ambient tuna products; ‘loins’: pre-cooked vacuum-packed frozen tuna loins; ** A separate subsidiary not noted here is Salica Congelados which 
produces and markets premium so-called ‘value-added’ products such as tuna steaks and various tuna-based ‘ready-made’ meals. 
Sources: multiple interviews, 2006-2010; company websites; various RFMO registries and vessel databases; Alimarket 2010; AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 104; Brus 2002: 99; CIMB 
2010; FIS; Josupeit 1993, 2009; Lequesne 2004: 135; Loubet 2010; Moral 2008; Mieu 2010; Murias 2010a; Princes n.d.; SNI 2006..
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According to the two criteria of differentiation in principal EU markets outlined above, 
two tendencies in the business strategies of these six firms have been identified. The first 
is to specialise in one type of market: Princes in the EU import market for canned 
skipjack, and Calvo, Garavilla and Albacora/Salica in the Spanish and Italian ‘national 
production systems’ for canned yellowfin. The other two firms straddle both sets of 
criteria: Bolton Group, very successfully, by leading the Italian national production 
system, the German branded import market, and the intermediate French market; and 
MW Brands with a leading role in the UK and France, but only a relatively small 
presence in the highly profitable Italian market.  
 
In terms of raw material sourcing, the larger branded-firms have considerable information 
advantages as well as buying power. For example, while Princes owns only one cannery, 
it benefits from Mitsubishi’s ‘communications all over the world, including the 
Mitsubishi office in Bangkok and in Philippines’, which gives it an important information 
advantage over smaller players on daily global catch and price data (EUInd#11). 
Similarly, in the late 1990s and early 2000s Heinz’s canned tuna business included 
several processing facilities on three continents. As one interviewee put it: ‘Nobody 
knows the world price except for the biggest players’ (EUInd#11). Both branded-firms 
undertake strategies to mitigate short-term raw material price fluctuations (also first noted 
in Section 3.2.4): One Princes representative stated: ‘We don’t adjust our selling price to 
the fish price, we reset our standards annually based on seasonality’ (EUInd#34); and as a 
US buyer put it ‘we equalise fish price’ over time (USInd#1). It appears that Heinz 
European Seafood took an even longer-term approach: ‘Before the price for fish was 
based on a 7-8 year cycle. We could manage an average price over the cycle; for 
example, impacts of El Nino could be absorbed over the cycle. Now, over the past few 
years there are new issues, not related to weather and sea temperature. Things are 
dragging with supply’ (EUInd#7). This drag was caused by a combination of growing 
global processing capacity, declining extraction of yellowfin raw material and stagnant 
production of skipjack, which meant that fish prices and security of supply have become 
more pressing strategic concerns in the processing node of the commodity chain. 
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On the one hand, the three non-Spanish branded-firms all procure finished product from 
non-branded manufacturers. This is of particular importance to Bolton and Princes. The 
highly diversified Princes Group has 130 suppliers in 30 countries for its wide range of 
food products, ‘is an integrated supplier to supermarkets’ and has staff seconded to 
supermarket headquarters on generating cost savings in areas like logistics (EUInd#34; 
#11). For canned tuna, on top of its sole factory in Mauritius, Princes ‘main suppliers are 
from Philippines, Thailand and Ecuador, plus a global strategy’ (EUInd#11). Bolton’s 
role in the commodity chain is highly dependent upon its partnership with the specialised 
tuna trading company Tri Marine International, which exclusively supplies its small 
cannery in Italy with tuna loins and also helps to procure finished product. As a whole, 
Bolton procures canned tuna across the globe from at least 15 factories, including the two 
major Thai firms (EUInd#11; #53; #57–#60; TInd#9; USInd#18). In other words, unlike 
Heinz’s strategy of establishing factories across the global ocean, these two firms engage 
in global sourcing from dispersed non-branded manufacturers.  
 
On the other hand, MW Brands and the Spanish branded firms are highly specialised in 
canned fish production. Importantly, MW Brands does not produce and market canned 
tuna only. This is important to relationships with supermarkets as buyers wish to source 
multiple products from a single supplier. As one US executive put it: ‘If you only do 
mono-produce you’re dead. So you come with a business package to the supermarkets’ 
(USInd#22). Canned tuna branded-firms try to generate selling, general and 
administrative (SGA) synergies by supplying other products (e.g. canned animal protein 
for the US firm Bumble Bee) which ‘creates a synergy for our customers’ (USInd#5; #10; 
#11). A major practical rationale for doing this is that they are able to offer retail buyers a 
‘mixed truck’ (i.e. several products in a single order) which gives supermarket buyers 
greater flexibility and reduces transaction costs. In short, branded firms adapt to 
supermarket buying ‘needs’ through broad specialisation in canned protein (Bumble Bee 
in the US), canned fish (MW Brands), or various food or consumer brands (e.g. Princes, 
Bolton); this tendency to concentration generates  significant barriers to entry. If a 
branded firm supplies only a single product it is likely to be squeezed out of the market 
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by supermarket buyers and be compelled to specialise as a non-branded-manufacturer, to 
which we now turn. 
 
 
3.4.4 ‘French’ and Spanish non-branded manufacturers: Key players and 
business strategies 
 
Private label constitutes 65 percent of sales in the large Spanish market (see below) and 
specialised non-branded manufacturing supply it. The two main players are Frinsa del 
Noroeste and the Jealsa Rianxeira Group, the second and third largest Spain-based 
producers of canned tuna. Frinsa is not vertically-integrated into fishing and while Jealsa 
had a 20 percent share of the Albacora Group, it only directly owned two purse seiners 
(and one by 2010, Table 2.4). Frinsa is majority family-owned and has four factories with 
an estimated production of 137,000mt of canned fish in 2009, the second largest Spanish 
canned tuna producer in volume. Jealsa is 100 percent family-owned and has eleven 
factories in nine countries producing canned seafood, including two tuna canneries in 
Spain and a loining plant in Guatemala that exports all of its production to the Spanish 
plants for re-processing (EUInd#23; #24; Alimarket 2010; Eurofish Magazine, April 
2010). Unlike Frinsa, Jealsa owns a brand but had only 0.6 percent share of the Spanish 
market in volume in 2009, declining from six percent in the late 1980s (ANFACO 2010; 
AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 105). Its major domestic advantage is an exclusive contract to 
supply Mercadona – Spain’s largest supermarket chain – with its private label. But 
because of this relationship Jealsa must export the rest of its production and has a 50:50 
joint-venture with the ‘Italian’ firm Star (Table 3.3; Catarchi 2004: 15),44 supplies the 
minor French supermarket System U, and the UK where ‘sales are growing’ (EUInd#23; 
#24). Exports to the UK are based upon an agreement with Princes to produce its 
branded-product and to sell to other UK-based clients Jealsa has to go through Princes 
(direct observation of Princes branded-product in Jealsa factory 2010; EUInd#23; #24). 
 
                                                     
44 Star is, in turn, owned by the Spain-based holding company Pasa Group. The Star brand’s share of the 
Italian market decreased from 15 percent in 1989 (ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 104). 
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French-owned processing facilities in West Africa and the Indian Ocean have so far been 
considered to be part of the French ‘national’ production system, primarily because of the 
combination of colonial legacy and post-colonial trading relations and, when French-
owned, the vast majority of their production flowed to the metropole.45 But, of course, 
they are simultaneously part of the extra-EU export-orientated category, and thus form an 
important cross-over between the two categories of production location. As noted above 
and discussed in more detail in Section 2.3, Pêche et Froid was one of the ‘big three’ 
French branded-processors, establishing canneries in Côte d'Ivoire in 1978 and 
Madagascar in c.1990 (Josupeit 1993: 26; Cassuto 2004: 72). However, with the 
intensification of concentration in the French branded-market and the rising share of 
private label, Pêche et Froid gradually transformed itself into a specialised non-branded 
manufacturer. The Moroccan-owned firm Thunnus Overseas Group (TOG) bought Pêche 
et Froid’s factories in Côte d’Ivoire in 2005 and Madagascar in 2007, and Saupiquet’s 
factory in Côte d’Ivoire in 2005 (EUInd#56).46 This gave TOG a total production 
capacity of 113,000mt of raw material (although it only operated at half of this), which it 
sources exclusively from the EU DWF as it does not own fishing capacity.47 By the late 
2000s TOG had 25 percent share of the French retail market through its production of 
private label for three of the top-four supermarkets (Carrefour, Leclerc and Auchan) and 
for its own (minor) brand, and 40 percent share of the French food service/catering 
market. TOG also supplies private label to supermarkets in Germany and Belgium 
(EUInd#5; Les Afriques 2009; Jeune Afrique 2009; Pêche et Froid 2010; Maury 2009). 
 
 
 
                                                     
45 Between 1976 and 1985 a minimum of 97 percent of French canned tuna imports emanated from Cote 
d’Ivoire and Senegal (Elsy 1987: 94). However, in the early 2000s the Saupiquet cannery in Abidjan 
supplied the Italian Rio Mare brand with canned tuna in brine, albeit a minor product on this market 
(Catarchi 2004: 27).  In 1997/8, 96 percent of Cote d’Ivoire’s and 82 percent of Senegal’s exports went to 
France (Anzer 2000: 92).  
46 TOG is an aggregation of six operating companies and holdings with combined revenues of US $166 
million in 2008 ($178 million in 2007), and employs around 4,500 factory workers. Mohamed Khachab is 
the majority shareholder. There is minority ownership by private equity firms: Emerging Capital Partners 
under its Africa Fund III (€21.4mn in January 2009) and Kingdom Zephyr under its Pan African 
Investment Partners II Fund (€14.3mn in March 2009) (ECP 2009; Kingdom Zephyr 2010). 
47 Pêche et Froid sold its purse seine fleet in 2000-2 having established it in 1973.  
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3.4.5  Summary 
 
We have seen that MW Brands and the three Spanish branded-firms are highly 
specialised in the production and marketing of canned seafood, especially tuna. The only 
way for these four firms to grow is to expand their share within this product category, 
which is precisely their strategy: e.g. Calvo and Garvilla’s forays into Italy and Latin 
America and MW Brands’ aggressive marketing campaigns (Corrales 2004; EUInd#16; 
#21; #22; #23; #24; #25). Conversely, the emphasis of Bolton and Princes is on 
marketing a wide range of consumer brands based on a highly diversified supply base 
sourcing from across the planet. Both Bolton and Princes could function as profitable 
canned tuna businesses without ownership of processing facilities simply by contracting 
non-branded manufacturers and continuing to focus on the category management of their 
leading brands. Similarly, if economic conditions changed and branded canned tuna 
became consistently less profitable, both would probably sell their canned tuna 
businesses and concentrate on more profitable consumer brands. We have also seen how 
specialised non-branded manufacturers were formed, in part because they were squeezed 
out of branded-manufacturing by leading players and, as we shall see, ‘supermarket 
power’. Finally, while the Spanish firms are big players, as highly specialised family-
owned firms they are not as strong financially as Bolton, MW Brands and Princes, 
making these three the lead EU-centred branded-firms (EUInd#11; Catarchi 2004) and 
MW Brands Europe’s lead firm specialised in canned fish.  
 
 
3.5 Canned Tuna, Supermarket Concentration, Business Strategies and 
Competition in Principal EU Markets 
  
3.5.1  Supermarket concentration, canned tuna and principal EU markets 
 
The discussion of chain governance in Section 1.1.2 highlighted the relative rise in 
market power of supermarkets as a major theme of GCC analysis. The ‘supermarket 
revolution’ of the 1980s is conceived as constituting a shift in power from branded-
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manufacturing firms to large retailers in the UK and USA, followed by a similar tendency 
in Western Europe, Japan and elsewhere in the 1990s.48 The following relates this 
analytical concern to the case of the EU-centred canned tuna chain. Representatives of 
the canned tuna industry from around the world consistently emphasise the loss of their 
prior position of market power to the giant supermarket firms (EUInd#11; #25; JInd#4–
#6; #16–#20; #29; JGvt#4–#14; USInd#1; #5; #8–#11; Krampe 2000; Lischewsky 2004: 
xiii; Schapira 2009: 313). As the CEO at Bolton Group’s canned tuna business put it, the 
retailers are ‘gaining more and more power on [sic] the producers’ (Trovamala 2004: 
115). For a senior manager at a US branded-firm: 
Supermarkets have 100 percent control now. In the late 70s, early 80s the food 
business told stores what to do. It began with increased prices for ‘real estate on 
the shelf’. … Now they tell us what we’re gonna do, and what our margin is going 
to be. It’s all about information – they control it! (USInd#3) 
The rising market power of supermarkets allows them to play the major branded canned 
tuna firms off against each other. They often threaten to (or do) switch more shelf space 
to their private label canned tuna so as to capture more of the profit on the product 
category. As one US manger put it: ‘We try to influence our shelf price (it used to be 
easier), but no-one wants to step-up, they’re afraid of retaliation [from supermarket 
buyers]’ (USInd#8; #9). 
 
Concentration in the UK market between the two branded-firms allows supermarket 
buyers to ‘play one off against the other ... In the UK, Princes are fighting against John 
West because supermarkets are pushing them against each other, asking: “what is it worth 
for you to be on the shelf?”’ (EUInd#25; #11).49 This is the practice of ‘slotting’: a 
                                                     
48 There are many categories of this type of retailer in the EU (e.g. hypermarkets, superstores, hard 
discounters, etc) and the US (e.g. dollar stores, warehouse clubs (e.g. Costco), supercentres (e.g. Wal-
Mart), etc), but the generic term ‘supermarkets’ is used to refer to all of these in this thesis. This is not to 
downgrade the importance of analysing retail based upon different store types. For example, in the US the 
‘supercentre’ and ‘dollar store’ categories increased their retail share by a whopping 68.6% and 60% 
respectively between 2001 and 2005 (ACNielson data as cited by Connors Bros 2006b: 17). 
49 Repeated requests were made in 2005 and 2006 of all of the major UK supermarkets to interview buyers 
dealing with canned fish, these were rejected by all but one firm. I was however, able to have several 
discussions and personal communications with buyers through other channels, including at industry 
meetings, but these were primarily specialised in fresh and frozen fish.  
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branded-firm rents shelf space for a six month period, and even then may be squeezed for 
additional revenue within that period so as to not lose their retail ‘real estate’, which is a 
reflection of the supermarket’s short-term profit focus (‘shareholder value’) ‘as they’re so 
focussed on quarterly profits’ (USInd#5; #10; #11). Adding to this dynamic is the power 
to discontinue (or ‘delist’) a brand if it does not provide a sufficient return to the 
supermarket (EUInd#11; #25; Krampe 2000). As one representative of a Thai firm 
exporting to both the EU and the US put it, the supermarkets are ‘trying to kick out most 
national brands and promote their own brand and only one or two big brands’ (TInd#1). 
An EU industry representative explained this dynamic in more detail: 
Delisting is a supermarket strategy to clear the shelf [for their own label]. ... 
The retailer policy in Western Europe is to have one ‘A’ brand (the 
reference for price), one challenger and one niche. The rest is private label – 
‘valued’ at around 40 percent of the ‘A’ brand (EUInd#11).  
This business strategy and other barriers to entry limit the number of branded competitors 
at point of retail. It is ‘very hard for small producers to get into sales in European 
supermarkets: they need to sell at a high price to recover the slotting fee, whereas big 
firms can afford to keep the price down’ (IntFS#22).  
 
As with other products (e.g. Gibbon and Ponte 2005), supermarkets also use their market 
power to extract additional revenue from canned tuna suppliers, including payments for 
business allowances, advertising and brochures, and damaged goods. According to 
Miyake et al. (2010: 100), these ‘costs’ can represent as much as 40 percent of the retail 
price of the canned tuna. Similarly, product promotions are paid by suppliers, even for 
non-branded-manufactures. As pointed out by one experienced cannery manager who 
dealt with UK supermarket buyers in the 1980s and 1990s: ‘Once or twice they made a 
certain promotion and all costs come to us. As usual!’ (PICInd#38). Another manager 
claimed that: ‘In French supermarkets, half [of the price] is already paid by the supplier. 
You pay fees to enter every year – it’s a racket! You pay for special promotions, etc.’ 
(USInd#22). In the late 2000s, retailers in the UK were asking branded-firms for even 
more of their price premium (EUInd#11). The result of these conditions of competition is 
the heightened tendency to concentration among branded-firms already highlighted in the 
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discussion above on French and Spanish production systems. As pointed out by the 
former vice-president of StarKist, the number of branded-firms decline as supermarkets 
focus on those suppliers which have a broad product range and supermarkets ‘will move 
to eliminate less profitable SKUs (stock keeping units) and the corresponding operating 
inefficiencies’ (Lischewski 1998: 21). 
 
At the same time, big supermarkets also compete with each other for market share by 
attempting to attract consumers with lower prices for ‘core category’ products such as 
canned tuna. As a non-branded manufacturer put it, European supermarkets are ‘using 
canned tuna to attract the customers, so that is why when they buy they’d like to buy at 
the cheapest price’ (PICInd#45–#47).  In the US canned tuna is the third largest seller in 
terms of dollar volume per foot of shelf space, following sugar and coffee. In addition, if 
a supermarket customer has tuna in their ‘basket’ they will spend 65 percent more on a 
shopping trip than without it (Lischewsky 2000: 88; 2006: 135). Given that the traditional 
source of profitability for supermarkets is based on large volume sales of food, canned 
tuna plays a strategic role in driving sales and is often sold as a loss-leader (USInd#3–#5; 
#10; #11). The former managing direct of Princes Tuna Mauritius related this dynamic to 
the specifics of the UK market: 
Because the consumption of tuna is heavily slanted towards young 
families, and these are the prime targets customers for retailers to develop, 
the tuna has often been used as bait to draw in other sales (Spruyt 2000: 
102; see also Valssecchi 2007: 145-6). 
As a result, UK supermarkets ‘regard canned tuna as a discount item’ (Tony Vince 
Foodnews (August, 1998) as cited by Anzer 1998: 127). The principal mechanism has 
been promotional offers such as ‘BOGOFs’ (buy one get one free) and multipacks. Both 
sales techniques eat into profitability but they simultaneously increase volume sales and 
consumer usage through ‘cupboard pressure’. Keeping canned tuna sales high through 
promotional offers on price to attract consumers is a source of horizontal competitive 
pressure between supermarkets, which even, in the US at least, involves selling at a loss. 
This is because, from the business perspective of a supermarket, ‘the tuna shopper is the 
preferred shopper’ (Lischewsky 2006: 134). 
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Increased consumer willingness to buy private label further exacerbated pressures on 
branded-firms because supermarkets can afford to sell private label more cheaply than the 
branded equivalent as they do not have to pay the same level of marketing or supply 
chain management costs (EUInd#6; USInd#22).50 Private label canned tuna is taking an 
increasing percentage of market share in major EU markets (Valsecchi 2006: 7; see also 
Spruyt 2000), to the extent that the CEO of MW Brands rhetorically claimed that: 
‘Private labels are the leading “brand” throughout Europe’.51 Perversely, except for those 
branded-firms operating in the UK market, many EU-centred brands were cutting their 
advertising and marketing budgets to reduce costs in the face of price competition from 
private label, which threatened brand-recognition and, thus, sales (Trovamala 2004: 114). 
According to a former Heinz European Seafood manager:  
When we started producing private label canned tuna they don’t have to pay 
for any advertising, promotion, etc – which is high cost for brand labels. Then 
supermarkets started to complain that John West and other brands were too 
expensive so they squeezed us from both ends (USInd#22). 
Combined, these competitive dynamics squeeze both branded- and non-branded 
manufacturers of canned tuna, forcing them to sell at lower prices and thus eat into their 
own profit margins or, in the case of the US-centred chain especially, degrade the quality 
of the product through using hydrolysed protein or vegetable broth (volume enhancing 
additives), smaller can sizes and/or lower grade fish so that the end product resembled 
‘tuna soup’ in the 2000s (USInd#2; 8; #9; EUInd#17–#20; #55; IntFS#3; Binotto 2004: 
100; COS 2001: 11, 2001b: 21; Josupeit 2004:161; King 1987b: 66, 72-3; Krampe 2000: 
114; Lischewsky 2000: 92; Munoz 1993: 75, 1996: 109).  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
50 On the strategic significance of supermarket own-brands, see Hughes 1996. 
51 Speech by Adolfo Valsecchi (CEO MW Brands) at the INFOFISH Tuna 2006 conference. 
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3.5.2 Canned tuna branded-firms and differential supermarket power in 
principal EU markets 
 
The field of commodity studies tends to assume that supermarkets function as lead firms. 
As we have seen, there is certainly a tendency to ‘supermarket power’ in the EU-centred 
canned tuna chain. However, these dynamics are not uniform and important differences 
exist between principal EU markets. Table 3.4 offers a snap-shot of corporate 
concentration in total grocery sales by the top-five supermarkets in six EU markets in the 
late 2000s (the five principal markets discussed above plus the Netherlands).52 It also 
details the relative position of the major ‘national’ canned tuna brands in relation to each 
other and to private label. The very low retail selling price of canned tuna in the USA and 
Germany (US$ 3.47 and US$ 3.50 per kilogram of fish respectively in 2002) can be 
contrasted with the significantly higher price in Italy and France (US$ 6.57 and US$ 6.05 
per kilogram) (ACNielson data as cited by Binotto 2004: 100; see Brus 2002: 96 for 
similar estimates and Trovamala 2004: 112 for slightly higher ones). Both the US and 
Germany are renowned as price-focussed, low quality canned tuna markets with high 
levels of potential product substitutability between different canned animal protein 
(Campling et al.  2007: 288-298, 319; EUInd#11; PICInd#45–#47). Private label sales 
dominate the German canned tuna market, which, combined with lower product quality, 
contributes to explaining the low retail price (IntFS#22; Brus 2002: 97; Catarchi 2004: 
25). As we saw earlier, this tendency in Germany (and elsewhere) resulted in the rise of 
specialised non-branded manufacturers to supply private label. 
 
It is often argued that the high price in Italy can be explained by the product containing 
higher priced raw material (yellowfin), packing media (olive oil) and a more technical 
easy-open can.53 This is largely discredited by the fact that Spain is close to the German 
price (at $3.54 per kilogram) but consumes mainly yellowfin in oil in easy-open cans. 
                                                     
52 It should also be noted that Bolton had an 8.5 percent share of the Belgian market in 2009/10 through the 
Saupiquet brand, but the leader was Imperial with 21%. Private label as a percentage of total canned tuna 
sales there was 54.6 percent in 2008/09 (AC Nielson, confidential industry source). 
53 Canned tuna is the seventh most important category of all shelf stable food sales in Italy (after UHT milk, 
pasta, coffee, etc), and Rio Mare canned tuna in olive oil is the second best selling individual branded item 
(Schapira 2009: 306-7). 
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Instead, the high price of product in Italy is probably due more to the Rio Mare brand 
being outright market leader with 36 percent share, which other brands base their own 
price on.54 This market dominance is reinforced by a combination of the highly 
fragmented supermarket sector (the top-five have only 40 percent of grocery sales), 
regional loyalties for specific canned tuna brands and very small market share of private 
label (18 percent) able to exert competitive pressure. In fact, the Italian brands have 
engaged in competitive pricing against private label – ‘it is not uncommon’ to find 
national brands priced 10-12 percent below private label (Brus 2002: 96; IntFS#22). In 
other words, this market seems to be based upon oligopolistic rent-seeking by the lead 
branded firm. As pointed out by Spanish managers, Bolton’s position ‘is good for us as it 
pushes price up for everyone!’ (EUInd#23; #24). Continuing this line of reasoning, the 
lower-price in Spain could be explained by the high degree of competition between 
fragmented national canned tuna brands and a fragmented supermarket sector (five firms 
control only 45 percent of grocery sales) engaged in horizontal competition on private 
label product, which has the highest total market share of all six EU markets at 65 
percent. One Spanish industry representative stated that: 
Supermarkets are the cancer of this business. If taking on a price squeeze 
for milk or coffee, etc, there’s less of a problem for sustainability. But 
they’re often using tuna as a traffic mover, losing money, and fighting on 
price. ... Retailers are pushing each other on price points, but there’s no 
other protein that you can get for one Euro a kilo’ (EUInd#21; #22).  
The relative power of supermarkets in Spain in the late 2000s is even more significant 
given that their rise was considerably later than their equivalents in France and the UK. 
For example, in the early 1990s private label had only 20 percent share of the Spanish 
canned tuna market (Josupeit 1993: 50). 
 
There is however, no automatic relationship between levels of supermarket concentration 
and private label share of sales of canned tuna. The Netherlands is the most concentrated 
                                                     
54 Bolkton Group also owns the Italian Palmera brand, which combined with Rio Mare gives Bolton just 
under 50% share of the Italian market. Rio Mare has led the Italian market since at least 1990 when it had 
28% share, growing from 17% in 1980 due to intense and successful marketing campaigns 
(ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 104; Josupeit 1993: 34; EUInd#11). 
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of Europe’s grocery markets – the top two supermarkets alone have around 60 percent 
share – but the market for canned tuna is more dominated by branded-firms than any 
other, with three brands sharing 84.5 percent of value sales. Like the UK, this market is 
characterised by a struggle for market share between John West and Princes. In the UK, 
Tesco is the dominant player (with around 31 percent of total canned food sales), while 
three other firms compete for second position. Around 60 percent of the UK canned tuna 
value market is held by the two main canned tuna brands. This concentration, combined 
with relatively high quality canned skipjack product compared to Germany, might 
explain why the UK price per kilogram of tuna in 2002 sits between the two sets of 
extremes noted above at US$ 4.43. This concentration may also encourage oligopolistic 
rent seeking (see below). 
 
Retail in France is structured very similarly to the UK in terms of its levels of 
concentration of supermarkets (both are at 80 percent for the top-five firms) and national 
brands, as well as being led by one major supermarket chased by a handful of followers: 
the global giant Carrefour has 25 percent of grocery sales in France with the next four 
largest firms in fairly close competition for the position of second runner.55 The 
explanation for the very high price in France (US$ 6.05 per kilogram) is more complex. It 
is most likely to do with the specialised market for ‘raw pack’ (thon au naturel) and for 
so-called ‘value added’ tuna salad packs (French canners pioneered the latter in the early 
1980s (Josupeit 1993: 21; IntFS#22)). Salad packs make the tuna raw material more 
profitable because of its reduced volume as it is mixed with other cheaper inputs. Of total 
retail sales of canned fish of €807 million in France in 2008, raw pack was 38.5 percent, 
standard (pre-cooked) canned tuna was only 16.5 percent, and ‘salad products’, which 
include the ‘use of tuna pieces’, was 14 percent (confidential industry source, 2010; see 
AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 98 for break-downs in 1980 and 1988). The high proportion of 
the specialised raw pack and ‘value added’ salads contributes to explaining the relatively 
                                                     
55 The combination of Carrefour’s premier position in France and second position in Italy and Spain 
provides it with immense buying power. However, very different market specifications for canned tuna in 
France and Italy/Spain limit production-line economies of scale for suppliers of Carrefour’s private label 
product. For example, in Italy and Spain demand is for 80gm cans of yellowfin in oil, while the French 
market is mainly for larger cans of raw pack skipjack. 
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high price of tuna per kilogram in France, which may also be attributed to ‘market 
sharing’ by the two main branded-firms and strong concentration in grocery sales. 
 
In summary, relative degrees of market power between supermarkets and branded-firms 
play a central role in shaping competitive conditions in different EU markets for canned 
tuna. It also appears that where a market is highly oligopolistic, whether by canned tuna 
branded-firm (e.g. Italy), or by a combination of branded-firm and supermarkets (e.g. 
France and the UK), retail sales price is higher. Conversely, the relatively more 
fragmented market in Spain, both by branded-firms and supermarkets, seems to generate 
greater competition on price despite the high cost of the predominant raw material 
(yellowfin). Finally, in order to enhance profitability, firms are increasingly focussed on 
so-called ‘value added’ products (i.e. that use less tuna raw material). In the EU this has 
so far been a significant success only in France;56 in Spain for example, the ‘innovation’ 
segment is reported to be only two percent of the market (EUInd#21; #22). 
                                                     
56 The other major success in ‘value added’ was StarKist in the United States (formerly owned by Heinz). It 
is the US market leader in ‘pouch’ tuna (aluminium packs), which accounted for an estimated 20 percent of 
StarKist’s business (sales in 2005 were US$596 million), but around 50 percent of its profit (USInd#1; see 
also, Campling et al 2007: 292). 
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Table 3.4: Supermarket concentration in major EU markets for canned tuna in late 2000s 
Country Top 5 supermarket chains  
(and % share of total grocery sales)* 
Top 5 
supermarkets 
share of total 
grocery market* 
Main ‘national’ brands of canned 
tuna (and % share sales) 
Private label as 
% canned tuna 
sales 
Netherlands Albert Heijn (29.5); Superunie (29.5); Schuitema (C1000) 
(14.5); Aldi (9); Super de Boer (7.5) 
90% John West (43.5); Deep Blue 
(22.3); Princes (18.7) 
(2009/10) 
15.5% 
(2009/10) 
UK Tesco (31); Asda (16.5); Sainsbury’s (16); Morrisons (12); Co-
op (5)** 
80.5%** John West (35.5); Princes (24.8) 
(2009/10) 
38% 
(2009/10) 
France Carrefour (25.3); Leclerc (16.1); EMC Distribution (13.2); 
Auchan (12.6); ITM Enterprises (Intermarché) (12.6) 
79.8% Petit Naivre (23); Saupiquet (18); 
Chancerelle (5) 
(2008)# 
38% 
(2008)# 
Germany Edeka (18.6); Rewe (14.7); Metro (14); Schwarz (Kaufland & 
Lidl) (11.2); Aldi (10.5) 
79%  Saupiquet (4). 95% 
(2010) 
Spain Mercadona (15.6); Carrefour (13.9); Alcampo (5.8); Dia (5.5): 
Eroski (4.1) 
44.9% Calvo (10.1); Albo (9.5); 
Garavilla (4.3) 
(2009) 
65% 
(2009) 
Italy Coop Italia (18); Carrefour (10); Esselunga (8); Pam (3): 
Auchan (1) 
40% Rio Mare (34); Nostromo (12), 
Star (9), Palmera (7), Mareblu (6), 
Maruzella (6)   
(2002) 
18.2% 
(2008) 
Average level of concentration 69% Top 2 brands: 20% 45% 
* 2006 or nearest available year; ** 2007 data for share of UK retail market for canned foods, which broadly mirror their positions in the overall market (Key 
Note 2009: 31); *** data for canned fish segment (for canned tuna private label had 44% in 2004); note that Petit Navire is the market leader for raw pack tuna, 
but Saupiquet is the leader for other packs (‘standard’ canned tuna, salads, etc). 
Sources: Seafish 2008a: 13; 2008b: 13; 2008c: 11; 2008d: 14; 2008f: 12; Key Note 2008: 32; Euro Monitor 2009; Trovamal 2004: 114; ANFACO 2010; 
FRUCOM, pers. comm., 2011; AC Nielsen and IRI Grocery Outlets data supplied by various industry sources; interviews and person. comms. with industry 
representatives in 2010.  
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3.5.3 Supermarkets and canned tuna in UK: oligopolistic rent-seeking and 
downgrading 
 
As the UK is the largest importer of canned tuna in the EU, a continued source of growth and 
the main destination of Seychelles exports (Chapter 6), it is worth taking a closer look at 
retail in this market. From 1995 to 1999 UK canned fish volume sales increased by only two 
percent, whereas canned tuna grew by 17.5 percent (and 21 percent in value) (Spruyt 2000: 
103). This growth appears to have been stimulated primarily by supermarket strategies of 
promoting their private label and delisting tertiary brands from the shelf. The volume share of 
private label in the UK market rose from 41 to 49 percent between 1996 and 1999, but value 
share slightly declined (Spruyt 2000: 104).57 In 1996 private label and branded product price 
was roughly equal, but in 2003 the latter was retailed at almost 11 percent more (Brus 2004: 
123). This is evidence of the price war between supermarkets in the late 1990s on core 
category (or ‘price fighting’) products in a struggle over UK market share. The impacts of 
this price war would be keenly felt among suppliers, especially in the Solomon Islands and 
Fiji (see below). Other key explanations for growing sales were an increase in shelf space 
allocated to canned tuna and a ‘major increase’ in advertising, especially televised 
commercials, by both John West and Princes (Spruyt 2000: 104).  
 
Unlike in the US this intensified competition did not result in a downward spiral in ever 
lower real prices (see above). According to a former senior manager at Princes, this was 
because John West and Princes played a ‘leading role in the development and direction of 
supermarket brands, in order to encourage sustainable growth for the entire category’ (Spruyt 
2000: 104). In fact, Princes and John West collectively increased their value share of the UK 
market from 45 percent in 1996 to 56 percent in 2003, and their volume share from 40 to 50 
percent (Brus 2004: 123) thus gaining one percent in value over volume sales.58 In other 
words, unlike in the US (Lischewski 2000: 90; Krampe 2000: 116), the UK branded-firms did 
not engage in sharp price wars; instead they ensured conditions for the maximisation of 
                                                     
57 Branded product volume share remained relatively stable at between 39-41 percent, but its value share 
increased from 45 to 46 percent (Spruyt 2000: 104).  
58 The supermarket private labels simultaneously increased their volume share from 41 percent to 50 percent, 
indicating that tertiary brands were completely squeezed out of the market. 
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oligopolistic rents (or, in business-speak ‘sustainable growth for the entire category’).59 As 
one manager put it: ‘The everyday price positioning is sufficiently high’ (EUInd#34). In 
addition, although the supermarkets compete using private label product, it would have been 
commercially illogical for them to continuously push the price point established by the two 
branded-firms below a margin where ‘sustainable growth’ (i.e. maximised profits) could be 
achieved. Instead it seems that the supermarkets engaged in a dual strategy of squeezing 
tertiary brands out of the market by only listing the two main branded-firms and exerting 
greater price pressure on their suppliers of private label product (apparently pocketing much 
of the savings, see below). However, as we saw earlier, with the shift in ownership of John 
West to MW Brands it shifted strategy and engaged in sharp promotional competition which 
ate into John West’s profitability. This is because MW Brands was pursuing its short-term 
remit of expanding market share before Lehman Brothers sold the investment tranche of 
which MW Brands was a part. This indicates that different types of business strategies and 
associated time-frames have important differential effects; as we shall also see in the example 
of UK supermarket relations with non-branded manufacturers.  
 
The late 1990s competition for share of the UK market between Sainsbury’s and Tesco was 
sparked by the latter’s seemingly inexorable rise. Sainsbury’s competed directly on price, 
including on its private label canned tuna which contributed directly to downgrading for two 
non-branded manufacturers based in the Pacific islands. This is worth a short explanation 
because it gets to the heart of one of the problems of the GCC approach with its emphasis on 
a one-way process of upgrading (see Section 1.1.2). In 1987 Fiji was the second largest 
supplier to the UK and the Solomon Islands was sixth largest. Each was based on only one 
factory – Pafco and Solomon Taiyo respectively – set-up in the 1970s as joint ventures 
between national governments and Japanese multinationals (Doulman and Kearney 1987: 26; 
Barclay 2008; Ram-Bidesi 2003). Canned tuna from Fiji was promoted by Sainsbury’s 
through its private label product and benefitted ‘from a very good reputation in the UK’ 
(AfDB/INFOFISH 1991: 29), and around 70-80 percent of Solomon Taiyo’s production went 
to Sainsbury’s private label and the rest to John West and Tesco as well as local and sub-
regional markets (PICInd#30; 38; IntFS#2; Doulman and Kearney 1987: 27). These two 
firms’ ‘high level of acceptance’ in the UK import market was ‘reflected in the high prices 
that the Pacific product commands’ (Elsy 1987: 92; IntFS#38). Their commercial success at 
                                                     
59 The two branded-firms do engage in sharp competition over raw material supply in the Western Indian Ocean 
(Chapter 6). 
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the time can be explained by three factors: first, as ACP states they benefited from duty-free 
access to the EU market; second, the UK market for canned tuna commanded a relatively 
high price in the 1980s, especially compared to the geographically-closer US market (see 
Appendix Figure 3B.1); and third, both canneries received an additional price premium on 
their product because their fish was caught using labour-intensive pole-and-liners (see 
Chapter 2). Sainsbury’s explicitly marketed the product at a premium because of the reduced 
environmental impact of pole-and-line gear (EUInd#57–#60; PICInd#38; #30; TInd#9; 
USInd#18). 
 
However, supplying just one major buyer was a commercial risk. The bitter battle for market 
share resulted in Sainsbury’s putting a price squeeze on first-tier suppliers of several of its 
own-brand products, including canned tuna. In short, the new ex-factory price offered by 
Sainsbury’s was not high enough to cover production costs: ‘Sainsbury’s always showed us a 
good price, but at the end of the day they didn’t … US$ 34 per case became US$ 21!’ 
(PICInd#38; #30; IntFS#2). In short, these two canneries not only had to contend with the 
higher costs associated with production in small economies in a geographically isolated area 
(JInd#21–#26; Section 1.2.2), but price pressures generated through competition in the UK 
retail market had a devastating impact, despite the 24 percent margin of preference. It also 
seemed that customers were not willing to pay for Sainsbury’s ‘green philosophy’ as the 
‘pole and line preference’ came to an end (EUInd#57–#60).60 These conditions of 
competition in the UK-centred commodity chain resulted in both firms downgrading from 
non-branded manufacturers of canned tuna to contract processors of tuna loins. Pafco became 
locked into an exclusive contract to supply loins to Bumble Bee’s canning-only plant on the 
US mainland and Solomon Taiyo (renamed Soltai) to Tri Marine (the supplier of loins to 
Bolton Group’s cannery in Italy) (EUInd#53; EUInd#57 –#60; TInd#9; USInd#3; #4; #18; 
#22; see Campling et al.  2007: 229-230). One production site’s loss was another’s gain. 
Sainsbury’s quickly shifted its source of supply to non-branded manufacturers in Ecuador and 
to IOT in Seychelles (EUInd#49; Gomez-Sanchez 2004: 167).  
 
 
                                                     
60 Paradoxically, due to intensive lobbying and public campaigns by Greenpeace and other NGOs, from 2009 
onwards UK supermarket buyers were desperately searching for supplies of pole-and-line-caught canned tuna. (I 
was asked on numerous occasions by UK buyers if I knew any untapped sources of pole-and-line caught tuna.) 
While a fundamental dynamic of increasing importance to the EU- and US-centred commodity chains, 
‘sustainability’ criteria such as ‘dolphin friendly’ standards are beyond the scope of this thesis.  
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3.6 Conclusion: Conditions of competition and chain governance in the EU-centred 
canned tuna industry 
 
This chapter detailed the relative concentration and business strategies of several canned tuna 
firms across principal EU markets in the context of the international division of labour in 
canned tuna production and different levels of supermarket concentration in these markets. 
The findings concur with the commodity studies literature on the general rise of supermarket 
power in agri-business chains. Evidence of ‘buyer drivenness’ includes ‘macro’ dynamics 
such as the dispersal of export-orientated canned tuna production in the international division 
of labour which allows buyers to engage in global sourcing and ‘micro’ supermarket buyer 
policies such as pushing various ‘costs’ onto suppliers. The former finding mirrors the 
tendency in a growing number of chains since the 1980s, especially with the neoliberal push 
to export-orientated development, which: ‘not only squeezes prices upstream along the chain, 
but gives an added advantage to those firms controlling market access whether through 
ownership of internationally recognized brand names or through control of retail space’ 
(Raikes et al.  2000: 398). 
 
While there is a dispersal of the ownership and geography of production in the manufacturing 
node of the global commodity chain, there is simultaneously a tendency to concentration 
among EU- and US-centred branded-firms. Heinz/ MW Brands was identified as one of three 
lead branded-firms in the EU-centred commodity chain, but it is the only firm specialised in 
canned fish; Princes/Mitsubishi and Bolton Group are primarily marketing firms engaged in a 
wide range of consumer brand segments. Barriers to entry are high in the EU-centred 
commodity chain, with each principal market typified by two or three major canned tuna 
brands, and the rest increasingly squeezed out by supermarket private label product. In terms 
of branding, market entry is generally limited to a category leader and a second placed brand 
that have the economies of scale to absorb supermarket ‘cost’ demands. This tendency 
contributed to the rise of the three lead branded-firms operating simultaneously in multiple 
markets (i.e. the branded node became more concentrated to allow firms to maintain 
profitability in the face of ‘supermarket power’). As recognised by the industry itself, 
branded canned tuna firms function as an oligopoly (e.g. Levy 2000). However, we also saw 
that cultures of consumption and different levels of concentration among canned tuna 
branded-firms and supermarkets have an effect on market dynamics (e.g. the relative role of 
private label), retails prices and, it is believed, strategies of oligopolistic rent-seeking. The 
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findings demonstrate differential levels of buyer drivenness in the EU-centred commodity 
chain depending upon market structure and conditions of competition. In other words, 
supermarkets both condition competition (through market power) and generate changing 
competitive dynamics (e.g. product promotions and the relative weighting of private label). 
 
The EU-centred commodity chain was shown to reflect complexities in the international 
political economy generated by historical relationships and tariff protection. The French and 
Spanish production systems were compared and the former was shown to have been based on 
colonial/post-colonial relations since the 1950s, while the latter remains centred on domestic 
production. So-called ‘value added’ production in France in the 2000s relies almost entirely 
upon on the ‘logic of loining’, while canneries in Spain apply a more complex ratio of labour 
time/cost to fish yield and the ‘tuna-tinplate factor’. Both locations are defined by their 
relationship to the international division of labour and protected by the EU tuna tariff regime, 
but while French firms have played a historically expansionist role, pioneering tuna canning 
in West Africa and the Western Indian Ocean, Spanish firms have tended to focus on 
domestic competition, with some expansion into the Italian market through the acquisition of 
national brands there since the 1990s and investment in EU-centred processing in Latin 
America, especially in the 2000s.  
 
The case of Heinz/ MW Brands illustrated more concretely dynamics in the international 
division of labour, including in relation to the Seychelles as a location of production. As with 
StarKist in the US, Heinz European Seafood was based upon extensive vertical integration 
into fishing and processing and limited reliance on non-branded manufacturers. Its ‘global 
ocean’ sourcing strategy for raw material and canned product means that Heinz European 
Seafood/MW Brands procures from two different duty-free ACP locations in two oceanic 
regions, a form of industrial organisation that reduced risk and increased profitability 
depending upon how environmental and economic conditions affected either location at 
particular times. As in Chapter 2, this demonstrated the centrality of business strategies 
employed to mitigate the complexities and fluctuations of environmental conditions of 
production, especially Heinz/MW Brands control over Cobrecaf and ownership of the TTV 
fleet in Ghana. We also saw how Heinz chose to penetrate EU principal markets for canned 
tuna by buying-into existing brands, demonstrating the important role that established brands 
play as a barrier to entry, even for this globally-recognisable food brand. On a similar theme, 
the emergence of specialised ‘French’ and Spanish non-branded manufacturers showed how, 
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unless in a leading position, branded-firms were squeezed out of the market by the buying 
practices of increasingly concentrated supermarkets. Heinz/ MW Brands also illustrates how 
different types of ownership demand higher (or lower) profit rates and how this translates into 
specific business strategies, with Heinz trying to generate above normal financial returns and 
Lehman Brothers trying to boost market share over a four to five year timeframe so as to 
increase resale value for its investors.  
 
In his analysis of US-centred clothing and apparel chains, Gereffi argues that profits in buyer-
driven commodity chains derive more from ‘unique combinations of high-value research, 
design, sales, marketing, and financial services’ than from ‘scale economies and 
technological advances as in producer-driven chains’ (1994: 99). Similarly, Gibbon et al.  
argue that: ‘Vertical integration was much less common in buyer-driven chains, since 
independent contractors performed production functions here, while lead firms concentrated 
instead on product development, branding, design and marketing rather than manufacturing’ 
(2008: 320). Neither is the case for the EU-centred canned tuna chain. Instead we see a range 
of different approaches by lead branded-firms, with some owning processing facilities and 
focussing on economies of scale and technological innovations (MW Brands), and others 
more on their role as ‘strategic brokers ... linking overseas factories and traders’ (Gereffi 
1994: 99), such as Bolton Group. 
 
We also saw how competitive dynamics between supermarkets in the UK directly resulted in 
the downgrading of non-branded manufacturers of canned tuna in Fiji and Solomon Islands to 
become contract processors of tuna loins, but simultaneously how the branded-manufacturer 
Heinz quickly stepped in to supply lower priced private label to replace them using its factory 
in Seychelles. This is a clear indication of chain governance by supermarkets, especially in 
relation to non-branded manufacturers. In terms of the implications for ‘upgrading’, it 
appears that concentration among supermarkets and branded canned tuna firms in the EU-
centred chain severely limits the possibility of new entrants, even if they are major coastal 
state ‘resource owners’. The volatility of tuna raw material price fluctuations lessens as the 
commodity moves through the various nodes of the chain – from fishing to processing, 
wholesaling/importing and, finally, retail. In addition, wholesalers and supermarkets 
especially are able to mitigate price fluctuations through the control of inventories (e.g. King 
1986: 11). For smaller manufacturers and fishing vessel owners these competitive conditions 
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are generally translated into reduced profit margins for upstream suppliers (EUInd#57; 
PICInd#44–#47; USInd#1).  
 
Degrees of ‘drivenness’ in commodity studies is often typified by barriers to entry, so that if 
they are particularly high in the production node the chain will be producer driven, and if 
they are low they will be buyer driven (e.g. Raikes et al.  2000: 397). But while the capital 
and operating costs of a purse seine fleet are very high, this node of the chain is not producer-
driven. Instead, boat owners are subject to pressures of buyer-drivenness which translate into 
sharp struggles over raw material price between boat owners and processors (unless vertically 
integrated). It appears that one of the reasons for this is that, ecological conditions allowing, 
purse seiners will catch the same amount regardless of price – aside from exceptional 
circumstances such as the 1999/2000 cost-price squeeze (see Appendix 2C.2) – which is the 
result of a combination of fragmented ownership of the global fleet and high levels of 
overcapacity. One industry representative cited ‘the tremendous pressures that retailers are 
putting on suppliers’ and that this pressure translates downstream to boat owners, who ‘get 
hit the hardest’ because they ‘are the least organized’ (USInd#2) (and the least 
concentrated!). This is why the various regulatory mechanisms available to the EU DWF are 
so important to their commercial survival, as we shall see in Chapter 4 on the EU fisheries 
subsidies regime and in Chapter 5 on preferential rules of origin.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PART II 
REGULATORY MECHANISMS 
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Chapter Four 
 
International Resource Regulation and the EU Common Fisheries 
Policy, 1970s-2000s 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Part I traced the ‘economic’ aspects of the EU-centred commodity chain across three ‘nodes’ 
– purse seine fisheries, branded-manufacturing and supermarket retail. While the rise of 
supermarket power certainly contributes to driving the chain both through specific buyer 
demands and wider conditions of competition in retail (e.g. private label, the squeezing out of 
tertiary brands), we also saw that the structures of principal EU markets have differential 
effects for branded and non-branded-firms. The case of Heinz European Seafood/ MW 
Brands – as well as the main Spanish branded-firms – demonstrated that backward 
integration into the fishing node is a major business strategy. Chapter 3 concluded by arguing 
that, of the three nodes, firms engaged in fishing are under the greatest amount of economic 
pressure because they are the most immediately effected by fluctuations in tuna raw material 
prices and gasoil costs, as well as the vagaries of changing environmental conditions of 
production. Chapter 2 established that there are very high levels of concentration in the 
French distant water purse seine fleet and that the ownership of the Spanish equivalent is 
more fragmented and can be differentiated by business strategies, typified by vertical 
integration (OPAGAC members) or specialisation in fishing (ANABAC members). Along 
with the French-flagged boats controlled by Cobrecaf and the Kühn-Ballery et al. consortium, 
five Spanish firms – Albacora (a member of OPAGAC) and Inpesca, Atunsa, Echebastar and 
Pevasa (ANABAC) – were identified as the main seven corporate players fishing in the 
Western Indian Ocean. 
 
Despite the importance of differentiation at the level of the firm, Chapter 2 also established 
that the French and Spanish fleets can be categorised as the EU DWF since the mid-1980s 
because they are active in the same fishing grounds and receive substantially the same 
supports from the European Union. This chapter is largely about these supporting 
mechanisms and how flux in the wider international political economy in the 1970s provided 
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a basis for some of their elements, but also suggests how EU regulatory mechanisms are a 
historical product of prior practices by, for example, the French state. An additional 
regulatory mechanism designed to benefit the EU DWF, again established in the 1970s, is the 
EU tuna trade regime, especially preferential rules of origin for fish products, addressed in 
the following chapter. In short, Part II of the thesis identifies and analyses the major 
‘political’ dimensions of the EU-centred commodity chain and situates them in historical 
context. This chapter focuses on the regulatory mechanisms of the fishing node (thereby 
connecting directly to Chapter 2) and Chapter 5 examines trade regulation in the processing 
node, especially for the ACP (connecting directly to discussion of the international division 
of labour and industrial organisation of lead firms in Chapter 3). 
 
The next section addresses two components of the international legal governance of tuna 
fisheries, first the centrality of the Law of the Sea as an institutional condition of resource 
access which provides coastal states with economic sovereignty over the marine resources in 
their waters. This historicises this regulatory mechanism and reiterates the centrality of 
Seychelles as an indispensible strategic location to commercially-viable purse seine fisheries 
in the WIO (Chapters 2 and 6). The second component is the regulatory mechanism of the 
relevant regional fisheries management organisation – the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission – 
and its failure to limit unsustainable fishing activities, especially for yellowfin tuna 
(connecting back to the discussion of productivity enhancing measures in the WIO fishery in 
Chapter 2).  
 
Section 4.3 moves from this general account of resource regulation to particular mechanisms 
designed by the EU under the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to support its ‘home’ DWF. It 
first identifies and assesses CFP payments for vessel construction and modernisation and a 
price subsidy specific to canning-grade tuna fisheries, and then examines EU support in 
negotiating and, again, subsidising the EU DWF is its resource access strategy with third 
countries (e.g. Seychelles). These subsidies are important not only because of the EU DWF’s 
relatively high operating costs compared to non-Japan Asian competitors (see Appendix 2B), 
but also to its commercial survival in the face of the price-cost squeeze  which combines high 
fuel prices and the role of ‘buyer drivenness’ in pushing down raw material prices (Appendix 
2C.3). 
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4.2 International Legal Governance of Tuna Fisheries 
 
Tuna fishing is subject to various forms of international regulation.1 The regimes of ‘hard’ 
and ‘soft’ international law that directly and indirectly govern tuna fisheries in particular and 
marine fisheries in general are complex and multilayered. They include standards protecting 
seafarers under the International Labour Organisation; International Maritime Organisation 
conventions on vessel safety and pollution; FAO agreements and codes of conduct on 
‘responsible fisheries’ and fishing on the ‘high seas’, as well as on combating illegal, 
unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing; and fisheries components of broader United 
Nations agreements on the environment and ‘sustainable development’ such as Agenda 21 
(1992) and the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002). Two major institutional 
regimes are focussed on here because of their centrality to the business activities and 
strategies of tuna fishing firms.  
 
The regulation of resource access is a central consideration and takes two main institutional 
forms. The Law of the Sea delineates economic sovereignty over resources within a given 
territorial area. We trace the historical emergence of the Law of the Sea and highlight 
tensions in international law between coastal states (‘resource owners’) and distant water 
fishing nations (‘resource users’) over access to highly migratory fish stocks, especially tuna. 
The second form is the attempt to ‘manage’ tuna fisheries on the basis of regional stocks. The 
most relevant regional fisheries management organisation for this thesis is the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission. It limits fishing in the oceanic area for which it is responsible to vessels 
that are flagged and registered with member nations (see zones 51 and 57 in Appendix 2A). 
The following addresses these two institutional forms in turn. 
 
 
4.2.1  The Law of the Sea  
 
Since its development by Hugo Grotius in the early 1600s at the height of Dutch maritime 
power, the freedom of-the-seas doctrine meant that – apart from a slim strip of coastal waters 
– the oceans are often typified in international legal practice as ‘a thing common of all’ (res 
communis omnium) to the exclusion of national claims to political control or territorial 
                                                            
1 Issues in and debates around fisheries management are not addressed in this thesis.  
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sovereignty (Lall and Khemchand 1997: 10; Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the 
Sea 1998),2 except of course where, between equal rights, military force decides. However, as 
pointed out by Bromley (2008: 9-10) this is better categorised as res nullius (nobody’s 
property) as the oceans are an open access resource (see also Pontecorvo 1988: 361). The first 
declaration against this doctrine was made by the US in 1945 when it extended national 
jurisdiction ‘to all resources on the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf’; a move that 
was clearly motivated by access to mineral resources (mainly oil) (Cantorna et al 2009: 373 
footnote 35; Hollick 1981). This was closely followed by similar declarations in 1947 by 
Chile, Ecuador and Peru (Loftas 1981: 232). Two UN conferences on the Law of the Sea in 
1958 and 1960 attempted to negotiate the outer limits of territorial waters, but this was not 
agreed until the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).3  
 
The UNCLOS negotiation process (1974-1982) was characterised by deep disputes, 
including, and of most relevance here, contradictory approaches to ‘highly migratory’ 
species.4 On the one hand, distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) argued that because highly 
migratory species move from one countries’ exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to another (as 
well as into the high seas) they cannot be the property (or responsibility) of any single state. 
Therefore, access to highly migratory stocks should be open to all, including, of course, to 
DWFNs. Coastal states, on the other hand, argued that they had the sovereign right over any 
fish while it is in their 200 mile EEZ (Joseph 1977: 280). The negotiated agreement resulted 
in an uneasy compromise to ‘solve’ these contradictory positions. From the end of 1982, 
coastal states were allocated sovereignty over the exploitation and management of all living 
resources within their EEZs 200 nautical miles from their coasts. Foreign fleets wanting to 
                                                            
2 Grotius wrote Mare liberum (1608) as a justification for Dutch trade with the East Indies, ‘alarmed that a few 
nations might try to gain control of shipping lanes and restrict the advantageous commerce of his native land’ 
(Bromley 2008: 9; Butler 1990: 210). 
3 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982. The assumptions of 
UNCLOS III in relation to marine fisheries resources were influenced by Hardin’s (1968) ‘tragedy of the 
commons’: that resources open to all inevitably lead to environmental deterioration, hence the need for their 
privatisation. Historical and ongoing debates in Marxian, Malthusian, neoliberal institutionalist and ‘common 
property resources’ traditions around ‘the commons’ and their bearing on tropical tuna fisheries (including 
‘rights based’ management) cannot be engaged with here (for a short discussion, see Campling et al. 2012. 
Questions around the commons, property rights, ground-rent and (capitalist) ‘landed-property’ in marine 
fisheries will be the subject of future comparative work on extractive industries. (See Capps (2010) for an 
exceptional application and development of Marx’s category of landed-property to the case of the chieftaincy 
and extractive industry (platinum mining) in South Africa. See also, Fine’s (1994) attempt to establish a general 
theory of mining.) Havice and Campling (2010) offer an initial attempt to critically engage with new 
institutionalist economics conceptions of fisheries property rights in relation to the WCPO tuna fishery.  
4 The elongation of the negotiations was due particularly to disputes over a regime for the deep sea bed (and 
thus access to oil).  
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access the resource would pay to do so. A ‘development clause’ granted coastal states the 
ability to (temporarily) block foreign access to their waters in order to develop domestic 
fishing capacity (UNCLOS, Article 56: 1a).5 However, in direct tension with the 
development clause, UNCLOS also mandated that coastal states offer fishing access where 
they were unable to exploit ‘surplus’ stocks themselves (the so-called ‘use it or lose it’ 
clause) (UNCLOS, Article 62: 2). It should be noted that it took some years for the 
sovereignty over tuna access to become a global norm. For example, the United States (a 
major DWFN) refused to recognise the sovereignty of Pacific island countries over highly 
migratory species, initiating a ‘tuna war’ (Teiwaki 1987; Tsamenyi 1986). That is until its 
hand was forced when Soviet fleets were poised to deepen their penetration of the fishery 
through an expanding network of access agreements, which, in the geo-political context of 
the ‘second’ Cold War, resulted in US acquiescence and the formation of a multilateral tuna 
access treaty with the islands. 
 
UNCLOS was negotiated in a period of flux in the world economy and, to an extent, in 
relative levels of asymmetry in the inter-state system. The 1970s witnessed the apex of ‘Third 
Worldist’ demands, including the call for a New International Economic Order and assertions 
of ‘resource nationalism’ (Campling 2006).6 (See Chapter 5 on the parallel importance of 
these dynamics to ACP-EU relations around preferential trade rules.) In this context, it was 
argued that UNCLOS could serve as an institutional mechanism to coordinate a substantial 
redistribution of resources from DWFN fleets to developing country interests (Copes 1981: 
223; Loftas 1981: 229, 232; Ogley (1977) citing Pardo and Borgese (1976); Pontecorvo 1988: 
363). In fact, UNCLOS provided a de jure legal basis for a de facto (albeit partial) legal 
reality in that it made legal provision for the EEZs already unilaterally declared by scores of 
coastal countries by 1976.7 One of the peculiar features of UNCLOS was that its draft terms 
during negotiation became part of customary international law before the convention itself 
was concluded. UNCLOS (1982) had two major implications for tuna fisheries. First, 
countries declared sovereignty over up to 90 percent of the planet’s tuna stocks in what was 
                                                            
5 The ‘development clause’ and the following ‘use it or lose it’ clause are open to diverse interpretation in their 
application in international law. 
6 See Schurman (1998) on the ‘resource nationalism’ of the Pacific islands in regard to tuna fisheries.  
7 The ‘common extension’ of EEZs to 200 miles is usually dated from 1976 (Cantorna et al 2007: 368) or 1977 
(Schmidt 2003: 2) when it was introduced by the United States, Canada, the EEC and others. On the EEC 
extension of its members’ national fishing areas from 12 to 200 miles in 1977, see Churchill (1987: 69-71), 
Garza-Gil et al (1996: 254) and Lequesne (2004: 23-4). 
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the largest and most rapid series of state-led enclosures in human history. Second, coastal 
state resource ‘owners’ had a firmer basis in access negotiations with DWFNs.  
 
Given the context of an uneven international political economy and the importance of tuna 
resources to industrial fishing fleets and their home states, it is no surprise that optimistic 
assumptions that UNCLOS would redistribute resources to developing countries turned out to 
be misplaced. As pointed out by Rachel Schurman in relation to tuna-related development in 
the Pacific islands, the ‘variables that critically mediate the relationship between property 
rights and income distribution are economic and political power’ (Schurman 1998: 133). As 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 and below, the economic and political power of European fishing 
interests (mediated by the EU) would define the dynamics of the WIO purse seine fishery 
from its outset.  
 
In addition to the formal creation of EEZs, UNCLOS also included specific mention of the 
management of highly migratory species. It mandated that coastal states and DWFNs: 
shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international organizations 
with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum 
utilization of such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the 
exclusive economic zone. In regions for which no appropriate international 
organization exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals harvest 
these species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organization 
and participate in its work. (UNCLOS, Article 64. Emphasis added.) 
This was a clear recognition of the fallacy of a core assumption behind Grotius’ freedom of-
the-seas doctrine as applied to the modern high seas: that, while “‘[m]ost things become 
exhausted with promiscuous use’”, the sea “‘can be exhausted neither by fishing nor by 
navigation’” (Grotius as cited by Schneider 1977: 149). Problematically, this fallacy was 
replaced with another – the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968);8 a reactionary neo-
Malthusian thesis that has formed the ideological corner-stone of most mainstream analyses 
of the economics of fisheries ever since.9 However, as indicated by the added emphasis in the 
passage from UNCLOS, this was a relatively weak legal commitment, especially for oceanic 
                                                            
8 See Bernstein (2010b: 307) and Skladany et al (2005) for critical notes from a Marxist perspective. 
9 Despite Hardin’s ‘false diagnosis’ (Bromley 2008: 1), his article and two other works in neoclassical economic 
theory on fisheries (Gordon 1954; Scott 1955) remain ‘seminal’ references in the mainstream fisheries 
economics literature. For a brief summary of the mainstream social science approaches to fisheries, see Salz et 
al (2007: 47-63), and for a representative selection in fisheries economics see Sumaila et al (2007b). 
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areas beyond the remit of EEZs – the high seas – which total almost 60 percent of the global 
oceans (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauley 2010: 1036).  
 
An attempt to redress this problem came with the follow-up to UNCLOS, the 1995 UN ‘Fish 
Stocks’ Agreement.10 The sole focus of this Agreement was on highly migratory fisheries and 
those that straddle EEZs and the high seas. Among other things, the Fish Stocks Agreement 
clarified the UNCLOS mandate on cooperation between coastal states and DWFNs over the 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in EEZs and, especially, the high 
seas. It included the requirement that regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs) 
be formed where they did not already exist. The Fish Stocks Agreement ‘thereby significantly 
strengthened the position of RFMOs as the paradigm through which States are to cooperate in 
order to achieve and enforce conservation objectives on the high seas and in areas under their 
jurisdiction’ (Lodge et al 2010: viii; see also Barston 1999). The Agreement put an end to the 
final vestige of the Grotian doctrine as applied to tuna: the high seas were no longer ‘a thing 
common of all’. A direct outcome was the formation of a tuna RFMO in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean in 2000, which legally enclosed the high seas areas of the world’s 
largest principal market tuna fishery.11 
 
 
4.2.2 Regional fisheries management: The case of the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission 
 
The first regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) was set up in the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific in 1950 as an institutional response to the complex international political-
economic issues thrown-up by the industrialisation and geographical expansion of tuna 
fisheries. As the species are ‘highly migratory’12 and thus outside of the sovereign control of 
any single EEZ, international cooperation is necessary in any attempt to seriously ‘manage’ 
(and extract rents from) the fishery. There is limited engagement in this thesis with the 
                                                            
10 Its full title is the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, New York, 4 August 1995, UN Doc A/CONF.164/37 
(8 September 1995). It has been in force since 11 December 2001. 
11 The Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean was opened for signature in September 2000 and entered into force on 19 June 2004. This 
mandated the creation of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). 
12 See discussion in Chapter 2. 
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history, negotiations and regulatory activities of tuna RFMOs. Their widely recognised 
failures are a major reason for their exclusion from the analysis (i.e. that they have had very 
limited impacts on levels of extraction).13 The most important failure has been a general lack 
of effective limits to unsustainable fishing of certain tuna species,14 especially in the Indian 
Ocean where only minor regulation has been introduced by IOTC in response to scientific 
advice (Anonymous 2009: 28-9).15 The failure of RFMOs to introduce effective resource 
management interventions, it is argued here, stems predominantly from the political-
economic pressures of fishing firms on their home and/or host states (and the competitive 
contradictions between them) in the context of the widely acknowledged global overcapacity 
of tuna fleets (Hinton 2007; Joseph 2003, 2004; see also Allen 2010: 30).16 This may well 
lend credence to the claim that fisheries biology more generally is duplicitous in its 
predominant concern ‘with the welfare of the fishing industry’ rather than resource 
conservation (Pauly 2009: 215). For example, the main institutional objective of IOTC is to 
‘promote cooperation among its Members with a view to ensuring, through appropriate 
management, the conservation and optimum utilization of stocks’ (IOTC 1993: Article 5(1). 
Emphases added). Rather a tension-laden task! All the more so given that ‘appropriate 
management’ has not been attempted and that ‘optimum utilisation’ has not even been 
properly defined (Anonymous 2009: 29). 
 
The most important legal limitation of the IOTC Agreement (concluded in 1993, in force 
since 1998) is that it has not been revised to take account of major changes in international 
fisheries law and management best-practice, including, among several others, UN Fish Stocks 
(signed in 1995, in force since 2001) and the FAO Compliance Agreement (adopted in 1993, 
                                                            
13 On the failure of RFMOs to sufficiently regulate tuna fisheries see Allen (2010), Lodge et al (2010), Cullis-
Suzuki and Pauley (2010), and, most of all, the tuna RFMO performance reviews published in 2009, available 
at: http://www.tuna-org.org/ 
14 Only IATTC has ‘a strict capacity limitation regime in place’, but even there, ‘the limit provided ... for the 
purse-seine fleet capacity is far above the optimum fleet size’ (Allen 2010: 29). 
15 It should be noted that IOTC recognised the necessity of capacity limits (Joseph 2003, and below), but 
concrete actions were inadequate. 
16 As pointed out by Symes (1997: 145) in reference to the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, while it ‘is 
nominally a science-based policy, when scientific advice has been refracted through the political process, it may 
appear to shed little light on the final decisions’. While fisheries specialists and industry representatives 
regularly discuss political-economic relations in private, the literature almost entirely ignores competitive 
accumulation as a fundamental mediating force on the fisheries ‘management’ potential of RFMOs. For a short 
development of this argument see Campling and Havice (2010c), which examines the role of competitive 
accumulation in the failed attempt in 2010 to use CITES to temporarily ban the international trade in Atlantic 
bluefin. Franchino and Rahming (2003) and Brandt and Svendsen (2009) offer highly formalised game-theoretic 
accounts of (methodologically individualist) ‘motivations’ of fishers and fisheries managers; for a sophisticated 
and empirically-rich antidote on similar themes, see Lequesne 2004: ch. 2. 
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in force since 2003) (Anonymous 2009).17 These two agreements are particularly important 
as they are legally-binding on signatories (i.e. so-called ‘hard’ international law), although 
several IOTC Members have not ratified one or both (Anonymous 2009: 16). Therefore, after 
only a few years after its conclusion the IOTC Agreement was outdated in terms of 
international fisheries management standards (e.g. the precautionary approach and eco-
systems-based management). More important is the failure of IOTC members to agree 
multilaterally to any effective limits on fishing either in terms of input (fishing capacity) or 
output (catch) measures, despite the view of the IOTC Scientific Committee that yellowfin 
tuna is probably in an overfished state (Table 4.1). 
 
 
Table 4.1: IOTC Scientific Committee stock status for principal market tuna, 2009 
Species Stock status summary 
 
Albacore Stock size and fishing pressure are considered to be within acceptable limits. 
Catches, mean weight and catch rates of albacore have been stable for over 20 
years. 
Bigeye Stock size and fishing pressure are close to the optimal (MSY) indicating that the 
stock is fully utilized. Indicators of stock size have shown a gradual declined since 
1970s. 
Skipjack Skipjack is a highly productive species and robust to overfishing. Catches have 
increased with increasing fishing pressure, but the trend of some indicators 
suggests that the stock status should be closely monitored. Stock size and fishing 
pressure are considered to be within acceptable limits. 
Yellowfin Stock size is close to or has possibly entered an overfished state recently. Fishing 
pressure has been too high in recent years resulting in a decline of the population to 
levels below the optimal. Currently, the population might not be able to sustain the 
1992-2002 level of catches. Recommends management measures to control fishing 
pressure  
Source: IOTC 2009: 4 
 
 
A major justification for the lack of management interventions by IOTC is that the 
bioeconomics of fishing activities will regulate themselves (IntFS#36).  Overfishing will lead 
to lower CPUE and result in the decline in vessel profitability; in turn this will lead vessels to 
exit the fishery until stocks have recovered, allowing an eventual return to profitable CPUE. 
The problem with this logic is that it assumes that firms function in economic equilibrium in 
conditions of perfect competition. In so doing it ignores both the centrality of fisheries 
                                                            
17 ‘FAO Compliance Agreement’ is the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. 
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subsidies as major economic props to profitable fishing operations (production ‘distortions’ 
for neoclassical economics)18 and, in some cases, vertical integration into processing where 
fishing activities can (at least in principle) be cross-subsidised within the firm in order to 
ensure strategic supply of raw material (see Chapters 2 and 3). In the more concrete context 
of threatened yellowfin stocks, IOTC management interventions were inhibited by divisions 
among members around two contesting hypotheses to explain record catches in 2003-06 – 
‘recruitment vs. catchability’.19 Proponents of the former argued that favourable 
environmental conditions in 1999-2001 led to increased recruitment (i.e. reproduction) in the 
yellowfin biomass. As the species matures at 2.8 years (Section 2.2), high catch rates were 
simply the result of an abundance of yellowfin. This position makes fishing input or output 
controls unnecessary. It thus supports the status quo of existing fishing interests as well as 
developing countries with fisheries development aspirations. The second hypothesis explains 
the record levels of exploitation through the increased productivity of tuna fleets. There was 
an increase in ‘catchability’ of yellowfin because of high levels of spatial and depth-range 
concentration of fishing effort, especially on FADs (see Chapter 2). This implies that the 
2003-06 boom in catches will result in a reduction in stock size and indicates the necessity of 
limitations on fishing to facilitate resource sustainability and, in turn, profitable CPUE for 
existing fleets.20  
 
The IOTC Scientific Committee supports the catchability hypothesis, but its (purely advisory) 
recommendations in 2009 (Table 4.1) were simply sidelined by IOTC members. Similarly, 
Scientific Committee recommendations in 2007 based on the catchability hypothesis called 
for yellowfin catch to be reduced to pre-2003 levels and for a freeze on fishing capacity. The 
only action by IOTC was to limit the number of industrial vessels flagged by members with 
more than 50 vessels of specific gear types. This had no effect on limiting catch (Allen 2010: 
24; Anonymous 2009: 24; see also IOTC Resolution 03/01). However, given the uncertainties 
                                                            
18 See below on subsidies available to the  EU DWF. See also Surís-Regueiro et al (2002: 118), which, in an 
analysis of EU subsidies and fleet profitability (albeit using vessels other than the DWF), concludes that, ‘if we 
consider all the possibilities for public aid and subsidies that exist, the financial return on the investment in the 
fishing sector can reach reasonable levels, comparable to the return obtained from other alternative 
investments’. 
19 Catches of yellowfin tuna in the IOTC region averaged 456,000mt per annum in this period compared to the 
previous record high of 395,000 tonnes in 1993 (IOTC 2009: 92-94; Allen 2010: 24). 
20 This point has long been understood. For example, at the London Overfishing Conference in March 1946, the 
British government pointed out that, ‘“if fishing is uncontrolled, the level of stocks [in the Northeast Atlantic - 
LC] will inevitably fall, the catch per unit of effort will diminish progressively and fishing will become 
unprofitable”’ (E. S. Russell (1946) as cited by Meuriot 1986: 295). See Economic Assessment of European 
Fisheries (2004) for estimated net profitability of a wider range of EU fishing fleets in 2004. 
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of stock estimates in fisheries science in general combined with the specific limits on 
estimating IOTC stocks because of poor compliance with reporting requirements (especially 
by artisanal fleets, but also by several DWFs), biomass would have to fall well below 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) before scientists could confidently identify this fall 
(Anonymous 2009: 24). In other words, without the application of a precautionary approach, 
fisheries science will only be able to prove a problem once it has occurred. 
 
4.3 The Common Fisheries Policy, Resource Access and the European Purse Seine 
Fleet  
 
The profitability of the EU distant water tuna purse seine fleet (DWF) depends upon catch 
levels and quality, the rate of exploitation on vessels and vertical integration into processing 
and/or branding, but crucially is also supported via regimes of fisheries subsidies, directly 
from EU member states and via the European Commission (EC). The issue of fisheries 
subsidies is as complex as it is contentious. Concern over the environmental and economic 
effects of subsidies paid to fishing activities has been highlighted since the late 1990s by 
environmental NGOs (especially WWF and Oceana) and international institutions (i.e. the 
OECD, UNEP, World Bank and the WTO) (see, for example, OECD (2005); Schorr (2004); 
UNEP (2008); WWF (1997); WT/CTE/W/51, 1997). WTO members subsequently identified 
fisheries subsidies as a major contribution to overcapacity and overfishing in global marine 
fisheries.21 As a result, a new draft agreement on disciplines for fisheries subsidies is being 
considered as part of the Doha Round negotiations.22 Due to limits of space, this thesis cannot 
engage with debates on the economic assumptions underlying these debates, the validity of 
the WTO as an institution able to regulate environmental issues, the possible (differential) 
impacts of proposed rules on fishing operations, or the (differential) developmental 
implications of proposed disciplines on coastal developing states (for summaries of these 
                                                            
21 Recognised as a formal component of the Doha Round with the WTO Ministerial Declaration in 2001, the 
commitment to negotiating disciplines on fisheries subsidies was heightened and deepened in the Hong Kong 
Ministerial Declaration in 2005 (WT/MIN(01)/Dec/1, 2001: para 28; WT/MIN(05)/Dec, 2005, Annex D, para 
9). Proposed disciplines on fisheries subsidies are one component of the negotiation modalities on ‘Rules’ in the 
Doha Round. 
22 The author has acted as trade policy consultant to the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) since 
November 2007, whose members have very similar interests to the Seychelles. This has included direct 
representation of the Pacific Islands at the WTO Fisheries Clusters in the NGOR since the beginning of 
negotiations on the Group Chair’s Draft Text in December 2007. He attended the majority of these multilateral 
meetings (as well as informal bilateral meetings held in parallel) in Geneva until February 2011. For overviews, 
see FFA Fisheries Trade News (various issues) and a draft paper on the political economy of the negotiation 
process (Campling and Havice 2010a). 
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debates, see Campling and Havice 2010a; Chang 2003; Grynberg and Tsamenyi 1998; 
Grynberg and Rochester 2005; Young 2008). What is important to the analysis here is the 
existence of an extensive regime of subsidies made available to the EU fishing fleet, one of 
the most highly subsidised in the world (Milazzo 1998; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2000; 
Sumaila and Pauly 2006; WWF 2001).  
 
 
4.3.1  The Common Fisheries Policy and EU DWF subsidies, 1994-2006 
 
Three types of direct EC subsidies have been identified as particularly important to the 
‘competitiveness’ of the EU DWF, each falling under a separate pillar of the Common 
Fisheries Policy (CFP).23 The CFP ‘structural policy’ includes payments for vessel 
construction and modernisation; a second CFP pillar, the ‘common organisation of the 
markets’, includes a ‘compensatory allowance’ price subsidy scheme specific solely to 
canning-grade tuna; and the third pillar includes subsidised access to coastal developing 
country EEZs (addressed in Section 4.3.2). The final and fourth pillar of the CFP is its 
resource conservation policy.24 
 
Under European Community law, either individual boat owners or nationally recognised 
‘producer organisations’ (see Section 2.5) can qualify for financial support from the 
Commission (EC 2002: 5). The Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) falls 
under the CFPs ‘structural’ pillar. FIFG funds were often matched by national governments 
(Sporrong and Bevins 2002: 2). The core strategic objectives of the FIFG (1993-2006) 
were:25  
a) ‘to contribute to achieving a sustainable balance between fishery resources and their 
exploitation; 
                                                            
23 Other sources of indirect EC funding to benefit the fishing industry – including to areas with lower levels of 
economic development (‘Objective 1’ regions) – are regional development and social funds, de minimis fuel 
subsidies, and ad hoc aid (Sporrong and Bevins 2002: 1-2, 4; Lequesne 2004: 85). In addition, as noted in 
Chapter 2 and in Meuriot (1986) and Lequesne (2004: 32-37, 89), sub-national and national-level subsidies were 
also critically important to the development of the French and Spanish industrial fleets.  
24 For a range of analytical overviews of the policies, practice and impacts of the CFP see Boude et al. (2001), 
Borg (2009), Hatcher (2000), Lequesne (2004, 2005), Surís-Regueiro et al. (2003), Symes (1997), Villasante 
(2010), and Villasante and Sumaila (2010) 
25 A major stated objective of the FIFG replacement – the European Fisheries Fund (2007-2013) – was also to 
‘strengthen the competitiveness of the operating structures and the development of economically viable 
enterprises in the fisheries sector’, among several other objectives around ‘sustainable development’, gender 
equality, and so on. Council Regulation (EC) No 1198/2006, Article 4(d).  
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b) to strengthen the competitiveness of structures and the development of economically 
viable enterprises in the sector; 
c) to improve market supply and the value added to fishery and aquaculture products; 
d) to contribute to revitalising areas dependent on fisheries and aquaculture.’ (Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1263/1999, Article 1(2)) 26 
Together these objectives clearly justify subsidies for the expansion of EU fishing fleets. 
Vessel construction and vessel modernisation subsidies paid under the FIFG to the entire EU 
fishing fleet totalled €1.6 billion over the period 1994-2006 (Mulvad and Thurston 2009: 5).27 
According to available data, the EU distant water tuna purse seine fleet received around three 
percent of these payments, valued at €55 million (Table 4.2).28 Given that the total EU fleet 
consists of 88,236 commercial fishing vessels and that the EU flagged DWF totals only 56 
boats,29 three percent of FIFG vessel construction and modernisation subsidies were 
channelled to only 0.06 percent of the total number of boats in the EU fishing fleet. However, 
the EU DWF consists exclusively of very large industrial-scale vessels and in terms of fleet 
capacity it constitutes six percent of the total gross tonnage (GT) of the EU fleet, and three 
percent of total EU fleet power (measured in kW).30 On this basis, the EU DWF receives a 
relatively equal proportion of FIFG vessel construction and modernisation subsidies 
compared to the aggregated GT and kW of the total commercial fleet. (The relative weights 
of fleet gross tonnage and power also serve to reiterate how highly capitalised the DWF is 
compared to the majority of EU fishing vessels.) 
  
                                                            
26 Note that a major finding of the official ex-post evaluation of the FIFG was that its strategic objectives did not 
take account of the need to limit fishing effort (Ernest & Young 2010a: 160; also, SEC(2010)428 final). A 
shadow evaluation was far more critical of the failure of FIFG to address fishing capacity and effort problems 
(Poseidon 2010). 
27 These authors (writing for EU Transparency) refer to subsidies paid under the CFP rather than the more 
specific instrument of the FIFG. However, their data is based solely on EC payments under the FIFG. 
28 Mulvad and Thurston (2009: 13) report a total of only €28 million in subsidies paid under the CFP for vessel 
construction and modernisation of an (unspecified) ‘EU tuna fleet’. I used a list of known EU purse seine 
vessels (Oceanic Développement 2008) – cross-checked with DG MARE’s vessel registry 
(http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/fleet) – which I then used to extract data from Mulvad and Thurston’s own 
database to come to the totals in Table 4.2. 
29 COM(2008) 902/final 2 
30 Total EU fleet capacity: 1,835,174 GT; and total EU fleet power: 6,572,007 kW (both at 31 Dec 2007) 
(COM(2008) 902/final 2, p.7). EU DWF capacity: 117,564 GT; and fleet power: 178,671 kW (Oceanic 
Développement 2008). 
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Table 4.2: Vessel construction and vessel modernisation subsidies paid to EU distant 
water tuna purse seine fleet under FIFG, 1994-2006 
Item Coverage* Value 
Total payments to Spanish 
DWF  
88% of fleet 
(29 of 33 vessels) 
€52,096,220 
Average per Spanish purse 
seiner 
-- €1,796,421.38 
Total payments to French 
DWF 
64% of fleet 
(14 of 22 vessels) 
€2,898,211 
Average per French purse 
seiner 
-- €207,015 
Total  -- €55,149,677* 
* Only includes vessels with an entry in EU Transparency database. 
** Includes one Italian flagged purse seine 
Source: List of EU purse seine vessels extracted from Oceanic Développement (2008). Raw subsidy data 
extracted from EU Transparency http://fishsubsidy.org. Full workings itemised by vessel are available in 
spreadsheet format upon request. 
 
 
If the EU Transparency data is broadly reliable,31 there are important differences between 
France and Spain in the reported take-up of FIFG vessel construction and modernisation 
subsidies (Table 4.2). The Spanish DWF received 94 percent of total vessel construction and 
modernisation subsidies paid to the entire EU DWF under the FIFG.32 This disproportionate 
flow is consistent with reports that Spain received 47 percent of payments to all vessels under 
the FIFG in the period 1994-2006, equivalent to € 27,528 for each Spanish catching sector 
employee (Mulvad and Thurston 2009: 9; Poseidon 2010: 56).33 
 
                                                            
31 There are large acknowledged gaps in the database such as poor levels of reporting (see Alfter 2009), while 
national payments by EU member states and EC access payments to third countries are completely excluded 
(the latter is discussed below). In terms of unacknowledged data gaps, two new French purse seiners were built 
in 2000, but there is no record of a vessel subsidy (which is unlikely) and there is also at least one known EU 
purse seine vessel not included in the database: the Spanish-flagged vessel Txori Gorri, owned by Inpesca, 
licenced in the Seychelles EEZ and on the DG MARE vessel registry (accessed December 2009). 
32 See Ernest & Young (2010b) for a break-down of total FIFG (2001-2006) payments to France and Spain for 
‘adjustment of fishing effort, fleet renewal and modernisation’. A shadow evaluation of the FIFG (2000-06) 
commissioned by the Pew Environment Group found that Spain received 46 percent of all FIFG funding – 
Mulvad and Thurston (2009) estimate this at 47 percent – and that ‘four times as much funding has gone on 
measures identified as having potentially negative environmental impacts compared to those with the potential 
for positive impacts’ (Poseidon 2010: ii, 30). 
33 See Cantorna (2007) on the history of subsidies by the Spanish state to the fishing industry. Direct subsidies 
from the European Commission for vessel construction ended in 2004. 
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The EU’s compensatory allowance for tuna is, essentially, a price subsidy. It is paid under the 
regulation on the common organisation of the EU market in fishery products,34 the second 
pillar of the Common Fisheries Policy. Payments are made to the EU DWF when average 
prices of tuna for canning in the EU market fall below an annually pre-negotiated threshold 
(EC August 2005; European Scrutiny Committee 2004: 56-58; Lequesne 2004: 91-2; 
Mongruel 2002; Oceanic Development et al 2005: 82-84; Guillotreau 2008: 4).35 While the 
compensatory allowance is not consistently utilised because of the threshold mechanism, it 
does provide an important strategic advantage to capital investment in the EU DWF by 
‘help[ing to] support producers’ incomes’ (Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000). If tuna 
prices fall to negotiated levels (such as during the 1999-2000 price collapse, see below and 
Appendix 2C.3), then European vessel owners are provided with a guaranteed minimum 
revenue when supplying EU-based processors (European Scrutiny Committee 2004: 13.1).36 
The scheme is thus a significant competitive advantage for the EU DWF over boat owners 
without such a prop. A strategic advantage is also provided to canneries in the EU as the 
DWF will have an incentive to supply them in periods when prices are low internationally, 
and processors may benefit from the ability to pay even lower prices knowing that boat 
owners will be compensated by the EU. It is important to note that only tuna for canning uses 
a Community producer price in the allocation of compensation allowances; all other fish and 
fish products use a guide price (Council Regulation (EC) No 104/2000). 
 
 
4.3.2 EU fisheries access arrangements, 1983-2009: From ‘cash for access’ to Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements 
 
Since the common extension of EEZs in 1976 and their subsequent institutionalisation in 
international law with UNCLOS six years later, coastal states and distant water fishing 
                                                            
34 First established in 1970 with Council Regulation (EEC) No 2142/70. For a review, see Ernest & Young 
(2008). It was ‘[d]irectly modelled’ on the Common Agricultural Policy (Lequesne 2004: 17).  
35 ‘The compensatory allowance is granted when both the average quarterly price of tuna on the EU market and 
the import price are simultaneously less than 87 % of the EU producer price. That combination is the threshold 
that triggers the aid mechanism.’ (EC 2001: 14). On contractual fixed price policy in France before its entry into 
the Common Market, see Le Roy (2008: 135-6), and its role as inspiration for the compensatory allowance 
scheme, see Lequesne (2004: 91). 
36 For details of payments, see Commission Regulation (EC) No 80/2001; Commission Regulation (EC) No 
585/2001; Commission Regulation (EC) No 2496/2001; European Parliament 2004; COM(2004)715 final; 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1343/2005.  
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interests have been locked into ongoing struggles over fishing access arrangements,37 
particularly around three issues: levels of financial compensation (a form of ground rent paid 
to coastal states38), various legal and regulatory terms and conditions, and contributions to 
tuna-related domestic development in coastal states. A large literature reflects on these issues 
in relation to the Pacific island countries from a range of disciplinary and political 
perspectives,39 but there is a dearth of analysis on tuna access arrangements in the WIO.40 In 
parallel (and partly in response) to the common extension of EEZs, in 1976 EEC member 
states transferred sovereignty for ‘foreign policy in the fisheries sector’ to the European 
Commission.41 Foreign policy in fisheries was to be conducted by the Directorate-General for 
Fisheries (DG Fish),42 created in 1977 and subject to annual direction by the Council of 
Ministers.  
 
DG Fish is institutionally responsible for multilateral agreements on fisheries management 
(such as UNCLOS or IOTC), aspects of fisheries trade policies (see Chapter 5), and ‘above 
all’ bilateral resource access agreements with third countries (Lequesne 2004: 18).43 The EU 
maintains two types of access arrangement with third countries: so-called ‘Northern’ 
agreements that tend to be based on reciprocal resource access and without financial 
components; and, non-reciprocal ‘Southern’ agreements, which are held exclusively with 
ACP coastal states (see Figure 4.1) and based on a complex set of financial payments by the 
EU and boat-owners.44 Southern agreements fall into two sub-categories – ‘mixed species’ 
                                                            
37 For discussion on contemporary tuna fisheries access and its relationship to the political economy of 
development, see Havice and Campling (2010), Mbithi Mwikya (2006) and Mfodwo (2008). 
38 See footnote above on future research directions on this issue. 
39 Aqorau and Bergin 1997; Barclay with Cartwright 2007; Campbell 1996, 2000; Doulman 1987a, 1987b; 
Duncan 2006; Gillett and Lightfoot 2001; Gillett, R. and G. van Santen 2008; Hanich et al 2010; Havice 2007, 
2010; Havice and Campling 2010; Hannesson 2008; Herrick et al 1997; Lewis 2005; Mfodwo 2009; Parris and 
Grafton 2006; Petersen 2001; Petersen 2003; Petersen 2006; Pretes and Petersen 2004; Ridings 1983; Schurman 
1998; Tarte 2004; Teiwaki 1987; Tiller 2005.  
40 Chapter 6 provides a discussion of purse seine access arrangements with the Seychelles. 
41 Under the terms of the Hague resolution, November 1976, that created the Common Fisheries Policy 
(Lequesne 2004: 18, 136-7). (See Chapter 5 on a similar transfer of sovereignty over the conducting of trade 
policy to DG TRADE.)  
42 In March 2008 it became the Directorate-General for Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (DG MARE). In the 
interests of clarity and style, the thesis refers only to DG Fish, even when discussing periods after the change in 
name. 
43 The Council (‘Hague’) Resolution of 3 November 1976 ‘“agrees ... on the need to ensure ... that Community 
fishermen obtain fishing rights in the waters of third countries and that the existing rights are retained. To this 
end, ... it (Council) instructs the Commission to start negotiations forthwith with the third countries concerned’” 
(cited in DG Fish 2001: 4). 
44 The first EU access agreement was with the US in 1977 (Ifremer 1999: 4). The first ‘Southern’ agreement 
quickly followed in 1979, with Senegal (Earle 2006: 233; Walmsley et al 2007: 5). Smidt (2001) dates this at 
1977. 
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and ‘tropical tuna’ agreements – and almost exclusively function in the interests of Spanish 
and French distant water fleets (Ifremer 1999: 8-10; Lequesne 2004: 136-9, 141-144). 
 
In light of this, and the disproportionately high levels of CFP structural funds chanelled to 
Spain discussed above, it is no coincidence that key personnel at DG Fish have historically 
been Spanish nationals (including from Galicia, one of its main fishing regions) (Lequesne 
2004: 36-7). It is a widely held perception among those who regularly work with this 
Directorate-General that ‘Spanish’ interests often take precedence in its activities, albeit 
within limits and not without its frustrations and unintended consequences.45 The sphere of 
Spain’s relative institutional influence in DG Fish is normally explained in relation to the 
wider horse-trading within and between EU member states over degrees of control over the 
day-to-day functioning of EU’s directorate-generals (EUGvt#2; #9; Int#15). 
 
Unlike French and Spanish tuna fishing in colonial and post-colonial West African waters, 
the conditions of production in the WIO fishery were mediated from its outset by formal 
access arrangements with coastal states, with Seychelles EEZ as the most important strategic 
consideration (see Chapter 2, Figure 4.1 and Chapter 6). With the institutionalisation of 
EEZs, two broad approaches to fisheries access emerged:46 
1) ‘First generation’ arrangements involve the allocation of fishing access in return for a 
financial payment. Various methods are used to calculate the financial component and 
the agreements are normally regulated by a complex set of requirements relating to 
fisheries management, monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS), and enforcement. 
There are three main types of first generation access agreements: government-to-
government (the approach used by the European Union), industry association-to-
government (the approach used by fleets flagged by Japan and Taiwan, among 
others), and company-to-government (used by the Spanish-owned Seychelles-flagged 
fleet).47 The first two types can also be accompanied by additional payments made by 
the fleet’s home state; this can be done directly through the legal terms of the 
                                                            
45 There is no such thing as a fully coherent ‘Spanish’ fisheries interest with third countries as multiple sites of 
tension and contradiction exist among players, whether between types of fishing fleets, within fishing fleet 
segments (e.g. between ANABAC and OPAGAC members), or between regions (e.g. between Galicia and the 
Basque Country, with the latter not benefitting from EU Objective 1 funding). 
46 This two-part typology is used widely in the literature. The contribution of the following is to more precisely 
define its contours based upon multiple interviews in 2006 and 2009, supplemented with analysis of dozens of 
public and confidential access agreements. 
47 Note that this typology applies to all known first generation tuna access agreements between distant water 
fishing interests and developing countries.  
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agreement (e.g. EU access arrangements, see below and Chapter 6, and the US 
multilateral tuna treaty in the Pacific, see Havice (2007, 2010)) or indirectly through 
decoupled ‘aid’ mechanisms (e.g. in the case of Japan). 
2) ‘Second generation’ access arrangements involve one or a combination of two broad 
mechanisms: the allocation of access in return for the vessels registering locally and 
agreeing to use local goods and services through transhipment and/or landing of the 
fish domestically; and/or, onshore investment in processing facilities in return for 
fishing access (controversially, this can involve the provision of more fishing 
potential than required to supply the capacity of the processing facility48). The latter 
can take the form of joint-venture enterprises, often dressed-up in the development-
friendly discourse of ‘technology transfer’.49 
While the terms and conditions of EU access agreements in the Western Indian Ocean (and 
elsewhere) have changed over time, they consistently fall under the government-to-
government type for French and Spanish flagged vessels. Terms and conditions shifted from 
the initial exploratory agreements in the early 1980s and the formalised ‘cash for access’ 
agreements from 1983 to 2001, through to the more ‘sustainability’-focussed Fisheries 
Partnership Agreements with the 2002 reform of the Common Fisheries Policy.50 Despite 
these changes, the core objective of DG Fish remains the same: to ‘[m]aintain and safeguard 
traditional fisheries activities of the Community fleets, including activities of the long-
distance fleets’ (DG MARE 2008: 22). 
 
In 2009 Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) were in place across three of the world’s 
four major tropical tuna fisheries, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The figure also illustrates the 
interlocking nature of Pacific island country EEZs in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. 
Tropical tuna in this oceanic region migrate predominantly in the waters of eight of these 
fourteen countries. This territorial configuration permits relatively effective levels of 
collective inter-state power through South-South cooperation,51 albeit peppered with 
                                                            
48 As was the case with at least two onshore investments in Papua New Guinea (multiple interviews and 
personal communications, 2006-2010). 
49 On Spanish joint ventures in the fishing sector see Cantorna et al. (2009: 370). 
50 Among other things, FPAs impose greater conditionalities on coastal states over the utilisation of EU 
payments. See Campling et al. (2009), Gorez (2005) and Walmsley et al. (2007) for detailed coverage of the 
policies associated with contemporary FPAs. 
51 This was coordinated by the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) since 1979. This was partly 
fragmented by the creation of the ‘PNA’ Secretariat in 2010, which is made-up of the eight island countries 
where tropical tuna fisheries are most prevalent (FFA Fisheries Trade News, various issues). 
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contradictions within and between countries and industry (see for example, Havice and 
Campling 2010). And, as detailed in Chapter 2, access to the Seychelles EEZ is an essential 
component to any purse seine fleet’s commercial survival in the WIO, but the figure makes 
clear that the configuration of EEZs – interspersed with large areas of high seas – limits the 
potential for South-South cooperation to maximise domestic benefits.52  
 
Yet it is important to emphasise that Figure 4.1 offers only a static moment in a complex 
historical story. By tracing capital flows over time we are left with a distinct pattern of a 
search for new commodity frontiers when the productivity of the EU DWF grew and biomass 
could not (profitably) sustain the intensification of extraction. As detailed in Chapter 2, 
before the early 1980s, EU DWF access agreements were solely with African states on the 
Eastern Atlantic, parts of this fishing capacity then moved to (and expanded in) the newly 
created fishery in the WIO, and partly shifted again – although far less successfully – to the 
WCPO in 1999, where US, Philippine and East Asian purse seine fleets were already firmly 
established. Spanish capital also penetrated the Eastern Tropical Pacific in the 1970s onwards 
with the transfer of purse seine vessels and direct investment (second generation access), but 
these boats do not qualify for FPAs. In sum, by the 2000s the EU DWF was active in each of 
the world’s main tropical tuna fisheries.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
52 See Chapter 6 for an overview of a failed attempt by independent coastal states to adopt the ‘FFA model’ in 
the WIO in the late 1980s. 
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Figure 4.1: Network of EU marine territories and Fisheries Partnership Agreements in 2009  
 
 
Sources: Flanders Marine Institute for line map; DG MARE website for location of access arrangements. 
http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/external_relations/bilateral_agreements_en.htm (accessed 12 December 2009) 
 = FPA  = EU marine territories (incl. Overseas Countries or Territories (OCTs), Departments, etc) 
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Direct payments by DG Fish to coastal states to facilitate EU DWF resource access is a major 
subsidy of the Common Fisheries Policy; and in 1998 totalled around five percent of 
allocations for the EU’s entire external operations (Ifremer 1999: 4) making fisheries access 
an important component of the EU’s international relations. The DG Fish budget for ‘cash for 
access’ agreements increased from 5 million Euros in 1981 to 38 million in 1987; a rise that 
incorporated both the first full access agreement with the Seychelles in 1983 (on behalf of the 
French DWF) and the activities of the Spanish fleet when this country acceded to the EEC in 
1986. The budget rose again to €163 million in 1990, before reaching €300 million in 1997. 
These flows constitute very significant subsidies to the EU DWF. In the period 1993-97 the 
financial contribution of boat-owners to ‘Southern agreements’ was an average of only 18 
percent of the total paid to ACP coastal states (Ifremer 1999: 4). In 2004, the ratio of industry 
payment to EU subsidy in total payments under FPAs had increased to between 25 and 35 
percent (Walmsley et al. 2007). Given the intensity of competition over tuna access, the very 
high subsidy component of EU Southern agreements places its DWF at a distinct commercial 
advantage vis-à-vis other DWFs. Apart from the US Multilateral Tuna Treaty with the Pacific 
island countries,53 the financial returns to coastal states are significantly lower in access 
arrangements with other DWFs. Access agreements in the Pacific islands with East Asian 
DWFs are typically based on a small flat fee plus a 5-6 percent ‘top-up’ based on the ex-
vessel value of the catch (Campling et al. 2009: 192-3),54 while FPAs are generally ‘valued’ 
at 13 percent of the value of the catch (Walmsley et al. 2007). (Chapter 6 provides a more 
detailed account of access payments to the Seychelles government.) 
 
One cannot properly estimate access payments without the full legal texts and associated 
protocols of access agreements, or disaggregated data on reported catch and ex-vessel 
reference prices (the basis of ‘top-up’ payments) and decoupled development aid, but all 
three sets of information are incredibly difficult to obtain.55 The ‘valuing’ of access is 
complicated further by the leveraging of negotiations with bribes to politicians and/or senior 
government officials (normally in fisheries departments), and the under-reporting of catch 
                                                            
53 Which also provides a high level of subsidy, albeit more carefully legally configured as ‘development aid’ 
(Havice 2007, 2010), designed to make it GATT/WTO compatible. 
54 Range based on a comparison of thirteen confidential tuna access agreements. 
55 Aside from EU bilateral access agreements and the US multilateral one which are publically available, the 
legal texts of all other agreements are considered to be commercially highly sensitive and are strictly 
confidential. One international fisheries specialist noted in 2006 that these agreements are like the ‘holy grail’ 
for researchers working on the political economy of tuna fisheries (Int#15).  
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volumes by fishing firms – a practice incentivised when access payments are based on a 
percentage of catch value.56   
 
Government-to-government access payments have been a major target for reform by 
developed and developing country governments and NGOs in WTO negotiations on fisheries 
subsidies disciplines since the late 1990s. The importance of the contribution of FPA 
payments to several ACP government budgets explains why, despite intense opposition, the 
ACP is so keen to include a caveat allowing the continuation of government-to-government 
transfers for fisheries access at the WTO.57 It is also widely argued that the ‘development aid’ 
component of FPAs should be decoupled from considerations associated with commercial 
resource access and that all payments should be publically available. Aside from the financial 
dimension, the political dimensions of FPAs have been the subject of dozens of critical 
investigations, including on the unequal negotiation process (facilitated by the multifaceted 
political and economic power of the EU), eventual legal terms and conditions in principle, 
and environmental and political-economic impacts in practice, especially in reference to the 
West African context (Acheampong 1997; European Parliament 2001; Kaczynski and 
Fluharty 2002; Lankester et al. 2001; Tarte 2002). The new FPAs were established in part as 
a response to this criticism (COM(2002) 637 final; Smidt 2001), but this reform was more 
effective in form and principle than in content and practice (ACP 2003; Bartels et al. 2007; 
Campling et al. 2009; Earle 2006; Gorez and O’Riordan 2003; SEC (2009) 1137 final; 
COM(2009) 461 final; Society for Nature Conservation 2010; Walmsley et al. 2007).  
 
 
4.4 Chapter Summary  
 
This chapter has identified and briefly summarised the most important institutional aspects of 
resource regulation in the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna. The specificity of the 
                                                            
56 For serious attempts at analysing corruption in fisheries access arrangements see Tsamenyi and Hanich (2008) 
and Hanich and Tsamenyi (2009) on the Pacific, and Standing (2008; 2011) on Africa. 
57 FFA Fisheries Trade News (various issues). As a result of intensive lobbying by the ACP and the EU, the 
NGOR Chair’s Draft Text on fisheries subsidies disciplines (2007) included a specifically designed loophole to 
allow government-to-government access payments (see TN/RL/W/213; see also the Chair’s 2008 ‘Roadmap’, 
TN/RL/W/236). On the importance of FPA payments to total revenue in several ACP governments, see Vallée 
and Guillotreau (2008: 2). However, for some ACP countries the indirect developmental benefits of FPAs can 
be considerably more important than the ‘compensation’ payments. The most important of these stem from the 
onshore economic interactions of EU DWFs, as examined in Chapter 6 on Seychelles. See also Stilwell et al. 
(2010). 
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environmental conditions of tuna production, especially the species’ highly migratory flows, 
means that the international legal governance of the resource is laden with tensions. These 
tensions were apparent from the period of negotiation of UNCLOS between coastal state 
resource ‘owners’ and DWFN ‘users’ and through interpretations of the final legal text, such 
as the ‘development’ and the ‘use it or lose it’ clauses. The subsequent UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement attempted to better regulate high seas fisheries for highly migratory and straddling 
fish stocks, but did not resolve tensions between owners and users over sovereignty when 
stocks are in EEZs (e.g. Havice and Campling 2010), and also meant that regional fisheries 
management organisations created before this Agreement were subsequently out-of-date in 
terms of international standards on fisheries management (e.g. IOTC). Through debates at 
IOTC in the late 2000s over the sustainability of purse seine fisheries for yellowfin, we also 
saw how tensions between different interests override scientific consensus and result in 
failures to regulate the fishery effectively.  
 
This discussion and that of the EU’s CFP also directly connect with the analysis in Chapter 2 
of how the firms of the EU DWF have dominated the WIO purse seine sector since the 
emergence of the fishery from the beginning of the 1980s. For the period 1984-2007, a total 
of 92 percent of catch in the entire WIO purse seine fishery was by European-owned boats. 
With relatively high cost operations (see Appendix 2B for comparative analysis) and the 
downward pressure of branded-firms and supermarkets on ex-vessel prices (Chapter 3), how 
does the EU DWF survive commercially as the leading supplier of tuna raw material to the 
EU-centred commodity chain? The short answer is that the interests of firms in the EU DWF 
are mediated by the political and economic power of the European Union. The most obvious 
component here is the extensive regime of fisheries subsidies which appear to be important to 
the formation and ongoing commercial survival of the fleet. The EU DWF also dominated the 
purse seine fishery in Seychelles EEZ with 93 percent of all catch between 1984 and 2007, 
enjoying resource access that was mediated by the EU through the negotiation and majority 
payment of access fees. This is not only an important subsidy, but it also introduces an 
important geo-political element as fiscally-squeezed and politically weak developing coastal 
states ‘negotiate’ with the collective might of the European Union, the largest economic 
entity on the planet. This complex of subsidies and resource access, combined with the sheer 
economic size and productivity of the EU DWF (as detailed in Chapter 2), contribute to 
explaining the relative stability of the EU DWF’s position in the Atlantic and Western Indian 
oceans. This stability must also be seen in relation to other actual and potential competitors. 
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Despite attempts to expand into the fishery (e.g. by the Japanese interests noted in Chapter 2) 
or to develop a domestic fleet (e.g. by the Seychelles state, Chapter 6), the role of subsidised 
access agreements and other subsidies seems to have made capital flows from other oceans 
and local investment non-competitive vis-à-vis the EU DWF. In short, these institutional 
dynamics directly enhance the competitive accumulation of the EU DWF. 
 
In sum, we have seen how legal governance of resource regulation and the role of EU 
subsidies combine the three interventions of this thesis in the commodity studies literature: 
the determining influence of environmental conditions of production in extractive industries, 
the importance of a historical understanding of the formation of mechanisms regulating the 
commodity chain, and how unequal political power – in this case between developing coastal 
states and the EU and its ‘home’ firms – results in dominant players mediating their interests 
through rule formation and enforcement, albeit with some countervailing tendencies, such as 
the role of developing coastal states in negotiating UNCLOS.  
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 Chapter Five 
 
The Politics of International Trade Relations and the 
Production of Canned Tuna: ACP Preferential Access to EU 
Markets 
 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Tariff policy has played an integral role in the formation and shaping of the general 
conditions of competitiveness of several global commodity chains (e.g. Gibbon and Ponte 
2005), including canned tuna. This chapter turns to the second set of regulatory 
mechanisms of the EU-centred commodity chain, those concerning negotiation and 
enforcement of trade policy. As we saw in Chapter 3, the EU ‘tuna trade regime’ plays a 
central role in the territoriality of the commodity chain, i.e. the geography and relative 
concentration of production of canned tuna and tuna loins. ACP governments and firms 
in the EU-centred commodity chain responded in different ways over time to the 
competitive advantage offered by EU trade preferences. The central analytical advance is 
how to identify and examine key elements in the negotiation and formation of 
international trade regulation as an arena of inter-capitalist competition: in this case, 
investment locations of canned tuna production and regulatory mechanism, and how they 
connect. Two themes of the thesis – the importance of historicising the formation and 
contemporary functioning of chains, and the role of unequal political power in this 
process – are addressed throughout this chapter. 
 
First we discuss debates between ‘pessimists’ and ‘optimists’ on the role of trade 
preferences as a mechanism for development. We then examine the specifics of the 
Lomé/Cotonou trade preference for canned tuna and its role in industrial upgrading in 
several ACP countries. This section also presents a specific ‘moment’ of negotiation at 
the WTO over the EU tuna trade regime and the commercial effects of its regulatory 
intervention. 
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 We saw in Chapter 2 how the biology and flows of tuna populations in the Western 
Indian Ocean determine the activities and business strategies of the EU DWF. The 
institutional context of these environmental conditions of production was detailed in 
Chapter 4 in relation to the Law of the Sea, EU fisheries subsidies and resource access 
strategies, and nascent attempts to regulate extraction of tuna resources through the 
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission. Section 5.4 investigates another institutional layer 
connected to the environmental conditions of production: the role of EU preferential rules 
of origin for tuna raw material, introduced in Chapter 2. This discussion emphasises the 
importance of the commercial interests of the EU DWF in the design of rules of origin by 
the European Union and, in turn, how uneven interstate power between the EU and the 
ACP perpetuated these rules, despite their limitations on tuna-related domestic 
development in many, but not all, ACP production locations.  
 
The theme of unequal interstate power is further investigated in the penultimate section. 
This traces EU-ACP negotiations between 2004 and 2007 over the design and formation 
of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the reform of the EU tuna trade regime and the responses of tuna-dependent ACP states. 
Finally, Section 5.6 pulls together these various elements with relevant aspects of the 
Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) discussed in Chapter 4 to demonstrate the interlocking 
nature of the political economy of the EU tuna trade regime. A summary completes the 
chapter.  
 
Our analysis of this set of institutional relations is based upon substantial primary 
research. This includes interviews with trade negotiators, other government officials and 
representatives of industry, and extensive participant observation in ACP trade 
negotiations with the EU between October 2005 and December 2007 on behalf of the 
Pacific Island countries (PICs) and the Indian Ocean island states of the East and 
Southern African (ESA) grouping of the ACP.  
 
Supplementary information and description is provided in the appendices to this chapter. 
Appendix 5A sketches the historical formation of EU-ACP trade relations, with particular 
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 emphasis on French colonial and post-colonial relations with West Africa as this formed 
the basis for the institutional design of the EU tuna trade regime. In doing so, we 
highlight the importance of longitudinal study in the assessment of continuity and change 
in the organisation, governance and regulation of commodity chains. We then show how 
the wider global regulation of international economic relations by the World Trade 
Organisation shaped the reform of this preference regime. Appendix 5B provides a sketch 
of ACP tuna canneries and tuna loining plants in mid-2000s. And Appendix 5C offers an 
account of the importance of the EU trade preference to canned tuna production in the 
ACP through a discussion of changing macro-regional market share. 
 
 
5.2 Trade Preferences and Development 
 
There is a vast literature on the trade effects of the non-reciprocal Lomé Conventions 
(1975-1999), and an emerging critical literature on the preparatory phase of the Cotonou 
Agreement (2000-2007) which laid the basis for the EU to negotiate reciprocal Economic 
Partnership Agreements with the ACP (see below and Appendix 3A). Unsurprisingly, 
this literature contains multiple perspectives, opinions, and methodologies. In summary 
form though, there are two broad positions of particular relevance to this thesis: those that 
claim that EU trade preferences did not help the development of ACP economies (‘the 
pessimists’), and, those that argue that EU trade preferences played an important 
developmental role for certain ACP exports (‘the optimists’). 
 
Preference Pessimists 
Preference pessimism is by far the most dominant in mainstream development circles.1 
Empirical assessments from this perspective almost exclusively use highly aggregated 
data and, based upon this, generally conclude that Lomé/Cotonou preferences were not 
successful in the development of industry in ACP countries (Davenport et al. 1995: 5; 
Moss and Ravenhill 1987: 112). A common statistic cited in support of this view was the 
                                                 
1 For example, interviews in 2006 with trade and development specialists and officials from the EU, FAO, 
and New Zealand and US governments all expressed a clear position as ‘preference pessimists’. 
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 decline in the share of ACP countries’ goods within total EU imports from 13.3 percent 
in 1976 to 3.7 percent in 2000 (Yu and Jensen 2005). Perhaps more importantly, in 
general, the ACP economies did not diversify and their export portfolios remained 
dominated by unprocessed primary commodities and some low value added agricultural 
products. For example, in 1999, only 9 products constituted 57 percent of total ACP 
exports to the EU, and, of a total of 77 ACP countries, 61 percent of total exports came 
from only 10 African economies (EC 2002: 3). From the theoretical perspective of neo-
classical economics, preferences work against the opportunity costs of comparative 
advantage, thereby constraining the most efficient allocation of resources and actually 
discourage economies from diversifying because of dependence on preferences 
(Davenport 1992; Davenport et al. 1995). Importantly, the EU itself was one of the 
leaders of the ‘preference pessimist’ position, stating that: 
trade preferences have neither halted the increasing marginalisation of the 
ACP region in world trade nor in their trade with the EU. Nor have they 
overcome the high dependence of the ACP on a few commodities. (EC 
2002: 2) 
Of course, this is an accurate generalisation, but of greater interest and contention is its 
explanation. 
 
Based on highly aggregated trade statistics, the EU’s statement obscures some important 
underlying dynamics in both the world economy and the internal conditions of the 
(highly differentiated) ACP, which help to explain the relative decline in ACP share of 
trade with the EU. First, the rise (and rise) of the East Asian newly industrialised 
countries (NICs) and economies in Southeast Asia resulted in their export of cheaper 
goods in direct competition with (current and former) ACP industries, while externally 
imposed structural adjustment programmes throughout the ACP from the 1980s onwards 
negated these countries using policy mechanisms deployed by their Asian competitors.2  
Second, if petroleum exports are removed from the last set of aggregated statistics cited 
above, the economic diversification of the ACP becomes more pronounced and the 
                                                 
2 See Stevens and Weston (1984: 60) on the displacement of ACP exports by NIC competition. For more 
detailed discussion on these points see Appendix 3A. 
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 proportion of the ten countries’ share of ACP exports becomes far less significant 
(McQueen et al. 1998).  Third, several ACP countries experienced severe political, social 
and/ or military conflicts, and/ or were subjected to deeply corrupt regimes, which clearly 
had a negative effect on economic diversification and trade flows. This point was actually 
acknowledged by the EU in a 1996 Green Paper: ‘the economic marginalisation of some 
ACP countries has gone hand in hand with social disintegration, mounting violence and a 
proliferation of armed conflicts’ (COM (1996) 570).3  
 
In sum, the ‘pessimists’, and even some more sympathetic analysts, tended to pose trade 
preferences as a perceived end-in-themselves and did not consider the context and 
conditions of these preferences, ranging from the objective commercial value of the 
preference to price and quality factors of demand, and from market growth and global 
competition to non-tariff barriers such as rules of origin.4 It should also be noted that 
without EU trade preferences, ACP exports may have performed even more poorly, but 
this counterfactual is difficult for either perspective to prove or refute. 
 
Preference Optimists 
In contrast, ‘preference optimists’ tend to use disaggregated data (by country and product 
type) to conclude that Lomé/ Cotonou preferences provided an important competitive 
advantage for some countries, for some products and at certain historical moments.5 
                                                 
3 But it did not influence its ‘pessimist’ position on ACP preferences. 
4 For example, as ‘sympathetic analysts’, Babarinde and Faber state that ‘Lomé was unable to catapult even 
a majority of the ACP countries to the community of middle-income countries after 25 years of privileged 
concessions’ (2005: 5). This argument over-determines the developmental potential of external policy 
regimes as it fails to take account of the need to consider the wider context of the world system or the 
domestic political-economy of individual ACP countries (and the relations between these two aspects).  
5 Extending from points made by McQueen (et al. 1998: 35). For example, in their assessment of Lomé I, 
Stevens and Weston point out that – despite the context of the downturn in the world economy during the 
period of the first Convention which ‘swamped’ the ‘stimulus’ provided by preferences – the exports of the 
36 ACP states ‘most likely to have diversified [excluding recent entrants and ‘hopeless cases’] reveals 
some encouraging results’. This included an expansion in the value of exports to the EEC of several ‘non-
traditional’ products between 1975 and 1980, including 89 percent growth for men’s clothes, 77 percent for 
knitted clothes, 75 percent for canned tuna, 55 percent for cotton fabric, and, among other items, growth in 
cut flowers, instant coffee, leather products and furniture (1984: 30, 32 and 34-5, author’s calculations 
based on Stevens and Weston’s data; see also, Babarinde and Faber 2004: 34). It is worth pointing out that, 
apart from clothing and apparel, canned tuna was the major growth item here, and with the phasing out of 
the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) by 2005, much of the ACP were less able to compete in commodity 
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 While the total volume of ACP exports to the EU increased by only 3.6 percent between 
1988-1997 (compared to 76 percent growth for non-ACP developing countries trading 
under the EU’s GSP regime or no preference scheme), a meeting of ACP 
Parliamentarians argued that there was an effective competitive advantage under Lomé 
preferences when the tariff preference was greater than three percent. In this case the 
increase in ACP trade volumes with the EU in the period 1988-1997 was 61.9 percent (as 
cited by Commonwealth Secretariat 2004: 183). While a three percent margin of 
preference would not generally be considered to be commercially significant, the fact that 
this baseline radically increases the pessimists’ estimates demonstrates the importance of 
disaggregated analysis in assessing the benefits of trade preferences. Along these lines, 
the majority of ACP exports had a very low or zero EU MFN tariff or the EU GSP 
regime provided a margin of preference which equalled that available to the ACP, 
generating an additional source of direct competition (Stevens and Weston 1984; 
McQueen and Stevens 1989; McQueen et al. 1998). In fact, by the time of Lomé IV (bis) 
only seven percent of ACP exports received a ‘significant’ margin of preference (of five 
percent or above) vis-à-vis other sites of production (Davenport et al. 1995: 67),6 but 
others have pointed out that even a five percent margin is ‘trivial’ (McQueen et al. 1998: 
40). In other words, in order for a tariff preference to have a stimulating effect on the 
development of export-orientated production it must provide a commercially significant 
preference relative to major competitors. In short, the commercial value of a preference 
to competitive accumulation can only be assessed on a product-by-product basis. 
 
In addition, the declining ACP share of EU markets for many of its major exports was a 
result of the ‘fallacy of composition’ (i.e. the simultaneous expansion of exports of the 
same product by several countries, which tends to have a downward effect on price).7 
Therefore, the failure of the ACP to capitalise on the competitive advantage of certain EU 
tariff preferences was not solely or even necessarily the result of flaws in ACP policy (as 
                                                                                                                                                 
chains in clothing and apparel (e.g. Gibbon 2008; an outcome that was predicted by McQueen et al 1998: 
49). 
6 The cut-off point of 5 percent for a preference to be of commercial value was confirmed by Manchin who 
found that ACP firms did not utilise preferences unless the margin was 4.5 percent above the MFN rate 
(2006: 1255). 
7 On the effect of the fallacy of composition on EU- and US-centred commodity chains in canned tuna see 
Chapter 3. 
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 the EU argued), but was also influenced by trends and dynamics in the world economy. 
Moreover, by the start of Lomé IV over 90 percent of total imports of manufactures 
entered the EU duty free under MFN treatment or the GSP regime (if rules of origin were 
met) (Grilli 1993: 166), the largest exceptions were textiles and clothing and processed 
fish (especially canned tuna). However, while many of the Lomé/Cotonou rules of origin 
were not particularly onerous, those ‘deemed to be particularly restrictive’ were applied 
to these very sectors, further constraining the economic benefits of preferences (Naumann 
2005: 8; see also Grilli 1993: 167). 
 
In sum, using the methodological approach of the preference optimists, canned tuna 
exports represented one of the few success stories of industrial ‘upgrading’ in the ACP 
under Lomé (McQueen and Stevens 1989), as sketched in detail in the next section. An 
additional aspect of the optimists’ argument is that one reason why the preferences did 
not work as well as they could have done is that associated rules of origin were too strict 
(Stevens and Weston 1984: 27; Ravenhill 1985: 170), addressed in detail below. 
However, even though the argument advanced here is broadly supportive of the 
methodological approach of the preference optimists, it remains very difficult to 
disentangle the effects of preferences from the wide range of other factors affecting sites 
of production (Grilli 1993: 160). The purpose of the following examination of the EU 
tuna preference is to demonstrate empirically that it was a necessary, but not sufficient, 
element in the industrial upgrading of several ACP sites of production. Chapter 6 presents 
specificities of the history and political economy of regulation in Seychelles, which, in 
turn, is supplemented by an understanding of the ecology of the resource, technological 
change and the dynamics of competitive accumulation in the global commodity chain as 
a whole, which were assessed in Chapters 2 and 3. This approach – an effort to capture 
the totality of the core elements of the EU-centred commodity chain – allows the 
commercial value of preferences to be considered alongside the other factors necessary 
for successful industrial tuna production. 
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 5.3 The Lomé/Cotonou Preference and Upgrading: The ACP Canned Tuna 
Industry 
 
5.3.1 What is the Lomé/Cotonou tuna preference? 
 
The Lomé/Cotonou tuna preference provides a competitive advantage of 24 percent on 
import duties compared to most other countries. Table 5.1 provides a simplified version 
of the contemporary EU tariff regime for tuna and tuna products. As well as the product 
description, the table provides the coding system at the four-digit level to identify product 
lines: for example, the specific tariff lines for canned tuna and tuna loins (i.e. 1604) under 
Chapter 16 of the Harmonised System of tariff classification (‘HS Code’ for short).8 The 
table provides tariff lines for beneficiaries of the Cotonou Agreement – interim Economic 
Partnership Agreements since 2008 – (‘ACP’) and all three pillars of the EU GSP regime. 
The core element here is that ACP exports are duty free compared to a 20.5 to 24 percent 
range for most other developing countries, including the main competing sites of 
production in Southeast Asia.  
 
The EU GSP was reformed in mid-2005 and a new regime came into force on 1 January 
2006. The outcome was three schemes: 
 A ‘standard’ GSP scheme (‘GSP’ in Table 5.1) that was very similar to the pre-
reform scheme and excluded only a handful of developing countries. The major 
difference in terms of tariffs on tuna products was that, instead of being 
equivalent to MFN treatment (the case for decades before), the 2005 reform 
provided all tuna products with a 3.5 percent preference relative to the MFN 
tariff. All tuna exporting firms based in Southeast Asia fell under this scheme, but 
only if they met the associated rules of origin. 
 The Everything But Arms Initiative (EBA) provided duty-free and quota-free 
market access to all countries categorised by the UN as LDCs. The only 
                                                 
8 This is the international standard for the classification of commodities for customs purposes, including for 
the application of tariffs. Each commodity is uniquely categorised by its own (at a minimum) eight-digit 
number. The EU TARIC system uses this classification. However, in the interests of parsimony, only the 
first four digits of the TARIC code are used in Table 5.1. 
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 significant tuna exporting LDC that utilised the EBA preference was the 
Maldives. However, those ACP LDCs that did not sign interim Economic 
Partnership Agreements (see below) switched their tuna (and other) exports to the 
EBA in 2008 when the Cotonou preference scheme ended. 
 The new ‘GSP+’ was available to countries that had signed and ratified a set of 27 
international conventions on labour and human rights and on environmental and 
good governance.9 On top of this, a country had to be categorised as ‘vulnerable’ 
according to its level of export-orientated economic diversification.10 Importantly, 
the GSP+ scheme offered Cotonou-equivalent treatment and pitted several Latin 
American countries (especially Ecuador) against ACP-based firms. 
These three schemes were initially scheduled to run until end-2008, but were likely to 
continue until 2015, subject to regular review at three-year intervals (EC July 2004). 
 
 
Table 5.1: Simplified EU tariff structure for tuna and tuna products 
HS Code/ Description ACP GSP+ 
 
EBA GSP MFN 
Chapter 3      
0302 and 0303 
Fresh chilled or frozen tuna for 
production under 1604 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
0302 and 0303  
Fresh chilled or frozen tuna for 
uses other than production 
0% 0% 0% 18.5% 22% 
Chapter 16      
1604 
Tuna loins to be processed 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
20.5% 
 
24% 
1604 
Canned tuna products, with oil or 
water and others (all species) 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
0% 
 
20.5%  
 
24% 
Source: EU TARIC 
Key: ACP: Cotonou Agreement preference; GSP+: Generalised System of Preferences Plus; EBA: 
Everything But Arms initiative; GSP: ‘standard’ GSP. 
                                                 
9 The GSP+ combined three prior GSP regimes: A system tied to combating the production of coca and 
traffic in cocaine, which was available to certain Andean countries, all Central American countries and 
Pakistan (commonly known as the ‘Drugs Arrangement’), and two GSP schemes aimed at promoting 
labour rights and environmental standards respectively. 
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences [2005] OJ 
L169/48. 
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As Chapter 3 noted, the MFN tariff of 24 percent for canned tuna provides a degree of 
protection (a ‘tariff peak’) to EU-based industry – especially that based in Spain – from 
imports from low cost producers, mainly those based in Southeast Asia. This is 
unsurprising given that tariff policy is generally used to protect the interests of 
domestically-based firms. The ACP preference itself has historical roots in investments 
by French tuna fishing and processing firms in francophone West Africa in the 1950s 
(Chapter 2; IDDRA 2004), that were assured duty-free market access into the EU with 
the Treaty of Rome and subsequent Yaoundé Conventions.  
 
Imports of whole fresh chilled or frozen tuna into the EU to be processed into canned 
product by EU producers (‘for production under 1604’) received duty free treatment 
regardless of the country of origin (compare the first and second rows of Table 5.1). This 
was a clear case of ‘tariff escalation’: keeping raw material input costs low for EU-based 
processors and providing them with maximum flexibility for sourcing inputs at the lowest 
price on international markets. Importantly, ACP-based processors did not benefit from 
this flexibility as they could only utilise the Cotonou preference if they processed fish 
caught by vessels owned by firms based in the EU or ACP.11  
 
Around 80 percent of labour in the processing branch of canned tuna production is 
applied in the activities of cooking, cleaning and loining the fish, which shapes the ‘logic 
of loining’ in the international division of labour (Chapter 3). As a result, there was a 
growing market in the EU for tuna loins (classified in Table 5.1 as ‘for further processing 
under 1604’) from preference receiving countries as they could be imprinted duty free. 
However, in the mid-2000s onwards, EU-based processors encountered difficulties in 
securing sufficient supply of duty-free loins.12 
 
 
                                                 
11 Under these EU rules of origin, fish were deemed ‘originating’ if they were caught by vessels with 
certain ownership, crew, flagging and registration requirements. See below for detail. 
12 See below on the response of EU processors to this situation. 
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 5.3.2 The Lomé/Cotonou tuna preference and industrial upgrading in the 
ACP 
 
This section identifies and analyses shifts in the share of EU markets from Southeast Asia 
to the ACP from the late 1970s onwards with the implementation of – and eventual 
commercial response to – the Lomé preference.13 The following evidence suggests that 
the Lomé/Cotonou trade preference was an integral competitive advantage in the 
establishment of industrial tuna processing plant in several coastal and island states in 
Africa and the Pacific. In aggregate terms, the ACP share of world production of canned 
tuna grew from 5 percent to 12 percent between 1976 and 2003 (Oceanic Développement 
2005: 114), supporting the position that ‘the Lomé Convention was in a key sense the 
midwife in the creation of the … ACP canning industry’ (Grynberg and White 1998: 
68).14 This is not to claim that the preference was the sole determinant in this process, but 
simply that it was an integral aspect of a set of necessary factors.15 
 
The competitive advantage of the 24 percent tariff preference acted as a major motivation 
for investment in tuna processing capacity in the ACP. Figure 5.1 illustrates this trend for 
eight ACP countries (see also Chapters 2 and 3). Prior to the Lomé Conventions, 
francophone states in West Africa benefited from preferential access to the EEC under 
the Yaoundé Conventions (1963-1975). This explains pre-existing levels of production in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal in Figure 5.1, as capital from French and Spanish fishing 
interests flowed there to take advantage of close access to tuna resources, cheap labour 
and, as noted, the benefits of the Yaoundé tariff preference.16 In addition, Mauritius 
signed-up to Yaoundé II in 1972 (the only Commonwealth country to do so) (Stevens and 
                                                 
13 Data on international canned tuna production is already presented Chapter 3. 
14 Drawing upon their analysis of trade data to mid-Lomé IV, Davenport et al. found that fish was the most 
important non-oil ACP export to the EU and was ‘one of the most successful cases of processing in the 
ACP countries’ (1995: 20; see also McQueen et al 1998: 48), referring to fish fillets, frozen prawns and 
shrimp, as well as tuna products. 
15 Appendix 5C offers a more quantitative account of the importance of the EU trade preference to canned 
tuna production in the ACP. 
16 In effect, the only market access gains made by these countries under Lomé were those accompanying 
the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK. See Chapters 2 and 3 and Stevens and Weston (1984: 53) 
on the role of ownership by French firms of tuna canneries in Côte d’Ivoire in shaping the latter’s export 
outlets in the EEC. 
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 Weston 1984: 39),17 which explains why it entered the period of the Lomé Conventions 
with an existing record of canned tuna exports. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: ACP Production of Canned Tuna 1976-2005 (in metric tons) 
 
Source: FAO Fishstat Plus 
 
 
The trends in Figure 5.1 combined with the analyses in Chapter 3 and Appendices 5B and 
5C illustrate shifts in production within the ACP and demonstrate that country- and firm-
level responses to the preference were far from uniform over time. On one hand, historic 
sites of canned tuna production in francophone West Africa declined in the ten years 
since 1996. On the other hand, production in the Western Indian Ocean (Mauritius and 
the Seychelles in particular) registered consistent growth. Similarly, there is a clear shift 
in EU-orientated sites of production in the Pacific islands, from Fiji (Pafco) and Solomon 
                                                 
17 Stevens and Weston also note that ‘foreign investors’ perceptions of the competitive advantage provided 
by the preferences was a factor in stimulating growth of the Mauritian EPZ [export processing zone]’ 
(1984: 47). 
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 Islands (Soltai) – which downgraded (Chapter 3) – to Papua New Guinea (RD Tuna 
Canners). 
 
 
5.3.3 The WTO and the EU-ACP tuna preference: The Cotonou waiver and 
other tariff quotas 
 
This sub-section first demonstrates that the Lomé/Cotonou tuna preference was not static: 
the terms of the relationship changed over time (albeit in relatively minor ways) to reflect 
the shifting interests of branches of EU capital as well as the emergence of the regulatory 
regime of the WTO and its use by third parties opposed to the preference. It also 
identifies important implications of these shifts for ACP interests. 
 
The granting of a tariff quota to Southeast Asian countries for canned tuna in 2003 was a 
major source of contention for ACP governments and tuna exporting firms as it partially 
ate into the ACP’s competitive advantage (i.e. it was a form of preference erosion). This 
concession to Southeast Asian exporters was because the Cotonou Agreement 
contravened the WTO MFN principle (Appendix 3A). The preparatory phase of Cotonou 
was a non-reciprocal trade arrangement and discriminated between developing countries 
without objective criteria for doing so, thus it did not comply with the GATT Enabling 
Clause and could not be categorised as a GSP regime (which allows non-reciprocal 
trade). Under direct pressure from domestic canned tuna exporters, the Thai government 
objected to this discriminatory practice as it directly affected opportunities for market 
access. This point was re-emphasised some years later by the chair of the Tuna Packers’ 
Group of the Thai Food Processors Association in 2006: ‘The 24 percent doesn’t 
represent fairness to us, there’ll be an open negotiation under WTO rules’.18 Thailand 
used the WTO Ministerial meeting in Doha in 2001 as a strategic forum to block 
consensus on the granting of a waiver for the Cotonou Agreement (which was necessary 
for the continuation of WTO non-compatible ACP-EU trade) unless the EU agreed to 
                                                 
18 Speech by Chanintr Chalisarapong at the INFOFISH Tuna 2006 conference, Bangkok. In addition, at the 
Cancun Ministerial in 2003, in reference to EU tuna tariffs, the Thai ambassador made the point that the EC 
‘was taking from the poor and giving to the poor’ (cited in Jawara and Kwa 2004: 99). 
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 address specific Southeast Asian interests regarding improved access for canned tuna. 
The ‘Cotonou waiver’ was granted and the meetings in Doha concluded, but on condition 
that the EU agreed to consult with the Southeast Asian countries on market access for 
their canned tuna exports (ICTSD November 2001). They met in December 2001 and 
April 2002, but the Southeast Asian countries were not satisfied with EU offers and 
requested WTO mediation in the dispute, which culminated in the allocation in early 
2003 of a quota of 25,000mt of canned tuna and 4,000mt of tuna loins at 12 percent duty 
to Thailand, Philippines and Indonesia (the ‘Cotonou compromise’ quota).19 
 
This compromise did not stop representatives of the tuna processing industry in 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand from continuing to lobby against the 
discriminatory nature of EU tariff peaks, supported by their respective governments. 
Lobbying by Thailand contributed to an additional tariff quota for canned tuna at 0 
percent duty from March 2006 as compensation for the compulsory tariff increases of the 
10 new EU member states when they joined on 1 May 2004 (the ‘EU enlargement’ 
quota) (Delegation of the European Commission to Thailand 2006; TInd#5–#7). The 
Philippines and Indonesia were excluded from this new quota for unknown reasons and 
the Philippines actively protested against it (Atuna 2006a). It is worth noting that the Thai 
industry has taken a consistently aggressive approach to access to the EU market. The 
chair of the Thai Tuna Packers’ Group claimed that Thai exports did not represent a 
threat to EU-based industry (which was unlikely), but at the same time emphasised that 
Thai industry intended to increase its EU market share.20 The only logical conclusion of 
his point was that Thai firms intended to capture ACP (and perhaps GSP+) market share. 
 
Another source of lobby power for tariff quotas was EU-based processing firms. They 
pushed for an annual tariff quota for 10,000mt of tuna loins at 6 percent for the period 
2007-2009 that was not country-specific (EC COM (2007) 289 final, 4 June 2007). In 
                                                 
19 The quota provides a quantitative allocation of canned tuna (25,000mt) and tuna loins (4,000mt) at half 
MFN-duty, based upon historical levels of exports to the EU from Thailand (52%), the Philippines (36%) 
and Indonesia (11%). Council Regulation (EC) No 975/2003. On the perspective of ACP governments and 
industry see ACP (2003a; 2003b; see also Josupeit 2007). On the EU-Thai dispute at the WTO that led to 
the Cotonou compromise see Xuto (2005). 
20 Speech by Chanintr Chalisarapong (Chairman, Tuna Packers’ Group, Thai Food Processors Association) 
at the INFOFISH Tuna 2006 conference. A point he had made previously: Chalisarapong (2004: 47).  
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 light of the increased demand for tuna loins for processing among EU-based canneries 
(see Chapter 3) and the inability of ACP and GSP+ countries to fully meet this demand, 
loin imports from Thailand and the Philippines expanded rapidly (Campling 2008a). 
However, only 61 percent of EU imports in 2006 from the three Southeast Asian 
countries were covered by the Cotonou compromise tariff quota, making the remaining 
imports more expensive to EU processors who had to pay between 20.5 and 24 percent 
duty, depending upon whether or not the exporter was able to meet GSP rules of origin 
(Appendix 5C). As a result of this, EU processors succeeded in reaching a compromise 
with the EU DWF within the European Commission to set this new tariff quota (the ‘loin 
quota’) (EUInd#10; #17–#20).21 
 
Why does all of this matter? According to interviews with EU and Thai tuna industry 
representatives, the Cotonou compromise quota at 12 percent and the EU enlargement 
quota at 0 percent were filled within days (i.e. the product was warehoused prior to the 
opening of the quota and pushed through customs on the day it commenced) (TInd#5–#7; 
see also Josupeit 2007). For example, according to one Thai industry representative: 
‘There’s no business in the EU for Central American countries during the Thai quota 
period because our imports take over’ (TInd#8). A similar trend was echoed by a tuna 
magnate in the Philippines: ‘The 9,000 ton quota given to the Philippines is only good for 
two weeks. We can do better than that.’22 The absolute growth of canned tuna and tuna 
loin exports to the EU by Thailand and the Philippines can be explained by the Cotonou 
compromise and (for Thailand only) EU enlargement quotas despite the high tariff peaks 
on these products.  
 
The important implication here is that buyers within the EU preferred to purchase 
Southeast Asian canned product at a 12 percent tariff under the ‘Cotonou compromise’ 
quota. This meant that if the EU tariff was eroded to that (or a lower) level, canneries 
located in Cotonou, EBA and GSP+ preference receiving countries would not be able to 
                                                 
21 As detailed below, the EU DWF benefits from the status quo of the EU tuna tariff regime, hence the need 
to reach a compromise with the processing branch of the EU-based commodity chain. 
22 Rudy Rivera, director of the General Santos-based Socsargen Federation of Fishing and Allied Industries 
Inc as cited by Atuna 2006b 
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 compete. Importantly, exports under this tariff quota were not subject to EU rules of 
origin for fish; thereby allowing processors to source the lowest priced tuna on the 
international market and increase the profitability of the final product. Therefore, despite 
the EU policy of tariff peaks, in the 2000s both Thailand and the Philippines experienced 
expanded penetration of the EU market in value terms for both canned tuna and tuna 
loins (Chapter 3). 
 
 
5.4 Preference Conditionalities: EU Rules of Origin for Fish and Fish Products 
 
5.4.1  What are EU preferential rules of origin for fish? 
 
Preferential rules of origin (RoO) were the ‘ticket of entry’ for ACP produced canned 
tuna to the EU market and accordingly a central conditionality for ACP-based firms, 
monitored by governments to ensure compliance. This section outlines these rules and 
demonstrates how their legal form reflects the mercantilist motivations of particular 
branches of EU capital. It demonstrates why the majority of ACP exporting states 
contested RoO for fish and fish products (hereon ‘fish’) since Lomé I (Cosgrove 
Twitchett 1981: 111).  
 
All preferential trade agreements contain RoO. These rules govern whether or not a 
product is eligible for the tariff preferences contained in a given trade agreement 
(Hoekman 1993). The main official objective of preferential RoO is to ensure that the 
economic benefits from trade preferences are granted only to the countries that signed the 
trade agreement. In other words, RoO are designed to ensure that a trade preference 
‘stimulates the development of industries’ in partner countries, but does not promote the 
formation of ‘mere trading houses’ that, for example, simply repackage imported goods 
produced in non-preference receiving countries (Weston et al. 1980: 58; see also OECD 
1983: 25; Ravenhill 1985: 163-4; Cosgrove Twitchett 1981: 47).  In principle, RoO are 
thus designed to avoid trade deflection. In terms specific to the tuna trade between the EU 
and the ACP:  
225
 Both the EU and ACP have an incentive to ensure tuna caught by foreign 
owned vessels in ACP EEZs and manufactured by these same countries do 
not receive EU trade preferences. This could happen for example with 
foreign owned factory ships operating within ACP EEZ’s. This clearly 
constitutes trade deflection and as such the RoO should protect against it. 
(Block and Grynberg 2004: 10) 
However, the following analysis of the specifics of EU RoO for fish demonstrates several 
important motivations behind the legal design of RoO that went beyond the sole objective 
of countering trade deflection, but first a brief outline of these RoO is necessary. 
 
There were two core over-arching conditionalities within EU RoO for fish under the 
Cotonou Agreement.23 The first was in relation to the fish itself, which had to be ‘wholly 
obtained’ (CPA, Protocol I, Article 3). This was determined by the EU’s definition of 
‘qualifying vessels’ (i.e. only such vessels can catch wholly obtained fish). The vessel 
had to be flagged and registered by a state that is a party to the agreement, 50 percent of 
the crew were to be nationals of parties to the agreement, and the vessel had to be 50 
percent owned by nationals or companies of parties to the agreement.24 In light of the 
high capital costs involved in industrial fisheries, ‘the most practicable method of 
exploiting marine resources for many ACP states is to lease fishing vessels’ (Ravenhill 
1985: 167). In this context, the ACP was permitted to lease or charter vessels which 
would be considered as qualifying. However, there were several strings attached to this 
‘concession’, the most important of which was that the ACP state first had to offer the 
                                                 
23 The following draws upon the Cotonou Agreement, ‘Protocol 1 Concerning the Definition of the Concept 
of “Originating Products” and Methods of Administrative Cooperation’, which is supplemented by multiple 
interviews and electronic communications with ACP and EU officials, and representatives of industry 
based in the ESA region, EU and PICs in 2005, 2006 and 2007; as well as participant observation in several 
meetings on ACP-EU fisheries trade (including RoO) in 2006 and 2007 at the ACP Secretariat (Brussels) 
and in Mauritius and Vanuatu (see Appendix 1A). 
24 There are additional technicalities and legal detail within the ownership criteria, but these are not 
important for the purpose of this thesis. For detailed technical analyses of EU RoO for fish, see Block and 
Grynberg (2004), Campling et al. (2007), Campling (2008b), and Rampa (2004). The rationale for 
requiring the firm owning the vessel to be both incorporated in a party to the agreement and having its 
headquarters or main place of business there stems from the Treaty of Rome (Article 58), which included 
the second requirement to account for the incorporation of firms for purposes of tax avoidance (Hoekman 
1993: 88). 
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 EU the opportunity to negotiate a fisheries access agreement that the EU did not accept,25 
thereby providing an additional inroad for the EU DWF to gain access to a country’s EEZ 
(see Chapter 4). The only other major exception to the ‘wholly obtained’ conditionality 
was if fish were caught within the territorial waters of a party to the agreement (i.e. the 12 
nautical mile zone). In this case the fish were wholly obtained regardless of the legal 
status or ownership of the vessel; as long as it met EU SPS measures.  
  
The second conditionality was that manufactured fish products had to meet the EU 
definition of ‘sufficiently worked or processed products’ (CPA, Protocol I, Article 4). In 
short, fish products (such as canned tuna) could use any inputs from any countries except 
that the fish itself had to be ‘wholly obtained’. Thus the export of ACP fish products to 
the EU under the Lomé/Cotonou preference was tied to the exporters’ ability to source 
fish from ‘qualifying vessels’. There were, however, three sets of partial exemptions to 
this rule applicable to fish products: 
1) ‘Cumulation’ allowed a preference receiving country to use fish from other 
specified countries, which would then be considered as locally sourced when 
establishing the ‘originating’ status of the final product. There were three sub-
types of cumulation, but the only one of additional practical relevance under 
Lomé/Cotonou RoO for fish was ‘diagonal cumulation’.26 This permitted the use 
of fish from ‘neighbouring developing countries’.27 For the sub-Saharan African 
ACP this included North Africa, for the Caribbean ACP it included much of 
Central America, but for the Pacific it added only Nauru (until it too became a 
member of the ACP group). Despite a declaration by the EU’s DG Development 
that this diagonal cumulation rule ‘breaks new ground’ (Directorate General for 
Development 1996: 7), the EU built-in a tuna-specific caveat wherein the 
                                                 
25 The other two conditions were that 50 percent of the crew had to be nationals of parties to the agreement 
and that the arrangement had been accepted  by the ACP-EC Customs Cooperation Committee as providing 
adequate opportunities for developing the fishing capacity of the ACP State and that that ACP State was 
responsible for the nautical and commercial management of the vessel (CPA, Protocol 1, Article 3.3) 
26 The other two types were ‘bilateral cumulation’ which meant that ACP producers could use inputs from 
the EU, and ‘full cumulation’ which allowed an ACP producer to utilise materials from other ACP 
countries. However, because ‘wholly obtained’ fish could already be sourced from any EU or ACP vessel 
that met the qualifying conditions, these cumulative options were irrelevant to this situation. 
27 This rule was introduced under Lomé IV (bis) (ACP-EC 1996: 85). 
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 exemption ‘shall not apply to tuna products classified under Harmonised System 
Chapters 3 or 16’ (CPA, Annex V, Protocol I, Article 6.11). This amounted to 
almost all tuna products and was thus a clear indication of the sensitivity of the 
EU tuna industry to foreign competition. 
2) ‘Derogation’ allowed for a pre-specified quantity of a country’s product to qualify 
as ‘originating’ even if it was not wholly obtained. Derogations were employed in 
the Cotonou Agreement in situations where promoting ‘the development of 
existing industries or the creation of new industries justifies them’ (CPA, Annex 
X, Protocol 1, Title V, Art. 38:1). The EU offered two types of derogation under 
the Cotonou Agreement, but the only one of practical use to the ACP tuna 
industry was an ‘automatic derogation’,28 which allocated a total annual quota of 
8,000mt of canned tuna and 2,000mt of tuna loins to the ACP (CPA Annex V, 
Protocol 1, Title V, Art. 38:8),29 which was then distributed among the 
beneficiaries via negotiation between ACP governments representing the interests 
of domestically-based firms. Automatic derogation was first provided from 1993 
onwards, perhaps in response to long-standing ACP arguments that the specific 
derogation did not provide the certainty required to attract capital to investment in 
production (Davenport et al. 1995: 33; Ravenhill 1985: 171). 
3) Finally, the ‘value tolerance’ exemption allowed for 15 percent of the ex-works 
(post-processing) value of a consignment of product to be non-originating (CPA 
Annex V, Protocol I, Article 4, Paragraph 2; Block and Grynberg 2004; Rampa 
2004).30 
The next step is to identify and assess what EU RoO for fish means in practice.  
 
                                                 
28 The other type was the request-based ‘specific derogation’. This was rarely used by the ACP under the 
Lomé Conventions. This was because the application process was administratively cumbersome, slow 
moving and disappointing in terms of the quantity eventually offered by the EU. See Cotonou Agreement, 
Annex V, Protocol 1, Title V, Art. 38:9; Cosgrove Twitchett (1981: 48); Stevens and Weston (1984: 56);  
Ravenhill (1985: 169); and Wallace (2005: 52). 
29 Under Lomé IV the automatic derogation for canned tuna was 1,500mt in 1992, which was increased to 
2,500mt in 1993 (Davenport et al 1995: 19), and to 4,000mt along with 500mt of tuna loins in 1995 under 
Lomé IV (bis) (ACP-EC 1996: 85). The volume allocated under Lomé IV (bis) was half of what the ACP 
had requested (Davenport et al. 1995: 61). 
30 This percentage had increased from 10 to 15 percent under Lomé IV (bis) (ACP-EC 1996: 85), although 
the ACP had pushed for an increase to 20 percent (Davenport et al 1995: 60). 
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5.4.2  Commercial policy or development anomaly? 
 
Discussion here is ordered by drawing out qualitative ‘costs’ and ‘benefits’: starting with 
the general benefits of the rules for the ACP before moving to the costs. It will then 
assess benefits and costs to EU and, finally, provides an overall assessment of the relative 
‘balance’ of these costs and benefits, with an explanation of which interests the legal 
form of the RoO represents. 
 
The most significant benefit was that the RoO provided an additional (albeit not primary) 
incentive for the EU DWF to base itself locally because vessel owners had a captive 
market unless the ACP state had an alternative supply of RoO-compliant tuna (see 
below). On a related point, the vessel ownership requirement encouraged foreign 
investors to transfer ownership (at 50 percent or above) to ACP governments or local 
entrepreneurs. For example, it is argued that this was the rationale for Taiyō Gyogyō’s 
provision of 51 percent ownership of Solomon Taiyo to the government of the Solomon 
Islands (Grynberg 1995: 82; Appendix 5B). Vessel ownership requirements encouraged 
several governments in Africa and the Pacific to invest in state-owned tuna fleets. While 
these were generally unsuccessful in terms of profitability (e.g. Schurman 1998), they 
were a fundamental education for an entire generation of tuna fishers in Fiji, Ghana and 
the Solomon Islands (Int#15; IntFS#3; #5; PIC#10; USInd#22).The automatic derogation 
allowed ACP-based processors to export relatively small quantities of non-qualifying 
product during periods of reduced supply of RoO-compliant tuna, such as periods of 
known seasonal fluctuation. Finally, the value tolerance provision was consistently 
utilised by only one ACP cannery: the Princes factory in Mauritius, which – because of 
the sheer complexity of the rule (see below) – was only able to make use of a maximum 
of eight percent of the total 15 percent allowable ‘tolerance’ (EU#34–36). 
 
Almost certainly the most important ‘cost’ of the RoO to most of the actual (and 
potential) tuna processing ACP was that it acted as a structural barrier to the development 
and/ or expansion of processing plant and associated firm-level economies of scale to 
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 even have a chance of competing with Thailand.31 This was because few ACP interests 
had the capital to invest in industrial tuna purse seine fleets to meet the strict conditions 
of the RoO (one purse seine vessel costs a minimum of US$ 20 million), hence there was 
a limited availability of RoO-compliant fish to supply factories (Davenport et al. 1995: 
33).32 In some cases, the Pacific ACP in particular, the supply of RoO-compliant tuna 
was very tight because there was no ACP-owned purse seine fleet and there was 
insufficient supply of tuna caught by the EU DWF Ravenhill (1985: 167). For example, 
the EU DWF was, in effect, barely operating in the WCPO throughout the period of the 
Lomé Convention, and even after signing access agreements with Federated States of 
Micronesia, Kiribati and Solomon Islands from 1999 onwards there was only very minor 
availability of EU-caught fish to Pacific processors throughout the preparatory period of 
the Cotonou Agreement (Campling et al. 2007; Hamilton et al. 2011).  
 
The other possible source of supply for the Pacific ACP – the transhipment of RoO-
compliant fish from other oceanic regions – was of limited commercial value because of, 
first, the absolute global limitation of RoO- and SPS-compliant tuna, and, second, the 
high freight costs (including deadheading) involved in sending reefer carriers to 
geographically isolated Pacific island countries.33 In sum, in the absence of trade 
preferences, firm- and cluster-level economies of scale are imperatives to international 
competitiveness and profitability in the canned tuna industry because of its high 
volume/low profit structure (see Chapter 3), but the RoO often did not provide sufficient 
flexibility of tuna supply with which to fuel profitable plant expansion and develop 
productive economies of scale. Following on from this, albeit on a speculative note, it is 
likely that the onerous nature of the RoO acted as a deterrent to potential investment by 
foreign capital in ACP tuna processing capacity because of associated structural 
constraints on supply (e.g. Stevens and Weston 1984: 55). 
 
                                                 
31 For a general argument along these lines see Davenport et al. (1995: 35). 
32 In the Indian Ocean, EU RoO benefited certain ACP coastal states (i.e. Madagascar, Mauritius and 
Seychelles) to different degrees at different times because of the provision of goods and services to the EU 
DWF, which came into port to sell originating fish direct to canneries and/or to tranship and/or for repairs. 
For Seychelles, see Chapter 6. 
33 On the importance of freight differentials to tuna canning firms see Campling and Doherty (2007). 
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 The requirement for wholly obtained fish led to costly investments by ACP governments 
in state-owned tuna fleets, which was another ‘cost’ (to governments) of the RoO. Two 
prominent examples here were IKA in Fiji and National Fisheries Development (NFD) in 
Solomon Islands. Both fleets operated at a loss and were a strain on government revenue 
but were commercially imperative in order to supply ‘originating’ fish to their respective 
canneries (EUInd#53; #57; IntFS#5; PICInd#30; Grynberg 1995: 51-52). Both were 
subsequently privatised and NFD was reportedly operating successfully under the 
management of Tri Marine (one of the ‘big three’ tuna trading firms). Similarly, there 
was a series of short-lived state interventions in industrial tuna fisheries in the Indian 
Ocean ACP, including in Seychelles (Chapter 6).  This response to the rules represented a 
state subsidy to capital that fiscally squeezed ACP governments could ill afford. On a 
related point, the vessel ownership criteria had negative implications for ACP food 
security and the sustainability of coastal fish stocks. Tuna vessels that did not meet the 
conditionalities of ‘qualifying vessels’ were compelled to fish within the 12 mile zone – 
which qualified automatically – if they intended to supply RoO-compliant fish to local 
factories. However, contrary to stated EU policy aims on poverty alleviation and the 
promotion of environmental sustainability, this aspect of the RoO put local artisanal and 
small-scale fishers in direct competition with industrial tuna fleets, with negative impacts 
on shared target (and other) stocks. This phenomenon was most common in West Africa, 
but was also reported in the Pacific islands.34 
 
Several other negative impacts (or ‘costs’) to the ACP were apparent. EU demands on 
ACP governments for administration of the rules were very demanding, perhaps due in 
part to prior cases of RoO fraud by ACP-based processors.35 The associated 
administrative costs of monitoring compliance and verifying certificates of origin were 
very high for under-resourced ACP customs authorities as well as for exporting firms.36 
                                                 
34 On the conflict between the EU DWF fleet and local fishers in West Africa in general, see Bartels et al. 
(2008), and in Senegal in particular, see Iossa et al. (2008). 
35 The European Anti-Fraud Office had issued a number of reports on this issue. See, for example, OLAF 
(2006). 
36 For example, a processing plant supplying local and other non-EU markets with non-originating product 
as well as EU markets had to ensure that the fish are not mixed. This led to additional plant-level 
compliance costs and reduced productive economies of scale. See also Block and Grynberg (2004). In 
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 The costs of compliance were so high that even a US MNC – with the associated 
financial and technical resources – cited insurmountable difficulties in meeting EU 
requirements for preferential access for its cannery in Ecuador: ‘they found that the costs 
of compliance and all the additional legal work and things that you had to do didn’t make 
it work’ (USInd#16). These types of difficulties have led prominent mainstream analysts 
of RoO to argue that the costs of RoO compliance should be commensurate to the risk of 
trade deflection taking place (Brenton and Manchin 2002). Similarly, as noted above, the 
value tolerance rule was only ever used by two ACP firms because of its complexity, 
which rendered this ‘concession’ commercially almost meaningless.37 Another 
‘concession’, the option to lease or charter a vessel, was subject to important 
conditionalities (see above). In effect, the EU would only allow leasing or chartering if 
the EU DWF did not have a commercial interest in that ACP fishery, despite the fact, as 
noted above, that leasing/chartering was by-far the most realistic and affordable strategy 
for ACP capital to enter into industrial fisheries (see further below). The automatic 
derogation for canned tuna and tuna loins was a useful (albeit small) exemption to the 
wholly obtained rule. However, it did not provide the stability of market access that ACP 
firms would have preferred because, when other eligible countries (or firms within 
existing countries) started exporting processed tuna, there were conflicts in deciding over 
the re-distribution of the quota (ACP 2003b).38 
 
EU RoO for fish provided two major commercial benefits to the EU DWF. Of course, EU 
vessels owners are aware of the preference offered to ACP canneries and were also 
cognisant of the related high demand for ‘wholly obtained’ fish, which EU-owned vessels 
                                                                                                                                                 
general terms, RoO often required relatively ‘sophisticated and expensive accounting procedures’, which 
were normal for European firms but a barrier to entry for ACP firms (Brenton and Manchin 2003: 763). 
37 It required the exporter to apply the rule on a single species, single consignment and single consignee 
basis, and the only EU customs authority that accepted imports under this rule was the UK. This outline of 
the practical application of this rule is based upon interviews and personal communications with ACP, EU 
and Thai industry representatives and ESA government officials, 2006 and 2007. 
38 In terms of the distribution within countries, for example, it resulted in domestic contestation in PNG 
over the allocation of the national derogation between RD Tuna Canners (est. 1998) and more recently 
established processing plants, that is, SSTC (est. 2003) and Frabelle (est. 2006) (see Appendix 5B for 
company overviews). 
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 were well-placed to provide.39 This captive market allowed the EU distant water tuna 
fleet to charge a price premium on ‘originating fish’ sold to ACP processors,40 which, in 
turn, meant that EU DWF owners were capturing a share of the ‘value’ of the preference. 
The bargaining power of the EU DWF was relatively strong because, if an ACP 
processor refused their higher prices, they could sell their catch at a premium to other 
(sub)regions requiring EU RoO compliant tuna (i.e. ACP and GSP+ countries). However, 
this point should not be overstated as the EU DWF also benefited from quick assured 
sales to ACP canneries so bargaining was not entirely uneven. 41 A second point stems 
from the leasing/chartering ‘concession’ which provided the EU DWF with an additional 
means to expand resource access opportunities (see also Davenport et al. 1995: 18; Block 
and Grynberg 2004), which has already been discussed. Moving downstream in the 
commodity chain, tuna processors in the EU were partly insulated from competition from 
ACP canneries as the policy of tariff peaks meant that there were no limitations on the 
procurement of whole frozen tuna by EU-based processors (i.e. it received a zero percent 
tariff if it was ‘to be processed’ in the EU, Table 5.1 above). In addition, as detailed 
above, EU-based processors had a wide range of sources of supply of zero or reduced 
duty tuna loins under the GSP regime, Lomé/Cotonou, and tuna tariff quotas. ACP 
canneries were not afforded this level of flexibility of supply.42 Further downstream, EU 
buyers utilised Thai price as their benchmark and because ACP tuna processors had to 
match the Thai price as closely as possible (despite operating with higher production and 
other costs), buyers consequently received indirect commercial benefits from the 
preference. In other words, it appears that a portion of the preference was absorbed by 
                                                 
39 This was confirmed in multiple interviews in 2006 and 2007 with representatives of the EU tuna industry 
with interests in purse seining. 
40 This phenomenon has been noted in several reports (e.g. Block and Grynberg 2004: 14; Rampa 2004: 17) 
and confirmed in multiple interviews in Belgium, Fiji, France, PNG, Solomon Islands, Thailand and the US 
in 2005, 2006 and 2007. The range US$ 20-50 per tonne was cited as a normal premium. In fact, only one 
(US) industry interviewee thought that it made no difference to factory gate price. In addition, the author 
has confidential price data from a cannery in Africa that documents a higher fob price paid to EU vessels 
than for non-originating tuna shipped (cif) from the WCPO; however, this may be the result of quality 
differentials (Appendix 2C.1). 
41 As detailed in Chapters 2 and 6 turnaround time is a core dynamic of competitive accumulation in the 
tuna purse seine industry so as to maximise fishing days and the rate of return on the capital investment. 
42 This point builds on Rampa (2004: 17). 
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 retailers via a reduction in the potential profitability of ACP canneries (Rampa 
2004:16).43  
 
The only major ‘cost’ to the EU was the need for customs officials in member states to 
monitor and implement a range of differing preferential RoO which represented an 
administrative burden (EUGvt#47). This was especially true in cases of false accusation 
against ACP governments of RoO fraud because EU authorities would have to bear the 
legal costs, but if fraud was proven the costs were borne by the preference receiving 
government, as occurred with Fiji in 1991 (Grynberg 1995). 
 
This analysis of the relative costs and benefits of Lomé /Cotonou RoO makes clear that 
‘Rules of origin are not a neutral instrument’, as candidly pointed out by an EU official 
(EUGvt#47).  While the RoO contributed to a small minority of the ACP benefiting from 
the relatively stable provision of goods and services to the EU DWF because of the 
latter’s captive market, for the majority the demonstrable costs far outweighed the limited 
benefits. Most important, the structural constraint of the availability of RoO-compliant 
tuna contradicted the fundamental stated rationale for the trade preference: to facilitate 
the development of infant industry in the ACP until it reached sufficiently competitive 
economies of scale so as to compete without a preference. In the context of highly 
globalised networks of supply and production in contemporary capitalism (including in 
tuna commodity chains), it is a developmental anomaly that EU preferential RoO still 
demand ‘wholly originating’ fish based upon a conceptualisation of ‘national’ ownership. 
This was neatly summarised in an interview with an ACP official: ‘The economics of 
trade nowadays don’t justify stringent, strict rules of origin’ (Int#9).44 The failure of EU 
RoO to reflect the realities of the globalisation of production systems was also recognised 
by the EU. In a communication on RoO it points out that they ‘were drawn up at a time 
                                                 
43 This point was confirmed in relation to a different tariff preference, the ‘Cotonou compromise’ tariff 
quota. In his speech at the INFOFISH Tuna 2006 conference, Francisco Tui-Laurel Jr, (President of 
Frabelle Fishing Corporation, Philippines) stated that: ‘Buyers benefited from EU tariff-quota, not 
Philippines’. 
44 Similarly, the World Bank’s expert on RoO argues that: ‘Strict rules of origin act to constrain the ability 
of firms to integrate into … global and regional production networks and in effect act to dampen the 
location of any value-added activities’. (Brenton 2003: 10) 
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 when the international economy was very different from that of today and when goods 
were produced in a very different way’ (EC COM(2005) 100final: 8). 
 
As an aside on the proximate concept of ‘national’ production systems raised in Chapters 
2 and 3, it is also worth noting that, considering the EU emphasis on the importance of 
RoO to ensure the flow of developmental benefits to the ACP, ‘there is nothing in the 
RoO that prevents firms from third countries from owning processing facilities’. It 
therefore appears that ‘the EU is willing to see investment deflection for the canneries but 
not the capture fishery’ (Block and Grynberg 2004: 13). Paradoxically, by making it 
more difficult to benefit from preferences if the firm was not vertically integrated (i.e. 
through the ownership of industrial tuna vessels as well as processing plant), these RoO 
were a disincentive for domestic investment. In fact, many of the canneries that operated 
in ACP states were owned by neither ACP nor EU capital (see Appendix 5B). The 
preference and the associated RoO were thus structured so that benefits from canning, 
which provide the bulk of the ‘value addition’, do not always accrue to ACP or EU 
interests (Block and Grynberg 2004: 13). This outcome is primarily an unintended effect 
of the preference because (as discussed above) it was initially designed to benefit French 
investments in West Africa.  
 
The fact that EU interests received significant benefits but only one (minor) 
administrative cost under the RoO regime is hardly surprising given that it writes the 
rules. In short, the legal form of RoO reflects the political clout of EU-based capital, 
particularly the EU DWF. In relation to ACP demands for the simplification of RoO, 
during a group interview of DG Fish officials they agreed that:  
We don’t see any need to go down that road. In DG Fish we’re very 
cautious of rules of origin reform (despite accusations of rules of origin, 
TBT and SPS as protectionism). Once we give preferences, rules of origin 
provide guarantees that the preference is helping who it was meant to help 
(EUGvt#3–#6).  
A DG Fish official went on to explain that the ‘most important aspect’ of fisheries RoO 
was the vessel flag: ‘We want to have a guarantee that at least someone is in control of 
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 what’s going on’ (EUGvt#3–#6). This is a reasonable position, but begs the question of 
why there were such strict ownership criteria? Contrary to the position of DG Fish, it is 
worth citing EU officials from another DG: ‘The feeling is that they’re [RoO] hindering 
development, … the beneficial impacts are at least as much on the side of EC operators 
as they are on the side of the ACP’ (EUGvt#1-#2). 
 
To sum-up, it is worth pointing out that this assessment of the EU RoO regime is neither 
new nor particularly controversial. For example, a UK Select Committee of the House of 
Commons in the early years of the Lomé preference concluded that the system ‘“seems to 
bias choices of industrial development and technology transfer in favour of the EEC”’ 
(UK Select Committee of the House of Commons on Overseas Development as cited by 
Ravenhill 1985: 169). Moving on two decades, the critique could be reiterated: the 
Report of the UK Commission for Africa stated that EU RoO can be ‘applied in a 
deliberately obstructive manner’ and are ‘taken to ludicrous extremes – to the extent that 
fish are ruled ineligible if the boat they are caught from is Ghanaian but the master of the 
vessel is South African’ (Commission for Africa 2005: 55-56). Even the EU’s DG Trade 
acknowledged an element of the developmental anomaly at the heart of the argument 
surveyed here: ‘The ROO creates a bias between sources of investment in ACP States, 
providing an incentive for ACP States to grant EU access to their EEZ over other 
countries’ (DG Trade, July 2007: 10-11).  
 
 
5.5 Market Access for Canned Tuna in ACP-EU Economic Partnership 
Agreement Negotiations 
 
ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) were intended to replace trade 
arrangements under the Cotonou Agreement with a set of WTO-compatible agreements 
by the end of 2007. We trace their negotiation with a particular focus on the interests of 
the non-least developed country (non-LDC) ACP – which includes Seychelles – because 
of the threat posed to their preferential access to EU markets if they failed toconclude 
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 EPA negotiations on time.45 The central argument here is that several ACP non-LDCs 
were pressured into EPAs in order to avoid the potential collapse of their tuna processing 
industries.46  The historical coverage here runs from the initial formal opening of 
negotiations in 2002 to the initialling of interim EPAs by certain ACP states in end-2007. 
 
EPAs were intended to govern ACP-EU preferential trade relations. Other relationships 
such as aid flows, technical assistance and other forms of cooperation fell under the 
Cotonou Agreement, which would expire in 2020. The driver behind the negotiation of 
EPAs was to make ACP-EU preferential trade compatible with the WTO (Appendix 
5A).47 In particular, non-GSP preferential trade arrangements were required to comply 
with Article XXIV of GATT(1994). This provided three options to the EU in its trade 
relations with the ACP post-2007: offer the same tariff treatment to all WTO members 
(the MFN principal), which would have immediately eroded the ACP preference and 
tariff protection to EU industry (an unacceptable outcome for all parties); change the 
terms of the arrangement so as to fulfil the legal requirements of the Enabling Clause of 
the GSP (which the EU was not willing to do, see below);48 or enter into an arrangement 
of reciprocal free trade areas framed under the terms of Article XXIV,49 which required 
legal commitments by parties to eventually liberalise ‘substantially all trade’ between 
them. The last option had been decided at the Cotonou negotiations (Appendix 5A), so 
that, unlike Lomé and the preparatory phase of the Cotonou Agreement, the ACP were to 
offer reciprocal market access for EU exports (much like the prior Yaoundé 
                                                 
45 Along with the sub-regional division of initial EPA configurations (four in Africa and one for the 
Caribbean and Pacific respectively), the ‘ACP’ is differentiated in this chapter by those countries that are 
categorised as LDCs or not. This does not entail an acceptance of LDC status as a legitimate analytical 
category, instead it is a recognition of the differential treatment of LDCs in international trade law. 
46 The author was closely involved in this process on behalf of the Pacific ACP EPA grouping and, to a 
lesser extent, the East and Southern Africa (ESA) grouping (which loosely consisted of COMESA 
members). This involved the production of several consultancy reports on the fisheries aspects of these 
negotiations, attendance at multiple meetings, and general day-to-day contact with negotiators while based 
in Fiji, in the Seychelles and via email and subsequent visits to these sub-regions upon return to Britain. 
47 The EU’s other stated objective in the promotion of EPAs is to encourage the ACP ‘to base their 
integration into the world economy on regional economic integration’ (Directorate-General for Trade & 
Directorate-General for Development 2002: 5). In other words, the EU was arguing that the ACP try to 
address their lack of productive economies of scale by mirroring developments in regionalism in Europe 
since World War Two. 
48 It was however, an option. See Bilal and Rampa (2006); (Stevens 2005). 
49 Even if an ACP country was not a member of the WTO, such as the Seychelles, trade still had to be 
WTO-compatible because the EU is a WTO member. 
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 Conventions). While the extent and timing of reciprocity was a central controversy of the 
EPA negotiations, the details of eventual ACP market access offers are beyond the scope 
of this thesis. Instead, the focus here is on the objective of certain ACP governments to 
maintain duty-free market access for canned tuna and tuna loins, for which a brief sketch 
of the institutional and procedural dimensions of proposed EPAs provides necessary 
context. 
 
On the EU side, negotiations were led by the Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade). 
With the 1957 Treaty of Rome, DG Trade was granted full competence to negotiate the 
vast majority of external trade policy on behalf of all EU members.50 This is not to 
suggest that DG Trade had full sovereignty in negotiations.51 Its remit was initially set by 
the EU Council of Ministers and, upon eventually reaching an agreement with an EPA 
grouping, the text would first be discussed by all other relevant Directorate-Generals and, 
when consensus was reached, it would be presented to the Council of Ministers, wherein 
member governments could exert influence.52 
 
As noted above, the stated rationale of the EU in promoting negotiation modalities with 
sub-regional groupings of the ACP was not solely to facilitate compliance with 
GATT(1994) Article XXIV, but also to encourage regional integration within the ACP 
along the lines of the ‘model’ of regionalism of the EU. As such, the configuration of 
EPAs loosely reflected existing regional integration organisations within the ACP. Figure 
5.2 illustrates the institutional appearance of this shift, but it does not demonstrate the 
inherent tensions, overlaps and contradictions of these sub-groupings (especially in the 
African context), which not only resulted in some African states being torn by their dual 
membership of two integration organisations (especially COMESA and SADC) but 
                                                 
50 The major exceptions to this rule were issues such as public procurement, which were a combination of 
EU and national competence (Woolcock 2005: 379). 
51 The following draws on interviews with multiple EU officials in 2005 and 2006; see also Wallace (2005). 
52 Prior to the 2009 Lisbon Treaty the European Parliament could only offer very limited scrutiny of 
proposals. It is worth noting that the formal responsibility for EU trade relations with the ACP used to be 
held by the Directorate-General for Development. Reforms within the European Commission since 1997 
shifted this portfolio to DG Trade (Page and Hewitt 2002: 94). This institutional realignment may have had 
an influence on the extent to which EPA negotiations maintained a development dimension, which was a 
core critique by the ACP as developmental components were largely absent from the texts of eventual 
interim EPAs. 
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 eventually led to splits within EPA groupings (in particular the ESA group, where a 
second grouping emerged, consisting of members of the East African Community, to 
negotiate a separate interim EPA). 
 
Figure 5.2: The changing institutional structure of EU-ACP trade relations 
 
 
 
 
 
Initially, the negotiations were designed to take place in two phases. first an ‘all-ACP’ 
phase where ‘guidelines’ on the general modalities would be developed and cross-cutting 
issues in six thematic areas of the negotiations would be decided with the EU. The 
strategic motivation was that the ACP would be able draw on the perceived improved 
collective bargaining power of this larger group. The second phase was to consist of the 
EPA sub-regions negotiating specific interests (Wright 2005: 74). Due to pressure of the 
end-2007 deadline and the fact that phase one was far from its September 2003 deadline, 
Notes 
CARIFORM: Members of the Caribbean 
Forum 
CEMAC: Members of the Central 
African Economic and Monetary 
Community plus São Tomé. 
ECOWAS: Members of the Economic 
Community of West African States plus 
Mauritania. 
ESA: Eastern and Southern Africa, 
majority membership of COMESA 
(Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa) 
Pacific: Pacific Forum Island Countries 
SADC: Southern African Development 
Community is leading the negotiations, 
but the EPA will consist of members of 
the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) minus South Africa, plus 
Angola, Mozambique and Tanzania. 
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 the EU required that first and second phase negotiations were to continue in parallel 
(Gasiorek and Winters 2004: 1336-7). The first phase, in effect, collapsed and, to the 
extent that they were developed, the guidelines were barely used.  
 
The strategic motivation for the ‘all ACP’ phase was probably misplaced because ACP 
bargaining power had never recovered from the heights of the mid-1970s when Lomé I 
was negotiated (Appendix 5A); processes of ‘all ACP’ negotiations platforms had 
subsequently been complex and, in turn, very weak, not least because of the highly 
differentiated political-economic interests and ideological perspectives of these former 
European colonies. The outcome was that the second phase led to some EPA groupings 
vying against others in order to get ‘better’ concessions from the EU,53 including tactics 
of trying to negotiate as quickly as possible so as to receive improved levels of EU 
patronage (e.g. CEMAC) through to deliberately delaying negotiations so that particular 
concessions might be gained that the EU might not be willing to provide to all EPA 
regions (e.g. Pacific).  On one hand, the swift move to phase two negotiations and the 
subsequent tensions between (and within) EPA groupings resulted in accusations that the 
EU was pursuing a policy of ‘divide and rule’; for example, one ACP representative 
maintained that ‘it’s not written but you can just see it!’ (Int#9). On the other hand, a less 
conspiratorial explanation was that this was the simple logic of institutional behaviour: 
the EU was merely trying to find actors to do business with (Int#15). 
 
In order to maintain Cotonou-equivalent market access for tuna (and other) products, 
ACP LDCs were able to fall-back on the EU’s Everything But Arms initiative. Therefore, 
tuna exporting LDCs (i.e. Madagascar, Senegal and the Solomon Islands) were generally 
under significantly less pressure to initial EPAs by the end-2007 deadline as they would 
suffer only marginal disruption of their preferential trade flows due to slightly stricter 
RoO under the GSP regime.54 In fact, they had a disincentive for entering into EPAs as, 
                                                 
53 Multiple interviews with ESA and PIC negotiators, international trade specialists and EU officials, 2005, 
2006 and 2007; direct observation in ESA and PIC technical meetings in 2006 and 2007. 
54 RoO for fish under the EU’s GSP regime (of which EBA was a component) are slightly stricter than 
under Cotonou (and subsequent EPAs) and were non-negotiable (i.e. unilaterally applied by the EU). For a 
detailed comparison of GSP and Cotonou RoO for fish see Campling et al. (2007), and of Cotonou and 
EPA RoO see Campling (2008b). 
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 by definition, such an agreement required committing to a timetable for eventual 
preferential market access for EU goods and services, with negative implications for 
government revenue through a decline in import tariffs and deepened competition for 
locally-based firms. Non-LDCs however, only had the option of the EU’s ‘standard GSP’ 
which meant the erosion of the tuna preference to a 20.5 percent duty, thereby putting 
non-LDC ACP exporters on a par with far more competitive sites of production in 
Southeast Asia and placing them at a direct disadvantage in relation to exporters using the 
EBA or GSP+ schemes. In effect, the non-negotiation of EPAs would almost certainly 
have resulted in the overnight collapse of non-LDC exports of canned tuna and tuna loins 
to the EU (i.e. from Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea and 
Seychelles). To illustrate this point, recall that product from Thailand was preferred by 
EU buyers at 12 percent duty under the ‘Cotonou compromise’ quota, implying that ACP 
product would not have been purchased if it carried a 20.5 percent duty. This loss of 
preferential market access would probably have also led to the closure of the associated 
ACP plant. According to one EU industry representative: ‘we have canneries around the 
world and if customs protections were removed and the 25 percent [sic: 24 percent] 
disappeared, the canneries would also disappear’ (EUInd#1). New markets might have 
been an option, but as discussed above, the preference appeared to be a determining 
competitive advantage for ACP-based processors and central to their commercial 
survival.55 
 
In this context, a set of important controversies surrounded the situation of the non-
LDCs. Under the terms of the Cotonou Agreement, the EU had committed to ‘assess the 
situation of the non-LDCs’ in 2004 if they reported to the Community that they were not 
able to enter into EPAs. In this case, ‘all alternative possibilities’ would be examined ‘in 
order to provide these countries with a new framework for trade which is equivalent to 
their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules’ (CPA Article 37.6). This links 
to the second negotiation option available to the EU noted above – the formation of a 
                                                 
55 As detailed in Chapter 3, the tuna cannery in Fiji was the only ACP plant to shift from being centred on 
the EU canned tuna chain to the US-centred one, but this involved a process of downgrading from 
producing canned tuna to tuna loins. Moreover, the US loin market consisted of supply to only one 
cannery, negating the possibility of additional, profitable supply. 
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 Cotonou-equivalent GSP regime. Aside from problems of the modalities for resolving 
this issue – the criteria for ‘alternatives’ and their assessment by the EU were not 
specified in Article 37.6 (Alavi et al. 2007: 13) – there were two other issues: first, no 
ACP non-LDC had opted out of EPA negotiations by end-2004, and thus the EU was not 
legally committed to offer equivalent alternatives (Alavi et al. 2007: 9). Second, when 
they realised that EPAs might not be concluded in time, several non-LDCs (including 
PNG and the Seychelles) enquired about the possibility of utilising the GSP+ regime to 
avoid the downgrading of tuna exports to the standard GSP.56 In response to these 
enquiries, the EU declared that it would not open this ‘closed list’ to new applicant 
countries until 2009, thereby effectively blocking ACP non-LDCs applying for GSP+ 
treatment as an alternative. While the EU argued that this decision was simply in 
conformity to its own rules, the ‘closed list’ was incompatible with the GATT Enabling 
Clause, including two specific WTO Appellate Body rulings in favour of India in 2003 
and 2004 against the EU’s prior GSP ‘Drugs Arrangement’, among other reasons because 
it used a closed list! (Bartels 2007; EC April 2004). This case clearly demonstrates the 
hypocrisy of the ‘developmental’ scope of EU trade policy: on one hand, its stated 
objective of full compliance with WTO rules compelled the ACP to enter into EPAs to 
maintain market access, while on the other, it failed to offer an already-existing EPA 
alternative to non-LDCs because it would break internal EU regulations, despite the fact 
that these very regulations contravened the WTO. 
 
In sum, the combination of the time constraint of the end-2007 deadline (imposed by the 
end of the Cotonou Waiver at the WTO) and the lack of alternative Cotonou-equivalent 
market access opportunities (imposed by the EU’s unwillingness to provide one), meant 
that tuna exporting ACP non-LDCs were compelled to enter into EPAs or lose 
preferential treatment. Given the fact that not one of the regions was ready to sign full 
EPAs by early 2007, a two-stage solution was developed. Interim EPAs would be signed 
by end-2007 which would meet the basic requirements of GATT Article XXIV by 
committing to the reciprocal (but asymmetrical) liberalisation of the trade in goods and 
                                                 
56 Multiple person. comm., ESA and PIC negotiators, 2006 and 2007; direct observation in ESA and PIC 
technical EPA meetings in 2006 and 2007. 
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 thus allow the continuation of uninterrupted preferential market access for the ACP. This 
was to be followed by a commitment to negotiate comprehensive EPAs in a range of time 
frames from 2008 (including agreements on trade in services, investment rules, etc). By 
the end of 2007, only around 35 of the 79 ACP countries had initialled interim EPAs. 
Continuing market access for tuna products was a central reason for doing so by PNG 
and Seychelles, and as part of several other preferential items for Côte d’Ivoire, Fiji, 
Ghana and Mauritius.57 
 
 
5.6 The Political Economy of the EU Tuna Trade Regime 
 
Grilli (1993) is probably correct to argue that EU trade policy towards the ACP and other 
developing countries was not a consistently coherent strategy of imperialist divide and 
rule. Instead it was shaped by colonial relations in the first instance (Appendix 5A), and 
subsequently by a series of ad hoc responses to emerging circumstances (albeit responses 
that reflected the hierarchies of the inter-state system). 58 Moreover, the objective of this 
policy was to defend and extend European economic interests, whether general or 
sectoral, and to maintain the post-colonial world order that had propped-up capitalist 
development in Western Europe since World War Two (Grilli 1993: 152). To this we 
might add the ideology, policy measures and broad regime of accumulation associated 
with neoliberalism, at least where it benefited EU interests, including the ‘re-designing’ 
and ‘locking-in’ of the ACP into the neoliberal world order with the conditionalities 
attached to Lomé IV, Cotonou and the subsequent system of EPAs (Nunn and Price 
2004). What mechanisms did capital involved in the fishing and EU-based processing 
nodes of the commodity chain use to achieve its particular interests? 
 
                                                 
57 Albeit spurred on by high pressure negotiation tactics by the EU such as linking the EPA to EDF 
funding. Multiple pers. comm., ESA and PIC negotiators and international trade specialists, 2006 and 2007; 
direct observation in ESA and PIC technical EPA meetings in 2006 and 2007. 
58 For example, even by the early 1980s the commercial motivations behind EU RoO for fish under Lomé 
were clear. First, ‘to help maintain the dominant position of certain member states, most notably France 
[Spain was not a member of the EEC during Ravenhill’s period of analysis], in the exploitation of the 
fishery resources of West Africa’, and second, ‘to prevent competitors of European fleets from gaining 
access to the domestic Community market’ (Ravenhill 1985: 167-68). 
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 While minor in terms of their economic weight in the EU as a whole, tuna fisheries are of 
great political and social importance.59 It appears that policy decisions were based on a 
diverse range of interests at the national and even local level. In fact, it was at the local 
level, through close-knit regionally-framed identities, that the interests of capital made its 
(economically relatively very small) voice heard in national and EU political fora, such as 
those who claimed Breton or Basque heritage or who come from Cornwall, Scotland, 
Galcia or Vigo (Lequesne 2005: 353-4 and 358-9). The EU DWF was able to punch 
above its economic weight in terms of its lobby power vis-à-vis the EU because of the 
political sensitivities of the historical-geographical roots of tuna fleet ownership. The 
formal representation of these interests at the level of the EU was mediated through 
Europeche and Eurothon, the former the lobby group for the EU-wide fishing industry as 
a whole and the latter representing EU tuna fishing and processing associations as well as 
their overseas interests (particularly in the ACP and GSP+ countries). Eurothon actively 
lobbied to maintain the status quo of the EU tuna regime, including the maintenance of 
the system of preferential RoO and tariff protection in EPA negotiations and at the WTO 
(Eurothon 2006a; 2006b; 2007a; 2007b). A major benefit to EU industry lobby power 
was strategic alliances with ACP governments, which clearly also had an interest in 
maintaining the status quo of the EU tuna tariff regime.60 This allowed EU tuna firms to 
apply a ‘developmental sheen’ to their commercial interests. For example, a media 
release by Eurothon stressed the importance of the tariff regime to the development of 
ACP countries, whereas the commercial interests of Eurothon’s membership were far less 
prominently highlighted (Eurothon 2006a). 
 
The impact of this lobby power is difficult to isolate analytically. However, EU officials 
were found to effectively represent the economic arguments forwarded by Eurothon and 
its members. For example, one official laid out the logic of the ‘three pillars’ of EU tuna 
policy – access agreements, tariff structure and RoO – and that ‘if one collapses the 
                                                 
59 For example, of the total EU DWF operating under access agreements with developing countries (of 
which a high percentage are tuna vessels) around 13,000 fish workers were EU nationals. Indirect annual 
employment resulting from these agreements was estimated at almost 19,000 people, of which 18 percent 
were in the canning industry (IFREMER 1999). 
60 For example, in 2006 a Eurothon representative travelled to several ACP sites of production to encourage 
governments to join Eurothon opposition to reform of RoO (EUInd#10; SGvt#43; SInd#9). 
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 others are weaker both for us and for the coastal state’ (EUGvt#3–#6). In fact, there are 
five ‘pillars’ (illustrated in Figure 5.3); to the three listed must be added the wide range of 
fisheries subsidies integral to the commercial survival of the EU DWF (Chapter 4) and 
SPS measures that constitute an additional limitation on potential competition from non-
EU interests. Nonetheless, the commercial logic of the interlocking nature of the EU tuna 
regime and the apparent symbiosis with ACP-based interests was also recognised by ACP 
policy makers and advisors. There were two aspects to this argument, one general to all 
ACP tuna exporters and the other to particular countries. First, if the ACP was successful 
in its pursuit of reform of the EU tuna regime and that this reform negatively affected the 
political-economic pillars propping-up the survival of the EU DWF, then the commercial 
logic (and associated lobby power) for maintaining tariff peaks would decline with it 
(EUGvt#1; #2; #9; Pearson 2007a). The outcome might have been an end to the tariff 
preference because there would have been little justification within the EU for 
maintaining tariffs peaks, especially given the assumption dominant in most EU policy 
circles that high tariffs have negative effects on consumer prices. In practice, this 
argument significantly tempered tuna-specific demands among most ACP states in EPA 
negotiations, particularly in the ESA region.  
 
Second, for those ACP states that benefited from the EU DWF using their ports as a local 
base, reform of RoO was seen to have negative economic and social implications as it 
might lead to a decline in DWF activities (Int#15; SGvt#14; #15; Pearson 2007b; 2007c). 
The most important example of this position was Seychelles. It benefits from status quo 
RoO because of the huge domestic availability of EU caught fish and the economic 
activities of these boats when in Port Victoria (Chapter 6). Conversely, other ESA group 
members wanted fish to be deemed originating when caught in their EEZs regardless of 
vessel flag and ownership, thereby reflecting economic sovereignty over resources in 
their waters.61 The outcome of the ESA IEPA in late 2007 was an automatic derogation 
from RoO of 8,000mt of canned tuna and 2,000mt of tuna loins. This was perceived as a 
gain as it gave the three tuna processing ESA countries (Madagascar, Mauritius and 
                                                 
61 Namibia in the SADC IEPA and the Caribbean EPA made similar demands (Campling 2008b). 
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 Seychelles) an identical potential volume of non-originating supply as that previously 
shared among the entire ACP group (Campling 2008b). 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The five pillars of the EU tuna regime62  
 
 
 
 
 
While reciprocal trade had been dropped with the shift from the Yaoundé to the Lomé 
Conventions, the effect of cumulation in RoO for EU capital was ‘to reintroduce the 
principle of reverse [reciprocal] preferences through the back door’ (Ravenhill 1985: 
168). The restrictiveness of rules of origin served to skew the developmental framing of 
EU preferential trade policy towards EU capital in terms of the flow of industrial 
development and technology transfer to the ACP (Select Committee of the House of 
Commons on Overseas Development as cited by Ravenhill 1985: 169; see also, 
Davenport et al. 1995: 33). In other words, the cumulative scope of the RoO was an 
example of mercantilist commercial policy because it allowed EU capital preferential 
access to EU markets via ACP-based processing. In effect, the RoO both protected 
processors based in the EU from the potential capacity of ACP production and it 
                                                 
62 As noted in Chapter 1, the role of public and private standards is excluded from this thesis. 
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 supported the EU DWF in terms of its sale of fish to a captive market.63 EU RoO for fish 
was so successful a tool of commercial policy that Japan and the US mirrored their 
design in their own FTAs.64 
 
However, this set of commercial policies also had either unintended effects or were, to an 
extent, genuinely designed with the intention of providing an incentive to capital to invest 
in industrial development in the ACP.65 The commercial benefits to EU capital were far 
from always apparent in relation to the ownership of ACP-based tuna factories. Indeed, 
foreign companies competing with EU firms frequently made use of the preference to 
gain access to EU markets (Appendix 5B).66 This seemed to represent either a concession 
on the part of the EU to non-EU capital or an unavoidable outcome of the benefits 
available to EU firms that had invested in other ACP states. In terms of tuna processing 
interests, this evidence makes a directly causal relationship between EU trade policy and 
the interests of its ‘national’ capitals empirically fuzzy. Nonetheless, the evidence 
presented above does demonstrate that, while the initial commercial rationale for the 
trade preference was to benefit primarily French processing firms, the wider and more 
strategic beneficiary was the EU DWF through RoO.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 It is worth noting that mechanisms of protection were applied by certain EU members against certain 
ACP exporters. In particular, by the early 1990s, France continued to apply quantitative restrictions on the 
flow of canned tuna exports from Fiji and Mauritius (as well as Thailand) to the French market. The 
rationale was to protect canneries in France and French-owned factories in francophone Africa (Davenport 
with Page 1991: 36-41). 
64 The US International Trade Commission explicitly recommended EU-style RoO for canned tuna exports 
under the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), stating that such a ‘restriction would be similar to one 
that has long been in place in the EU version of ATPA, which has provided benefits mainly to the Spanish 
tuna industry’. (USITC July 2002: 10. Emphases added.) 
65 Several EU officials were genuinely concerned about the negative effects of RoO on ACP tuna 
development and the potential loss of market access if EPA negotiations collapsed. These concerns were 
either raised off-the-record in their personal capacity or in relation to their institutional role as development 
officials (EUGvt#1; #2; #7; #9; #15). 
66 For example, the Japanese fisheries MNC Maruha (formerly Taiyō Gyogyō) invested in Solomon 
Islands, the major Japanese trading company Itochou (formerly C. Itoh) in Fiji, and the US MNC Heinz in 
canneries in Ghana and Seychelles (later taken over by Lehman Brothers). 
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 5.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has provided evidence of the importance of the EU tuna preference to 
several interests. Contrary to the methodologically flawed arguments of the preference 
pessimists, the competitive advantage afforded by the EU tuna preference served as a 
major incentive for capital to invest in several ACP coastal and island states. The genesis 
of this non-reciprocal preferential treatment under Lomé I was a consequence of the 
world-historic context within which it was negotiated (Appendix 5A). The argument was 
advanced that very few tuna-related gains were achieved in future agreements,67 and that 
this was a reflection of the growing inequality of political power in EU-ACP relations. 
 
The chapter also demonstrated the complexity and interconnectedness of the EU tuna 
trade regime, including the role of industry lobbies (i.e. firm-to-state political power). It 
argued that the tuna preference was not designed as an incentive for development in the 
ACP, but is a historically-emergent tool of commercial policy to support the competitive 
accumulation of EU capital, in particular the EU DWF. However, this argument is 
qualified by several (seemingly) unintended effects apparent in the evidence, including 
benefits to non-ACP and non-EU firms. Further, we saw how the EU tuna preference 
impacted on (and was impacted by) international trade regulation and the accumulation 
strategies of firms over time, including through examples of a tuna-related dispute at the 
WTO and the shifting interests of EU-based tuna processors through the loin quota.  
 
The rules of origin associated with the EU preference were outlined and assessed from 
the perspective of different interests. Rules of origin determine the extent to which a trade 
preference can be commercially utilised or not, and EU RoO for fish (especially in 
relation to tuna) were a source of contention in ACP-EU trade relations since the 1970s. 
The evidence firmly suggests that EU RoO for fish were designed and enforced as a 
commercial support for the EU DWF. The EU was able to negotiate these asymmetrical 
terms because of the ACP’s unequal political power, even at its relative height during the 
                                                 
67 Minor gains from RoO reform included the allocation of the automatic derogation in 1993, its 
incremental increase, and improved derogations under IEPAs. 
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 negotiation of Lomé I.  The evidence also suggests that analyses of the ‘ACP’ must be 
differentiated as, for example, some states appeared to benefit from the RoO (e.g. 
Seychelles), while others were significantly disadvantaged by them.  
 
The main thrust of the argument is that the tuna preference was not developed as a tool of 
development policy but was instead a historically contingent and ad hoc commercial 
arrangement advanced to support the interests of French firms in its colonies and, from 
the first Yaoundé Convention, its former colonies. EU branded and non-branded firms 
were able to procure product from a range of sources while maintaining protection for 
their processing interests in the EU. This supports the argument made in Chapter 1 that 
historical accounts of the formation of commodity chains, including regulatory 
mechanisms, can contribute to understanding contemporary dynamics. However, the 
evidence also contests any simplistic argument that the EU acted ‘purely’ as a mediator 
for the interests of ‘national’ EU capital: ACP countries benefited from employment 
generation and spin-off benefits, and beneficiary firms based in ACP sites of production 
were often not owned by ‘EU’ or ‘ACP’ capital. Nonetheless, the deepening 
neoliberalisation of EU trade policy with the ACP resulted in huge pressure on ACP non-
LDCs to sign-up to interim EPAs, including to avoid the probable collapse of their tuna 
processing industries, such as Seychelles, to which we turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Six 
 
The Canned Tuna Commodity Chain and Upgrading in 
Seychelles 
 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates how Seychelles’ integration with and ‘upgrading’ in the 
commodity chain in canned tuna is historically and politically constituted. We identify 
how government policies were deployed over time in various attempts to upgrade 
Seychelles’ interactions with the chain (sometimes successfully, sometimes not) and 
present research on the socio-economic effects of this upgrading in the late 2000s. We 
also examine the political economy of government relations with the firms that undertake 
tuna fishing and canning activities, supported by their home state the EU, including how 
firms negotiated the institutional conditions for their investments. Connecting back to the 
discussion of territorial and social embeddedness in Section 1.1.2 (under the rubric 
‘institutional context’), the chapter shows how upgrading in the commodity chain 
impacted social relations in Seychelles and how, at the same time, economic and political 
dynamics in Seychelles generated different degrees of ‘anchoring’ among firms in the 
fishing and manufacturing nodes of the chain.  
 
The chapter does not proceed through a strict historical narrative, although the historical 
trajectory is a complex one. The focus is on the emergence of the commodity chain in the 
WIO from the late 1970s to 2009. After offering a brief overview of the historical 
emergence of industrial fisheries policy in Seychelles, it identifies and explains the set of 
policy interventions deployed by the Seychelles government in the late 1970s onwards to 
establish the necessary domestic conditions for upgrading in the fishing and canning 
nodes of the commodity chain (Section 6.2.1). These conditions include domestic 
fisheries development policy, the legal regulation of foreign fishing, physical 
infrastructure for boats and the canning factory, vessel services, and investment 
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incentives for the factory. The following two sub-sections then lay out the institutional 
relationships between the Seychelles government and the EU DWF/ the European 
Commission since 1983 (6.2.2) and investors in the cannery since 1987 (6.2.3). This 
discussion makes clear that government policy was an essential ingredient in establishing 
Seychelles upgrading. The final sub-section (6.2.4) identifies and summarises the main 
developmental effects of Seychelles upgrading in the commodity chain. The emphasis 
here is on extending the scale of the concern with upgrading in the GCC literature away 
from the firm to the broader terrain of employment and government revenue. 
 
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 look at unequal political relations in Seychelles interactions with and 
upgrading in the canned tuna chain, identified in Chapter 1 as a lacuna in the commodity 
studies literature. It draws out unequal state-state and firm-state relations between 
Seychelles and the European Commission and EU DWF in the fishing node (6.3) and 
unequal firm-state relations in the manufacturing node (6.4). This discussion also serves 
to identify an elite of local players in Seychelles domestic politics, connecting to the 
discussion in Section 1.1.2 of the need for ‘institutional context’ to include consideration 
of domestic political economy. This is followed by a summary of the chapter. 
 
One important caveat must be highlighted. Interventions by the Seychelles state should 
be understood in the context of wider domestic dynamics of social change, which were, 
in turn, influenced by dynamics and processes in the global political economy. Due to the 
confines of space, these cannot be detailed here beyond a cursory sketch. Necessary 
analysis of this important context is provided elsewhere (Campling et al. 2011: especially 
pp. 3-46).  
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6.2 Seychelles Interactions with the Canned Tuna Commodity Chain: Policy 
Interventions, Institutional Relations and Upgrading  
 
6.2.1 Domestic policy interventions and Seychelles upgrading in the 
commodity chain, 1977-1995  
 
Before moving to the major domestic policy interventions by the Seychelles government 
between 1977 and 1995, it is useful to contextualise post-independence fisheries 
development policy.1  People living in Seychelles have relied on fishing as a source of 
animal protein and essential micro-nutrients since the settlement of the islands in 1770. 
The first known advocate for developing industrial fishing and canning capacity was 
Joachim Arissol (a leading member of the Creole population) in the mid-1940s as part of 
a wider proposed programme of socio-economic and political development supporting 
the majority population. However, under risk-adverse and fiscally conservative British 
colonial rule, industrial fisheries development was largely seen as the exclusive domain 
of the private sector resulting in very limited public investment in capitalisation and 
necessary physical infrastructure.  
 
The leader of the pro-independence Seychelles Peoples United Party (SPUP), France 
Albert René, was influenced by Arissol’s promotion of an industrial fishing and canning 
industry and called for public investment in the sector as a new pillar of the economy to 
compliment (declining) copra exports. René continued this drive in opposition and it was 
one of the centre pieces of his party’s economic policy upon seizing power in a coup 
d’etat in 1977, one year after independence from Britain. The renamed Seychelles 
People’s Progressive Front (SPPF) established a one-party left populist regime, typified 
by state intervention in the economy such as through the creation of monopoly 
parastatals, including in the fisheries sector (see below). In parallel to the emergence of 
the WIO purse seine fishery from 1978 onwards (Chapter 2), the SPPF regime 
                                                 
1 The density and complexity of the history of the politics of fishing and canning in Seychelles cannot be 
fully presented here. The following is based on a more detailed overview of the historical evolution of 
industrial fisheries development policy in Seychelles from the late colonial period (1945-1976) through the 
period of one-party rule by the Seychelles Peoples Progressive Front (SPPF, 1977-1991), which will be 
published at a later date. 
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established a range of legal and regulatory mechanisms to govern foreign fishing in its 
waters (below). It also part-financed two deeply flawed attempts to establish a 
domestically-owned industrial tuna fleet: a highly asymmetrical joint venture with a 
French firm to construct and operate pole and line vessels in 1979,  and a state-owned 
fleet of small purse seiners in 1986 (Figure 6.1). This negative experience of state-led 
upgrading in the fishing node further bolstered the parallel aim of establishing a 
domestically-based canned tuna factory (see below). 
 
The explicit objective of the SPPF regime was ‘to create the conditions and the facilities 
so that Victoria becomes the primary tuna port in the Indian Ocean’ (René 1984: 29), 
which, as we shall see, it indisputably achieved by the late 1980s. The regime did not 
view this ‘upgrading’ as an end in itself. The associated generation of government 
revenue and economic activity was used, along with tourism (the primary pillar of the 
economy since the 1970s), to finance a progressive programme of social development, an 
extensive programme of import-substitution (much of which was doomed economically 
given the tiny domestic market), and an apparatus of oppression (the army, militia, police 
force, and the Party itself) (Campling et al. 2011; van Nieuwkerk 2003). 
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Figure 6.1: Timeline of Seychelles industrial fisheries development policy, 1945-1995 
 
mid-
1940s 
Joachim Arissol (former member of the Seychelles Taxpayers and 
Landowners Association) calls for development of export-orientated fishing 
and canning industry as part of wider socio-economic reforms to support 
Creole population 
late-
1940s 
Colonial governor introduces progressive ten-year development plan which 
includes minor expenditure on fisheries 
1947 Colonial Development Corporation funds flawed industrial fishing scheme by 
private British interests (collapses in 1952) 
1952 Japanese tuna longline fleets start fishing in Indian Ocean (Taiwan from 1954 
and South Korea from 1966) 
1959 Colonial government downplays potential of export-orientated fisheries 
development, fisheries receive only 2 to 3.1% of development policy 
financing 
1963 Leader of Seychelles Peoples United Party (SPUP), France Albert René, 
writes to Colonial Office calling for independence under universal suffrage, as 
well as immediate development of fishing and canning industries 
1976 At independence, President Mancham of Seychelles Democratic Party adopts 
René’s emphasis on fisheries development 
1977 SPUP coup. New regime establishes Seychelles EEZ 
1978 Industrial fisheries development a major component in the (renamed) 
Seychelles People’s Progressive Front’s (SPPF) first National Development 
Plan (1978-82). WIO purse seine fishery pioneered by Japan 
1979 State-owned fleet of four pole and line vessels rolled out with French 
financing. Collapses after nine months of operation. 
1980 Experimental fishing in WIO by French purse seiner 
1982 National Development Plan (1982-86) allocates 42% of investment in 
productive sector to fisheries. French purse seine fishing under a special 
access agreement in Seychelles EEZ is a commercial success. 
1983 Seychelles Fishing Authority (SFA) set up. First purely commercial purse 
seine access arrangement agreed with the EEC (representing the French fleet) 
1984 First commercial access arrangement with Spanish government 
1985 Work commences on new industrial fishing port. Parastatal Seychelles 
Petroleum Company (SEPEC) incorporated 
1986 Government purchases fleet of small purse seiners. Project quickly fails. 
1987 Conserveries de l’Océan Indien tuna cannery established in joint venture 
between government and Pêcheurs de France 
1995 Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd (IOT) joint venture between government and H. J. 
Heinz 
 
Sources: Colony of Seychelles 1959; EIU 1983, 1984; FAO/AfDB 1983; Fisheries Development 1978; 
Franda 1982; Harris 1988; Gabbay and Ghosh 1992; McAteer 2008; Michaud 1986, 1990; Ministry of 
Planning and External Relations 1981; Miyake et al. 2004; Nageon de Lestang 1986, 1988a; NEDECO, 
Arup and Ascon 1981; NORPLAN 1981; Payne and Savini 1978; René 1981a, 1982, 1984, 1985; Rowe 
1959; Savini with Dubner 1979; Scarr 2000   
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Having established that industrial fisheries development was a central objective of the 
SPPF regime, this section identifies a set of domestic policy interventions that laid the 
necessary conditions for Seychelles’ integration with the fishing and manufacturing 
nodes of the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna. Five main policy interventions 
are highlighted in their chronological order which, in combination, contributed to 
upgrading Port Victoria to become a tuna transhipment port of global significance and as 
host to one of the largest canneries in the world.2 The strategic responses of the post-
colonial Seychelles state to the emerging tuna fishery in the WIO and the growing EU 
market for canned tuna demonstrate the importance both of a historical understanding of 
the contingencies of chain formation and of government policy in facilitating domestic 
‘upgrading’. 
 
The first policy intervention was establishing the legal and other regulatory mechanisms 
to govern the new exclusive economic zone (EEZs). Seychelles independence in 1976 
fell in the same year as the extension of state territory to 200 nautical mile EEZs across 
the planet (Chapter 4). A flurry of legislation was enacted by the SPPF upon taking 
power, including a declaration of national sovereignty over the EEZ and laying part of 
the necessary foundations for legal relations with foreign fleets in its EEZ (Savini with 
Dubner 1979). The Seychelles Fishing Authority (SFA) was created in 1983 and legally 
incorporated in the following year. The rationale was to have ‘one powerful organisation 
... devoted fully and exclusively to the Fishing Industry – both pelagic and demersal’ 
acting as ‘the executive arm of the Government in all maters concerned with fishing’ 
(René 1983: 2 and 27). In short, the Authority was the premier institution in the 
negotiation, regulation and enforcement of Seychelles external fisheries relations, as well 
as in the development of a domestic fishing industry. SFA was chaired by Glenny Savy, 
the step-son of President René.3 This move, combined with the Authority’s executive 
                                                 
2 Of course, all of these domestic conditions for Seychelles upgrading must be set in the wider context of 
the biological and environmental basis of tuna flows through and close to Seychelles waters and the 
associated capital flows of the EU DWF to exploit this new commodity frontier, as detailed in Chapter 2; 
expanding canned tuna consumption in principal EU markets (Chapter 3); and the preferential trade regime 
which benefitted several coastal ACP countries, including Seychelles (Chapter 5). 
3 His other two stepsons, David and Francis, would go on to head the most important parastatals in the 
tourism industry, Air Seychelles and the (then) Seychelles Tourism Marketing Authority. The first SFA 
chair was Maxime Fayon. 
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power, is widely credited as giving SFA significant relative institutional autonomy in 
domestic politics and in negotiations with external parties (see below).  
 
The second intervention was the creation of new port infrastructure to house the boats in 
the emerging purse seine fishery. In 1981 the deep-water quay in Port Victoria was 
highly congested and was expected to reach its technical capacity by 1983 (NEDECO, 
Arup and Ascon 1981: 6, 11 and 17), the same year as the emergence of commercial 
purse seine fishing by French boats in the EEZ. Given the central importance of turn-
around time in-port for the maximisation of fishing days (Chapter 2), the competitive 
accumulation strategy of the EU DWF demanded investment in port development. In 
order for Seychelles ‘to establish itself firmly as one of the most important fishing ports 
of the Indian Ocean’, the SPPF regime took on public debt to embark on an extensive 
programme of infrastructure development called the East Coast Project (René 1983: 15-
16).  This included the construction of a new fishing port at an estimated cost of Rs.162.2 
million (René 1984: 21; EIU 1986: 43; NORPLAN 1981).  
 
The third policy intervention (and the final one in the fishing node of the chain) was the 
creation of necessary services for the EU DWF and other foreign tuna fleets. Domestic 
vessel services were identified as insufficient at the emergence of the fishery, 
(NORPLAN 1981: 16). In the context of the SPPF regime’s wider objective of state 
investment to boost the economy (Campling et al. 2011) and more specific aim of 
upgrading interactions with the industrial tuna fishery, parastatals were established to 
fulfil these functions. Three specialised parastatals were set-up in the first half of the 
1980s: 
1) Union Lighterage Company Ltd (ULC) was provided with a monopoly for 
stevedoring, shorehandling, ship chandlery and shipping agency functions, which 
had previously been carried out by private firms (Chaudron 1992: 10; René 1983: 
22).  
2) Naval Services Ltd was established to provide vessel maintenance and repair. Its 
turnover doubled in 1985 compared to the previous year, ‘mainly due to services 
rendered to the tuna fishing fleet’ (René 1986:  46).  
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3) Seychelles Petroleum Company (SEPEC) was given national monopoly control 
over the acquisition and distribution of all petroleum products, including 
bunkering for fishing boats (René 1986: 47; Parker 1986).  
Most parastatals providing vessel services had been privatised by the mid-1990s as a 
result of the SPPF regime’s first, partial wave of privatisation (Driesen 1995; Sparks 
2007; Gabbay and Ghosh 1998). Stevedoring activities was liberalised in 1993 and ULC 
was broken up into smaller companies in 1994 (Boullé 1995: 7; SFA 1996: 2). ULC’s 
stevedoring activities were largely absorbed by Landmarine and its ship agency business 
by a firm called Aquarius, although both were now controlled by private individuals 
associated with the ruling elite. However, SEPEC remained a parastatal, even after an 
IMF adjustment programme in late 2008, and is widely recognised as one of the few 
success stories of parastatal development in Seychelles 
 
The fourth and fifth interventions are oriented on the domestic manufacture of canned 
tuna and involve, respectively, the government’s role in the establishment of a joint-
venture cannery in 1987 with one of the ‘big three’ French manufacturers and the 
creation of a free trade (export processing) zone in 1995 as a condition for investment by 
Heinz in enhancing this canning capacity. In the context of the failure of state investment 
in joint-ventures and state-owned enterprise in industrial tuna fisheries (Figure 2.1), it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the government now focussed on upgrading in the canning 
node of the commodity chain (René 1986: 49; Nageon de Lestang 1986: 18). This fourth 
intervention saw public investment in the construction of a small canning factory and a 
cold store as part of the in the East Coast Project (Nageon de Lestang 1988a:183, 185). 
This was part of a joint venture with Pêcheurs de France which created Conserveries de 
l’Océan Indien in 1987 (see below for more on this). The government had taken on a 
significant aspect of the risk by contributing the physical infrastructure component, 
funded with loans from the French state. Just eight years later, as part of its expansion 
into the UK-centred canned tuna market (see Chapter 3), Heinz took over Pêcheurs de 
France’s control of this cannery.  But it seems to have had a major condition – the 
creation of the Seychelles International Trade Zone (SITZ) in 1995. The zone was the 
government’s fifth intervention and provided commercially significant legal exemptions 
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innational law, as opposed to the prior ad hoc incentives given to the Conserveries de 
l’Océan Indien investment. The SITZ provided several exemptions for investors based 
there, including on business tax, trades tax and imports of capital equipment, and 
payment of Gainful Occupation Permit fees for expatriate workers. It also allowed for 
foreign exchange bank accounts, which was of particular importance given a fixed 
exchange rate and government control of foreign exchange movements across the rest of 
the economy. We now turn to discussion of the institutional aspects of the EU DWF’s 
access arrangements with the Seychelles government, which focuses on the financial 
elements. This establishes the institutional bases for the analysis of the politics of the 
fishery in Section 6.3. 
 
 
6.2.2  EU-Seychelles access arrangements, 1983-2009  
 
Seychelles has two major assets in relation to the capture of economic rent from the WIO 
purse seine fishery: 1) control over access rights to fishing in its EEZ, which, enshrined 
in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), is not a Seychelles-
specific factor as it applies to all coastal states (Chapter 4); and, 2) the strategic location 
of Port Victoria on the main island of Mahé, which is in close proximity to purse seine 
fishing activities through the majority of the year. As detailed in Chapter 2, the use of 
Port Victoria is of major geographical and operational importance to the business 
strategies of the EU DWF in terms of maximising fishing days and minimizing steaming 
days. To summarise the point through the words of one EU official:  
The bottom line for boats is to maintain an average catch per day of a 
minimum of 30 tons, so you don’t want to lose days going elsewhere. 
Victoria gives a saving of one-and-a-half days on fuel, crew, etc, which is a 
big saving. (EUGvt#15) 
We also saw in Chapter 4 how the contemporary EU DWF benefits from a network of 
Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs) in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans, 
which are negotiated and heavily subsidised by the European Union. The following 
focuses on EU-Seychelles government-to-government agreements (culminating in FPAs) 
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and private company-to-government arrangements by Spanish firms who use the 
Seychelles flag, and thus combines an analytical concern with the relationship between 
regulatory mechanisms, territorial embeddedness and upgrading outlined in Chapter 1. 
    
The two primary objectives of the Seychelles state for the licensing of fishing vessels 
were to regulate the number of fishing vessels active in the Seychelles EEZ and raise 
government revenue (Ministry of Planning and External Relations 1981: 27; Nageon de 
Lestang 1986: 18; Saint Ange 1988: 2). The economic benefits included freely 
convertible currencies in the form of license fees and other access revenue (see Table 6.1) 
as well as the projected provision of goods and services to purse seine vessels. These 
were essential inflows in the context of the new SPPF regime’s extensive programme of 
social development, ever deepening state involvement in the economy and the domestic 
economic recession of the early 1980s (Campling et al. 2011). By the end of 1982, the 
success of experimental purse seine fishing was clear (Chapter 2). In light of this and the 
failure of its pole-and-line joint-venture (Figure 6.1), the Seychelles government had 
identified foreign purse seining as the most viable option for the immediate commercial 
development of the fishery. Following the line of argument of an FAO consultant that 
‘Seychelles should take advantage of the present fishing bonanza’ (Cooklin 1984: 40), in 
1983 all tuna fishing agreements moved from being on a concessionary research and 
experimental basis to being ‘purely commercial’ (Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 178).  
 
EU-Seychelles access arrangements 
In the early 1980s, purse seiner captains and owners did not have detailed data on tuna 
population movements, but they did know the results of experimental purse seining 
carried out in and around the Seychelles EEZ. In the context of this and the government’s 
objective of generating rent from the fishery, Seychelles’ first ‘purely commercial’ purse 
seine access agreements were agreed with the EEC (representing the French fleet) in 
1983 and the government of Spain in 1984. As noted, SFA was the primary agency for 
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negotiating, monitoring and enforcing access agreements.4 The EEC agreement allowed 
access for up to 18 French seiners, while the government-to-government agreement with 
Spain provided for 15 Spanish vessels. Additional company-to-government agreements 
were signed in 1984 with firms from France (nine purse seiners), Spain (two) and Ivory 
Coast (five) (Nageon de Lestang and Lablache 1989: 3; René 1984: 28).5 By the mid-
1980s, the Seychelles government had entered into ‘cash for access’ agreements under all 
three of the categories of ‘first generation’ arrangements outlined in Chapter 4.6  
 
We saw in Chapter 4 that ‘Southern’ tuna access agreements have been negotiated by DG 
Fish at the European Commission since the late 1970s (the first being with Senegal in 
1979). After the first short-term commercial arrangement with the EEC in 1983, 
Seychelles consistently signed medium-term framework agreements and protocols, 
following a three year cycle between 1984 and 2002, as detailed in Table 6.1. With the 
accession of Spain to the European Communities in 1986, the EEC access agreement 
(1987-1990) provided for double the number of purse seine vessels (Table 6.1; Nageon 
de Lestang and Lablache 1989: 3). Financial payments in these agreements consist of two 
components: the majority is paid by the EU and the remaining by the vessel owners. 
Within the EU payment, the major element that changed over time was the rising 
proportion and changing allocation of ‘additional funds’, including for scientific and 
technical programmes, establishment of a satellite-based vessel monitoring system 
(VMS), and development of a domestic fleet of semi-industrial long-liners.7 Aside from 
direct licence fee payments, the vessel-owner contribution also includes a top-up payment 
to be made if the EU DWF catches more than the annual quota of tuna paid for up-front 
by the EU. As can be seen from Table 6.1, this top-up payment did not move with 
                                                 
4 In fact, SFA staff negotiated the EEC agreement in the year before the Authority was legally incorporated 
(René 1984: 28). Prior to this, fisheries access negotiations with tuna longline fleets were led by the 
Ministry of Planning and External Relations (Ministry of Planning and External Relations 1981: 44). 
5 The ‘Ivory Coast’ vessels were owned by French firms and sold their catch through the French trading 
firm SOVETCO (Marcille 1987: 45; see also Chapters 2 and 3). 
6 That is, government-to-government, -to-industry association, and -to-company. Government-to-industry 
association is the standard model for Seychelles access agreements with East Asian longline fleets which 
are beyond the scope of this thesis because they supply distinct tuna commodity chains in sashimi. 
7 These vessels were introduced to supply domestic export-orientated processors of fresh-chilled tuna 
‘steaks’ and related products, primarily to EU markets. See Campling et al. (2009: 16-17, 25, 260-4) on 
these Seychelles firms, and Campling et al. (2008) on the EU-centred commodity chains for chilled and 
frozen tuna ‘steaks’ and related products. 
261
inflation, remaining at a static ECU 20 per ton between 1984 and 1999 devaluing returns 
to the Seychelles government. There was only one increase, to 25 euros per ton from 
1999 onwards. Moreover, this top-up fee is identical across FPAs and thus does not 
reflect the commercial importance of the higher proportion of yellowfin to skipjack 
caught in the WIO compared to the other two regions where the EU maintains FPAs (the 
Atlantic and WCPO). 
 
The 2002-2005 agreement was a transition arrangement to maintain access while 
negotiations were ongoing within the EU over reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, 
which was finalised in 2002. The outcome of CFP reform in terms of Southern access 
agreements was much lauded by the EU as being a shift to ‘sustainability’ and 
‘partnership’, but as we saw in Chapter 4, critics saw this as mainly a change in form 
rather than content. Three major changes were apparent though. First, the EU-Seychelles 
FPA (2005-2011) ran for double the time period as prior ‘cash for access’ agreements, 
thereby giving the EU DWF even greater stability of resource access. Second, FPAs 
required an increased allocation to conditional funds for domestic fisheries management. 
Third, there was a small shift in the proportion of total payments made by boat owners, 
slightly reducing the direct EU subsidy. 
 
The major ‘gains’ in the 2005-11 FPA were that it provided for a larger maximum 
tonnage from 46,000 per annum (which had been in place since 1990) to 55,000mt, 
which meant that the basic EU financial compensation per ton grew from €75 to €90; and 
if Seychellois crew were not employed (which they largely had not been since 1983) boat 
owners would pay a daily fee of US$20 for two crew while in Seychelles waters. These 
two changes were touted as a negotiating victory by government (The Nation, 27 
September 2006). 
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Table 6.1: Financial components of EU-Seychelles access agreements, 1984-2011 
Period EU financial 
compensation 
Purse seine vessel-owner 
contribution 
Additional Funds Max number 
of vessels 
1984 – 
1987 
 
Ceiling of ECU 
3,000,000 for period 
of agreement. 
Minimum annual 
payment of ECU 
300,000 for  up to 
6,000 tons of tuna 
caught in EEZ  
ECU 120,000 advance payment 
by vessel owners per annum and 
ECU 20/ton of tuna caught in 
EEZ 
ECU 250,000 for 
scientific and 
technical programmes 
18 purse 
seiners. 
Provision for 
other types 
of vessels 
1987 – 
1990 
 
Minimum of ECU 
6,000,000 for period 
of agreement for 
catch up to 40,000 
tons of tuna per 
annum  
Annual ceiling of 
ECU 2,200,000  
ECU 20/ton of tuna caught in 
EEZ and ECU 5,000 advance 
payment per vessel licence per 
year (equivalent to fees for 
catch of 250 tons)  
 
Each vessel shall employ at 
least 2 Seychellois crew 
ECU 750,000 for 
scientific and 
technical programmes 
40 purse 
seiners. (22 
French and 18 
Spanish) 
Provision for 
other types 
of vessels. 
1990 – 
1993 
 
Fixed ECU 6,900,000 
for period of 
agreement for catch 
up to 46,000 tons of 
tuna per annum 
 
ECU 20/ton of tuna and ECU 
10,000 advance payment per 
vessel licence per year  
(equivalent to fees for catch of 
500 tons) 
 
Each vessel shall employ at 
least 2 Seychellois crew 
ECU 2,700,000 for 
scientific and technical 
programmes 
ECU 300,000 study grant 
and attendance at 
international 
meetings 
40 purse 
seiners 
Provision for 
other types 
of vessels 
 
1993 – 
1996 
 
Fixed ECU 6,900,000 
for period of 
agreement for catch 
up to 46,000 tons per 
annum 
 
ECU 20/ton of tuna and ECU 
5,000 advance payment per 
vessel licence per year 
(equivalent to fees for catch of 
250 tons)  
 
Each vessel shall employ at 
least 2 Seychellois crew 
ECU 2,700,000 for 
scientific and technical 
programmes 
ECU 300,000 study grant 
and attendance at 
international 
meetings 
40 purse 
seiners 
Provision for 
tuna trollers 
and surface 
longliners not 
exceeding 
18m  
1996 – 
1999 
 
Fixed ECU 6,900,000 
for period of 
agreement  for catch 
up to 46,000 tons per 
annum 
 
ECU 20/ton of tuna  and ECU 
7,500 advance payment per 
vessel licence per year 
(equivalent to fees for catch of 
375 tons)  
 
Each vessel shall employ at 
least 2 Seychellois crew 
ECU 2,700,000 for 
scientific and technical 
programmes 
ECU 300,000 study grant 
and attendance at 
international 
meetings 
 
42 purse 
seiners 
15 surface 
longliners 
not exceeding 
37m  
 
1999 – 
2002 
 
Fixed EUR 6,900,000 
for period of 
agreement for catch 
up to 46,000 tons of 
tuna per annum 
 
EUR 25/ton of tuna and EUR 
7,500 advance payment per 
vessel licence per year 
(equivalent to 300 tons of tuna) 
 
EUR 1,950,000 for 
scientific and 
technical programmes 
EUR 300,000 for study 
grant and attendance at 
international meetings. 
EUR 450,000 setting up of  
VMS/Satellite tracking 
system 
EUR 750,000 development 
fund for local long-line  
fleet 
47 purse 
seiners 
32 surface 
longliners 
not exceeding 
37m  
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Table 6.1 [cont.]: Financial components of EU-Seychelles access agreements, 1984-
2011  
Period EU financial 
compensation 
Purse seine vessel-owner 
contribution 
Additional Funds Max number 
of vessels 
2002 – 
2005 
Fixed EUR 3,460,000 
per annum for period 
of agreement 
for catch up to 46,000 
tons of tuna per 
annum. 
Of which EUR 
2,300,000 as 
‘financial 
compensation’, 
balance is conditional 
(column 3) 
 
 
 
EUR 25/ton of tuna and EUR 
10,000 advance payment per 
vessel licence per year 
(equivalent to 400 tons of 
tuna) 
 
Each vessel shall employ at 
least 2 Seychellois crew 
33.5% of funds conditional 
financing (total of EUR 
3,480,000 over period of 
agreement): 
(a) EUR 1,230,000 for the 
development of local 
fisheries; 
(b) EUR 1,000,000 for the 
setting up and development 
of a monitoring control and 
surveillance (MCS) system 
(c) EUR 950,000 for 
scientific and technical 
programmes aiming at 
greater knowledge of fish 
stocks; 
(d) EUR 300,000 for 
training courses in the 
various scientific, technical 
and economic fields linked 
to fishing and for attending 
international meetings. 
40 purse 
seiners 
27 longliners 
2005 – 
2011 
Fixed contribution of 
EUR 24,750,000 for 
term of agreement 
(average 4,950,000 
per annum) for catch 
up to 55,000 tons of 
tuna per annum. EUR 
75/ton paid for catch 
above this volume 
 
 
EUR 25/ton of tuna and EUR 
15,000 advance payment per 
vessel licence per year 
(equivalent to 600 tons of 
tuna) 
 
Each vessel shall employ at 
least 2 Seychellois crew. If no 
crew employed, $20 per day 
of vessel operating in 
Seychelles waters to be paid to 
government for purpose of 
training fisherman. 
 
36% of funds are conditional 
on financing ‘towards 
defining and implementing a 
sectoral fisheries policy in 
Seychelles with a view to 
promoting responsible 
fishing and sustainable 
fisheries in its waters’ 
40 purse 
seiners 
12 surface 
longliners 
Sources: EEC-Seychelles 1984; 1987; 1990; EC-Seychelles 1993; 1996; 1999; 2002; 2005. 
 
 
The financial commitments detailed in Table 6.1 give an indication of direct revenue 
generation from EU DWF access to the Seychelles EEZ. Access payments might be 
considered a component of the development effects of ‘upgrading’ in that the conditional 
funds are channelled to domestic fisheries development and the unconditional (non-
hypothecated) payments are channelled directly to the Ministry of Finance for 
government spending priorities. However, given that the EU and other fleets maintain 
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fishing access arrangements with various countries, the basic extraction of economic rent 
from resource access payments cannot be considered to be a form of ‘upgrading’ because 
it is universally available to – and extracted by – all governments that control fisheries 
abundant EEZs. Furthermore, calculating actual financial benefits to Seychelles from EU 
agreements is fraught with difficulty. While the central financial terms of the agreements 
have been public since the early 1990s,8 as noted in Chapter 4, the actual weighted value 
of payments for DWF in-EEZ catch is treated confidentially (Boullé 1995: 9). This is 
partly because disaggregated in-EEZ catch is not made publically available.  
 
A study commissioned by SFA included full access to catch and financial data, but the 
data and findings are confidential (Campling et al. 2009). Averaged over four years 
(2003-06) total payments (including vessel licences, EU compensation and additional 
tonnage payments) were equivalent to a ‘rate of return’ on the landed value of the catch 
of 7 percent. This was a reasonable rate of return compared to agreements by other fleets 
in other locations. For example, access to tuna-rich Pacific Island country EEZs by East 
Asian purse seine fleets was generally based on a rate of return of 5 to 6 percent of the 
landed value of the catch (Campling et al. 2009: 192). This corroborates the widely held 
perception of officials in coastal developing country governments that EU FPAs are more 
lucrative than access arrangements by most other fishing interests. It also indicates that 
SFA personnel have been effective in their negotiations with the EU. Senior Seychelles 
government officials have explicitly recognised the strategic role of the EEZ to the 
commercial reproduction of the EU DWF, and used this form of ‘territorial 
embeddedness’ (based on the environmental conditions of production) to their advantage 
(see Section 6.3 below). The relative success of Seychelles negotiators is recognised by 
officials from other coastal states who claim that they look to the terms of the most recent 
Seychelles-EU FPAs as a basis for their own positions on FPAs (IntFS#3; #4; SGvt#5). 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 The EU is the only government agency that makes the contracts of its fisheries access agreements with 
third countries public, although they did so only after pressure from NGOs and EU parliamentarians 
(Standing 2011). 
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Access arrangements for the ‘Seychelles’ purse seine fleet 
EU flagged vessels are highly regulated by the European Commission, ranging from 
labour standards to complex environmental requirements. The regulatory requirements 
associated with flags of convenience are less stringent and thus less costly to meet 
(Chapter 2). In addition, the European Commission allocates the EU DWF with a limited 
quota of vessel capacity (based on horse power/kw of engine) and a set amount of 
licences to boats under FPAs. The use of flags of convenience allows firms in the EU 
DWF to by-pass this quota to invest in additional capacity (SGvt#14).  
 
In 1997 onwards, several Spanish firms became registered under the Seychelles flag.9 
Aside from overcoming EU regulatory constraints, these boats accrued a number of 
additional benefits. The most important of these is discounted fishing licences 
(EUInd#40). The annual average ‘rate of return’ from licence fees paid by the Seychelles-
flagged, Spanish-owned purse seine fleet was 6 percent, also between 2003 and 2006 
(Campling et al. 2009: 192). In other words, the government captured 1 per cent less of 
the landed value of the catch compared to the French and Spanish-flagged EU DWF 
despite that these Spanish firms receive enhanced benefits from their Seychelles flag 
status. However, as these boats were not receiving subsidised access under an EU FPA, it 
is better to compare them with non-EU purse seiners. But even here the Seychelles-
flagged boats received a 33 percent discount compared to considerably smaller purse 
seiners flagged by Thailand. In addition, despite being based locally, firms in the 
Seychelles-flagged fleet do not pay import or business taxes because they are 
incorporated in the SITZ (EUInd#51; #52). 
 
How can we explain the discounting of licences to Seychelles-flagged purse seiners?  
Two main points bear consideration. First, the major benefit to Seychelles is if the Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission shifts to a quota based system in the allocation of fishing rights 
based upon historical catch volumes. This approach is used by other regional fisheries 
management organisations (RFMOs) such as the Western Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC). If IOTC shifts to this system, Seychelles-flagged purse seiners 
                                                 
9 See Section 2.5 and Appendix 2D for details on the firms that use it. 
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(and East Asian-owned longliners flagged by Seychelles) will provide a substantial quota 
allocation to Seychelles based on catch by ‘home’ flagged vessels. Second, once a vessel 
has taken on a non-EU flag it is more difficult to re-flag back to the EU (EUGvt#15; 
SGvt#43). This means that Seychelles-flagged vessels are, at least temporarily, ‘captive’ 
to the WIO and thus a steadier source of licence revenue and, moreover, purchaser of 
domestic goods and services in Port Victoria (see below).10  
 
 
6.2.3 From Conserveries de l’Océan Indien to Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd, 
1987-2009 
 
Chapter 3 detailed the international division of labour in the EU-centred commodity 
chain in canned tuna, including the historical importance of relatively low cost 
production in West Africa in supplying the French market from the 1950s.  Chapter 5 
demonstrated that ACP trade preferences (and French colonial policy before it) were an 
important competitive advantage for tuna processing firms based in several coastal ACP 
states. Trade preferences appear to play an even more crucial role in the competitiveness 
of tuna processing in small island developing states because of their comparatively high 
cost structures (Campling 2008a; Campling and Doherty 2007; Campling and Havice 
2007; Winters and Martin 2004). In this context, this section describes Seychelles 
industrial upgrading into canned tuna processing from 1987 to the late 2000s. Seychelles 
has only ever hosted one tuna cannery, but it went from being a small, globally 
insignificant plant to the second largest in the world. This section identifies changes over 
time in terms of the main players, their types and levels of investment, the role of 
Seychelles government policy, and different export strategies by firms. 
 
Conserveries de l’Océan Indien (COI), 1987-1995 
The small manufacturing sector in the Seychelles was historically focused on the tiny 
domestic market. In the mid-1980s, observers found it ‘difficult to imagine penetration of 
                                                 
10 Similarly, in order to fish in the jurisdiction of a different RFMO than IOTC, the vessel must, in 
principle, fly the flag of a Member of the RFMO in question. In this context, changing flag can be a costly 
and time consuming process and is thus a disincentive to Seychelles-flagged vessels for leaving the WIO.  
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external markets in the foreseeable future’; not least because of the large increase in the 
minimum wage in 1979 and revaluation of the rupee (by 15 percent) in 1981, which gave 
‘industry a cost structure well above that of its rivals’ (Driesen 1988b: 167; EIU 1986: 
45). René recognised the failure of SPPF plans to spark industrial development in his 
1986 budget announcement: ‘Unfortunately Government measures to encourage 
industrial development have not had far reaching results’ and employment in the sector 
totalled only around 1,300 jobs (René 1985: 12).  
 
Seychelles support to the operations of the EU DWF through the public provision of port 
investment and vessel services generated a steady source of potential raw material supply 
for tuna processing investment in Port Victoria. However, given the lack of domestic 
processing capacity, French and Spanish purse seine catch was all transhipped, including 
to supply the cannery markets: in West Africa (Dakar and Abidjan) – which needed EU-
caught tuna in order to meet preferential rules of origin; EU-based processors in France, 
Italy and Spain; and Puerto Rico, Thailand and the USA (Marcille 1987: 42; Iverson 
1987b: 11; Chapters 3 and 5). Compared to industrial fishing activities, the canning of 
tuna was a more commercially viable and developmentally strategic option for upgrading 
in Seychelles. This is for two reasons. First, it was recognised by the government that 
European and other firms in the industrial fishing node were (and are) highly capitalised 
and heavily subsidised and thus hard to compete with (Nageon de Lestang 1986: 18; 
Chapter 4), and second, that the labour-intensive process of canned tuna manufacture 
offered a major source of employment which would allow Seychelles to diversify its 
export-orientated economy away from dependence on tourism (René 1983: 2).11  
 
A 1981 consultancy report had identified tuna as the only viable fish species to supply the 
setting-up of canning facilities in Seychelles, and even then only ‘if a recognised 
company with well developed marketing identity and facilities could be attracted’ 
                                                 
11 The tourism sector emerged rapidly from 1971 with the opening of the international airport. The sole 
prior export-orientated sector in this small island economy was agriculture (especially copra), which 
collapsed through the 1970s (Campling et al. 2011: 9-11, 16-17). 
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(NEDECO, Arup and Ascon 1981: 13).12 Given the concentration of ownership in the 
branded-manufacturing node of the global commodity chain, this was probably good 
advice. The Seychelles government could not act alone to develop a marketable brand in 
increasingly concentrated EU markets or provide the associated assurance of sufficient 
supply of product from additional oceanic regions to meet the purchasing demands of 
brands or supermarkets (see Section 3.4.1 on the ‘global ocean’ strategy).13 
 
Investment in canning first came in the form of a joint-venture among the government, 
Pêcheurs de France – one of the original ‘big three’ French manufacturers (see Chapters 2 
and 3) – and a minor French fishing firm, Armement Coopératif Finistèrien (ACF) 
(Nageon de Lestang and Leblache 1989). The joint venture enterprise was called 
Conserveries de l’Océan Indien (COI) and the Seychelles government was majority 
shareholder. At that time Pêcheurs de France was moving its canned tuna production out 
of France, but still wanted to produce for the French market ‘which had a high price’ at 
retail (EUInd#61). Pêcheurs de France provided foreign marketing expertise, ACF two 
dedicated seiners (René 1986: 4; EIU 1986: 43), and government contributed land and 
constructed the factory at a cost of Rs.45 million. The latter was 50 percent funded by a 
loan from the Caisse Centrale de Coopération Economique (EIU 1987a: 44), again 
demonstrating the role of the French state in expanding the commodity frontiers of the 
EU-centred commodity chain (see Chapters 2, 4 and 5). The institutional conditions for 
this investment were provided on a discretionary basis (Boullé 1995: 7) in negotiations 
led by René, Glenny Savy and Vice President James Michel on the government side 
(SGvt#5; #8).14 
 
                                                 
12 The same report also correctly noted that the processing of by-product into animal feed (fish meal) and 
fish oil was an economically promising avenue (NEDECO, Arup and Ascon 1981: 13). Early fish 
processing in Seychelles was undertaken by parastatals. Frozen steaks and other prepared fish products 
were processed in a small plant (FAO/AfDB 1983: 10) and there was also discussion on setting-up a 
katsuobushi plant to supply the Japanese market (Matthews 1981/2; NORPLAN 1981: 39). 
13 Although some firms, such as the parastatal Mifco cannery in the Maldives, successfully developed 
processing facilities independently of multinational involvement (AInd#9).  
14 Seychelles did not have an investment code at the time, despite a call for one from domestic private 
sector employers and the Central Bank (EIU 1986: 54) 
269
The COI factory opened in June 1987. It was a comparatively small plant, employing 450 
workers and with capacity to process 8,000 tonnes of raw material into canned tuna 
(René 1986: 49). As with the canneries in West Africa and Madagascar (Chapters 2 and 
3), COI was established primarily to supply the France-centred commodity chain. It also 
eventually became a non-branded manufacturer of private label canned tuna for UK 
supermarkets, including Tesco, Morrison’s and Safeway. But as a marginal player in the 
global commodity chain, COI was a price taker and buyers would routinely negotiate on 
a dropped down price that took into account commercial gains from the 24 percent 
margin of preference (EUInd#61). 
 
COI experienced similar problems of unequal bargaining power in its commercial 
relations with the EU DWF. In anticipation of the completion of the plant, the 
government attempted to lock the EU DWF into supplying the factory in negotiations on 
the terms of the 1987-1990 access arrangement (EEC-Seychelles 1986: 7). The text 
agreed at this meeting appeared verbatim in the legal agreement: 
Community tuna vessels shall participate in securing the need of the 
Seychellois tuna canning industry at a price to be fixed in common 
agreement between the Community shipowners and the Seychelles Fishing 
Authority on the bases of current international prices. The amount must be 
paid in convertible currency [a recognition of the monetary and financial 
problems facing Seychelles as early as the mid-1980s]. (EEC-Seychelles 
1987: Annex I, Art. 5; see also Michaud 1990: 4). 
Despite this legal commitment and that Port Victoria was by now one the world’s major 
tuna transhipment hubs, COI sometimes suffered a lack of raw material (EUInd#61; 
SGvt#5). The firm’s negotiating clout was weakened by the relatively small volumes of 
tuna purchased from boats – a reversal of the market power of large manufacturers vis-à-
vis fleets detailed in Chapters 2 and 3. COI rarely hit its production capacity and thus 
failed to consistently process the volumes necessary to make margins. This resulted in it 
sometimes exporting canned tuna below cost, losing around US$3-5 million per year, and 
being supported by ‘heavy government subsidies’ (EUInd#6; #61). On top of this, by the 
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early 1990s, Pêcheurs de France’s canned tuna brand was being squeezed out of the 
increasingly concentrated French market. 
 
 
Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd (IOT), 1995-2009 
In these conditions of business failure, Heinz purchased COI in 1995 in a 60:40 joint-
venture agreement with the Seychelles government. Like Pêcheurs de France, the two 
most important competitive conditions for Heinz investment in canned tuna 
manufacturing in Seychelles were the ACP trade preference and the large local 
availability of tuna raw material that is compliant with EU rules of origin. Unlike COI, 
which was ‘a price taker’ in ‘buying fish and selling cans’ (EUInd#61), Heinz European 
Seafood’s effective control of the Cobrecaf fishing fleet from 1994 to 2006 provided 
security of supply for its EU-centred ‘global ocean’ strategy (see Section 3.4). This  
made a big difference as it allowed [IOT managers] to focus on production 
and development. ... Heinz was making bulk purchases [of tuna] for 
Portugal, France, Seychelles and Ghana ... it had a lot of clout with vessel 
owners (EUInd#61).  
Heinz was also motivated by the ability to gain from freight savings. By situating a 
cannery in Seychelles IOT could buy directly from the EU DWF, which allowed it to 
‘offer a lower price on fish but still be competitive. It gives the fob price plus a 
percentage of the cif, but not the full price’ (EUGvt#15). In other words, because IOT 
had a relatively captive market in the Western Indian Ocean, it is estimated that the 
difference between the annual average Port Victoria price for skipjack was US$ 40-50 
per ton lower than the Bangkok equivalent (EUInd#7; TInd#5–#7), this is over and above 
insurance and freight costs, and possible quality and rule of origin price premiums 
demanded by the EU DWF (EUInd#49; see Chapter 5) as there is ‘a 180 to 200 dollar 
increase for Bangkok just to get the fish there’ (EUInd#7). This entails an important 
symbiosis between IOT and the EU DWF landing in Seychelles because the EU DWF 
obtains a better average price than transhipping to Bangkok (EUInd#54), while IOT 
benefits from a lower average price than its competitors in Bangkok . In addition, the Port 
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Louis price for canning-grade tuna is around US$ 100 per ton higher than in Port Victoria 
because of the costs incurred in transhipping the fish from Seychelles to Mauritius and 
because the Princes Tuna Mauritius cannery only purchases single species (skipjack) 
which slows down offloading from the boat (EUInd#7; EUInd#50; Bruneau 2006). As 
one MW Brands representative put it: 
To be competitive we buy as much [tuna] as we can and try to pay the 
‘right’ price to get the fish. We buy from boats, not reefers. Our big 
advantage is that we process all species so we’re able to buy the full cargo 
of all the boat. Our competitors specialise in one species [e.g. Princes]. So 
it’s quicker and easier for vessels to deal with us: one invoice, one crew 
check, they just sort the species composition for relative pricing. All 
negotiations are done at sea at one week to a few hours before offloading. 
(EUInd#7) 
The complete lack of independently owned cold storage in Port Victoria, mean that IOT 
held a highly strategic position (see 6.4.1). In short, IOT benefits from its location and the 
associated differential between the directly landed and the transhipped price, which 
includes reefer and insurance costs (the fob-cif differential).15 IOT was able to attract 
boat owners by offering a price that was slightly higher than the landed price, but its raw 
material costs were lower than competing canneries because it did not incur the same 
costs for reefer transhipment and insurance. Even Spain-based buyers use the IOT price 
as a guide: ‘It’s very important, everyone depends on IOT’ (EUInd#51; #52). 
 
Additional major conditions for Heinz in its investment were the creation of a legally 
secure environment and the reduction of avoidable costs. These conditions directly 
influenced the SPPF regime to institutionalise the Seychelles International Trade Zone in 
1995 (noted earlier). The creation of the SITZ provided a wide range of exemptions and a 
legal-institutional basis to mitigate investment risks (e.g. around any concerns that the 
                                                 
15 This is a fairly common practice in the procurement strategies of canneries located close to rich tuna 
fishing grounds. For example, Starkist pioneered this strategy in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean at 
its American Samoa-based cannery, i.e. Starkist paid the US purse seine fleet and Taiwanese longline fleet 
a lower price than that received in Bangkok based upon the fob-cif differential (USInd#5; #10; #11). 
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factory might be nationalised) (SITZ 1995; SITZ 1997).16 The tuna factory remained the 
largest player benefitting from SITZ terms throughout the 2000s and beyond, and by a 
very large margin.  
 
Heinz invested US$ 45 million to upgrade the COI factory between 1997 and 1999 
(SGvt#1; EUInd#6). The so-called ‘Diamond Project’ expanded the production line and 
moved it from a single shift operation to three shifts (two for production and one for 
cleaning). This brought daily raw material processing capacity up from 60mt per day 
under COI to a daily peak of 440mt per day by 2000 (EUInd#6; #61).17 This expansion in 
productive capacity allowed for a diversification of the product range and target markets. 
Unlike COI’s France-centred production, IOT manufactured canned tuna for several 
other markets as well. From the Seychelles government’s perspective, Heinz was a 
‘preferable partner’ precisely because of its forward integration into major canned tuna 
brands in the UK, France and Italy, as well as supplying private label to these markets 
and Germany and the Netherlands (EUInd#49; #61). By applying a similar strategy as its 
US-centred cannery in American Samoa, Heinz had transformed Seychelles’ relative cost 
disadvantages by building ‘economies of scale and the spreading of overhead costs’ 
(COS 2001: 17). The rapid success of the Diamond Project is reflected in the exponential 
growth of IOT’s canned tuna production in value and volume in the late 1990s (Figure 
6.2). As detailed in Chapter 3, in 2006 Heinz European Seafood was bought by an 
investment fund controlled by Lehman Brothers and was renamed MW Brands. The deal 
included Heinz’ 60 percent share of IOT, and the Seychelles government continued to 
retain the other 40 percent. This leveraged buyout had no major impacts on IOT 
production. On the surface, the success of IOT served to justify René’s long-held belief in 
the potential of industrial upgrading in the tuna sector for diversifying the economy and 
generating employment, to which we now turn. 
 
  
                                                 
16 Here Seychelles was mirroring the tendency to the creation of export processing zones in countries across 
the planet, including in the small island developing states of the Caribbean from the mid-1980s (Heron 
2004). 
17 Before this investment IOT management apparently pushed the same plant used by COI to 150mt per day 
(EUInd#6). 
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Figure 6.2: Seychelles production of canned tuna in volume and value, 1987-2005 
 
 
Notes: 1) production in 1987 began mid-year; 2) only a tiny percentage of production was consumed 
locally; 3) export value for 2005 is provisional. 
Source: SFA Annual Report (various years); CBS Annual Report (various years); MISD Statistical Abstract 
(various years)  
 
 
6.2.4 Upgrading, government revenue and employment 
 
From the outset of the purse seine fishery the Seychelles government placed heavy 
emphasis on direct revenue generation from fishing access agreements (e.g. Table 6.1) 
and taxing vessels and their activities. For example, tuna transhipment was (and is) 
required to take place in Port Victoria so as to ensure the correct application of transfer 
fees (Plows 1982: 11). It was quickly recognised that indirect revenue was economically 
more significant (René 1986: 3). While total direct revenue from access arrangements 
was US$ 4 million in 1985 (including the costs of collection), indirect benefits after 
import leakage totalled an estimated US$ 9 million and included expenditure by vessels 
on bunkering, chandlery and other ship services (Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 179; for 
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similar estimates for different years in the 1980s see EIU 1987b: 42 and Nageon de 
Lestang and Leblache 1989: 6) 
 
The SPPF regime’s primary objective in upgrading into the canned tuna industry was to 
reduce reliance on tourism as the principal pillar of the economy (Adams and Rassool 
1990: 105). Between 1992 and 2001 the contribution to GDP from the tourism sector was 
a fairly stable annual average of around 16 percent. However, this was in the context of 
an absolute increase in visitor arrivals from 98,500 in 1992 to 129,800 in 2001 (MISD 
1995; 2001). This relative reduction in tourism’s contribution to GDP can be explained 
by the parallel rise in the contribution of the tuna fishing and processing sectors.  In 2002, 
the gross foreign exchange inflow of fisheries and related activities amounted to Rs. 1.2 
billion, or US$ 232 million, which was 48 percent higher than gross inflows from tourism 
(SFA 2002: 8-9; Seychelles Today 2000). Of this value, the activities of IOT contributed  
direct inflows of foreign exchange of around 35 million euros each year 
that is converted into Seychelles rupees. That is, the buying of utilities, 
flows through the Central Bank, salaries, etc. ... This 35 million euros in 
cash coming through [but not necessarily staying! See below] excludes 
spin-offs and multiplier effects through rents, etc. (SGvt#1) 
Heinz had used its far superior financial resources, backward integration into the tuna 
fishing node and ready access to major EU markets to transform tuna processing into a 
second pillar of Seychelles export-orientated economy. In 2007, when IOT had been 
controlled by Lehman Brothers for a year, canned tuna accounted for 91.4 percent in 
value of all Seychelles goods exports (CBS 2008: 49). IOT had become one of the largest 
tuna canneries in the world and in 2005 it supplied over 14 percent of the EU market for 
canned tuna imports (Valsecchi 2006). (IOT also provides an annual dividend to 
shareholders, discussed in Section 6.4.1) 
 
275
However, given that Seychelles imports almost everything that it consumes,18 these 
headline figures conceal a high proportion of import leakage and, as we shall see in 
Section 6.4, government subsidies to IOT. For example, in 2006, which was the highest 
year of foreign fishing vessel expenditure in Port Victoria in the 2000s (Rs. 865 million), 
the largest item was bunkering at 75 percent (SFA database). Gasoil is all imported by 
SEPEC and was bunkered duty-free, thereby only generating SEPEC’s margin (which 
was used to cross-subsidise oil costs to the rest of the economy), its tax payments and the 
employment of around 40 fisheries-related staff engaged in this activity (Table 6.2; 
SVS#14).19 In addition, IOT exports are based on imported fish, machinery, cans, 
packing media (e.g. vegetable and olive oil), and packaging, and, as we shall shortly see, 
even 40 percent of the workforce is ‘imported’. 
 
A more tangible benefit of Seychelles upgrading is direct and indirect employment 
generation. Based on interviews in 2009, it is estimated that around 3,320 people were 
employed fulltime as a direct or indirect result of Seychelles interactions with the EU-
centred commodity chain in canned tuna (Table 6.2).20 These jobs totalled around 8 
percent of the total formal workforce in Seychelles (41,891 in 2009; National Statistics 
Bureau 2010). More specifically, private sector ‘production’ and ‘services’ employment 
in the tuna-related economy (3,160 in 2009, see Table 6.2) was over 11 percent of total 
private sector employment in the country (27,721 in 2009; National Statistics Bureau 
2010). This employment is centred on the Port Victoria and IOT production networks. 
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 map the input-output structure of these two production networks in 
2009. Here we use production ‘network’ as opposed to commodity ‘chain’ because the 
emphasis is on the horizontal and diagonal linkages of the fishing and manufacturing 
nodes with the domestic Seychelles economy (‘spin-off’ benefits) as opposed to the 
                                                 
18 Seychelles imports around 90 percent of its consumption. This has contributed to a consistently negative 
balance of trade throughout most of the country’s history. In the period 1992–2001 Seychelles suffered an 
average annual balance of trade deficit of Rs. 976 million, or roughly Rs. 12,000 per capita (authors’ 
calculations based upon MISD 2002; 2003). 
19 For detailed discussions of foreign exchange retention/ import leakage in Seychelles tuna-related 
economy, see Parker (1986), Kasprzyk (1994), SFA (1996) and Campling et al. (2009). 
20 Kasprzyk (1994) estimated that 1,166 people were employed in the fisheries-related economy in 
Seychelles in the early 1990s. Between 1983 and 1985, around 350 new local jobs were generated around 
the activities of foreign tuna fleets (EIU 1987a: 44; see also Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 179). 
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emphasis on vertical and horizontal relationships among firms in Chapters 2 and 3 (see 
the discussion of the GPN approach in Section 1.1.2).  
 
Canned tuna processing is the most important component of Seychelles upgrading in 
terms of employment with 72 percent of tuna-related workers employed at IOT and 
Impress (a can making factory attached to IOT). IOT employs over 2,300 (mainly 
female) workers, primarily in the labour-intensive process of cooking and loining the 
fish. MW Brands (and Heinz before it) uses migrant workers for around 40 percent of its 
labour force, including, at various times, from Kenya, Madagascar and Thailand. 
Expatriate workers are especially important to IOT’s nightshift as Seychellois women 
play a pivotal role as care givers as reflected in the high prevalence of women-headed 
households in Seychelles (EUInd#49; #50; Campling et al. 2011: 91).  
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Table 6.2: Estimated full-time equivalent employment in the Port Victoria and IOT 
production networks, 2009 
Category of 
activity  
Activity (firm/agency) Number of 
employees* 
Private sector 
production** 
Canned tuna production (IOT seychellois) 1,320 
Canned tuna production (IOT expatriate) 1,000 
Can production (Impress) 76 
FAD manufacture 5 
Private sector 
services 
Stevedoring (Hunt, Deltel & Co, Landmarine) 600 
Net repair (Bernard Toulon, CASAMAR) 63 
Vessel agents and locally-based EU DWF representatives 
(Aquarius Shipping Agency, CMB, Echebastar/ Hartswater, Mahé 
Shipping, misc. other) 
35 
Fish inspection and quality control (Société de Contrôle 
d’Expertise Maritime et Pêche (SOCOMEP)) 
24 
Chandlery (Chandler 99, Southern Ocean Ship Chandlers) 18 
Vessel engineering and repair (Marine and Engineering Works 
(Marzocchi), Naval Services (1994) Ltd, Seychelles Electronic 
Maritime Co. Ltd (SEYCMI)) 
19 
Government/ 
parastatal 
services 
Bunkering (SEPEC) 40 
Fish inspection and quality control (Fish Inspection Unit/ 
Competent Authority, Seychelles Bureau of Standards) 
16 
Crew transfers (Air Seychelles) 3 
Government/ 
parastatal 
regulation 
Various activities (Seychelles Port Authority) 70 
Various activities (Seychelles Fishing Authority) 25 
Various activities (Seychelles Coastguard) 10 
Total  3,324 
Source: Multiple interviews in 2006 and 2009, Seychelles.  
* Employment is counted based upon actual or estimated full-time equivalent. The Port Victoria production 
network only includes those employed directly in the industrial tuna sector (see Figure 6.3). 
** This excludes the local,  high-value fish exporting firms Oceana Fisheries and Sea Harvest which both 
procure small volumes of high-quality bycatch from the EU DWF that is stored by crew in their food 
freezers (i.e. not in brine in the hold). This is then processed and sold locally or to export markets, mainly 
the EU. 
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 Figure 6.3: Port Victoria tuna production network 
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 Figure 6.4: IOT production network 
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René had correctly identified stevedoring as a major source of potential employment in 
Seychelles upgrading in the commodity chain (1983: 23). In 2009 stevedoring for the EU 
DWF was the second largest source of direct employment, with 18 percent of the total 
(Table 6.2), and unlike IOT all of these jobs employ locals. Of total foreign fishing vessel 
expenditure in 2006, stevedoring was 9 percent. Total expenditure without fuel was 
around Rs. 108 million of which stevedoring constituted almost 54 percent (SFA 
database).21  In addition, given that around 60-65 percent of shipping inflows to 
Seychelles are containers for IOT and over 90 percent of national exports are from this 
firm, IOT supports ‘a huge network of services’ and employment in the Commercial Port, 
including non-fisheries stevedoring (SVS#4; #5; #13; #15; #16).22 Compared to canned 
tuna processing and stevedoring other sources of employment are secondary and are 
mainly in specialised vessel services such as net and vessel repair, chandlery, and fish 
quality control. However, the political economy of Seychelles upgrading is more 
complex and ambiguous than this overview of the domestic benefits of revenue and 
employment generation suggests. The next two sections examine the unequal political 
relationships between the Seychelles government and the EU and its distant water fleet 
(6.3) and between the government and Heinz/MW Brands (6.4), and argue that these 
political dynamics provide a fuller story of the extent to which Seychelles benefits from 
‘upgrading’ in the commodity chain. 
 
 
6.3 The Politics of the Fishery 
 
Chapter 1’s discussion of ‘institutional context’ in the GCC framework introduced the 
concept of territorial embeddedness,  the ‘anchoring’ of firms in different places and at 
different scales (Henderson et al. 2002: 452). It argued that major lacunae in commodity 
studies are sufficient recognition of and explicit empirical attention to the roles both of 
                                                 
21 It is worth noting that, as a further reflection of the distinction between the French and Spanish ‘national 
production systems’ (Section 2.3.2), national fleets have exclusive contracts with different stevedoring 
firms in Seychelles (the French use Landmarine and the Spanish Hunt Deltel, see Figure 6.3). 
22 These volumes also mean that Seychelles benefits from more regular visits from container vessels 
(otherwise it would only be on a minor and more expensive feeder route for container shipping), which has 
wider benefits to the economy in terms of the frequency and price of movement of other goods to and from 
the country (SVS#15; #16). 
281
unequal political power among states and firms and of domestic political economy in 
shaping relations and dynamics in commodity chains. The remainder of this chapter 
investigates these analytical concerns through the case of Seychelles. In this section we 
examine three aspects of the dynamics between the EU DWF and Seychelles: the 
relationship between environmental conditions of production and competition from other 
ports and canneries in the WIO region; non-linear shifts in Seychelles relative negotiation 
position and tactics with the EU DWF in the context of Seychelles’ domestic political 
economy; and (ultimately unsuccessful) challenges to European dominance of the WIO 
purse seine fishery by other foreign fleets and by independent coastal states. This and the 
next section (on the politics of the cannery) demonstrate that social embeddedness, 
political asymmetry and domestic politics matter to the analysis of commodity chains, not 
only in terms of the shaping of chain activities and linkages23 but also to the potential for 
local economies to ‘upgrade’ and the contingent role of  local elites. 
 
 
6.3.1  Environment conditions of production and regional competition 
 
The geographical importance of Seychelles to the business strategies of the EU DWF has 
been clearly established in this thesis. Yet a common perception of Seychelles 
government officials in the 1980s – encouraged by the representatives of vessel owners – 
was that the socio-economic benefits from vessel activity in Port Victoria ‘could be lost 
overnight by licensed boats moving to other ports’ (Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 179; 
Michaud 1986: 5). Material context for this concern were declines in world tuna prices in 
1987 and the associated (temporary) re-emergence of the Eastern Atlantic as ‘a cheaper 
and more attractive fishing ground for European based operators’ because of the shorter 
steaming days to fishing grounds and lower freight costs for transporting tuna and vessel 
supplies (EIU 1987a: 44; Marcille 1987: 45). This and similar temporary shifts in the 
1990s (Bargain 1998; Chaudron 1992) led to drops in Seychelles licence fee and vessel 
expenditure revenue and probably served to re-affirm the fear that the sector might shift 
                                                 
23 As argued in Chapter 1, firms behave differently in relation to different places and scales and adjust their 
business strategies and day-to-day operations in relation to national government policies, local labour 
regimes, and the broader dynamics of the domestic political economy. 
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to competing locations as quickly as it had arrived in Port Victoria. In short, that the 
fleet’s home port would move with the fish. 
 
The seasonality of the fishery, variations in tuna movements between years and the 
warming effects of El Niño events have each resulted in the EU DWF using different 
Indian Ocean ports for transhipment/ landing at different times (COWIconsult 1988: 7; 
Lawson et al 1986: 11; Marcille 1987: 42; Nageon de Lestang 1988a: 179). By the mid-
1980s observers noted that the period mid-April to mid-June saw tuna populations move 
to the Mozambique Channel (see Figure 2.3). This seasonal shift in migration patterns 
made Diego Suarez, Madagascar a more profitable port for landing/transhipment because 
of the significant reduction in steaming days to offload compared to Port Victoria (Parker 
1986: 4; Marsac 1988). But this movement in the Mozambique Channel was not a 
constant, and in some years, such as 1994, catch rates were higher in the Seychelles EEZ 
with positive implications for increased vessel expenditure in Victoria (SFA 1996: 3).  
Moreover, a particularly strong oceanic warming event in 1997-98 caused by the El Niño 
Southern Oscillation meant that tuna migrated eastwards, with many vessels shifting their 
base of operations to Phuket, Thailand. While this effect was only temporary, reduced 
fishing vessel activity in Port Victoria resulted in a 40 percent loss to the Seychelles 
economy compared to normal fishing years (Robinson et al. 2010). Policy decisions and 
investment in Mauritius in the early 2000s raised the spectre of the EU DWF shifting its 
base there. These included the construction of a dry dock suitable for purse seiner repairs 
and the creation of the Mauritius Seafood Hub which offered a range of incentives for 
fisheries-based investment (Barnes and Campling 2008; Bruneau 2006). Similarly, in the 
mid-2000s, the Spanish fleet commissioned a Seychelles firm to investigate whether Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania was a viable alternative to Port Victoria. The results were 
considered confidential, but it ‘could be a real threat ... the infrastructure is there and 
labour is very cheap’ (SVS#15; #16). This information may have been used by the EU 
DWF to extract additional concessions from the Seychelles government (6.3.2).  
 
These dynamics serve to illustrate the highly competitive struggle by regional states to 
‘anchor’ the EU DWF and also the vagaries of economic reliance on tuna fisheries in the 
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face of cyclical and ‘structural’ environmental change, such as El Niño events and 
anthropogenic climate change (e.g. Bell et al. 2011; Brander 2010).  For some, the 
emerging ‘threat’ from Port Louis was seen as a particularly virulent challenge to tuna-
based foreign exchange receipts in Seychelles (The Nation 17 September 2004; Nageon 
de Lestang 2004; SVS#8). In 2005 Mauritius increased its tuna processing capacity with 
the opening of a new loining and canning plant called Thon des Mascareignes (TDM), 
which specialises in processing yellowfin for the EU market and albacore loins for 
processing in the US (USInd#5; #10; #11). Combined with the introduction of additional 
cold storage under the new Seafood Hub and with Princes Tuna Mauritius (PTM) 
opening a new, expanded factory in 1999,  Mauritius became ‘the largest collection point 
in the Indian Ocean with around 100,000 tonnes of whole tuna processed per annum’ 
(EUInd#34; Appendix 3D). In addition to reefers controlled by the EU DWF (Chapter 
2),24 the transhipment of fish to Mauritius was supplied by two reefers controlled by PTM 
and one by TDM, each dedicated to collecting tuna from the EU DWF in Port Victoria 
(EUInd #34; #40; #51; #52). PTM and TDM also receive direct supply from the EU 
DWF when (mainly French) vessels use the Port Louis dry dock (Chantier Naval de 
l’Ocean Indien) which provides up to 10 percent of PTM’s annual raw material supply 
(EUInd#34).  
 
PTM was at a disadvantage in price negotiations with the EU DWF because it processes 
only skipjack for its principal canned tuna markets in the UK and the Netherlands. This is 
in contrast to IOT which is able to buy a boat’s entire catch as it processes mixed species 
to supply its main markets in the UK, France and Italy, and could thus negotiate a lower 
price from boat owners as selling to IOT sped-up the vessel’s turnaround time in port 
(EUInd#7). However, with expanded strategic cold storage of over 17,000mt,25 PTM was 
able to gain ‘synergistic benefits’ with TDM, including the procurement of ‘mixed loads’ 
from the EU DWF (skipjack for PTM and yellowfin for TDM), and ‘as [independent] 
                                                 
24 With a 25 percent share in TDM, the Spanish fishing firm Echebastar is the only ANABAC member with 
investment in processing (Chapter 2) and as a result sends the majority of its catch to Mauritius (EUInd#40; 
#41). This again highlights the importance of types of ownership and industrial organisation in the fishing 
node to the direction of movement of raw material. 
25 Tuna processors in Mauritius benefit from the availability of 11,500mt of cold storage supplied by Froid 
des Mascareignes and 6,000mt offered by Mauritius Freeport Development (Barnes and Campling 2008). 
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cold storage is fairly poor in Seychelles’, the EU DWF ‘keep reefers bobbing around to 
get a better price during the low season’ (EUInd#35). In short, the value of IOT’s fob-cif 
differential declined, especially from 2006 onwards, because EU vessel owners now also 
had large volume and mixed species buyers in Mauritius (EUInd#35). As one interviewee 
put it in 2007: 
The European fleet used to dump fish in Seychelles, so the price was low. 
But now there’s an option. IOT has lost some control in fish price 
negotiations with the fleet. (EUInd#34)  
Several representatives of the EU DWF concurred in interviews in 2009: ‘We prefer to 
offload to their [PTM and TDM] reefers wherever we can’ (EUInd#38; #39), and; ‘The 
IOT price is too low and there’s a good price in Mauritius, despite cif costs’ (EUInd#40; 
#41). In addition to regional competition, catch declines in the Western Indian Ocean in 
2007 induced by a combination of ecological limits to the yellowfin fishery and the 
impacts of Somali piracy (Chapters 2 and 4) resulted in an increase in price and a struggle 
over supply. PTM and TDM responded by paying higher raw material prices than IOT 
and were thus able to increase canned tuna production while it declined in Seychelles.  
This meant that IOT’s price advantage relative to world-leading processors in Bangkok 
was also reduced. As we saw in Chapter 3, MW Brands’ response to the decline of its 
competitiveness on fish price in the WIO was to increase production volumes at its other 
cannery in Ghana, which increased its exports to the EU between 2006 and 2009.  
 
Despite this shift in relative buying power, IOT remained a major player and continued to 
take advantage of its strategic position. This was made clear by EU DWF representatives 
in an interview in 2010: ‘If the fleet has no logistical alternative, such as when PTM 
reefers aren’t in Port Victoria, then IOT buys. It’s very aggressive when the fleet has no 
alternative’ (EUInd#17–#20). Moreover, labour productivity in Port Victoria is 
comparatively high, contributing to ‘anchoring’ the purse seine fleet there. Industry 
representatives estimated that the average offloading ratio by stevedores in Seychelles 
was around 80mt per day in the mid-1980s, but had grown to 300mt per day in 2006, and 
up to 700mt for the newer ships which use an offloading mechanism based on mobile 
conveyor belts (EUInd#51; #52; direct observation, Port Victoria, 2006, and Yaizu, 
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Japan, 2006). This indicates that, over time, Seychelles also benefitted from the 
‘upgrading’ of skill and expertise among the fisheries-related labour force (e.g. 
Appleyard and Ghosh 1990: xv). Competing ports such as Dar es Salaam are reportedly 
able to achieve similar offloading speeds but using double the number of stevedores, 
albeit at half the cost (SVS#15; #16).  
 
Similarly, the ‘threat’ from the Mauritius Seafood Hub should not be overplayed. As one 
Seychelles government official put it, the perception of regional port competition from 
‘Mauritius is a blessing in disguise, if it wasn’t for us believing it was an “enemy”, we 
would’ve sat on our arses’ (SGvt#14). When asked whether Port Louis is too far from the 
centre of purse seine fishing grounds to offer a commercially viable alternative for the 
EU DWF, the same official agreed and pointed out that ‘the Minister [had] said, “let them 
believe it”’.26  This moment coincided with a change in presidency in 2004 from René, 
after 27 years in power, to James Michel who placed greater political emphasis on the 
tuna-related economy (SGvt#27). Michel’s response to the perception of heightened 
regional competition was to establish a public-private sector Task Force in 2004 to 
prepare a ‘master plan’ to develop the Industrial Port ‘to encourage shipowners not only 
to continue using Port Victoria but to increase their activities’ (Task Force 2004: 4). The 
Task Force’s central recommendation was to construct additional quay space to improve 
the turnaround time of the EU DWF which often hit a bottle neck at the Industrial Port. 
For most observers, this was a simple and achievable solution to this problem, and would 
have cost an estimated US$ 4 million (SGvt#5). But it would have reduced IOT’s 
competitive advantage of private quay space that it could ‘offer’ boats for direct 
offloading to the factory when the Industrial Port was overly congested. A second 
committee was established in 2006 consisting of considerably more politically powerful 
individuals, including those perceived as being close to IOT. It superseded the Task 
Force and produced a highly ambitious Integrated Fisheries Development Project, which, 
in its entirety would have cost an estimated US$80 million (CBS 2007). In short, nothing 
                                                 
26 In fact, no person with a working knowledge of the industry saw Port Louis as a genuine threat to Port 
Victoria (e.g. IntFS#36; SGvt#19; SVS#1; #2; #15; #16). As one industry insider pointed out: ‘The purse 
seiners won’t go to Mauritius to offload. To steam from Seychelles to Mauritius it takes 3 days. And from 
the fishing zone in the north it takes two to three days to get to Seychelles.’ (EUInd#40) 
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happened, the growing problem of Somali piracy and the introduction of an IMF 
stabilisation package in November 2008 meant that these two priorities took precedence 
over large-scale expenditure on port development. The question of why this second 
committee was established is an open one, but it is clear that the effect of its overly 
ambitious recommendations scuppered the considerably more modest Task Force 
proposal on quay development, which, whether deliberate or not, served the commercial 
interests of IOT over the EU DWF. 
 
 
6.3.2  EU DWF-Seychelles government relations 
 
In the early days of the fishery, Seychelles was negotiating with the EU DWF from a 
position of considerable weakness. Availability of data on the fishery and knowledge of 
the industry was at first highly unequal (SGvt#19). For example, the French fisheries 
science research institute ORSTOM27 claimed that the Seychelles government was over-
optimistic about both the environmental sustainability of industrial tuna fisheries and the 
likelihood of purse seine fleets using Port Victoria as a base (ORSTOM reports as cited 
by Cooklin 1984: 40). While the scientists were no doubt sincere, this opinion may well 
have been used as a negotiating tactic by fleet representatives. The accession of Spain to 
the EEC and the incorporation of its purse seine fleet with the French under the EEC- 
Seychelles 1987-1990 access agreement further weakened Seychelles relative position. It 
meant that the micro-state of the Seychelles was pitted against ‘an economic giant’ in 
access negotiations (Michaud 1986: 3). Of course, these fleets were also in competition 
with each other: French against Spanish, ANABAC against OPAGAC, and firm against 
firm (Chapter 2). But, as elsewhere, in their relations with the Seychelles state they 
collaborate; with their interests mediated by DG Fish at the European Commission and its 
associated political-economic backing by the EU as a whole (see Chapters 4 and 5). 
Negotiating experience also plays a role. The European Union and vessel owners or their 
representatives deal simultaneously with several coastal states in order to gain fisheries 
                                                 
27 Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique d'Outre-Mer, now L'Institut de recherche pour le 
développement (IRD). 
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access (Chapter 4). The (then) Managing Director of SFA was cognisant that this 
provides the Europeans with ‘opportunities to “divide and rule” or at least claim that they 
have attractive alternatives’. He also pointed out that the EU DWF can claim a better 
knowledge of the global tuna industry and ‘plead financial difficulties and very low 
selling prices’.  This combination of elements put the Seychelles state ‘somewhat at a 
disadvantage’ (Michaud 1986: 3). 
 
But it did not take long for SFA staff to recognise the relative power of their negotiating 
position. The growth in SFA’s confidence was facilitated by Glenny Savy’s personal 
political power as the stepson of the president and his executive position at the head of 
SFA. He personally undertook access negotiations with foreign fleets, and SFA rapidly 
developed a high-level of fisheries and industry knowledge and personal contacts 
(SGvt#5; #14).28 Sectoral focus and relative institutional autonomy in domestic politics 
were major advantages. SFA was  
given latitude – within guidelines made by government. ... If there was a 
ministerial negotiator, fisheries would be used as a trade off with other 
issues with the EU and Japan. (SGvt#5) 
As one EU official recognised: ‘The ship owners know that Seychelles depends on them 
and vice versa. Sometimes the Spanish fleet pretend that they’re going elsewhere, but the 
data speaks for itself’ (EUGvt#15).29 For example, as we saw in Chapter 2, Port Victoria 
accounted for 88 percent of total known transhipment/landing volumes of the WIO purse 
seine fleet throughout the period 2000-08 (SFA database). By the end of the 1980s the 
Seychelles government had fully recognised the strategic centrality of Port Victoria’s 
location, SFA had been transformed into a highly professional organisation, Savy’s 
                                                 
28 One official said that Savy ‘used to be a super minister’ (SGvt#19) and an international fisheries 
specialist claimed that Savy ‘knew very well where he stood in negotiations ... he was a good negotiator’ 
(IntFS#36). 
29 A consultant to the FAO had made a similar point right at the outset of the fishery in a report to the 
Seychelles government. He correctly argued that distant water purse seiners are actually quite vulnerable 
and their ‘dependence on the country in which [they] are based is quite significant, although boat owners 
and/or managers like to play this down’. He went on to note that while keeping European purse seine fleets 
‘as operative and content as possible’ is ‘a difficult task, especially with the French owners, ... it must be 
remembered that right now, and for an undetermined length of time, there is no better option open to these 
fleets’ (Cooklin 1984: 38). 
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power and confidence were assured, the industrial port was complete, vessel services 
were more developed, and COI was established. This all meant that the Managing 
Director could claim that the country was ‘now negotiating from a position of strength’ 
(Michaud 1990: 13). At the same time, major boat owners also have a direct line to the 
presidents, and when boats owners visit the country they are often granted an audience 
with the president (e.g. The Nation 19 November 2004; The Nation 29 January 2005; 
EUInd#40), which enhances their lobbying power compared to larger coastal countries 
where tuna fisheries are economically less significant. 
 
When René passed the presidency on to Michel in 2004, the latter began to erode SFA’s 
relative institutional autonomy and placed the agency under the control of the Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources. This Minister apparently ‘wanted SFA under his 
belt. It was a power move as fisheries generates the biggest forex inflows’ (SGvt#5; also, 
SGvt#44). As part of this process Savy’s position as SFA chairman was passed to 
Sylvestre Radegonde and a fisheries scientist, Rondolph Payet, replaced the highly 
experienced Philippe Michaud as managing director. There was also a political purge of 
several other experienced individuals perceived as being sympathetic to the opposition 
party or as being closely associated with Savy (SGvt#5; #14; #19; #27; #44). The exit of 
two of the most experienced individuals in the politics of Seychelles relations with the 
EU DWF weakened the country in negotiations.30 For one official, SFA became 
‘completely understaffed regarding industrial tuna fisheries. How can they ever match the 
EU or distant water fleet negotiation teams?’ (SGvt#19). In this context, the EU DWF 
ramped-up claims that operating in Port Victoria was too expensive and ‘lobbied heavily 
and threatened to leave’ (SGvt#43). As one official shrewdly observed: ‘Sometimes they 
offload elsewhere for practical reasons but it also provides them with dividends, such as 
gaining concessions’ (SGvt#14; see also, SVS#1; #2). Radegonde took EU DWF 
                                                 
30 The removal of Savy probably had a dual motive. He and his two brothers are highly unpopular among 
the general population and were major targets of the opposition parties, but also it allowed Michel to exert 
greater influence over fisheries policy. 
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relocation threats seriously (The Nation, 17 September 2004) and reduced tuna 
transhipment fees paid by the fleet in March 2005.31 
 
While there is some truth in on-going relocation threats by the EU DWF, the industry 
itself recognised that this would only be viable if the majority of the fleet collaborated to 
shift to East Africa or Madagascar at the same time, thereby sharing the cost:  
If the owners decide to work together it would be a disaster for Seychelles. 
If we move at the same time to a new port, we lose nothing! For example, 
during the stevedore strike [in 2003], we all went to Madagascar, but we 
were losing together so we could do it (EUInd#51; #52; also, EUInd#40). 
But the EU DWF also wields influence in Seychelles through other means, including by 
backing government loans. A local vessel service company (Aquarius, see Figure 6.3) 
working with the French fleet was committed to channel its foreign exchange earnings 
through the Central Bank of Seychelles (SGvt#14). This was used to fund a foreign loan 
of US$ 27 million by the Public Utilities Company for which one of the French fishing 
firms was a guarantor (SVS#1-4; #13). The same firm also reportedly guaranteed another 
loan through Aquarius for an infrastructure project to support domestic small scale 
fisheries (the ‘Zone 14’ project) (EUInd#38; #39). 
 
It is also believed that elements of the EU DWF engage in the defrauding of Seychelles, 
as shall also shortly be seen in a discussion of alleged transfer pricing by Heinz and MW 
Brands. In the early 1990s Philippe Michaud (1990: 11) noted the practice of foreign 
vessels under-reporting catch in Seychelles EEZ. This allegedly continued into the 2000s 
when elements of the Spanish fleet systematically under-reported in-EEZ catch. When 
compared to the French record there were consistent and large relative declines as soon as 
some Spanish vessels entered the EEZ, meaning that they would not have to pay the 
vessel-owner ‘top-up fee’ for additional catch (Table 6.1). This issue was reported by 
Seychelles to DG Fish whose legal representative argued that this was not ‘proof’ (EC-
                                                 
31 Radegonde naively argued that the EU DWF was operating from Port Victoria because it ‘liked’ the 
country: ‘If you have a really beautiful girl, she could be living at Takamaka [in the less populated south of 
the main island Mahé] and you’re still going to drive out there to see her’ (quoted in The Nation 17 
September 2004). 
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Seychelles 2009a). In response, Seychelles requested access to all internal vessel logs 
books, including on use of hydraulic gear and freezer temperature variation, which would 
demonstrate precisely when a vessel was fishing and storing catch on-board. The official 
response from Spain was reportedly that these logs do not exist, which is known to be 
false (SGvt#27; #43; #44). Regardless of the merits of Seychelles’ argument (some 
experts argue that it was problematic, IntFS#41), government officials ‘found it very hard 
to negotiate – we get bullied. We don’t have enough expertise to stand up to them’ 
(SGvt#8; also, SGvt#5; #14). Diplomatic representatives of France and Spain both 
reportedly said they would lobby the Paris Club, where Seychelles was holding 
negotiations on its debt, if the EU was forced to provide compensation for perceived 
under-reporting – ‘neo-colonial or what?!’ (SGvt#8; also, SGvt#43). The Seychelles 
government responded quite radically, it simply withdrew licences for vessels fishing 
under the FPA, to which a representative of the Spanish fleet responded: “‘It's simple. If 
we can’t fish in their waters we will not use their port’” (cited in Lough 2009). Additional 
fees were quickly agreed for an increased estimate of catch volume for 2006 and 2007 
which both fell under the FPA of the time (Table 6.1), but not  backdated to 2000-05 as 
requested by Seychelles (EC-Seychelles 2009b; Thande 2009).  
 
In sum, most key players in the government and industry are cognisant of the state’s 
relative negotiating power due to its strategic location and sovereignty over access to the 
resource. However, the economy’s dependence on foreign exchange from both EU access 
agreements and vessel expenditure in Port Victoria in the context of structural 
indebtedness from the late 1990s meant that it was no longer in a position to leverage the 
EU DWF. Nonetheless, in the late 1980s and early 1990s some attempts to counter EU 
dominance were made, to which we now turn. 
 
 
6.3.3  Challenges to EU dominance of the WIO purse seine fishery 
 
The EU DWF created the Western Indian Ocean purse seine fishery in the early 1980s 
and has dominated it ever since. There have been, however, two minor sets of challenges 
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to its position. One came from other distant water purse seine fleets supported by their 
home states and the other from the independent Western Indian Ocean coastal states 
themselves. Seychelles first formal access arrangement was signed in 1978 with the 
USSR. This included a wide range of areas of cooperation, including resource surveys, 
training, technical assistance for domestic fisheries development and, of course, fisheries 
access in the Seychelles EEZ by Soviet vessels (Savini with Dubner 1979: 5).  
 
Fisheries access was a major component in Seychelles positioning in the geo-political 
dynamics of the Cold War (Franda 1982: 56, 85-90).32  René proved to be an effective 
player in manoeuvring bi-polar politics to achieve ‘the maximisation of the benefits on 
offer from each superpower’ (EIU 1987b: 39). By the mid-1980s, the SPPF regime was 
deepening its relations with the USSR. For example, in 1987 Seychelles hosted visits by 
members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the 
Soviet-Seychelles friendship society was formed (EIU 1987b: 39). It also signed an 
agreement with the Soviet fishing firm SOVRYFLOT to allow access for up to four purse 
seines and two longliners (Nageon de Lestang and Lablache 1989: 3). However, even 
before the collapse of the Soviet Union it was clear that the government held a pragmatic 
preference for fisheries relations with France and Spain. The EU-centred commodity 
chain in canned tuna was a larger volume and higher value concern than the Soviet 
alternative, and drove a considerably larger and more sophisticated European fleet, which 
promised (and realised) greater revenue and other socio-economic benefits for the 
Seychelles economy. In addition, even if the SPPF regime deepened its ties with the 
USSR through the 1980s, it continued to maintain a position of non-alignment, with the 
USA maintaining a satellite tracking station on Mahé throughout the period.33 
 
The second challenge to the EU DWF came from South-South cooperation among the 
independent coastal states of the Western Indian Ocean. In 1990, the Managing Director 
of SFA had suggested the: 
                                                 
32 See Teiwaki (1987) on the successful negotiation of bi-polar politics by the Pacific Island countries to 
improve tuna fisheries rents with the USA. 
33 The station reportedly played a role in the USA’s ‘Star Wars’ missile defence programme and René 
‘drove a hard bargain to get the rental increased’ in 1985 (EIU 1986: 33). 
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possibility of entering into arrangements ... with other States in the 
Indian Ocean … for joint or harmonized surveillance and enforcement 
measures in respect of foreign fishing vessels. ... Arrangements of 
such a nature could have a great impact on licence revenues earned in 
countries with adjacent EEZs as often vessels claim that catches are 
made on the border or just outside the licensing country’s EEZ 
(Michaud 1990: 11). 34  
The direct institutional inspiration for this suggestion was the Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency (FFA) which groups together independent island states in the Western 
Central Pacific Ocean to collaborate in their relations with distant water tuna fleets 
(Michaud 1992; WIOTO 1990). FFA had had several broad successes through the 1980s, 
including the raising of fisheries access revenue and collaboration over the management 
of foreign fleets (IntFS#3; #4; #28).  Mirroring this example and largely under Seychelles 
leadership, the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organisation (WIOTO) was formed in 1991 
to counter the obvious dominance of French and Spanish vessel owners over the WIO 
purse seine fishery (WIOTO 1991). It committed members to the regional harmonisation 
of fisheries policies; collaboration in members’ relations with distant water fishing 
nations to increase benefits from tuna resources; cooperation in fisheries surveillance and 
enforcement; and mutual access to the EEZs of WIOTO members (Marashi 1996; 
Michaud 1992). A positive sign of this initiative’s potential was that ‘industry is very 
scared of the WIOTO’ (IntFS#36). 
 
However, the WIOTO was a still-born institution. Only a handful of members remained 
by the mid-1990s (Seychelles, Mauritius, Comoros and India), and other parties to the 
organisation did not appear to take it seriously (Marashi 1996; WIOTC 1991).35 
Moreover, France directly opposed the organisation, not least because it excluded the two 
                                                 
34 The Chief Coordinator of the, then, EEZ Control Centre (the partial precursor to SFA), had also 
identified the unequal distribution of benefits from tuna fisheries in the WIO at the outset of the purse seine 
fishery in 1982 (albeit in a patronising tone): ‘The potential of tuna fishing is immense, and it is sad that all 
the Indian Ocean states seem so incapable of properly taping into this wonderful resource themselves, 
leaving to it nations who travel nearly half-way around the world to make a profit and reap the nutritional 
rewards’ (Plows 1982: 18). 
35 Signatories to the Convention establishing the WIOTO were Comoros, India, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Sri Lanka and Tanzania. 
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French overseas territories in the region – Mayotte and Reunion – and challenged the 
status quo for the French fleet. France undermined the WIOTC using its influence at the 
FAO – where ‘the French wield enormous influence’ (IntFS#28) – and in the WIO region 
where ‘countries were being bitten one by one’ (IntFS#36). French officials apparently 
referred to FFA and the spread of its institutional model as the ‘FFA disease’ (IntFS#28). 
The WIOTC also suffered from geographical weaknesses compared to FFA. The FFA 
member countries’ EEZs interlock, making it impossible to undertake commercially 
viable purse seiner operations in the WCPO without accessing several members’ EEZs 
across the year, but in the WIO tuna move through surrounding high seas areas for a 
greater proportion of the year. In the mid-2000s some attempts were made by the Indian 
Ocean Commission to develop improved South-South cooperation around the tuna 
resource, but, like the WIOTC, these were actively resisted by France (Int#23; IntFS#35) 
and also suffered from the problem of intra-regional rivalries between Mauritius and 
Seychelles (IntFS#36). 
 
 
6.4 The Politics of the Cannery  
 
The social embeddedness of IOT incorporates a similarly complex set of dynamics as 
Seychelles’ relationships with the EU DWF. The following examines three major 
interactions: the terms of the IOT Shareholders Agreement, government subsidies to IOT 
operations, and government leveraging of IOT to gain access to commercial loans. We 
shall see that even where Heinz/MW Brands worked with the interest of the government 
in one respect – the leveraging of loans – the costs outweighed the benefits. 
 
 
6.4.1  The IOT Shareholders’ Agreement 
 
Given the business failure of Conserveries de l’Océan Indien and its drain on the public 
purse, the Seychelles government was desperate to find a lead firm as a replacement 
investor (EUInd#6; SGvt#5). This may have weakened its position in joint venture 
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negotiations with Heinz. As one observer put it: ‘If King Kong had come along and 
wanted to buy they would’ve sold. As a result it wasn’t a very good deal.’ (EUInd#61). 
To be fair, the government’s primary interest was in retaining and expanding the direct 
and indirect socio-economic benefits associated with a large factory managed by a firm 
that was backward and forward integrated into the commodity chain,36  as opposed to 
focussing on possible profits from a position as minority shareholder. Due to the 
government’s negative experience with COI of raw material supply constraints, 
marketing weaknesses and small production volumes, when it came to negotiating with 
Heinz it recognised that a successful cannery was about ‘volume scale ... and the 
marketing clout to do this’ (SGvt#5). This argument was summarised further by another 
government official: 
Some say that we were screwed by Heinz. But without Heinz (pre-IOT), 
we had no one to distribute, so growth and development was structurally 
limited. The barriers to entry are very high. The cost of the factory was 
250 million Seychelles rupees or 60 million US dollars. Straightaway that 
meant five million dollars in interest and debt service payments per annum 
alone. (SGvt#1) 
Nonetheless, the inequality of the two parties in forming IOT – i.e. one of the smallest 
countries in the world ‘negotiating’ with one of the largest agri-business multinationals – 
was reflected in the basic terms of the joint venture Shareholders’ Agreement.37 
 
Three aspects of the Shareholders’ Agreement serve to illustrate the unequal relationship 
between the government and Heinz. The first is that shareholder dividends appear to have 
been capped – at around US$ 1 million in the early 2000s, although this was apparently 
only 30 percent of the dividend, with the rest going to pay the government share of IOT’s 
debt, especially that incurred with the Diamond Project (EUInd#6; SGvt#8). The 
mechanism for capping dividends was based on a ‘statistical equivalent case’ which 
                                                 
36 These included private sector employment, ancillary industry, extra volume of shipping services which 
would reduce deadheading and freight costs, and the provision of goods and services through increased 
landings of tuna (EUInd#6; #61). 
37 The text of the 1995 Shareholders’ Agreement and its amendments is considered by both parties to be 
confidential. As such, the following is based almost exclusively on the triangulation of interview transcripts 
in 2006. 
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aggregates the ex-factory price of IOT’s range of canned tuna products (e.g. different 
grades of meat from flakes to steaks, different sized cans and different packing media). 
This method appears to have been based on the aggregated price for a standard case (48 
cans) of a range of types of canned skipjack. Aside from the overly complex nature of 
this method (which may also have hidden potential surplus for canned skipjack), it also 
ignored IOT production of canned yellowfin tuna which fetches a considerable price 
premium on EU markets and, as larger fish, generates higher recovery rates in the labour 
process (Chapters 2 and 3). The apparent failure to incorporate this species differentiation 
in the ‘statistical equivalent case’ may have allowed Heinz (and MW Brands) to capture a 
greater share of the profits when producing canned yellowfin, which it did for 20-25 
percent of its output in the mid-2000s (EUInd#6; #46). However, the dividend cap also 
reduced the government’s exposure to risk. After the experience of subsidising COI, 
government negotiators may have thought assured dividends and the guarantee of no 
losses a favourable outcome (SGvt#5). 
 
The second unequal aspect of the Agreement is a mechanism that facilitated alleged 
transfer pricing so that the full profitability of the cannery was not reported to the IOT 
Board (which consisted of Heinz and government representatives). The SITZ again 
played a major role in reducing Heinz’ costs, in this case by hiding profits from its local 
‘partner’. A component of the SITZ was the registration of offshore companies which 
benefit from secrecy and privacy provisions.38 The legal structure of Heinz’ investment 
included an offshore entity – Heinz Seychelles Ltd (HSL) – which had an agreement with 
IOT to buy the vast majority of its production for export (Figure 3.5) and whose accounts 
are secret, even to IOT board members. As one manger put it: ‘Transfer pricing was 
common. It all depended on when [and where] Heinz wanted to repatriate profit’ (EU 
Ind#61). This mechanism continued into the legal structure of MW Brands in 2006 with 
the Lehman Brothers take-over. MW Brands Seychelles Ltd (MWBSL) played the same 
alleged function, but due to the legalised secrecy of offshore firms, official investigations 
                                                 
38 This aspect of the SITZ was administered by a parastatal – the Seychelles International Business 
Authority (SIBA). SIBA was designed to establish Seychelles as an ‘Indian Ocean international financial 
and trading hub’ and was touted as a potential third pillar of the Seychelles economy. SIBA’s principal 
activity was the simple registration of offshore international business companies. For a short overview see 
Campling et al. (2011: 37, 87-88). 
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into IOT in the late 2000s were unable to prove transfer pricing (Int#5; SGvt#8). MW 
Brands defence is that the mechanism was established solely to administer and repay 
loans – ‘a transfer box’ – provided to IOT to fund the Diamond Project, which were still 
being repaid in 2009 (EUInd#6). Nonetheless, the widely held perception among 
government officials and domestic media is that MW Brands (and Heinz before it) 
engaged in transfer pricing and uses MWBSL to do so (SGvt#1; #5; #8; SVS#15; #16; 
Regar 2010; Financial Times 2008). This would be unsurprising as transfer pricing has 
long been a common strategy of multinational firms including in fisheries joint ventures, 
normally hidden in exchange rate conversions and the marketing functions of their 
business (Int#5; #15; IntFS# 28; Greboval 1987). It appears that government negotiators 
went into the Agreement with this in mind: ‘We knew there’d be transfer pricing, so we 
pushed for a royalty’ (SGvt#5). 
 
Supporting the claim that IOT was not a profitable aspect of its wider business, MW 
Brands management regularly referred to it as a ‘cost centre’ (EUInd#6; #49). In its 
literal sense (i.e. the opposite of a profit centre) IOT only indirectly adds ‘profit’ to MW 
Brands by supplying the product where ‘value’ would then be added through marketing. 
But in accounting terms a ‘cost centre’ is treated as a separate entity within a wider firm 
with the objective of motivating management to maximise cost reduction (Russell et al 
2001: 9). One senior government official repeated MW Brands’ language in an interview 
in 2006: ‘IOT is only a cost centre, it’s not a profit maker’ (SGvt#1).  However, 
according to a leaked US government cable from the US embassy in Mauritius to the US 
State Department in the context of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the Chief Financial 
Officer of IOT (and an IOT Board Member) reported that ‘IOT's current profitability and 
performance’ and ‘the structure of ownership, which limits Lehman Brothers’ financial 
impact on the company, assuages any concern IOT has about Lehman’s bankruptcy’ (US 
Embassy Port Louis 2008). This and other (confidential) documentary sources indicate 
that IOT was not a ‘cost centre’ in the literal meaning of the term, and was, in fact, a 
profitable operation. 
 
297
Finally, the Shareholders’ Agreement includes an ‘exclusivity clause’ for the industrial 
processing of fish products and a first preference on the right to invest in new cold 
storage (SGvt#1; #43). Heinz’ rationale for excluding other firms from establishing a 
cannery in Seychelles was motivated by IOT’s position as the only domestic buyer of EU 
DWF-caught fish and the associated market power that this provides in negotiating lower 
prices. It also had more practical justifications, including the limited availability of (and 
competition for) domestic labour, electricity and, during the dry season, water (EUInd#6; 
SGvt#19). The preference on investment in new cold storage provided Heinz/ MW 
Brands with leverage over the EU DWF. If IOT were to build new cold storage it would 
give it additional market power as it could buy fish when the price was low and hold on 
buying when the price was high. Alternatively, it could (and apparently did) use the 
Agreement to block cold store construction by firms in the EU DWF. Connected to this, 
one of MW Brands’ major growth strategies was to use the strategic buying position of 
IOT to compel the EU DWF to land its catch of yellowfin tuna rather than tranship it to 
Italy, Spain, competing canneries in the WIO and elsewhere (EUInd#38; #39). The 
primary objective was to process this species for MW Brands’ Mareblu brand so as to 
expand its share of the highly profitable Italian market in time for the projected sale by 
Lehman Brothers (EUInd#6; #49; Chapter 3).  
 
There were test cases on the preferential investment in cold store under the Agreement. In 
the 2000s Albacora declared an interest in building new cold storage and a new quay 
separate from the Industrial Port (e.g. The Nation 29 January 2005; EUInd#40). Some 
argue that the lure of investment possibilities by firms in the EU DWF is ‘used as a 
bargaining chip’ to attract additional gains from the Seychelles government (SGvt#43). 
Regardless, senior political players – including the governor of the Central Bank of 
Seychelles at the time – appear to have sided with Heinz/MW Brands to block investment 
(A new quay as both would have reduced IOT’s advantage of having a private quay for 
direct offloading (EUGvt#15; SGvt#5).) In 2006, IOT stated that it intended to build a 
10,000mt capacity cold store to address supply issues during the annual low fishing 
season (The Nation, 2 March 2006). This would certainly have given IOT greater market 
power in negotiations with the EU DWF throughout the year. As one fleet manager put it: 
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‘It’s better for IOT if shipowners have no choice but to discharge to the factory [when the 
Industrial Port is congested]. More quays give the fleet a better ability to tranship’ 
(EUInd#38; #39).  The investment may also have been touted because the first preference 
under the Agreement required IOT to show movement before the option was allocated to 
other investors. However, as one Seychelles government official recognised:  
IOT is against others having a cold store here; but should we be ‘yes sir’? 
It may not be in IOT’s absolute interest to have an independent cold 
storage ... but it might not be in the national interest. (SGvt#14) 
Regardless, IOT had still not built new cold storage by 2011, citing the decline in 
Western Indian Ocean catch (Chapter 4) and government investigations into IOT’s 
finances for the lack of movement (EU#6). Despite the lack of strategic cold storage or a 
new quay, the EU DWF evaded MW Brands’ objective of capturing greater yellowfin 
supply for its Italian market and continued to coordinate reefers to tranship the majority 
of its large yellowfin to buyers in Spain and elsewhere, attracted by premium prices or 
driven by forward integration into manufacturing (EUInd#38; #39; Chapter 3).  
 
 
6.4.2  Government subsidies to IOT 
 
Aside from the leveraging of IOT for government borrowing (see the following section), 
officials were focused on the factory’s direct generation of employment and foreign 
exchange inflows from its local activities. In terms of whether government should focus 
more on improving competitive conditions for the EU DWF or promote the interests of 
IOT, one senior official stated the issue clearly:  
The dilemma is do we protect IOT or do we promote transhipment? We 
don’t have a choice because of the socio-economic impacts: Where will 
the 2,000 low-skilled employees go? The employment and taxes generated 
through transhipment will never be at the level provided by IOT. 
Politically, we can’t allow the factory to close.  (SGvt#1) 
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It appears that MW Brands management (and Heinz before it) were cognisant of these 
sensitivities and leveraged this position to extract a number of subsidies from the 
Seychelles government.  
 
When IOT was established the government ‘absorbed all [COI] debts and sold the assets 
[to IOT]’, some of which are very significant, ‘especially the land – the factory has a 
great location’ (EUInd#61). The government’s contribution of these assets was probably 
not properly valued under the terms of the joint venture. In addition, as 40 percent 
shareholder in IOT, government absorbed its proportion of the costs of the Diamond 
Project. The US$ 45 million investment was channelled to IOT in an interest-bearing loan 
via the offshore entity Heinz Seychelles Ltd (EUInd#6). In addition, IOT ‘built and sold 
back items through the Diamond Project’ (SGvt#8) normally through long-term 
leaseback agreements with the government. In this way Heinz was able to generate a 
stronger financial statement by improving upon the appearance of its overall return on 
assets employed (see Section 3.4.2 on Heinz’ emphasis on ‘shareholder value’). 
Controversially, it also managed to sell non-performing assets to the government, 
including a waste water plant which could not be used because it generated a powerful 
stench that drifted to the capital city.39 As one government official recognised of MW 
Brands: ‘In Seychelles they don’t own much, not even assets’ (Sgvt#14). 
 
The CEO of MW Brands, Adolfo Valsecchi, played an active advisory role in policy 
formation in Seychelles.40 He was a member of the elite National Economic Planning 
Council (established by President Michel in 2006), which generated concerns 
domestically that Seychelles fisheries development policy would reflect MW Brands’ 
interests.41 In 2007 Valsecchi presented data to government on the ‘competitive 
benchmarking’ of IOT and placed relative emphasis on lower production costs in 
Thailand (IOT 2007; see also, Financial Times 2008). These data were used to argue that 
                                                 
39 General complaints about this smell were legion among Seychellois when the author was living there 
(also USInd#11). 
40 He had been Managing Director of Heinz European Seafood since 1999 (joining Heinz in 1996) and 
active in the Italian canned tuna industry before that. 
41 Valsecchi was also an advisor to the Minister of Fisheries in Ghana where MW Brands’ other major 
factory was based (EUInd#6). 
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without direct subsidies IOT would be non-competitive and MW Brands threatened to 
divest (SGvt#43). A very small group of senior politicians and government officials had 
been sufficiently convinced by MW Brands’ lobbying to allocate IOT with 
Unemployment Relief Scheme rebates when employing new Seychellois workers and 
reduced employer contributions to the Social Security Fund (SGvt#8; #46).42   
 
Despite the obvious problem of relying on data produced by interests that would benefit 
from its indications, as with the ‘statistical equivalent case’ method discussed above, 
these benchmarking data did not incorporate IOT’s production of higher value canned 
yellowfin, even though this species allows for higher productivity in the labour process 
and larger profits on the Italian market. Moreover, the data itself showed that without 
URS rebates the EU import price of IOT product was more competitive than canneries in 
Mauritius and Madagascar, thereby making problematic the use of Thailand as the 
principal benchmark, especially given that Thailand is widely recognised as the most 
competitive producer of canned tuna on the planet (e.g. Campling et al. 2007; Hamilton 
et al. 2011). In sum, the combination of limited profit sharing and the cost of subsidies 
resulted in some arguing that IOT probably cost the government more than the various 
net benefits gained through local employment generation and spin-offs (SGvt#8; #45). 
While the precise weighting of the benefits of local upgrading in the canning node of the 
commodity chain is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is clear that, in this case, 
‘upgrading’ included considerable hidden costs. But even where it appeared to offer 
benefits to the government, it worked in the interests of multinational firms. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 The URS provided temporary income to active jobseekers. Participants were encouraged to work in 
productive industries such as tourism and manufacturing and their wages would be subsidised by the Social 
Security Fund. The success of this scheme may be debated, but it certainly contributed to halving formal 
unemployment between 2000 and 2007 (Campling et al. 2011: 82). Therefore, subsidised employment at 
IOT fulfilled wider social policy goals and the SPPF regime’s domestic political objective of manipulating 
unemployment data. 
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6.4.3  Government leveraging of IOT 
 
Government leveraging of IOT to plug holes in the national finances is central to 
understanding the domestic politics of the cannery. From the mid-1980s, Seychelles 
persistently suffered from foreign exchange shortages which were aggravated by the end 
of cold war patronage after 1991 (CBS 1999; Payet 2008; Scarr 2000).43 Despite a series 
of home-grown liberal reforms in the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the economy remained 
‘hamstrung by foreign exchange shortages’ (CBS 2006: 3). Very high levels (and non-
repayment) of domestic and external debt meant that Seychelles could not borrow from 
concessional lenders (Campling et al. 2011). By 2008, the annual shortfall of foreign 
exchange in the balance of payments was over US$ 100 million (Afif 2008), almost US$ 
12,000 per capita. This crisis culminated in an emergency IMF loan and adjustment 
programme in late 2008, but before this rapid restructuring of the economy, government 
used IOT in various ways to stymy the shortfall.  
 
In 2002 the government took out a US$ 150 million loan with the Bank of Japan and 
Mitsubishi that was repayable at commercial interest rates over five years (CBS 2003; 
2006). It used IOT’s future foreign exchange earnings as collateral, and ‘would never 
have gone through the capital market without a comfort letter from Heinz’ (Sgvt#1).44 In 
2006 the government arranged another loan for US$ 200 million (a sovereign bond 
managed by Lehman Brothers) again to service external debt and provide desperately 
needed foreign exchange, US$ 64 million of which was used to repay the Bank of Japan-
Mitsubishi loan (CBS 2007). It also reportedly relied on Lehman Brothers for an 
additional US$ 30 million to service the sovereign bond (US Embassy Port Louis 2008). 
By this time, Lehman Brothers had taken control of IOT and it was argued that: ‘There is 
high value in the linkages to Lehman Brothers. CBS [Central Bank of Seychelles] needs 
                                                 
43 The SPPF regime ‘insisted on an artificially high exchange rate for the Seychelles rupee, partly so as to 
insulate the population from external fluctuations, and instituted exchange controls in 1999 to limit the 
outflow of foreign exchange. The shortage of foreign exchange led to a flourishing informal economy from 
the late 1990s onwards, wherein rupees were routinely exchanged at around double the official rate.’ 
(Campling et al. 2011: 40). 
44 This is an interesting example of the inter-penetration of capital as Mitsubishi and Heinz were direct 
competitors in the canned tuna industry, around both raw material supply in the WIO (6.3.1) and the UK-
centred chain through their Princes and John West brands (Chapter 3). 
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IOT for loans’ (SGvt#1). This was clearly the case, but it also meant that the government 
was playing three (contradictory) roles: acting as a shareholder of IOT with an interest in 
maximising dividends, subsidising IOT’s commercial survival so as to utilise it to 
mediate commercial loans, and regulating the tuna industry as a whole (including IOT) to 
maximise local upgrading and the national economic interest. Whichever of these took 
precedence at particular moments probably depended in part on political contingency 
and/or the policy issue in question, but the reliance on IOT to borrow foreign exchange 
and service external debt certainly gave Heinz/MW Brands a major bargaining chip in 
their relations with government.  
 
In this context, it is worth noting a final example of government attempts to leverage 
IOT. Given the on-going foreign exchange crisis and the immediate need to inject foreign 
exchange into public coffers, the government approached Heinz in the mid-2000s to 
make an advanced purchase of electricity from the parastatal Public Utilities Corporation 
(PUC; EUInd#6). However, all electricity supply in Seychelles is generated by PUC 
using imported oil and subsequent sharp increases in the international oil price meant that 
the advanced purchase was based on a lower price. As a result, this attempt to leverage 
IOT resulted in the public directly subsidising IOT’s electricity costs. In other words, 
even where the government tried to leverage IOT, MW Brands was the ultimate 
beneficiary. 
 
 
6.5 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter presented an analysis of the economic and the political dimensions of 
industrial upgrading through a case study of Seychelles – an ACP state and one of the 
most important tuna transhipment/ landing hubs and sites of canned tuna production in 
the world. Through a short sketch of fisheries development policy in the colonial period, 
including advocacy for the creation of an industrial fleet and cannery among the 
leadership of the pro-independence movement, this chapter demonstrated the historical 
antecedents for Seychelles contemporary industrial upgrading. It then investigated the 
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integral role and relative autonomy of government policy in generating the legal-
institutional and infrastructural conditions for creating the Port of Victoria and IOT 
production networks. In doing so, we demonstrated that upgrading is a historical process 
that cannot be understood by examining contemporary dynamics alone, and that the state 
plays a highly significant role in shaping the local conditions for competitive 
accumulation in the commodity chain. The analysis once again returned to a 
consideration of the environmental conditions of production, from oceanic dynamics 
shaping the movement of tuna and the seasonality of the fishery and their socio-economic 
effects in Seychelles, to the commercial importance of species differentiation and its 
manipulation by firms such as the failure to properly value yellowfin in EU access 
agreements and the IOT joint venture agreement. 
 
Rather than focussing on upgrading as a technical issue and as primarily a concern of 
firms, it was explained as a combination of structural, environmental and conjunctural 
political dynamics, including the contingent and changing role of the domestic elite. 
Similarly, in examining the developmental effects of upgrading, we moved beyond a 
firm-centred account to emphasise implications for direct and indirect government 
revenue and local employment. Combined, the Port of Victoria and IOT production 
networks were found to contribute over 11 percent of total private sector employment in 
the country in 2009. However, we also saw how attempts to counter the dominance of the 
EU DWF failed, either because the countervailing power was insufficiently well placed 
to do so (e.g. the USSR), or that internal divisions among independent coastal states and 
the influence of the French state undermined South-South cooperation (the WIOTO). 
 
The chapter also examined the extent of territorial embeddedness of firms. The EU DWF 
and IOT are anchored in the Seychelles and respond to the domestic political economy, 
including guaranteeing government loans. Conversely, these firms shape the institutional 
conditions of their local interactions, including the use of unequal bargaining power by 
Heinz to create an export processing zone and by the EU DWF to achieve a reduction in 
tuna transhipment fees. The threat of relocation – whether real or not – plays an important 
part in this negotiating power. Even individual firm managers play a role, such as the 
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CEO of MW Brands, by influencing government policy through relationships with a tiny 
domestic elite to generate maximum gains for their firms, including direct government 
subsidies. The provision of tax breaks and public subsidies not only demonstrates a 
hidden cost of ‘upgrading’, but also shows how Seychelles domestic political economy 
became intertwined with the commercial survival of fishing and processing interests. 
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 Chapter Seven 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis used the Global Commodity Chain approach to unravel the complex and multi-
layered dynamics of the EU-centred canned tuna industry. The GCC approach was 
understood here as an investigative tool for the analysis of firm activities and government 
policies under conditions of competitive accumulation.  The thesis applied five conceptual 
components of GCC analysis: input-output structure, territoriality, chain governance, 
institutional context and upgrading. These components were used to structure the thesis and, 
in turn, were interrogated through the empirical case under investigation. The thesis also 
identified and discussed three lacunae in the GCC approach: the environmental conditions of 
production, the historical formation of chains, and unequal political power among states and 
firms. Eight sets of research questions were formulated in Section 1.2.2 to engage directly 
with these concepts and lacunae. This concluding chapter presents the major findings of the 
thesis by addressing those questions. 
 
 
7.1 GCC Analysis and the EU-centred Chain in Canned Tuna: Five Concepts  
 
Input-output structure 
What is the input-output structure of the canned tuna commodity chain (i.e. what are the 
functions or activities necessary to canned tuna production)? 
All political economy commodity studies approaches emphasise the foundational importance 
of an understanding of input-output structure in a commodity chain (or segment of a chain). 
Chapters 2 and 3 identified the activities necessary to the functioning of the canned tuna 
chain in considerable detail, supplemented in appendices with additional descriptions of 
production processes and cost structures (especially 2B, 3A and 3B). The chain is composed 
of four major vertical linkages: raw material extraction in industrial fisheries, processing of 
canned tuna, branding, and distribution and retail (Figure 1.2). A fifth linkage, raw material 
trade, is carried out by specialised fishing firms themselves in the EU-centred chain, 
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individually or in collaborative arrangements.1 Some firms are vertically integrated from 
fishing to branding, and others specialise in a single activity. No retailers have backward 
functional linkages into the chain beyond supply contracts for their private label product and 
most EU supermarkets use importing firms to source canned tuna.   
 
Chapter 2 showed how technological and organisational innovations in fishing gear, 
refrigeration and reefer transhipment allowed firms to overcome prior limits to geographical 
distance and organic durability in the global commodity chain. Chapter 3 described the 
division of the processing node into full canning, loining only and canning only factories, 
reflecting the relative costs of production in the international division of labour and the role 
of the EU trade regime (below). Horizontal competition among processing firms is driven by 
access to (and price negotiation for) tuna raw material. Species differentiation plays a major 
role with larger yellowfin allowing for higher recovery rates and fetching higher prices on EU 
canned tuna markets. Larger, more diversified economies such as Spain and Thailand benefit 
from cheaper inputs, such as cans, compared to production locations like Seychelles. So-
called ‘value added’ production in France relies almost entirely on the ‘logic of loining’, 
while canneries in Spain apply a more complex ratio of labour time/cost to fish yield and the 
‘tuna-tinplate factor’. We also mapped diagonal linkages in the Port Victoria and IOT 
production networks in Seychelles which allowed for a fuller account of the direct and 
indirect input-output structure of the chain in this economy.  
 
 
Territoriality 
Who owns or controls these activities? What is the spatial dispersal or concentration of 
production? Is there a tendency to concentration in ownership? If so (or if not), what factors 
help to explain this process? In sum, what is the role of ‘territoriality’ in the commodity 
chain? 
Gereffi’s notion of territoriality, ‘the spatial dispersion or concentration of production … 
comprised of enterprises of different sizes and types’ (1994: 96), is underdeveloped but, as 
noted in Chapter 1, sufficed for the purposes of this thesis. Chapters 2 and 3 detailed the 
major firms which control fishing, processing, branding and retail activities in the EU-centred 
                                                 
1 In the WCPO fishery by contrast this is a distinct node, where three specialised trading companies concentrate 
this activity (Campling et al. 2007). 
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commodity chain. In the fishing node, we traced the geographical dispersal of the EU DWF 
as a whole from the 1950s to the late 2000s and the parallel intensification of concentration of 
control in the French fleet. We then showed how struggles over corporate control of the 
French fleet by manufacturers to ensure strategic access to raw material, especially Cobrecaf 
by Heinz, were a major dynamic in the EU-centred commodity chain from the 1980s 
onwards.  Historically, the Spanish fleet is family-owned and managed, and in the 2000s five 
main players were identified. The most important of these is the vertically integrated 
Albacora, the world’s only purse seine firm with fishing operations across the global ocean, 
and the overall lead player in the EU DWF. The other four Spanish firms were active only in 
the WIO and the Atlantic, and except for one, are all specialised fishing firms.  
  
We also traced territoriality in the canned tuna manufacturing node over time. We identified 
distinct national production systems and created a typology of firms engaged in 
manufacturing. While the French ‘national’ production system became spatially dispersed to 
its colony of Senegal in the 1950s, there was a parallel intensification of corporate 
concentration with the emergence of the ‘big three’ branded-manufacturers acting as an 
oligopoly in the France-centred commodity chain from the 1970s, each of which were 
integrated backward into fishing and also had a cannery in France. By the late 1980s, only 
two brands dominated the French market, Saupiquet and Petit Naivre; by this time the latter 
was controlled by Heinz in its first step to a consolidated position in the EU market as whole. 
The remaining French firms transformed themselves into specialised non-branded 
manufacturers to supply increasingly concentrated French supermarkets, and followed the 
new WIO fishery to establish factories in Madagascar and Seychelles in the late 1980s.  
 
By the mid-2000s only three main players remained in the France-centred chain – Heinz, 
Bolton Group (undertaking only the marketing function with Saupiquet) and Thunnus 
Overseas Group (a non-branded manufacturer), none owned by French capital. Conversely, 
the Spanish production system remained a ‘national’ one in the 2000s, with full canning 
production geographically clustered in Galicia but ownership dispersed across several family 
firms, with production volumes led by Calvo (a branded-manufacturer integrated backward 
into fishing), Frinsa del Noroeste (a non-branded manufacturer), and Jealsa (backward 
integrated into fishing and combining branded and non-branded manufacturing). In the 
context of the highly competitive Spanish market, Calvo and Jealsa bought Italian brands 
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which contributed to the rapid intensification of EU-based production volumes in Spain and 
an absolute and relative decline in Italy.   
 
In the 1970s the main extra-EU locations of canned tuna production were in Japan and West 
Africa, supplying Northern Europe and France respectively. The changing geography of 
canned tuna production from the 1980s was shaped by the expansion of the EU tuna trade 
regime to new states (e.g. ACP and GSP+ countries), new commodity frontiers in the WIO 
and WCPO, the emergence of new industrial purse seine fleets divorced from supplying their 
own ‘national’ production systems (e.g. boats owned by Taiwanese and South Korean firms), 
and technological and organisational change (such as the emergence of a global trade in tuna 
using reefers). By the 2000s, non-branded manufacturing centred on the EU import market 
was dispersed both spatially and in terms of corporate concentration. The global dispersal and 
overcapacity of export-orientated production is of considerable benefit to buyers in EU 
branded-firms and supermarkets as they were able to rely upon an increasing number of non-
branded manufacturers across the ‘global ocean’. This provided buyers with security of 
supply, allowing branded-firms to divest direct ownership of production facilities, and also 
saw buyers play suppliers off against each other in price negotiations. This evidence supports 
the notion of a fallacy of composition, which is a particular problem for highly standardised 
manufactures such as canned tuna where suppliers are fragmented in terms of ownership and 
thus negotiating power. 
 
 
Chain governance 
Which firms, if any, ‘drive’ the canned tuna commodity chain? If there are ‘lead firms’ in this 
commodity chain, what mechanisms produce and reproduce their relative control over chain 
‘governance’?  
In Chapter 1 chain governance was defined as the concrete processes and relationships that 
allow lead firms to shape the activities of and distributional outcomes for other firms in a 
vertical division of labour. This definition avoids Gereffi’s original ideal-typical approach to 
identifying ‘drivenness’ in chain governance. Chapters 2 and 3 showed that governance is 
achieved by lead firms through a combination of their relative market power, creation and 
enforcement of rules and conditions of chain participation, and their positioning in nodes of 
the chain that enjoy enhanced shares of value extraction. The findings broadly concur with 
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the commodity studies literature on the rise of supermarket power in agri-business chains 
since the 1980s onwards. The volatility of tuna raw material price fluctuations lessens as the 
commodity moves through the various nodes of the chain – from fishing to processing, and 
branding to retail – generated by varying degrees of exposure to global fleet overcapacity (i.e. 
intense horizontal competition in the fishing node) and the vagaries of the environmental 
conditions of production. Evidence of ‘buyer drivenness’ in the canned tuna chain includes 
‘macro’ dynamics such as the dispersal of export-orientated canned tuna production in the 
international division of labour, which allows branded and supermarket buyers to engage in 
highly competitive sourcing, and ‘micro’ supermarket buying practices such as pushing 
various costs onto suppliers. Barriers to entry are very high and most principal EU markets 
are typified by two or three major canned tuna brands, while others are squeezed out by 
supermarket private (own-) label product.  
 
However, the findings also demonstrate differential levels of buyer drivenness in principal 
EU markets. This was shown to depend upon levels of concentration among canned tuna 
branded-firms and supermarkets, which has an effect on market share (e.g. the relative role of 
private label), retail prices and strategies of oligopolistic rent-seeking by branded-firms and 
supermarkets. We also found that lead branded-firms use a range of corporate strategies, with 
some specialised in canned fish chains that own processing facilities and fishing fleets (e.g. 
MW Brands), and others focussing on their role as diversified consumer goods marketing 
firms (e.g. Bolton Group). In addition, contrary to generalised assumptions in commodity 
studies that highly capital-intensive industries generate ‘producer-driven’ chains, the 
industrial fishing node of the chain is subject to a high degree of buyer-drivenness which 
translates into sharp struggles over raw material prices. It was argued that this is largely 
because the EU DWF will catch the same volumes regardless of price (ecological conditions 
allowing), which is a result of a combination of fragmented ownership of the global fleet, 
high levels of overcapacity, and an extensive regime of EU subsidies. 
 
Increasing buyer drivenness in the processing node of the France-centred commodity chain 
from the 1960s onwards was met by a number of countervailing strategies by firms in the 
fishing node. These included the intensification of concentration of control of the fleet (as 
noted earlier), but also moments of collaboration among fishing firms such as the creation of 
the Soveto trading company as a source of collective bargaining power with the ‘big three’ 
French manufacturers. Some specialised fishing firms in the Spanish ANABAC producer 
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organisation attempted a similar collaborative strategy with Peva Eche, but this was less 
successful with only two members (a third firm having left in the 2005 due to commercial 
tensions). It is worth noting that capital as a whole in this node collaborated during the 1999-
2000 cost/price squeeze to create the World Tuna Purse Seine Organisation which 
temporarily limited raw material supply and increased prices (Appendix 2C), demonstrating 
that the constraint of fragmented ownership can be overcome in moments of declining 
profitability. 
 
If lead firms play a role in governing the commodity chain, to what extent do the ways in 
which these firms are themselves governed influence the whole chain?  
Chapter 1 also asked how lead firms themselves are governed and the extent to which this 
influences chain governance. The most important dynamic identified in the thesis is the short-
term doctrine of shareholder value. Here we focussed mainly on Heinz/ MW Brands. Chapter 
3 detailed how Heinz stripped several of StarKist’s productive assets in 2001, which was 
motivated by the financial objective of improving return on assets. This strategy was 
mirrored in its 1995 joint-venture with the Seychelles government where a range of fixed 
assets were sold to the government and leased-back in order to demonstrate a low ratio of 
working capital, and also an alleged transfer pricing mechanism was established (Chapters 3 
and 6). The sale of Heinz European Seafood was also motivated by the maximisation of 
shareholder value: even though profitable, this business was sold so that Heinz could focus 
on building profitability in ‘core categories’, including through the purchase of competing 
brands so as to control the supermarket shelf (e.g. table sauces in the UK).  
 
Lehman Brothers purchase of Heinz European Seafood was based on the projected sale of the 
investment tranche (of which MW Brands was a part) in four to five years. This put pressure 
on MW Brands management to realise additional value from the firm, which it did through 
heavy product promotion in the EU to expand market share, attempts to ‘capture’ EU DWF 
sales of yellowfin in Port Victoria, and the successful extraction of subsidies for IOT from the 
Seychelles government (Chapters 3 and 6). Other firms less subject to corporate 
financialisation, such as Bolton Group and Princes, appear better placed to spread out risk 
over the medium term, such as the fluctuations of raw material costs, without the need for 
intense and costly marketing campaigns to maximise shareholder value in the short-term. 
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Finally, while apparent monoliths in the commodity studies literature, supermarkets 
themselves are subjects of the doctrine of shareholder value. Aside from the well documented 
day-to-day pressures that buyers place on suppliers, moments of heightened competition 
among supermarkets can transform their buying practices. Chapter 3 showed how horizontal 
competition between Sainsbury’s and Tesco on core category products such as canned tuna 
resulted in the downgrading of factories in Fiji and Solomon Islands (below) and offered a 
new market opening for competing canneries such as IOT. In sum, the thesis demonstrated 
that chain governance in the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna can be better 
understood through examination of the corporate drivers of lead firms themselves, including 
horizontal competition and the wider dynamics of corporate finalisation. 
 
 
Institutional context(s) 
How have the regulatory mechanisms of international trade and resource access and 
management shaped (and in turn been shaped by) the commodity chain?  
The fourth component of the GCC approach examined in the thesis was ‘institutional 
context’. Gereffi’s initial formulation was extended in Chapter 1 in three ways to incorporate 
regulatory mechanisms (Bair 2005), territorial embeddedness (Henderson et al. 2002), and 
social embeddedness, which includes wider dynamics of domestic political economy distinct 
from the specifics of the commodity chain (Taylor 2008). Chapters 4 and 5 detailed how 
resource and trade regulations are constitutive of the commodity chain in canned tuna. The 
specificity of the environmental conditions of tuna fisheries, especially the species’ highly 
migratory flows, means that the international legal governance of the (transnational) resource 
is laden with tensions. The Law of the Sea and regional fisheries management organisations, 
such as IOTC, provide the institutional conditions for interactions between fishing fleets and 
coastal states, and in turn, these interactions shaped these institutional conditions.  Chapters 4 
and 6 described how the EU DWF receives substantial institutional support in its relations 
with coastal states such as Seychelles in the negotiation and subsidisation of resource access. 
This component of the Common Fisheries Policy is complemented by a regime of additional 
subsidies which provide the EU DWF with a substantial commercial advantage over actual 
and potential competitors in this node of the chain. This combination of institutional supports 
from the EU certainly contributed to the EU DWF dominating the WIO purse seine fishery 
since its creation in the early 1980s.  
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 Chapter 5 showed how the EU tuna trade regime shaped the geography of export-orientated 
canned tuna production. Contrary to the methodologically flawed arguments of the preference 
pessimists, we saw that the EU tuna preference provided a highly significant commercial 
advantage for processors in several ACP coastal and island states. Yet at the same time, 
fisheries rules of origin were shown to be an important regulatory pillar of EU DWF 
operations, which make ACP-based processors captive buyers of the fleet’s raw material 
sales. Despite this, the evidence also contests any simplistic argument that the EU acted 
purely as a mediator for the interests of ‘national’ capital: beneficiary firms based in ACP 
production sites were often not owned by ‘EU’ or ‘ACP’ capital and ACP countries benefited 
from local employment generation and spin-off benefits (below). Finally, Chapter 5 detailed 
the wider regulatory context of the WTO, including how this institution was used by 
Southeast Asian countries to challenge non-reciprocal ACP market access and how several 
ACP non-LDCs were pressured into initialling Interim Economic Partnership Agreements 
with the EU to ensure WTO compatibility of their trading arrangements. 
 
Has territorial and social ‘embeddedness’ configured interactions and relationships between 
firms and Seychelles in the commodity chain? 
Discussion in the thesis of territorial and social embeddedness was largely focussed on the 
interactions of Seychelles with the EU-centred commodity chain in Chapter 6, and relates to 
upgrading (below). In terms of territorial embeddedness, we described the initial moment of 
anchoring of the EU DWF which was based upon the strategic location of Port Victoria to the 
business strategy of maximising fishing days, and how investment in canning capacity 
followed based upon subsequent local raw material supply and the competitive advantage of 
the EU tuna preference. We traced the deepening complexity of the EU DWF’s and IOT’s 
anchoring in Seychelles over time and how firms became embroiled in the dynamics of the 
domestic political economy, including guaranteeing government loans. Chapter 6 also 
showed how these firms shaped the institutional conditions of their local interactions, from 
the creation of the Seychelles International Trade Zone with the investment by Heinz to the 
reduction in transhipment fees paid by the EU DWF based on the threat of relocation to 
competing ports in region. 
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Discussion of the social embeddedness of the commodity chain in the domestic political 
economy included the contingent role of a small local elite in Seychelles. We traced how the 
domestic political power of individuals was used to give the Seychelles Fishing Authority 
relative institutional autonomy in its relations with the EU DWF (reducing trade-offs in 
negotiating access arrangements), and how this relative autonomy was lessened when SFA 
fell under direct ministerial control with a change in the country’s presidency in 2004. We 
also saw how the political elite collaborated with senior Heinz/ MW Brands management to 
provide public subsidies to IOT on the assumption that this would ensure the commercial 
survival of the cannery. Chapter 6 also showed how the wider policy direction of the SPPF 
regime had implications for the country’s specific relations with the chain. This included the 
objective of diversifying the economy so to reduce dependence upon tourism and how, in 
turn, Seychelles’ domestic political economy became intertwined with the commercial 
survival of fishing and processing interests. 
 
Finally, Chapters 2, 4 and 5 detailed the social embeddedness of the EU DWF. Combined, 
this evidence demonstrated that, while minor in terms of their economic weight in the macro-
regional context of the EU as a whole, tuna fishing firms are of great political and social 
importance. The interests of the EU DWF – locally-embedded in Breton and Basque politics 
and identity – made its voice heard in national and EU political fora, enabling it to punch 
above its economic weight in terms of its lobby power. 
 
In sum, the thesis argued that the combination of territorial and social embeddedness as an 
‘institutional context’ for chain activities and linkages matters. Firms behave differently in 
different spaces and places and adjust their business strategies and day-to-day operations in 
relation to local political and economic dynamics. 
 
 
Upgrading 
Have interactions with the fishing and processing nodes of the chain resulted in ‘upgrading’ 
in Seychelles?  
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Upgrading is the fifth and final component in existing commodity studies frameworks 
addressed in the thesis.2 Rather than a technical question, upgrading in this thesis was 
analysed as a political one. The case study of Seychelles demonstrated the role of developing 
country states in creating the conditions for industrial upgrading. Chapter 6 identified and 
explained the set of policy interventions deployed by the Seychelles government from the late 
1970s to 1995 to upgrade interactions in the fishing and canning nodes of the commodity 
chain. It also described how Seychelles maintained its position in the chain by subsiding 
foreign firms (e.g. investing in port development for EU DWF and providing state subsidies 
to COI and IOT), illustrating the important of public subsidies to capital even in the case of 
politically and economically insignificant states such as Seychelles. 
 
The thesis then described the main developmental effects of Seychelles upgrading. The Port 
Victoria and IOT production networks directly or indirectly supported a wide range of local 
firms and parastatals. We emphasised the broader dynamics of upgrading rather than firm-
centred ones. Seychelles’ upgrading accounted for over 11 percent of total private sector 
employment in the country in 2009 and provided a diverse range of sources of government 
revenue for spending in other areas, including an extensive programme of social policy 
interventions (Campling et al. 2011).  
 
However, as argued in Chapter 1, industrial upgrading is not a linear developmental process, 
changing market dynamics and buyer demands can also generate downgrading. In Chapter 3 
we described how intensified competition among UK supermarkets downgraded non-branded 
manufacturers of canned tuna in Fiji and Solomon Islands to contract processors of tuna 
loins. This is a clear evidence of chain governance by supermarkets, especially for non-
branded manufacturers. In addition, concentration among supermarkets and branded canned 
tuna firms in the EU-centred chain severely limits the possibility of upgrading of new 
entrants, even if they are major coastal state ‘resource owners’.  
 
Finally, as already partly noted, the thesis made clear the centrality of other states in the 
formation and reproduction of the commodity chain. The EU contributed directly to 
upgrading its home firms, including supporting: the creation of fisheries, especially in the 
WIO, through negotiating and paying for access arrangements and providing other direct 
                                                 
2 Recall from Chapter 1 that it is a concern of the GCC, Value Chain and GVC approaches. 
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subsidies; the creation of regional ports and canning capacity (e.g. French state funding of 
port development in Seychelles and of COI); and, their maintenance through the EU trade 
regime, limiting environmental regulation (e.g. at IOTC) and resisting coastal state initiatives 
(below). 
 
 
7.2 GCC Analysis and the EU-centred Chain in Canned Tuna: Three Lacunae 
 
Interrogation of the empirical case of the EU-centred commodity chain in canned tuna 
highlighted three major conceptual lacunae in chain analysis. Here we summarise how the 
thesis engaged with these. 
 
Environmental conditions of production 
Given that the chain is based directly on an extractive industry, what are the environmental 
conditions of production? How do these affect business strategies?  
Chapter 2 made clear that the environmental conditions of production are the starting point of 
any analysis of capture fisheries. Tuna biology in general and population dynamics in the 
WIO in particular determine the range of business activities and forms of industrial 
organisation of firms engaged in fishing for tuna. The search for and creation of new 
commodity frontiers, in terms of both geographical extent and socio-technological intensity, 
provided the basis for an original periodisation of the EU DWF’s development from the 
1860s to the 2000s. Chapters 2 and 3 showed how species preference in cultures of 
consumption in different European markets shape business strategies, with, for example, the 
smaller vessels of the French fleet placing greater emphasis on targeting more valuable 
yellowfin, Princes’ cannery in Mauritius focussing on canned skipjack markets with negative 
commercial implications for raw material price as it did not buy ‘mixed loads’ from boats, 
and Heinz/MW Brands using its strategic position in Port Victoria to try to procure greater 
volumes of yellowfin to expand its share of the profitable Italian market. The Spanish fleet 
invested in larger boats to maximise fishing days per trip which brought with it additional 
pressure to reduce the risks of hunting for fish, which the introduction of FADs (often 
supported by service vessels) since the 1990s seemed to have solved. However, the 
unintended consequences of these productivity enhancing measures include negative effects 
on the environmental conditions of production, with commercial consequences for the EU 
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DWF as a whole, but also for manufacturers’ raw material supply, shown in the discussion of 
competition between canneries in Mauritius and Seychelles in Chapter 6. In the context of 
struggles over raw material supply, we also saw the centrality of business strategies employed 
to mitigate the complexities and fluctuations of the environmental conditions of production, 
such as Heinz/MW Brands backward integration into fishing through its control of Cobrecaf 
and ownership of the TTV fleet in Ghana. 
 
Chapter 6 discussed how the commercial importance of species differentiation was 
downplayed by firms in their agreements with the Seychelles government. The EU DWF 
provides a set value for ‘top-up fees’ for tuna catches over pre-agreed catch quotas in all of 
its access agreements, but this fee did not account for the higher proportion of more valuable 
yellowfin catch in the WIO. Similarly, dividend payments under the IOT Shareholders’ 
Agreement was based upon a ‘statistical equivalent case’ of canned skipjack, masking the 
factory’s production of canned yellowfin (20-25 percent of its output in the mid-2000s) even 
though this species allows for higher productivity in the labour process and larger profits on 
the Italian market. 
 
 
Historical formation of chains  
How does a historical approach to GCC analysis (i.e. chain formation) contribute to an 
understanding of contemporary dynamics, processes and relationships? 
The second lacuna is the central importance of a historical understanding of chain formation. 
While commodity studies analysts have often emphasised the importance of this aspect, very 
few have demonstrated it empirically. The thesis described how the historical formation of 
the EU-centred chain shaped several aspects of its contemporary dynamics, including the 
import substitution policies of Franco’s regime in Spain in supporting the development of the 
Spanish distant water fleet, and the policy campaigning of René in the colonial era for the 
promotion of industrial fishing and canning in Seychelles to its actualisation in shaping forms 
of local upgrading and their contemporary effects.  
 
In particular, Chapter 5 showed how the historical evolution of the EU trade regime was 
shaped largely by the interests of the French fishing and canning industry in the 1950s, and in 
turn, how this regime shaped the geography of EU-centred canned tuna production into the 
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2000s. Even though the trade preference had developmental effects for some ACP countries, 
the chapter argued that it was not designed as a tool of development policy but was instead a 
historically contingent and ad hoc commercial arrangement advanced to support the interests 
of European capital. In Chapter 4, we saw how the world-historic context of the 1970s shaped 
the outcomes of the negotiations on the Law of the Sea and that the eventual terms of 
UNCLOS saw an uneasy compromise between the rights of coastal states and distant water 
fishing nations on sovereignty over highly migratory species such as tuna (e.g. the ‘use it or 
lose it’ clause). The same context saw the ACP gain non-reciprocal preferential market 
access under Lomé I (Appendix 5A). However, the argument was advanced that very few 
tuna-related gains were achieved in future EU-ACP agreements, and that this was a reflection 
of the growing inequality of political power in relations between these two blocks of states. 
 
 
Unequal political power 
What is the role, if any, of unequal political power in mediating dynamics among states and 
firms in the commodity chain? 
The final lacuna identified in this thesis is the role of unequal political relations among states 
and between developing country states and multinational firms. While this is often an implicit 
concern of the political economy variant of commodity studies, it is less commonly used as 
an ordering principal in empirical investigation of commodity chains. For example, despite 
the emphasis on horizontal and diagonal relations in the GPN approach, Bridge (2008) points 
out the continuing importance of vertical relations and associated inequalities of power and 
dependency in extractive industries. This is the case in the tuna fisheries analysed in this 
thesis: colonial power gave France ready access to the fishery off the coast of Senegal, post-
colonial state power shaped the terms of resource access in the Western Indian Ocean, and 
the EU fishing and canning industry effectively lobby their home states and the EU to 
maintain the status quo of the various pillars of the EU tuna trade regime.3  
 
Rules set by the powerful in the state system more broadly (often in the interest of ‘home’ 
firms) determine the range of policy options open to developing country states in the 
commodity chain. For example, the terms of UNCLOS do not unambiguously allow coastal 
                                                 
3 Including how the  EU, the largest economic entity on the planet, ‘negotiates’ resource access arrangements 
with fiscally-squeezed and politically weak developing coastal states such as Seychelles. 
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states to exclude foreign fleets from their EEZs and where a coastal state suspects malpractice 
(e.g. Seychelles, Chapter 6), dependence on access revenue and fleet activities limits its 
ability to respond. Similarly, the EU used the formation of the WTO to justify ending non-
reciprocal market access to the ACP and, instead of providing a workable alternative (e.g. 
GSP+), imposed a network of WTO-compatible Economic Partnership Agreements, which 
both divided the ACP into six groups4 and will give EU firms access to these countries’ 
markets for goods and services, among other things. Several ACP states were coerced into 
negotiating EPAs in order to avoid the collapse of tuna processing industries dependent upon 
duty-free access to EU markets. Despite the reciprocal nature of these negotiations, the EU 
continued to impose restrictive rules of origin which limit the scope for tuna-based 
development in most ACP countries by excluding sources of raw material that may allow for 
both lower costs and greater production flexibility and volume. 
 
Several chapters touched upon the theme of unequal power relations between multinational 
firms and developing countries, but the main example was the Seychelles government’s 
relations with the EU DWF and Heinz/MW Brands in Chapter 6. Most important, the 
continued threat of relocation by the EU DWF and Heinz/ MW Brands allowed these firms to 
extract additional concessions from the government, from reduced taxation to public 
subsidies. We also described the highly unequal terms of the IOT Shareholders’ Agreement, 
including a profit cap, alleged transfer pricing and an exclusivity clause that reinforced IOT’s 
buying power in Port Victoria and blocked the government from attracting competing firms, 
effectively locking-in the country’s economic dependency on Heinz/ MW Brands.   
 
Yet the thesis has also shown that these tendencies are not structurally immutable: changing 
dynamics in the world economy can shift the balance of political forces. For example, forms 
of South-South cooperation can generate countervailing tendencies where developing states 
resist and extract (albeit limited) gains, such as the compromise terms of UNCLOS and non-
reciprocal market access under Lomé I noted above. Yet we also how tensions among 
developing states and the geopolitical and economic influence of powerful states (e.g. France) 
can limit countervailing power. For example, attempts by the Seychelles government to 
counter the dominance of the EU DWF failed, either because the countervailing power was 
insufficiently well placed to do so (the USSR), or that internal divisions among independent 
                                                 
4 Which became seven when the East African Community split from the ESA group. 
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coastal states and the influence of the French state undermined South-South cooperation (e.g. 
the Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organisation). 
 
 
7.3 Future Research 
 
Several future research agendas have been identified through the process of producing this 
thesis.5 The following briefly summarises four of these. The first is to develop the specific 
(and highly detailed) evidence presented in the thesis to reflect on the conceptual implications 
for commodity studies more broadly. While the three lacunae identified here go some way to 
doing this, more conceptual work is required to make interventions with resonance beyond 
the specifics of the global commodity chain in canned tuna. These potentially include 
comparative work on the politics of upgrading (including for labour, Selwyn 2007) and 
critical engagement with associated assumptions in the literature around linear development.  
 
Second, as identified in Chapter 1, the political economy of capture fisheries is seriously 
understudied despite the importance of the sector to the direct and indirect employment of 
over 100 million people, the high value of seafood in developing country trade with the 
global North, and that the environmental bases of capture fisheries are increasingly being 
undermined. An initial intervention into this emerging field was made in a co-edited special 
issue of Journal of Agrarian Change. The editorial introduction identified the need for more 
comparative work on fisheries production systems, including of distinct commodity chains 
(Campling et al. 2012). In addition, given that fisheries management tends to ignore the role 
of differentiated firms in driving extraction, the findings of this thesis combined with other 
work in the area could form the bases for analysis of the effectiveness of regulation in the 
context of the tendency to corporate concentration and associated market power in the sector.  
 
Third, and similarly, capture fisheries have tended to be ignored in accounts of extractive 
industries and there is potentially fruitful research in examining the similarities and 
differences between fisheries and, for example, mining. As noted in Chapter 4, one specific 
avenue is comparing property rights, ground-rent and landed-property in industrial tuna 
                                                 
5 The policy implications of the work are also numerous, several of which have already been followed through 
in single-authored and joint publications and reports by the author, including Campling (2008a; 2008b), 
Campling and Doherty (2007), Campling et al. (2007), Campling et al. (2008), Campling et al. (2009), 
Campling et al. (2011), Doherty and Campling (2007), and Hamilton et al. (2011). 
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fisheries and platinum mining (e.g. Capps 2010). Finally, the thesis could also form the basis 
for comparative analysis of the role of trade policy and development, whether focussed on 
specific issues such as historical development and contemporary dynamics in EU trade 
arrangements with developing countries or on broader ones such as South-South cooperation 
among resource rich countries to extract maximum local gains from multinational firms. 
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APPENDIX 1A 
INTERVIEWEES AND MEETING ATTENDANCE 
 
Meetings and conferences in which I attended or participated 
Brussels, European Tuna Conference, European Tuna Conference, 27 April 2009, Belgium. 
Windhoek, ICTSD-Commonwealth Secretariat Regional Dialogue on Fisheries Aspects of 
the ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements, 28-29 August 2008, Windhoek Country 
Club, Namibia  
Brussels, PACP-EU Interim Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations, 17-19 and 24-26 
September 2008, Belgium. 
Geneva, multiple meetings at WTO fisheries subsidies multilateral clusters and bilateral 
meeting at Negotiating Group on Rules, December 2007 to February 2011, Switzerland. 
Port Louis, East and Southern Africa (ESA) meeting convened by Commonwealth Secretariat 
on Trade and Sustainable Approaches to Fisheries Negotiations under WTO and EPA, 2-4 
May 2007, Mauritius  
Grand Bay, ESA Economic Partnership Agreement Fisheries meeting, 23-24 March 2007, 
Mauritius 
Port Villa, Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Fisheries Trade Studies Workshop, 19–20 
March 2007, Vanuatu 
Brussels, ACP Consultative Process on a Trade and Sustainable Development Approach to 
Negotiation of Fisheries under the EPA, 22–24 January 2007, Belgium. 
Port Villa, Ministerial and Senior Officials workshop ‘Pacific–EU Economic Partnership 
Agreements: Opportunities and Challenges for the Private Sector of New Trading 
Arrangements’, 27–28 November 2006, Vanuatu 
Port Villa, Joint Pacific ACP Trade and Fisheries Ministers and Officials Meeting, 13-14 
November 2006, Vanuatu 
Bangkok, Tuna 2006: Ninth INFOFISH World Tuna Trade Conference and Exhibition 25-27 
May 2006, Thailand. 
 
In addition to participant observation in these trade negotiations and informal discussions at 
industry conferences and meetings, the thesis is based upon transcripts of semi-structured 
interviews with 512 interviewees (see the following table). Of these, 13 interviews were not 
done by me and instead I used transcripts recorded by others (indicated below).   
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 Country Entity (firm, government agency, etc) Name Date(s) of interview Category of interviewee 
Belgium (Brussels) Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE) Eric Rotsaert, Expert, Sectoral and Programme 
Operations Unit 
2006 (May) International agency  
Belgium Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE) Vana Catsica,Regional Coordinator, Regional 
Operations Unit 
2006 (May) International agency  
Belgium Centre for the Development of Enterprise (CDE) Michel de San, Marine Biologist, Fisheries 
Consultant 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Belgium Coalition for Fair Fisheries Agreements (CFFA) Beatrice Gorez, 2006 (May) NGO 
Belgium Directorate-General Development, European 
Commission 
Francisco Affinito, 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General Development, European 
Commission 
Norbert Probst, Fisheries Policy Officer 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime 
Affairs, European Commission 
Fabrizio Donatella, Bilateral Agreements 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime 
Affairs, European Commission 
Staffan Ekwall, Principal Administrator, 
International and Regional Agreements 
2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime 
Affairs, European Commission 
Barbara Focquet, Administrateur Accords 
Bilateraux 
2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General for Fisheries and Maritime 
Affairs, European Commission 
Juan José Ronco Zapatero, Principal 
Administrator Markets and Trade 
2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General for Taxation and Customs 
Union (TaxUD), European Commission 
Jean Michel Gravé, Rules of Origin 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General Trade, European 
Commission 
Fabrice D’Aprile, 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General Trade, European 
Commission 
Martin Dihm, 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Directorate-General Trade, European 
Commission 
Niel McDonald, 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Europeche Guy Vernaeve 2006 (May) EU industry representative 
Belgium Europeche (Scottish Fishermen’s Federation) Mike Park, President 2006 (May) EU industry representative 
Belgium Europeche (Swedish Fishermen’s Federation) Henrik Svenberg, President 2006 (May) EU industry representative 
Belgium Independent  Tony Lewis  Brussels (July 2011; person 
comm. 2010) 
International fisheries specialist  
Belgium International Collective in Support of 
Fishworkers (ICSF) Brussels 
Brian O’Riordan 2006 (May) NGO 
Belgium Pro-Invest, Management Unit Bruno van Eeckhout, Matchmaking Activities 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Ahmed Ndyshobola, Global Economics and 2006 (May) International agency  
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Group of States (ACP Group) Finance 
Belgium Strengthening Fishery Products Health 
Conditions in ACP/OCT Countries (SFP) 
Oliver Ledoux, Project Leader 2006 (May) EU government official 
Belgium Syndicat National Des Armateurs de Thoniers-
Congelateurs/ Orthongel (Organisation des 
Producteurs de thon Congelé) 
Michel Dion, Délégué Général/ Directeur 2006 (May) EU industry representative 
Fiji (Suva and 
surrounds unless 
otherwise specified) 
Asian Development Bank Thomas Gloerfelt-Tarp, Head – Project 
Administration Unit 
2006 (Feb) International agency  
Fiji Asian Development Bank Tina Seniloli, Assistant Project Analyst 2006 (Feb) International agency  
Fiji Australian High Commission Stephen McMillan, First Secretary 2005 (Dec) ANZ government official 
Fiji Celtrock Holdings Adrian Chute, General Manager 2006 (Feb; Interview 
transcript V. Ram-Bidesi) 
PIC industry representative 
Fiji Celtrock Holdings  Avichal Raj, Production Manager 2006 (Feb; Interview 
transcript V. Ram-Bidesi) 
PIC industry representative 
Fiji Center-PAC Agency James Movick 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Fiji CNFC Overseas Fishery Co., Ltd Jing Chunde, General Manager  (Lami) 2006 (March) Asia industry representative 
Fiji Department of Commerce, Government of Fiji 
Islands 
Mau Alipate 2006 Fiji government official 
Fiji Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Fisheries 
& Forests 
Stan Qalovaki, Senior Researcher/Trade and 
Policy Advisor 
2006 (Feb) Fiji government official 
Fiji Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Fisheries 
& Forests 
Apolosi Turaganivalu, Principal Fisheries 
Officer, Management Services 
2006 (Feb) Fiji government official 
Fiji Embassy of Japan Shlendra Prasad Bilash, Economic & Aid 
Researcher 
2005 (Dec) Japan government official 
Fiji Embassy of Japan Shigeki Takaya, First Secretary 2005 (Dec) Japan government official 
Fiji Embassy of the People’s Republic of China Chen Dao Yun, Economic & Commercial 
Counsellor 
2005 (Dec) East Asia government official 
Fiji Embassy of the Republic of Korea Jason Chandra, Research Associate/Special 
Assistant 
2006 (March) East Asia government official 
Fiji Embassy of the Republic of Korea Yeonjean Yoon, Counsellor 2006 (March) East Asia government official 
Fiji Embassy of the United States of America Nirmal Singh, Political & Public Affairs 
Specialist 
2005 (Dec) US government official 
Fiji Delegation of the European Commission for the 
Pacific 
Michele Gauché, First Counsellor Natural 
Resources 
2006 (Feb) EU government official 
Fiji FCF Fishery Co. Ltd Yao Lin (Levuka) 2006 (Feb) Asia industry representative 
Fiji FCF Fishery Co. Ltd Jeff Tseng, Chief Representative Fiji Operation 2006 (March) Asia industry representative 
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Fiji Fiji Development Bank Anjna Deb, Manager, Planning Research & 
Marketing Division 
2005 (Dec) Fiji government official 
Fiji Fiji Development Bank Rudra Singh, Senior Business Manager 2005 (Dec) Fiji government official 
Fiji Fiji Fish Marketing Group Grahame Southwick, Executive Chairman  
(Lami) 
2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Fiji Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics Davendan Kumar, Trade Section 2006 (March) Fiji government official 
Fiji Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics Nalima Lal, Divisional Manager, Economic 
Statistics 
2006 (March) Fiji government official 
Fiji Fiji Islands Bureau of Statistics Ronald Bali, Establishment Section 2006 (March) Fiji government official 
Fiji Fiji Islands Customs and Revenue  Gopal Naiker, Tariff and Trade Section 2006 (Feb) Fiji government official 
Fiji (Levuka) Fiji Islands Customs and Revenue Dept  Joseva Utovou 2006 (Feb) Fiji government official 
Fiji (Levuka) Fiji Islands Customs and Revenue Dept Jovesa Drega 2006 (Feb) Fiji government official 
Fiji Fiji Islands Trade and Investment Bureau Villame Volavola, Deputy General Manager 2006 (March) Fiji government official 
Fiji Gillett, Preston & Associates Bob Gillett 2005 (Dec) International fisheries specialist  
Fiji Gourmet Foods Robert Stone 2005 (Dec) International fisheries specialist  
Fiji Great Ocean Enterprise Min Sik Park, Managing Director 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Fiji Greenpeace Australia and Pacific Ltd Lai Waqanisau, Oceans Campaigner 2006 (March) NGO 
Fiji Hangton Pacific Co. Ltd. Jitendra Mohan 2005 (Dec) PIC industry representative 
Fiji Hans Marine  Han Sang Nam, Managing Director 2006 (Feb) Asia industry representative 
Fiji Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Hisashi Suzuki, Assistant Resident 
Representative 
2005 (Dec) Japan government official 
Fiji Jiko Fisheries Babra Seema, Accountant 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Fiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs and External Trade Namita Khatri, Economic Planning Officer, 
External Trade and Sustainable Development 
Division 
2005 (Dec) Fiji government official 
Fiji Ministry of Labour, Industrial Relations and 
Productivity  
Tavite Racumu 2006 (Feb) Fiji government official 
Fiji New Zealand High Commission Michael Greenslade, Trade Commissioner 2006 (Feb) ANZ government official 
Fiji New Zealand High Commission Richard Kay, Second Secretary 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
Fiji Overseas Fishery Cooperation Foundation 
(OFCF) 
Katsuji Fujita, Fishery Advisor 2006 (March) Japan government official 
Fiji Overseas Fishery Cooperation Foundation 
(OFCF) 
Takashi Nagura, Resident Representative 2006 (March) Japan government official 
Fiji Overseas Fishery Cooperation Foundation 
(OFCF) 
Tomohide Yamada, Assistant Resident 
Representative 
2006 (March) Japan government official 
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Fiji Pacific Fishing Company Limited (Pafco) Chandra Prakash, General Manager 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Roman Grynberg, Director Economic 
Governance 
2005-2007 (multiple person. 
comms.) 
International agency  
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat David Primack, EPA consultant 2005-2007 (multiple person. 
comms.) 
International agency  
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Judith Fessahalie, ODI Fellow 2005-2007 (multiple person. 
comms.) 
International agency  
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat James Gosselin, Regional Trade Policy Advisor 2005 (Dec) International agency  
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Laura Chappell, ODI Fellow 2005-2006 (multiple person. 
comms.) 
International agency  
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Mere Falemaka, EPA Consultant 2006 (Feb) International agency  
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Moses Mose 2006 (Feb) International agency  
Fiji Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat Peter Forau, Deputy Secretary General 2006 (Feb) International agency  
Fiji (Levuka) Pafco  Ashok Kumar Raj, Production Manager 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Fiji (Levuka) Pafco  Gerald B. Kontoh, Quality Assurance Manager 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Fiji (Levuka) Pafco  William Gounder, Raw Materials & Logistics 
Manager 
2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Fiji (Levuka) Pafco  Jean Claude Guenegan, General Manager 2006 (Feb) US industry representative or PIC 
industry representative 
Fiji PAFCO Employees' Union Tomasi Tokalauvere, Trade Unionist 2006 (Feb) NGO 
Fiji Seafresh (Fiji) Ltd Sheldon Xu, Deputy General Manager 2006 (Feb; Interview 
transcript V. Ram-Bidesi) 
PIC industry representative 
Fiji Solander Pacific  Radhika Kumar, Business Manager 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Fiji Solander Pacific  David Lucas, Director 2005 (Dec); 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Fiji Tai-Fi Shipping Agencies Johnny Wang, Director 2006 (March) PIC vessel services 
Fiji Tosa Bussan (Fiji) Ltd Toru Nakano, Director  (Lami) 2005 (Dec x2) Japan industry representative 
Fiji Trade Mission of the Republic of China  Adnan C. Y. Tu 2006 (March) East Asia government official 
Fiji Tripacific Marine Limited  Uttam Kumar, Manager Finance 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Fiji University of the South Pacific Sandra Tarte, Senior Lecturer 2006 (March) International fisheries specialist  
Fiji World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Regional Office Kesaia Tabunakawai 2006 (March) NGO 
Fiji World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Regional Office Penina Solomona 2006 (March) NGO 
Fiji World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Regional Office Louise Heaps 2006 (March) NGO 
France 
(Concarneau unless 
CMB (Ets Chevannes-Merceron-Ballery)  
(Concarneau) 
Jean-Yves Labbe, President 2009 (March Concarneau); 
2010 and 2011 (person. 
EU industry representative 
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otherwise specified) comm.) 
France (Paris) Eurothon   Pierre Commere 2007 (March Paris); 2009 
(March Paris) 
EU industry representative 
France IRD Alain Fonteneau Person. comm. (various 
years, 2002-2011) 
International fisheries specialist  
France (Paris) MW Brands  Adolfo Valsecchi, CEO 2009 (March Paris; March 
telephone interview) 
EU industry representative 
France (Paris) MW Brands   Philippe de Saint Pern, General Manager Fish 
Procurement and Fleet 
2007 (March Paris; June 
telephone interview) and 
2009 (March Paris) 
EU industry representative 
France Piriou Shipyards  Pascal Piriou, President du Directoire 2009 (March Concarneau) EU industry representative 
France Saupiquet   Yvon Riva, Fleet and fishing dept manager 
(Saupiquet) and President of ORTHONGEL 
2009 (March Concarneau) EU industry representative 
Italy (Rome) Commodities and Trade Division, Economic 
and Social Department, FAO 
J. R. Deep Ford, Senior Economist, Trade and 
Commodity Policy Group 
2006 (May) International agency  
Italy  Commodities and Trade Division, Economic 
and Social Department, FAO 
Ramesh Sharma, Senior Economist, 
Commodity Policy and Projections Service 
2006 (May) International agency  
Italy  Fisheries Department, FAO Ezzeddine Boutrif, Chief, Food Quality and 
Standards Service 
2006 (May) International agency  
Italy  Fishery Industries Division, Fisheries 
Department, FAO 
Dr. Lahsen Ababouch, Chief, Fish Utilization 
and Marketing Service 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Italy  Fishery Industries Division, Fisheries 
Department, FAO 
William Emerson,  Senior Fishery Industry 
Officer (International Trade), Fish Utilization 
and Marketing Service 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Italy Fishery Industries Division, Fisheries 
Department, FAO 
Dr Audun Lem,Fishery Industry Officer, Fish 
Utilization and Marketing Service 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Italy  Fishery Industries Division, Fisheries 
Department, FAO 
Grimur Valdimarsson, Director 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Italy  Fishery Industries Division, Fisheries 
Department, Food and Agricultural Organization 
of the United Nations (FAO) 
Camillo Catarchi, Consultant 2006 (May); multiple 
person. comms. 2006-07 
International fisheries specialist  
Italy  Fishery Information, Data and Statistics Unit 
(FIDI), Fisheries Department, FAO 
Stefania Vannuccini, Fishery Statistician 
(Fishery Commodities),  
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Italy Fishery Policy and Planning Division, Fisheries 
Department, FAO 
Dr David J. Doulman, Senior Fishery Liaison 
Officer, International Institutions and Liaison 
Service 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Italy  Legal Department, FAO Blaise Kuemlangan, Legal Officer, 
Development Law Service 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Italy Legal Department, FAO Victor Mosoti, Associate Legal Officer, 
Development Law Service 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist  
Japan (Tokyo Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, Koichi Tahara, Assistant Director, Fisheries 2006 (June) Japan government official 
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unless otherwise 
specified) 
Forestry and Fisheries Processing Industries and Marketing Division 
Japan Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Ryo Omori, Section Chief, Far Seas Fisheries 
Division, Resources Management Dept 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Shingo Ota, Assistant Director, Office of 
Overseas Fisheries Cooperation 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Shuya Nakatsuka, Fisheries Processing 
Industries and Marketing Division 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Takaaki Sakamoto, Assistant Director, 
International Affairs Division 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Yosuke Yasumuro, Office of Overseas 
Fisheries Cooperation, International Affairs 
Division 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan  Fisheries Agency, Ministry of Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
Hayato Shirase, Office of Overseas Fisheries 
Cooperation 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan (Yaizu) Hagoromo Foods Corporation  Etsuo Matsumura, Director and Plant Manager 
Yaizu Plant 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Yaizu) Hagoromo Foods Corporation  Noriyuki Yamanashi, Deputy General Manager, 
Product Dept No. 2, Procurement Group 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Itochu Corporation Tsuyoshi Akiywama, Manager of Marine 
Products Section No. 1, Marine Products Dept, 
Food Company 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Itochu Corporation Kenichi Hayashi, General Manager of Marine 
Products Dept, Fresh Food & Businesses 
Solutions Division, Food Company 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Itochu Corporation Tsuyoshi Kawano, Tuna Team No.1, Marine 
Products Dept, Fresh Food & Businesses 
Solutions Division, Food Company 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Kaimaki: Japan Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing 
Association 
Kazuo Shima, President 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Kaimaki: Japan Far Seas Purse Seine Fishing 
Association 
Minoru Honda, Executive Secretary 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Kinkatsu, National Offshore Tuna Fisheries 
Association of Japan 
Akihiko Yatsuzuka, Manager 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Shida) Kyokuyo Suisan Co., Ltd.  Hideto Chiba, Director and General Manager, 
Fisheries Dept. Purse Seining Section 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Shida) Kyokuyo Suisan Co., Ltd.  Ikuo Muratani, Preident 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Shida) Kyokuyo Suisan Co., Ltd.  Shinya Yoshimoto, Sub Manager, Fisheries 
Dept. Purse Seining Section 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Shida) Kyokuyo Suisan Co., Ltd.  Tai Nozaki, Fisheries Dept. Purse Seining 
Section 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
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Japan (Shida) Kyokuyo Suisan Co., Ltd. Taro Kawamoto, Manager, Fisheries Dept. 
Purse Seining Section 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Luen Thai Fishing Venture Ltd. Japan Branch Gen Takekata, General Manager 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Satoru Goto, Special Advisor to the Minister of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries on 
International Affairs (Fisheries) 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Mayumi Kobayashi, Oceania Division, Asian 
and Oceania Affairs Bureau  
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Yujiro Akatsuka, Grant Aid Division, 
Economic Cooperation Bureau 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan Nikkatsu: Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperative 
Association 
Hisao Masuko, Director 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Nikkatsu: Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperative 
Association 
Kazushige Hazama, International Division 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Nikkatsu: Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperative 
Association 
Masaaki Nakamura, Advisor 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan OFCF: Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation 
Hidenobu Eguchi, Managing Director, Planning 
and Coordination Dept. 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan OFCF: Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation 
Jun Takahashi, Director Planning and Research 
Division 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan OFCF: Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation 
Masaru Suzuki, Vice President 2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan OFCF: Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation 
Shigeru Kuramochi, Director, Pacific Islands 
Division 
2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan OFCF: Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation 
Shogo Sugiura, Vice President 2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan OFCF: Overseas Fishery Cooperation 
Foundation 
Toshio Tsukahara, Special Advisor 2006 (June) Japan government official 
Japan OPRT (Organization for the Promotion of 
Responsible Tuna Fisheries) 
Yuichiro Harada, Managing Director 2006 (June) NGO 
Japan T & F Co. Ltd. Kenneth H. Banwell, Manager, Import Division 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan T & F Co. Ltd. Teruyo Watanabe, President 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd Akio Fukuma, Team Leader, Purse Seine 
Fishery Group 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd Hironobu Imamura, President 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd Masakazu Sonobe, Manager Purse Seine 
Fishery Group 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd Tadashi Iijima, Advisor 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd Takashi Furukatsu, Group Manager, Purse 
Seine Fishery Group 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
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Japan Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd Yoshimi Tateno, Manager, Purse Seine Fishery 
Group 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Yaizu) Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd  Akira Hashiguchi, Sub-leader, Purse Seine 
Fishery Group, Tuna Trade Team 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Yaizu) Taiyo A&F Co., Ltd  Toshio Mukaigawato, Team Leader, Purse 
Seine Fishery Group, Tuna Trade Team 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Tohto Suisan Co., Ltd Yoku Oshikata, Managing Director 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Tokyo Central Wholesale Market, Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government 
Yoshihiro Yamada, Public Relations Official  2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan Toshou Trading Co, Ltd. S. Watanabe, President 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Yaizu) Yaizu Fisheries Cooperative Association  Misao Hirata, Department Manager, Fish 
Market Dept, 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Yaizu) Yaizu Fisheries Cooperative Association  Keitaro Katayama, Director in Charge of Fish 
Market Dept. 
2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Japan (Yaizu) Yaizu Fishery Processing Centre Cooperative  Hiroyuki Kawamura, Director 2006 (June) Japan industry representative 
Mauritius Indian Ocean Commission Raj Mohabir, Task Manager 2007 (May and July and 
person. comms.) 
International agency  
Mauritius Indian Ocean Commission David Ardill, Regional Coordinator, MCS 
Project (former Executive Secretary, Indian 
Ocean Tuna Commission) 
2007 (May); 2006 (Sept 
informal) 
International fisheries specialist  
Mauritius Government of Mauritius, Ministry of Agro-
Industry, Food Production and Security 
Daroomalingum Mauree, Principal Fisheries 
Officer 
2007 (informal May and 
July) 
International fisheries specialist  
Mauritius Princes Tuna Mauritius Evert Liewes, Managing Director 2007 (May, May 
videoconference, July 
informal, and person. 
comms.) 
EU industry representative 
Mauritius Princes Tuna Mauritius Rob Laird, Financial Controller  2007 (May and May 
videoconference) 
EU industry representative 
Netherlands 
(Amsterdam) 
Greenpeace International Sari Tolvanen 2007-2011 (multiple 
informal communications) 
NGO 
Netherlands 
(Rotterdam) 
Princes Group Misja de Schepper, Head of  buying and sales 2010 (June) EU industry representative 
New Zealand 
(Wellington) 
Ministry of Fisheries David Marx, Senior International Advisor 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  Ministry of Fisheries Mathew Bartholomew, International Advisor 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade David Evans, Senior Legal Advisor 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Jennifer McDonald, Deputy Director 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade John Riley Non-Agricultural Products 
Technical Barriers to Trade Trade Negotiations 
2006 (March) ANZ government official 
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Division 
New Zealand  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Brian Smythe, Pacific Regional Trade Advisor  2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Mark Talbott, Senior Policy Officer 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Michelle Wanwimolruk, Policy Officer 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  New Zealand Aid Paul Wallis, Programme Manager Pacific 
Group 
2006 (March) ANZ government official 
New Zealand  Seafood Industry Council Alastair Macfarlane, General Manager Trade 
and Information 
2006 (March) ANZ government official 
(industry representative, but only 
ANZ one so anonymised under 
'government') 
Niue Canoe owners (Vaka) association Taumafai Fuhiniu 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Niue Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry 
Brendan Pasisi, Director of Fisheries 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Forestry 
Fiafia Rex, Fisheries Officer 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Economic Planning and Development Section, 
Premier’s Dept. 
Frank Sioneholo,  e-business Development 
Officer 
2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Government of Niue Bill V. Motufoou,  Minister for Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry 
2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue New Zealand High Commission Heather Wright, NZAID Manager and Deputy 
High Commissioner 
2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Niue Chamber of Commerce Lofa Rex, President 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Niue Development Bank Kathy Sofaea, Manager 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Niue Fish Processors (NFP) Eddie Watts,  Manager 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Niue Niue Fishermans Association Tau Pasisi 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Niue Premier’s Dept, Economic Planning and 
Development Section,  
Sonny Liuvaie 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Premier’s Dept. Josie Tamate,  Secretary to Premier 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Reef Group Ltd. Angela McNicholl, General Manager Niue 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Niue Revenue Section, Treasury Department, Sione P. Sionetama, Collector of Customs 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Niue Treasury Department Eddie McEachan, Financial Secretary 2005 (Nov) Niue government official 
Papua New Guinea 
(Port Moresby 
unless otherwise 
specified) 
AusAID Hannah Birdsey, Second Secretary 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
Papua New Guinea Austrade John Brand, Senior Trade Commissioner 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
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Papua New Guinea Australia Foreign Affairs and Trade Deahne Turnbull, Third Secretary 2006 (March) ANZ government official 
Papua New Guinea Delegation to the European Commission to 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Vanuatu 
Lars Gronvald, Second Secretary 2006 (March) EU government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of National Planning and 
Monitoring  
Jerry Huekwahin, Programme Officer 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Seline Leo-Lohia 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Andrew Lilivra, Industry Division 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Ronald George Maru, Policy Division 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Vincent Kisso, PTO-APEC 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Elise Mcauley, ODI Fellow 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Karo Rupa 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Darlie Tony, Policy Division 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Trade and Industry Jacinta Warakai-Manua, Trade Division 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Treasury Allan Kapi Gipis, Economic Fiscal 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Treasury Alfred Mokae, Acting Principle Economist 
Forecasting 
2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Department of Treasury Andrew Oaeke, Acting Principle Economist 
GEP 
2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Division of Fisheries  Willie Sangi, Acting Provincial Fisheries 
Officer 
2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Fairwell Fishery Francis Houji 2006 (March) Asia industry representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Lae) 
Frabelle (PNG) Limited  Alex R. Bernadino, General Manager 2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Lae) 
Frabelle (PNG) Limited Jun Cuanan, Assistant Plant Manager 2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Lae) 
Frabelle (PNG) Limited Nestor Depensor, Resident Director 2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Lae) 
Frabelle (PNG) Limited Dexter Patrick N. Martinez, Quality Assurance 
Manager 
2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea Gillett, Preston and Associates Gary Preston, Consultant 2006 (March) International fisheries specialist  
Papua New Guinea International Finance Corporation Peter Cusack, Papua New Guinea Coordinator 2006 (March) International agency 
Papua New Guinea International Food Corporation Ltd Luke B. Supro, Personnel and Public Affairs 
Manager 
2006 (March) Asia industry representative 
Papua New Guinea Investment Promotion Authority Clarence M. Hoot, Director 2006 (March) PNG government official 
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Papua New Guinea Investment Promotion Authority Yave Yarita, Investment Officer 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Japan International Cooperation Agency Tony Ombo, Development Officer 2006 (March) Japan government official 
Papua New Guinea Latitude 8/Industry Assn Maurice Brownjohn 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Lae) 
Maps Tuna  Paul Akop 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Lae) 
Maps Tuna Angelito Mangubat 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Papua New Guinea National Fisheries Authority Aquina Kango 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea National Fisheries Authority Justin Ilakini , Industry Liaison Officer 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea National Fisheries Authority Leka Pitoi, Project Coordinator 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea National Fisheries Authority Sylvester Pokajam , Acting Managing Director 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea National Fisheries Authority Jerome Tioti, Assistanct Economic Research 
Officer 
2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea National Statistical Office Nick Suvulo,  National Statistician 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea National Statistical Office Tony Waisa, Statistician 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Neptune Fishing Sir Henry Chow, Managing Director 2006 (March) PIC industry representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Madang) 
RD Tuna Canners Ltd. Pete Celso, Executive Vice President/ 
Managing Director 
2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea  
(Madang) 
RD Tuna Canners Ltd.  Genevieve C. Fernando, Quality Control 
Manager 
2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Madang) 
RD Tuna Canners Ltd.  Elmer A. Mordeno, Vice President 2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Madang) 
RD Tuna Canners Ltd.  Philip Sanchez, Vice President Sales and 
Marketing 
2006 (March) PIC and Philippine industry 
representative 
Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank Rodney Hoffman, Executive Manager – 
Lending Divison 
2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank Luke Ambu, Branch Manager – Boroko 2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea Rural Development Bank Garima Tongia, Project Officer, Microfinance 
Divison 
2006 (March) PNG government official 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Sepik Coastal Agencies  Paul Martin 2006 (March) PIC vessel services 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Sepik Coastal Agencies  Foeng Tjoeng, Director 2006 (March) PIC vessel services 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Sepik Coastal Agencies  Mathew Watson, Shipping Manager 2006 (March) PIC vessel services 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Sepik Coastal Agencies  Caspar Kwaindu, Administration Manager 2006 (March) PIC vessel services 
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Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Southseas Tuna Corporation  Ian Boatwood, General Manager 2006 (March) Asia industry representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Southseas Tuna Corporation  Francis Sumanop, Manager/ Community and 
Government Liason 
2006 (March) Asia industry representative 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Wewak Agencies Limited  Jillyanne Sengi, Manageress 2006 (March) PIC vessel services 
Papua New Guinea 
(Wewak) 
Wewak Agencies Limited  Shiela Sengi,  2006 (March) PIC vessel services 
Samoa Albacorp Investments Limited and Vice-
President of the Tuna Exporters Association 
Robert Ripley, Managing Director 2005 (Nov; Interview 
transcript V. Ram-Bidesi) 
PIC industry representative 
Samoa Apia Export Fish Packers Ltd. John Luff, Managing Director 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Samoa Apprenticeship and Labour, Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Labour 
Elisapeta Eteuati, Asst. CEO  2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Census and Survey Section, Statistical Services 
Division, Ministry of Finance 
Taiaopo Faumuina, Senior Statistician 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Census and Survey Section, Statistical Services 
Division, Ministry of Finance 
Sefo Taulealo, Senior Statistician 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Central Bank of Samoa Arona Alosina, Senior Economist 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Central Bank of Samoa Karras Lui, Assistant Manager 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Central Bank of Samoa Tanya Tuisuga, Senior Exchange Control 
Officer 
2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa CJ Exports and Imports Rob Willis 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Samoa Dept of Customs, Ministry for  Revenue Sina Laumea, Customs IT Manager 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Dept of Customs, Ministry for Revenue Ray Pereira, D/CEO 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Dept of Customs, Ministry for Revenue Tanuvasa Iosefa Kalolo, Asst. CEO, Trade & 
Technical,  
2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Development Bank of Samoa Fuimaono Falefa Lima, General Manager 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Economic Policy and Planning Division, 
Ministry of Finance 
Paul Meredith, Asst. CEO 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Economic Policy and Planning Division, 
Ministry of Finance 
Benjamin Pereira, Principal Planning Officer 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Economic Policy and Planning Division, 
Ministry of Finance 
Penelope Tevita-Tuatagaloa, Principal 
Macroeconomic Officer 
2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Fisheries Division, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
Antonio P. Mulipola,  2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Fisheries Division, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
Savali Gu Time 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Fisheries Division, Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
Ueta Faasili (Jnr) 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
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Samoa Industry, Investment and Fair Trading, Ministry 
of Commerce, Industry and Labour 
Iulia Petelo, Asst. CEO 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa JICA Samoa Office Ichiro Mimura, Asst. Resident Representative 2005 (Nov) Japan government official 
Samoa Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Frank Fong, Asst. CEO Policy, Planning & 
Communication 
2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Labour Belinda Filo 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Aida Faumui, Principal Trade Officer 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Nella Tavita-Levy, Principal Trade Officer 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa NZAID Manager, First Secretary  Philip Hewitt,  2005 (Nov) ANZ government official 
Samoa Pacific Corporate Services John Boyle, Managing Director 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Samoa Policy, Planning & Communication, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries 
Jasmine Sila, Senior Planning Officer 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Research and Statistics Dept, Central Bank of 
Samoa 
Alavine Sua, Assistant Manager 2005 (Nov) Samoa government official 
Samoa Sub-Regional Office for the Pacific Islands, 
FAO 
Massimo Diomedi,  Associate Professional 
Officer for Agricultural Trade Policy 
2005 (Nov) International agency 
Samoa Sub-Regional Office for the Pacific Islands, 
FAO 
Masanami Izumi, Fishery Officer 2005 (Nov) International fisheries specialist 
Samoa Tradewinds Fishing Company Bev Levy, Managing Director 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Seychelles Aquarius Shipping Agency Anthony Savy de St. Maurice, General 
Manager 
2009 (January) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Aquarius Shipping Agency Claude Robert, Accountant 2009 (January) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Atunsa Peter Padayachy, local agent 2006 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Central Bank of Seychelles Francis Chang Leng, Governor 2006 (Aug) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Central Bank of Seychelles Caroline Abel, Head of Division, Monetary 
Analysis and Statistics (2009); Head of 
Research (2006) 
2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Central Bank of Seychelles Hilda Palconit, Economist 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles CMB (Ets Chevannes-Merceron-Ballery),  Frederic Rivalain 2009 (January) EU industry representative 
Seychelles CMB (Ets Chevannes-Merceron-Ballery),  Bertrand Monpert 2009 (January) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Consultant to Spanish government Juan Jose Areso, Spanish Fisheries Office 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) EU government official 
Seychelles Department of Legal Affairs Ronny Govinden, Attorney General 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Echebastar/ Hartswater Ltd. Gaetan Pierre, Inspector 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Echebastar/ Hartswater Ltd. Itxaso Echevarria, sister of owner 2009 (January) EU industry representative 
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Seychelles Fishing Boat Owners Association Beatty Hoaureau, (Head, 2006; member, 2009) 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Hunt, Deltel & Co Ltd Edmond H. Houareau, Managing Director 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles vessel services or 
Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Hunt, Deltel & Co Ltd Mike C. King-Harman, CEO 2006 (Sept) Seychelles vessel services or 
Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles IFREMER Patrick Berthou, Responsable du programme 
SIDEPECHE 
2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
EU industry representative 
Seychelles Impress Danilo A. Banga, Plant Manager 2009 (January) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Impress Name not recorded (plant manager) 2006 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Impress ‘Dan’ (health and safety manager) 2006 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT) Ltd Alain Olivieri, (temp) IOT General Manager, 
MWB Manufacturing Director 
2009 (January) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT) Ltd Cecile Holtzhausen, IOT Quality Manager 2009 (January) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT) Ltd Gaëta le Colleter, MWB Group Quality 
Manager 
2009 (January) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT) Ltd David Bentley. Managing Director IOT and 
PFC and IOT Board Member 
2006 (Sept x2 interviews); 
2003 
EU industry representative 
Seychelles Indian Ocean Tuna (IOT) Ltd Joe S. Madnack, head of finance and IOT 
Board Member 
2006 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Seychelles Inpesca and Pevasa Gorka Ugarte, local representative 2006 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Seychelles IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) Alejandro Anganuzzi, Executive Secretary 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan); 
multiple informal comms 
International fisheries specialist  
Seychelles IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) Julien Million, IOTC Tagging Assistant 2006 (Sept); multiple 
informal comms 
International fisheries specialist  
Seychelles IOTC (Indian Ocean Tuna Commission) Michael Stockwell, Financial and 
Administrative Officer, Regional Tuna Tagging 
Project - Indian Ocean 
2006 (Sept); multiple 
informal comms 
International fisheries specialist  
Seychelles Island Development Company Ltd (IDC) Glenny Savy, Executive Chairman 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Land Marine David Monthy 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Land Marine Eugene Harkoon 2006 (Sept) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Land Marine Hughes Adam 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles vessel services or 
Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Mahe Shipping Co. Ltd., Gerry Adam, Managing Director  2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Mahe Shipping Co. Ltd., Joe Morin, Operations Manager  2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Marine and Engineering Works Charlie Marzocchi 2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
Seychelles vessel services 
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Seychelles Ministry of Finance Sitna César, Head of Budget 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Melanie Stravens 2006 (Aug); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Michelle Tomkinson 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Jacqueline Pierre 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Steve Jardine, Commissioner of Taxes  2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Ronald Cafrine, Director General, Policy and 
Strategy Division 
2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Charles A. Morin, Technical Advisor (Trade) 2006 (Aug) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Nadir Hussein 2006 (Aug) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Finance Hugh Watts 2009 (Jan 2009) Seychelles government official or 
International fisheries specialist 
Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs Philippe Michaud, Technical Advisor (2009); 
special advisor, Fisheries Policy Unit, Ministry 
of Environment and Natural Resources (2006); 
SFA (2003) 
2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan); 
2003 
Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Foreign Affairs Vivienne Fock-Tave, Special Advisor (2009) 
and Principal Secretary, Department for 
International Cooperation (2006) 
2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan); 
(2003) 
Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment and 
Transport  
Joel Morgan, Minister (meetings, not formal 
interviews) 
2009 (January and July) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment and 
Transport  
Walter C. Talma, Principal Secretary, 
Department of Natural Resources [then] 
Ministry of Environment and Natural 
Resources 
2006 (Sept) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment and 
Transport  
Dr. Bernard Moulinie, Director General Animal 
Health and Development, [then] Ministry of 
Environment and Natural Resources 
2006 (Sept) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Ministry of Natural Resources, Environment and 
Transport  
Joël Nageon de Lestang, Principal Fisheries 
Officer, Fisheries Policy Unit, Department of 
Natural Resources 
2006 (Aug) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles National Statistics Bureau (NSB) Laura Ah Tim, Director 2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Naval Services (1994) Ltd Captain Morgan, Managing Director 2009 (January) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Oceana Fisheries Co. Ltd. Radley Weber, co-owner [prior Managing 
Director of COI and, subsequent, IOT cannery] 
2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) EU industry representative or 
Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Oceana Fisheries Co. Ltd. Joseph Tirant, Managing Director 2009 (January) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Oceana Fisheries Co. Ltd. Jean Claude Houareau, Quality Assurance 
Manager 
2009 (January) Seychelles industry representative 
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Seychelles OPAGAC Julian Rica,  local representative 2006 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Seychelles President’s Office Rolph Payet, Special Advisor on Environment 
to the President 
2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes); misc. 
informal, 2004. 
Seychelles government official 
Seychelles President’s Office Jean-Paul Adam 2006 (Sept) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Sea Harvest Eugene Albert, Managing Director  2009 (January) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Sea Harvest Evans Mellon, Quality Assurance Manager  2009 (January) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Sea Harvest Marc Houreau, owner 2006 (Aug) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Sea Harvest Guy Houreau, owner 2006 (Aug) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Sea Harvest Travis Jensen, General Manager 2006 (Aug) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Seychelles Bureau of Standards (SBS) Amy C. Quatre, CEO 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Bureau of Standards (SBS) Andy Ally, Manager 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Bureau of Standards (SBS) Mohit Kamble, Senior Standards Officer 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Bureau of Standards (SBS) Mariam Kante, Principal Chemist 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
(SCCI) 
Nicole Tirant-Gheradi 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Seychelles Electronic Maritime Co. Ltd 
(SEYCMI) 
John R. Tregarthen, Executive Chairman 2009 (January) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Seychelles Electronic Maritime Co. Ltd 
(SEYCMI) 
Allen Houareau, General Manager 2009 (January) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Vincent Lucas 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Juliette Dorizo  2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Florian Giroux, Fisheries Technical Adviser  2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Veronique Herminie, Chairperson 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Michel A. Marguerite, Project Manager (2009); 
Senior Manager, Policy Planning (2006) 
2009 (January and July) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Carol Low, Senior Fish Inspector, Fish 
Inspection Unit 
2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Finley J. Racombo, Chairperson 2006 (Sept) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Rondolph Payet, Managing Director 2006 (Sept); 2008 
(telephone interview); 2009 
(Jan x3 and July) 
Seychelles government official or 
International fisheries specialist 
Seychelles Seychelles Fishing Authority Jan Robinson, [acting] Head of Research 
(2009) 
2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan); 
(2003); multiple informal 
comms 
Seychelles government official or 
International fisheries specialist 
388
Seychelles Seychelles Investment Bureau (SIB) Sherin Renaud, CEO 2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Investment Bureau (SIB) Maria Morel, Promotion Development Officer 2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Licensing Authority (SLA) Michael Walletamby, CEO 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Licensing Authority (SLA) Francis Carota, Financial Controller 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Licensing Authority (SLA) Robert Daymyre, Manager Licence Processing 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Petroleum Company (SEPEC) Guy Adam, CEO 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles vessel services or 
Seychelles industry representative 
Seychelles Seychelles Port Authority (SPA) Lt Col. Andre Ciseau, CEO 2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Port Authority (SPA) David Biamchi, Economic and Finance 
Manager 
2006 (Sept); 2009 (Jan) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Port Authority (SPA) Captain Percy Laporte, Harbour Master 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Seychelles Port Authority (SPA) Franky Laporte, Project Manager 2009 (January) Seychelles government official 
Seychelles Société de Contrôle d’Expertise Maritime et 
Pêche (SOCOMEP) 
Jean-Marc Perrin, Consultant [and former 
French fleet manager] 
2009 (January x2) EU industry representative or 
Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Société de Contrôle d’Expertise Maritime et 
Pêche (SOCOMEP) 
Isabella Lablache, Operation Director  2009 (January) Seychelles vessel services 
Seychelles Southern Ocean Shipchandlers (Pty) Ltd. Albert Gonzague d’Offay, Director 2009 (January; Interview 
transcript C. Barnes) 
Seychelles vessel services 
Singapore Tri Marine International Phil Roberts 2009 (June); 2006 (May x2, 
Bangkok); multiple person. 
comms. 
EU industry representative or 
Asia industry representative 
Solomon Islands Dept of Finance & Treasury, Ministry of 
Finance, National Reform & Planning 
Harry Greenwell, Economic Reform Unit 2005 (Nov) Solomon Islands government 
official 
Solomon Islands Embassy of Japan Izumi Iwaoka, Researcher/Advisor 2005 (Nov) Japan government official 
Solomon Islands European Union Henry Prankerd, Chargé d’Affaires 2005 (Nov) EU government official 
Solomon Islands Fisheries Department Sylvester Diake, Under Secretary  2005 (Nov) Solomon Islands government 
official 
Solomon Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Mike Batty, Fisheries Development Policy 
Specialist 
2005 (Nov) International fisheries specialist 
Solomon Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Len Rodwell, Head Fisheries Development 
Division 
2005 (Nov); multiple 
person. comms. until 2011 
International fisheries specialist 
Solomon Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Transform Aqorau, Legal Counsel 2005 (Nov) International fisheries specialist 
Solomon Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Masao Nakada, OFCF advisor, General 
Manager, Port Relief Engineering Co. Ltd. 
Tokyo, and former  Operations Manager at 
Solomon Taiyo 
2005 (Novx2); 2006 
multiple informal 
International fisheries specialist 
and PIC/Japan industry 
representative 
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Solomon Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Amanda Hamilton 2005 (Nov); multiple 
person. comms. until 2011 
International fisheries specialist 
Solomon Islands Forum Fisheries Agency Masao Nakada, OFCF advisor, General 
Manager, Port Relief Engineering Co. Ltd. 
Tokyo, and former  Operations Manager at 
Solomon Taiyo 
2005 (Novx2); 2006 
multiple informal 
International fisheries specialist 
and PIC industry representative 
Solomon Islands H.M. Customs & Excise Daniel Rofeta, Comptroller of Customs 2005 (Nov) Solomon Islands government 
official 
Solomon Islands Japan International Cooperation Agency Hiromi Fujita, Resident Representative 2005 (Nov) PIC industry representative 
Solomon Islands Mako Fisheries Limited Durkee Kim, Managing Director 2005 (Nov) Asia industry representative 
Solomon Islands Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Foreign 
Affairs 
Henry Pika, Under Secretary 2005 (Nov) Solomon Islands government 
official 
Solomon Islands National Fisheries Development Adrian Wickham 2005 (Nov) EU industry representative 
Solomon Islands New Zealand High Commission Brian Sanders, High Commissioner 2005 (Nov) ANZ government official 
Solomon Islands New Zealand High Commission Tamsin Royson, Second Secretary 2005 (Nov) ANZ government official 
Solomon Islands Soltai Fishing & Processing Ltd Milton Sibiospere 2005 (informal, Nov); 
Interview transcript (A. 
Hamilton) 
PIC industry representative 
Spain (Bilbao) Albacora, SA  Inaki Lachanga Bengoetxea, President 2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Bilbao) Albacora, SA (Bilbao) Luisa Lachanga, Asst President 2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Bilbao) Albacora, SA (Bilbao) Imanol Loinaz Eguiguren, Fleet Director 2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain ANABAC/OPTUC (Bermeo) Anertz Muniategi 2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Vigo) ANFACO  Juan Manuel Vieites Baptista de Sousa, 
Secretary General, Anfaco-CECOPESCA 
2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Vigo) ANFACO  José Carlos Castro Neila,Head of Department 
of Institutional Relations, Expansion and 
Management of Associations 
2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Vigo) ANFACO Felicidad Fernández Felicite, Head of 
Department of International Information 
2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Vigo) ANFACO  Marta Aymerich Cano, Head of Department of 
Trade, Promotion and EU Affairs 
2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Madrid) Calvo   Carlos Sánchez Plaza, Director of Fleet 2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Galicia) Conservas Garavilla Juan Coralles, Chief Executive 2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Galicia) Conservas Garavilla José Manuel Blanco Cid, Director 2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain (Galicia) Jealsa Rianxeira Benjamin Recarey Rendo, Plant Production 
Manager 
2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
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Spain (Galicia) Jealsa Rianxeira  Paula Fabeiro Castro, Plant Quality Control 
Manager 
2010 (Sept) EU industry representative 
Spain OPAGAC Julio Moron Interview transcript (A. 
Hamilton) and person. 
comms., 2011 
EU industry representative 
Spain (Bilbao and 
Galicia) 
Tri Marine International (Spain) Alfonso Beitia, General Manager 2010 (Sept, and informal) EU industry representative or 
Asia industry representative 
Spain (Galicia) Tri Marine International (Spain) Alberto Quinteiro, Inspector 2010 (Sept, and informal) EU industry representative or 
Asia industry representative 
Thailand (Bangkok 
and surrounds) 
Besso Limited, Lloyd’s Brokers Eyre Turbett, Director – Marine Division 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand Echebastar fleet, s.l.u. José Luis Jauregui Iriarte,  Director of Fleet 
Operations 
2006 (May) EU industry representative 
Thailand FAO David James, 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand FAO Helga Josupeit, 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand FAO Derek Staples, Senior Fishery Officer 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand FCF Fishery Co., Ltd. David Fang, Bangkok Representative Office 2006 (May) Asia industry representative 
Thailand Gillett Preston and Associates Mike McCoy, Consultant 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand Independent. Dr Sakda Thanicul, Faculty of Law, 
Chulalongkorn University 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand Interpral s.a. Prachote Bedi, Bangkok Representative Office 2006 (May) EU industry representative 
Thailand J.M.B. International Ltd. Anchern Thangsombat 2006 (May) Thailand industry representative 
Thailand Kingfisher Group, Southeast Asian Packaging 
and Canning Ltd. 
Yanee Arunthong, General Manager – Admin 
& Procurement (Canned Operation)  
2006 (May) Thailand industry representative 
Thailand Kingfisher Holdings Limited Toshikatsu Tanaka, Managing Director 2006 (May) Thailand industry representative 
Thailand Kingfisher Holdings Limited, Southeast Asian 
Packaging and Canning Ltd. 
Nat Onsri, General Manager –Manufacturing 2006 (May) Thailand industry representative 
Thailand Maldives Industrial Fisheries Company 
(MIFCO) 
Mohamed Adil Saleem, Managing Director 2006 (May) Asia industry representative 
Thailand Marine Stewardship Council Duncan Leadbitter, Regional Director – Asia 
Pacific 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
(SEAFDEC) 
Suppachai Ananpongsuk, Administrative 
Division Head, Training Dept. 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
(SEAFDEC) 
Bundit Chokesanguan, Information and 
Extension Division Head, Training Dept. 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
(SEAFDEC) 
Dr Somboon Siriraksophon, Research Division 
Head, Training Dept. 
2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
Thailand Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center Dr. Yuttana Theparoonrat, Training Division 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
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(SEAFDEC) Head, Training Dept. 
Thailand Starkist South East Asia, Inc Tim Real, Director 2006 (May) US industry representative 
Thailand TESS Group of Companies, Sri Lanka Roshan Fernando, Director 2006 (May) Asia industry representative 
Thailand Thai Union Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Sunan Chantavichaikij, Manager, Procurement 
Dept. 
2006 (May) Thailand industry representative 
Thailand Thai Union Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Wanna Sukwiboondacha, Marketing Executive, 
Marketing Dept. 
2006 (May) Thailand industry representative 
Thailand Thai Union Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Varawit Tre-tip-rat, Regional Manager, 
Marketing Dept. 
2006 (May) Thailand industry representative 
Thailand Tri Marine International (Bangkok) Michele Mango, Thailand Representative 
Office 
2006 (May) EU industry representative or 
Asia industry representative 
Thailand Tri Marine International (Panama) Rick Heroux, Managing Director 2006 (May) EU industry representative or 
Asia industry representative 
Thailand Tri Marine International (Panama) Manuel Zito, Commercial Manager 2006 (May) EU industry representative or 
Asia industry representative 
Thailand Tri Marine International (Singapore) Marco D’Agostini, Assistant Manager, Value 
Added Products Asia/ Africa 
2006 (May) EU industry representative or 
Asia industry representative 
Tonga ‘Alatini Group of Companies Bill Holden, Director 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Tonga AusAID Tracey Austwick, AusAID Representative 2006 (Feb) ANZ government official 
Tonga Customs Kelemete Valie 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Customs Heiloni Latu 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Don Jacobson & Associates Don Jacobson 2006 (Feb) International agency 
Tonga Global Fishing Sailosi Taunaholo 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Tonga Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Mr. Soane Patolo  2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Tonga Maritime Projects Tonga Ltd Lennie Niit, Managing Director 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Tonga Ministry of Finance Aholotu S. Palu,  Economist 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Ministry of Fisheries Sione Vailala Matoto, Secretary for Fisheries 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry Jaya Choraria, ODI Fellow 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry, Paulo Kautoke, Secretary for Labour, 
Commerce and Industry 
2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry, Vika Filsimaloliu, Deputy Secretary, Industries 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Ministry of Labour, Commerce and Industry, Siaosi T. Fifito,  Senior Trade Officer 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga New Zealand High Commission Michael McBryde,  High Commissioner 2006 (Feb) ANZ government official 
Tonga RIOT UNIFI Ltd Tisina Filo 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
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Tonga South Pacific Resources Co. Ltd Chin H. Choe, Managing Director 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Tonga South Pacific Resources Co. Ltd Lopeti Prescott, Operations Manager 2006 (Feb) PIC industry representative 
Tonga Statistics Division Mrs. Masivailo Masila,  Consumer Price Index 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Statistics Division Mr. Feleti Wolfgramm (Trade) 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Statistics Division Mr. Sione Lolohea, Vital Statistics 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Statistics Division ‘Ata’ata M. Finau, Government Statistician & 
GDP/GNP 
2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Tonga Development Bank ‘Otenifi Auf’alo Matoto, Managing Director 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Tonga Development Bank Simione Sefanaia, Deputy Managing Director–
Operations 
2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Tonga Development Bank John Bath, Manager, Risk Management/Board 
Advisor 
2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Tonga Fisheries Project Marc Wilson, Team Leader & Institutional 
Specialist 
2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
Tonga Tonga Ports Authority Mr. Viliami Tuipulotu, Deputy Port Master 2006 (Feb) Tonga government official 
UK Foodvest (Findus, Young's Bluecrest Seafood 
and The Seafood Company) 
Stephen William Wardley, Seafood Sourcing 
Manager 
2008 (Aug, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK Greenpeace UK David Ritter 2007-2011 (multiple 
informal communications) 
NGO 
UK Iglo Birds Eye  Bob Hannon, Procurement Director 2008 (Sept, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK Iglo Birds Eye  Peter Hajipieris, Director of Sustainability and 
External Affairs 
2008 (Sept, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK M&J Seafoods Mike Berthet, Group Director Fish and Seafood 2008 (Aug, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK Marks and Spencer (M&S) Andrew Mallison, Technical Manager - 
Seafood Procurement 
2008 (Aug, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK New England Seafood International Lucy Pelham Burn, Head of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
2008 (Aug, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK Princes Group Mike Easterbrook, Chief Executive Group 
Buying 
2007 (May, Liverpool) EU industry representative 
UK Seafish Andy Gray, Marketing Manager 2008 (Aug, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK  Waitrose John Vine  2005 (Oct, telephone 
interview) 
EU industry representative 
UK Waitrose Quentin Clark, Central Buyer Poultry, Fish And 
Eggs 
2005 (Oct, person. comm.); 
2008 (Aug, telephone 
interview); 2011 (March, 
informal meeting) 
EU industry representative 
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United States (San 
Diego) 
American Tunaboat Association Paul Krampe, Executive Director  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (LA) Bumble Bee Seafoods, LLC Sheri R. Glazebrook, General Manager 2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (LA) Bumble Bee Seafoods, LLC Liliana Rodriguez, Quality Assurance Manager  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Bumble Bee Seafoods, LLC Michael McGowan, Vice President, Resourcing 
& Government Affairs  
2006 (May in San Diego and 
Bangkok and person. 
comms.) 
US industry representative 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 
Department of State 
Gavin A. Sundwall,  Country Desk Officer, 
Office of Australia, New Zealand and Pacific 
Island Affairs  
2006 (May) US government official 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Catalina Offshore Products, Inc. Dan Nattrass, Sales/Purchasing 2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Catalina Offshore Products, Inc. Dave Rudie, President  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Chicken of the Sea International Kevin Bixler, Director, Procurement  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Chicken of the Sea International Kevin McClain, Vice President, Procurement  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Connors Bros. Ltd. J. Douglas Hines, Executive Vice President, 
COO  
2006 (May in San Diego and 
Bangkok) 
US industry representative 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Connors Bros. Ltd. Christopher Lischewski, President, CEO, 2006 (May in San Diego and 
Bangkok) 
US industry representative 
United States (New 
York) 
High Representative for the Least Developed 
Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries 
and Small Island Developing States, United 
Nations 
Anwarul K. Chowdhury, Under-Secretary-
General  
2006 (May) International agency 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Independent. James Joseph, Consultant 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC) 
Robin Allen, Director 2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
(IATTC) 
Brian S. Hallman, Senior Policy Advisor  2006 (May) International fisheries specialist 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
IUCN (The World Conservation Union), USA 
Multilateral Office 
Dr Harlan K. Cohen, Advisor, Ocean 
Governance Global Marine Program 
2006 (May) NGO 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
IUCN (The World Conservation Union), USA 
Multilateral Office 
Dr Charlotte de Fontaubert, Senior Marine 
Advisor 
2006 (May) NGO 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
National Marine Fisheries Service, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US 
Department of Commerce 
Dean Swanson, Chief, International Fisheries 
Division  
2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
National Marine Fisheries Service, National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, US 
John Ward, Office of Constituent Services  2006 (May) US government official 
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Department of Commerce 
United States (LA) New Zealand Seafoods John Barrett, South Pacific Specialist 2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (LA) New Zealand Seafoods Ruben Galicia, HACCP Director  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Office of Marine Conservation, Department of 
State 
Dave Balton 2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Office of Marine Conservation, Department of 
State  
William Gibbons-Fly, Director 2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Office of Marine Conservation, Department of 
State 
Holly Koehler 2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Executive Office of the 
President 
Roy Malmose  2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Executive Office of the 
President 
Carlos S. Pachon, Director for Environment 
and Natural Resource Policy Affairs  
2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Office of the United States Trade 
Representative, Executive Office of the 
President 
Tiffany Smith, Director for Market Access  2006 (May) US government official 
United States (San 
Diego) 
Pacific Princess Partnership Ltd. Ricardo da Rosa, Manager  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
Sher & Blackwell Jeffrey R. Pike, Government Relations  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States Starkist Susan Jackson, Procurement 2006 (May)  [Telephone 
Interview] 
US industry representative 
United States (LA) Taiwan Seafood & Fish Corporation Frank Namikawa  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (LA) Tri-Marine Fish Company, LLC Anthony Vuoso, Executive Vice President  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (LA) Unified Seafood Co., Inc Robert C. Wang 2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States (San 
Diego) 
United States Tuna Foundation David G. Burney, Executive Director  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
United States Tuna Foundation Randi Parks Thomas  2006 (May) US industry representative 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
US House of Representatives Eni F. H. Faleomavaega, Member of Congress  2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
US House of Representatives Tim W. Johnson, Legislative Counsel to 
Congressman Eni F. H. Faleomavaega  
2006 (May) US government official 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
World Bank (Agriculture and Rural 
Development Department) 
Kieran Kelleher, Senior Fisheries Specialist  2006 (May) International agency 
United States 
(Washington DC) 
World Bank (Environmental, Rural and Social 
Development) 
John Virdin, Operations Officer  2006 (May) International agency 
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United States WWF David Schorr, consultant 2008-2010 (multiple 
informal comms. in Geneva) 
NGO 
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CHAPTER 2 APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX 2A 
Characteristics of Principal Market Canning-Grade Tuna Species; and Extent 
and Intensity of Global Tuna Fisheries, 1960-2004 
 
 It should be noted that there is some variation (and confusion) in nomenclature used 
for different species of tuna by: a) the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
(with significant variations and overlaps in the English, French and Spanish names); 
b) the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, entered into force in 
1994) and the subsequent 1995 UN Agreement Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN ‘Fish 
Stocks’ Agreement); the World Customs Organisation (WCO); and, c) the 1983 
International Convention on the Harmonised Commodity Description and Coding 
System. A legal review by Serdy clarifies that FAO nomenclature is preferred as it is 
based upon the principle of ‘one species, one name’; although, for legal purposes, 
Serdy recommends the use of the scientific (Latin) names (2004: 245-246). 
 
As noted in Chapters 1 and 2, the other main canning-grade subtropical tuna species – 
albacore – is not addressed in this thesis because of the limited interactions with purse 
seine fisheries (including in and around the Seychelles EEZ) and its relatively minor 
direct importance to EU markets. It is, however, of central importance to the US 
canned tuna market, which in turn might affect EU markets for canned skipjack, such 
as in the case where increased US consumption of canned albacore relative to skipjack 
expands the international availability of supply of canned skipjack, expressed through 
a downward effect on price, and vice versa. 
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Table 2A.1: Characteristics of principal market canning-grade tuna species 
FAO 
English 
name 
Key biological characteristics1 Key production-consumption characteristics  
(industrial fishing method  principal market) 2 
Albacore Sub-tropical. Worldwide distribution along this latitude. Intermediate between tropical and temperate 
tunas, i.e. adults widely distributed in tropical waters, but also widely distributed in subtropical and 
temperate waters. Moderately developed thermoregulation and seasonal spawning. 
Spawning duration: 3 months (in year); sexual maturity: 4.5 years and 15kg in weight; maximum: age 
(10 years), length (120cm) and weight (80kg) 
Primarily freezer longliner, but some fresh-chilled longliners  
Canned tuna, primarily for US consumption (marketed as ‘white 
meat’), but also in France and other EU15 countries. Minority 
consumption as tuna steaks in the US and elsewhere. 
Bigeye 
tuna  
 
Sub-tropical. Worldwide distribution. Intermediate between tropical and temperate tunas. Advanced 
rate of thermoregulation which allows their range to extend vertically in water column well below the 
epipelagic zone (diving to over 500 m).  
Spawning duration: 3 months; sexual maturity: 3.5 years and 31kg in weight; maximum: age (15 
years), length (180cm) and weight (225kg) 
Depth of habitat for adults means that they are primarily targeted by 
industrial longliners (freezer and fresh-chilled vessels)  
Consumption as sashimi, primarily in Japan. 
Industrial purse seiners targeting skipjack and yellowfin incur 
significant levels of incidental catch of juveniles, especially when 
fishing on Fish Aggregating Devices (FADs)  Incidental catch used 
in canned tuna, often packed with skipjack 
Skipjack 
tuna 
Tropical. Worldwide distribution along this latitude. Poorly developed thermoregulation, spends entire 
life in tropical waters (except when currents displace), spawns all year round over wide areas, and 
patterns of movement tend to be limited. All commercial tuna species listed here are all part of the 
genus Thunnus except for skipjack tuna, which is the only species in its genus (Katsuwonus pelamis). 
Spawning duration: 12 months; sexual maturity: 1.5 years and 1.7kg in weight; maximum: age (4-5 
years), length (75cm) and weight (23kg). 
In order of importance, purse seine, pole and line and, very limited, 
longline  Canned skipjack tuna consumption is global. Principal 
markets are EU and USA (mixed with yellowfin in US for 
‘lightmeat’ canned tuna) 
Also supplies katsuobushi (dried tuna) and other specialised markets 
in Japan. 
Yellowfin 
tuna 
Tropical. Worldwide distribution. Population based in the Indian and Pacific oceans. Less advanced 
rate of thermoregulation which confines their range to the upper 200 m of the water column. Poorly 
developed themoregulation, spends entire life in tropical waters (except when currents displace) and 
spawns for much of the year over wide areas.  
Spawning duration: 6 months; sexual maturity: 2.8 years and 25kg weight; maximum: age (10 years), 
length (170cm) and weight (176kg). 
In order of importance: Purse seine and pole-and-line  Canned 
tuna, primarily for southern EU consumption and mixed with 
skipjack for US ‘lightmeat’ product; Longliners (freezer and fresh-
chilled vessels)  Sashimi, primarily in Japan, but also US, East 
Asia and the EU; Longline, pole-and-line and purse seine  tuna 
fillets (e.g. ‘steaks’, etc), primarily to EU and US. 
 
                                                            
1 Based on FAO (2001: sections 1.4 and 1.5). 
2 Based on multiple interviews and direct observation over 2006-9, see also Campling et al. 2007; Miyake et al. 2010. This discussion excludes artisanal and small-scale tuna 
fisheries. An explanation of different fishing methods follows in the next section.  
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As we have seen in Chapter 2, freezer technology and enhanced vessel capacity 
allowed longer periods at sea, and permitted the spatial and temporal range and 
intensiveness of resource exploitation to expand rapidly.3 Figure 2A.1 illustrates total 
global production of skipjack by purse seine vessels in terms of volume and location 
between 1960 and 2004.4 Average yearly catch is illustrated over five year periods 
running from the start of each decade. This avoids El Nino events in 1996/7 
(dramatic) and 2007 (moderate) when changes to oceanic temperature affected tuna 
population flows, thus the data on location of fishing effort for these periods shifted. 
A clear trend is the rapid expansion of the fishery from the 1980s onwards in terms of 
both geographical location and intensity of catch volume. The spatial expansion and 
enhanced productivity of purse seine fisheries in the 1980s was driven by constant 
growth in sales of canned tuna in the US until 2002 and in the EU (see Chapter 3). Of 
particular importance to this thesis is the clear emergence of the purse seine fishery in 
the Western Indian Ocean (WIO) from the 1980s onwards (FAO statistical area 51 in 
the first plate of figure 2.3). The WIO tuna fishery must however, be understood in 
relation to other relevant fisheries for skipjack and yellowfin.  
 
                                                            
3 As did the ability of firms to tranship frozen fish in reefer vessels to processing locations long 
distances from fishing grounds, such as Thailand (see Chapters 2 and 3) 
4 The same exercise was undertaken for purse seine capture of yellowfin tuna. The results are broadly 
similar in terms of both spatial and volume growth trends, albeit at a lower absolute volume (compare 
figure 2.3 and 2.4), and are not provided here. 
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Figure 2A.1: Average yearly catch of skipjack by purse seine, 1960-2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Customised illustration using FAO Atlas of Tuna and Billfish Catches: Interactive display. 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/statistics/tuna-atlas/query/en (last accessed 01 December 2009). 
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APPENDIX 2B:  
Comparing production costs of tuna purse seiners by national fleet 
 
French and Spanish boat owners regularly point out that their costs are higher than 
those of their Asian competition. This however, excludes Japanese boats which are 
consistently recognised as having similar crew and regulatory costs to the EU DWF 
(EUInd#14; #15; #21; #22; JInd#9; #16–#18; #21–#26;#32; #33; JGvt#4–#14). Table 
2.3 presents comparative data on costs of exploitation – or ‘operational’ costs5 – by 
four major distant water purse seine fishing ‘nations’ in 2003: Spain, Taiwan, Japan 
and the Philippines (for detail on the last three fleets, see Campling et al. 2007; 
Hamilton et al. 2011). Given that the data compares boats of different gross tonnage 
(GT), a euro/vessel tonnage weighting is applied. The data is only indicative and 
contains several weaknesses: first, given that fuel is normally purchased in US dollars 
and that different ‘national’ boats operate in different currencies, comparing costs in 
any arbitrarily selected currency is skewed by exchange rates; second, and similarly, 
no attempt is made to factor-in different costs of living, for example, the comparison 
of Spanish and Philippine crew costs would be substantially transformed if weighted 
by purchasing power parity; third, boats operate in different oceanic regions which 
involve different distances between port and fishing ground (see below on ‘fishing 
days’) and are subject to different regulatory mechanisms (e.g. Japanese boats have 
historically been obliged to offload in Japan, see above), which all have important 
effects on fuel and maintenance inspection costs; and finally, the data does not 
account for fish sales, including the role of catch quality and quantity, and species 
composition (see below) in shaping ex-vessel fish prices accrued to the boat owner, or 
the role of government subsidies (see Chapter 4 on EU subsidies). 
 
In light of these weaknesses the data in Table 2B.1 are of greatest use as a rough 
indicator of relative (rather than absolute) comparative costs. It serves to confirm 
numerous interview data stating that the principal operational costs of any purse 
seiner are crew and fuel (although Philippine crew costs are comparatively minor). 
While the examination of the commodity chain in canned tuna in this thesis excludes 
the political economy of labour, its exchange value and regulation are central 
considerations from the perspective of capital; for, while the ‘crew payment system 
varies from one fleet to the other’, it ‘is a determining factor for the profitability of the 
vessel’ (Estudios Biologicos 2006: 55). Industrial purse seining is already a highly 
capital intensive fishing method and there are few major additional labour saving 
devices that can be inserted into production except for making bigger boats.  
 
Employment and wage costs 
French, Spanish and Japanese boat owners and managers regularly complain that 
regulatory mechanisms make their crew costs very high compared to competing purse 
seine fleets from East and Southeast Asia. For example, one Spanish boat-owner 
                                                            
5 It is recognised that this combines variable capital (wages) and constant capital, and also that it 
excludes various other components of constant capital, especially the vessel itself (including interest on 
loans and depreciation), as well as costs of compliance with regulation. However, ‘operational cost’ is 
used here and in Chapter 3 on the canning industry as the analysis is from the perspective of capital, 
which itself uses mainstream (bourgeois) methods of accounting. 
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argued that: ‘The East Asian crews eat rice and tuna – they’re on very poor salaries: 
they’re slaves! So their spending onshore is far less’ (EUInd#13); and a Japanese 
manger claimed that their Asian competitors ‘have a slave fishery compared to ours’ 
(JInd#7; also IntFS#5; PICInd#5; AInd#2). While it is believed that most crew on 
Taiwanese boats are ‘cheap’ Chinese nationals as well as from Vietnam, Philippines 
Indonesia, Burma and Bangladesh (AGvt#4; PICVS#1; JInd#7; #8; AFP/Taipei Times 
2002), it is also known that Indonesian and Pacific Islander crew work on Japanese 
purse seiners, although most ‘upper level crew’ are Japanese nationals ‘because of 
pressure from the Seaman’s association in Japan’ (JInd#9–#14; JGvt#7–#14; see 
below on EU DWF crew). The sensationalist claims are only partly apparent from 
estimated total crew costs detailed in Table 2B.1.  
 
Of total operational costs, crew wages totals almost 42 percent on Spanish boats, 33 
percent on Japanese and Taiwanese boats, and only six percent on Philippine boats. 
European and Japanese fishing firms are obliged to pay year-round salaries to crew 
(which is the highest on Spanish boats), while Philippine and Taiwanese equivalents 
establish employment contracts on the basis of individual fishing trips (Estudios 
Biologicos 2006). But given that crew on Taiwanese and Philippine boats can stay 
onboard without holiday for over 12 months, this is, in effect, an annual contract.  In 
contrast, according to EU employment law, crew on the EU DWF receive two months 
of paid holiday – including transfers – for each four months of work onboard.6 As a 
result EU boat managers/owners rotate crews in thirds: given that a typical French 
purse seiner employs 20-24 crew and a Spanish boat 24 crew, a complete crew totals 
between 33 and 36 employees (Oceanic Développement et al. 2005: 236). EU DWF 
crew also receive several days holiday when the fish is offloaded (direct observation, 
Seychelles, 2001-4; interviews, multiple industry representatives 2006 and 2009), 
while crew on Philippine and Taiwanese boats often do the stevedoring themselves 
(EUInd#13; multiple interviews PIC industry representatives). Fishing bonuses are the 
majority source of income for crew on all types of boats in Table 2.3 and are largest in 
the Spanish case, followed by Japan; for the latter, fishing bonuses constitute over 90 
percent of total remuneration to crew, generating a high degree of precarity and, in 
turn, financial incentive to maximise catch. In the majority of cases, Spanish boat 
owners base crew bonuses on the quantity of fish caught,7 except for skippers and 
engineers, where it is calculated on the basis of the selling price of the fish (Estudios 
Biologicos 2006). Under Spanish law employers of Spanish citizens must make 
national social security contributions, which total 8 percent of operating costs, but for 
all three of the other ‘national’ employers in Table 2B.1 it is less than 1 percent. 
 
It was estimated that the EU-flagged DWF provided between 780 and 910 direct jobs 
for EU citizens in 2003 (Oceanic Développement et al. 2005: 236). Although very 
small, this contribution to the generation of employment of EU citizens is a major 
lobbying point by industry associations (see Chapter 2 and 5). However, EU boat 
owners/managers often stress that it is difficult to employ European crew. One 
Spanish owner of a vertically-integrated firm noted that: ‘It’s more difficult to get 
Spanish crew, even if there are many ‘hot potatoes’ at home. ... Adult Spanish males 
in their 30s still living with parents for economic reasons.’ He also pointed out that 
                                                            
6 Skippers and engineers (almost always Spanish or French citizens) receive four months holiday for 
every four months (Estudios Biologicos 2006). 
7 In an effort to discourage the catch of juveniles, French crew are not paid for tuna under 1.5 kg 
(Goujon and Riva 2009: 8). 
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even in the pole-and-line fleet in the Bay of Biscay around half of the crew employed 
are from Peru and Senegal because ‘the  boats are very uncomfortable’ (EUInd#21; 
#22). 
 
A long-standing strategic response by the EU DWF to crew costs and shortages has 
been to employ crew from West Africa (primarily from Senegal) and the Western 
Indian Ocean (mainly from Madagascar).8 In 2003 the EU-flagged DWF directly 
employed between 1,365 and 1,430 crew from non-EU countries. The provision of 
local crew was locked into EU preferential rules of origin for tuna, where 50 or 75 
percent of crew must be nationals of the signatory states (see Chapter 5). It is also 
recognised (and encouraged) in fishing agreements signed by coastal states with the 
EU, which require a negotiated number of crew to be employed from the coastal state; 
if this condition is not met, compensation is paid to the coastal state (see Chapter’s 4 
and 6). However, despite employing an average of 1.7 times more non-EU citizens, 
total wages (fixed and variable components) paid by the total EU DWF in 2003 to 
these crew came to only €6.9 million, while total wages paid to the (minority) EU 
employees came to €52.3 million, or 7.6 times more  (Oceanic Développement et al. 
2005: 235). This disparity is certainly in part due to Spanish and French employees 
normally performing highly specialised roles (e.g. captains, fishing masters and 
engineers), but it also reflects racialised conceptions of the international division of 
labour which are normally justified based upon the fact that income earned by non-EU 
citizens working for the EU DWF is substantially higher than opportunities available 
domestically. For example, in reference to Ecuadorian crew on Spanish-owned boats 
active in the Eastern Tropical Pacific, one industry representative exclaimed that 
‘They are kings!’ but immediately followed with: ‘They are on half the salary of 
Spanish crew’ (EUInd#21). 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 On similar strategies by Japanese tuna boat owners/managers to mitigate crew costs, see Campling et 
al. 2007: 238. 
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Table 2B.1: Comparative costs of exploitation for tuna purse seiners 
 Spanish  
(Average capacity 1,700GT) 
Taiwanese 
(Average capacity 1,700GT) 
Japanese 
(Average capacity 800GT) 
Philippine 
(Average capacity 650GT) 
 Cost items Euro/Vessel 
Tonnage 
% Total Euro/Vessel 
Tonnage 
% Total Euro/Vessel 
Tonnage 
% Total Euro/Vessel 
Tonnage 
% Total 
Crew 1,295.5 41.5 562.8 33.9 1,287.9 33.2 117.5 6.0 
Salaries  230.5 7.4 139.4 8.4 52.8 1.4 53.1 2.7 
Fishing bonus 713.6 22.9 373.5 22.5 1.195.2 30.8 58.5 3.0 
Social security 257.2 8.2 14.9 0.9 19.9 0.5 5.9 0.3 
Crew trips  94.2 3.0 34.9 2.1 19.9 0.5 -- -- 
Other costs related to work 91.6 -- * * 5.9 -- 22.0 ?? 
Supplies  686.1 22.9 673.1 40.6 1,020.9 26.3 963.9 49.4 
Food, water, other supplies 67.3 2.2 6.3** 0.4** 209.2 5.4 15.4 0.8 
Fuel  576.5 18.5 647.4 39.0 776.9 20.0 918.0 47.0 
Lubricating oil 42.4 1.4 19.4 1.2 34.9 0.9 30.5 1.6 
Maintenance/repair, mooring 
fees, maintenance inspections  
644.1 20.7 124.5 7.5 896.4 23.1 656.7 33.6 
Equipment  361.8 11.6 249.0 15.0 598.6 15.4 175.1 8.9 
Insurance 132.4 4.2 49.8 3.0 79.7 2.1 39.6 2.0 
TOTAL 3,119.8 100 1,659.1 100 3,883.5 100 1,952.9 100 
Notes: Numbers rounded so may not equal 100%; * data excluded by original authors because submission by Taiwan Tuna Association under this heading was deemed 
‘disproportionate’; ** no data provided as crew provide their own food, estimated minimum inserted by original authors. 
Source: Estudios Biologicos (2006: 46, 49-51) translated by Béatrice Gorez, using data supplied by OPAGAC, Taiwan Tuna Association, Kaimaki (Japan Far Seas Purse 
Seine Fishing Association), and Confederation of Philippine Tuna Industry. 
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Fuel costs 
The ratio of edible-protein energy return on fuel energy investment for global marine 
capture fisheries is more ‘efficient’ than in intensive livestock production such as beef 
and lamb. Nonetheless, ‘fisheries globally dissipated 12.5 times the amount of fuel 
energy as they provided in the form of edible-protein energy’ (Tyedmers et al. 2005: 
636). For tuna purse-seiners, it is estimated that some boats ‘use as much as four 
metric tons of fuel for each ton of tuna that they catch’ (Krampe 2006: 1). Thus, as 
Friedman rhetorically points out, ‘We are eating oil’ (Friedmann 2008: 620; see also 
Weis 2007) as much for fish products as for agriculture ones.9 Fuel is the second 
largest operational cost for Spanish and Japanese purse seiners, and the largest for 
Taiwanese and Philippine boats, based on data for 2004.10 The rise in global gasoil 
prices in 2005 and their sharp acceleration from mid-2007 (Figure 2B.1) would have 
shifted upwards the proportion of fuel costs detailed in Table 2.3,11 and certainly 
imposed a price-cost squeeze on vessel owners (Krampe 2006: 22; Tiu-Laurel 2006: 
80). Importantly, the EU DWF based in the Eastern Tropical Atlantic and the WIO 
has a fuel advantage over the Taiwanese fleet (€576.5/GT and €647.4/GT 
respectively, Table 2B.1). This is because the latter is entirely based in the WCPO 
where the number of ‘steaming days’ (see below) required to access fishing grounds is 
considerably larger. 
 
 
Figure 2B.1: Gasoil and canning-grade skipjack price index, January 2000 to 
June 2009 
 
                                                            
9 It is estimated that fisheries accounted for about 1.2 percent of global oil consumption to the point of 
landing catch alone (Tyedmers et al. 2005: 635). An assessment of which areas of the UK-centred 
seafood chain are responsible for the greatest carbon emissions found that fishing itself generates the 
most (Seafish 2008; see also, Campling 2008c). 
10 Floyd (1987b: 24) estimated that fuel accounted for between 50 and 60 percent of total operating 
costs of distant-water fishing vessels in the mid-1980s. 
11 For example, Krampe (2006: 3) estimated that fuel costs were 52 percent of total production costs of 
the US purse seine fleet but only two percent of final canned lightmeat production cost. Miyake et al. 
(2010: 42) estimate that in the 1980s and 1990s fuel as a proportion of total operating expenditure in 
purse seine fleets in general, regardless of vessel size, was 20 percent, but ‘In recent years, this 
increased to 50 percent or more for some vessels’. 
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Source: FFA database (price data uses Bangkok skipjack price in cif for fish weighing 1.8-3.4kg; 
Singapore gasoil spot price data is sourced from the US Energy Information Administration). 
 
 
The relationship between canning-grade tuna and gasoil prices is central to an 
understanding of the economics of purse seining because of the high proportion of 
fuel to total operational costs. Gasoil price shifts are thus important to relative levels 
of vessel profitability, even if ‘fishing days’ are successfully maximised (Chapter 2). 
Since 2005, skipjack tuna prices have very rarely risen to the same heights as gasoil 
prices (Figure 2B.1). The widening of the fuel-fish price differential during the oil 
price hike from 2007 to mid-2008 resulted in the tying-up of East Asian longline 
fleets, protests by fishers across Europe and the roll-out of new subsidies in several 
countries (Campling 2008d; 2008e; 2008f; see also, Arnason 2007). For the EU DWF 
in the WIO it resulted in lower profit margins (Miyake et al. 2010: 44).  Conversely, 
assuming stable catch rates, when gasoil price drops and the tuna prices rise a vessel 
is more likely to turn a profit, as occurred for the EU DWF in late 2008 and into 2009.  
 
Other running costs 
The third major cost identified in Table 2B.1 for all boats is the combination of 
maintenance/repair, mooring fees and maintenance inspections. This is an important 
area of potential economic activity for coastal states in their interactions with the 
fishing node of the commodity chain (i.e. ‘upgrading’, as analysed at length in 
Chapter 6). These costs are broadly equivalent for Spanish, Japanese and Philippine 
boats, but especially low for the Taiwanese. This confirms the perspective of various 
Japanese industry representatives who claim that Taiwanese boats are able to stay at 
sea for longer periods because of more limited boat inspections and lower levels of 
other regulation (JInd#9; #16–#18; #21–#26;#32; #33; JGvt#4–#14; IntFS#3).12 
While the relative costs of regulation are difficult to quantify and are not captured in 
Table 2B.1, EU regulations are a major concern of the EU DWF and are probably the 
most restrictive in the world (EUInd#1–#4; #12; #13; #15; #21; #22). One Spanish 
fleet manager spoke at length on this: 
The control of our boats is very heavy, but for [Asian] long-liners?! 
They have no controls. Our purse seiners must comply with EU SPS 
[sanitary and phyto-sanitary] regulations. Food and Veterinary 
Office inspectors are very tough on vessels and factories, but East 
Asian boats are not subject to this (aside from Japan, which have 
similar standards to us). Therefore the costs of raw material are 
lower. The 24 percent margin doesn’t cover our higher SPS and 
wider regulatory compliance costs. It’s much easier for FVO 
inspectors to check us, all our boats and operations are well known 
(EUInd#16).  
Another fleet manager put it more succinctly: ‘Fishing for the EU distant water fleet is 
highly regulated – to fulfil everything is a nightmare’ (EUInd#14).  Arguably, 
                                                            
12 In the mid-2000s one major Japanese company was maintaining purse seiners less frequently in order 
to maximise fishing days and to reduce fuel costs associated with returning to port for scheduled 
maintenance. The company previously undertook in-dock boat and net maintenance annually, but has 
switched to doing it every 15 to 20 months (20 months is reported to be the regulatory maximum period 
without maintenance in Japan) (JInd#10–#14). 
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however, the costs of regulation for the EU DWF are countered by an extensive 
regime of subsidies (see Chapter 4).  
 
In terms of equipment cost the largest recurring for most purse seiners in Table 2B.1 
is the net, which costs around €0.5million (EUGvt#14). Given their enormous size 
and technical intricacy they require constant maintenance and repair (see Chapter 6 on 
net repair in Seychelles). However, extensive use of modern technology on fish 
aggregating devices (FADs) by Spanish boats means that they are a major component 
of equipment costs for this fleet – at over 60% (Estudios Biologicos 2006: 46). This 
was a non-existent or extremely minor (or unreported) equipment cost for the other 
three representative purse seiners detailed in Table 2B.1. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
the additional ‘cost’ of high-tech FADs to the Spanish fleet certainly contributed to 
enhance the productivity of fishing trips.  
 
The final major item of operational cost is insurance. The insuring of fishing vessels is 
a highly specialised and complex industry and often extends to machinery, fishing 
gears, industrial freezers and electronic systems (e.g. navigation and fish finding 
equipment). The capture fisheries insurance market in Europe, North America, and 
Latin America is largely dominated by private-sector insurance firms, while in Asia 
the public-sector plays a major role either through public insurance firms or, in the 
case of Japan, through government financial assistance to fishing cooperatives (Van 
Anrooy et al. 2009: 8).13 The slightly lower Taiwanese insurance costs (three percent 
of total operating costs) compared to the Spanish (4.2 percent) might be explained in 
part by the practice of the former of ‘only buy[ing] total loss cover to satisfy the bank, 
but no cover for fires onboard, crew cover, etc.’ (IntFS#7).14 This serves to support 
the claims of the EU and Japanese DWF that their cost structures are higher than the 
Taiwanese competition because they are regulated more extensively (see above). In 
the case of large vessels such as those in the EU DWF, it may also be that insurance is 
obligatory and, because of their high value, includes reinsurance on the international 
market (Van Anrooy et al. 2009: 14-15). 
 
In summary, given its comparatively high operating costs it is perhaps surprising that 
the EU DWF has survived commercially and is the largest purse seine fleet in the 
world. The answer to this lies in part in the regime of government subsidies made 
available to the fleet (Chapter 4) and a set of commercially-beneficial regulatory 
mechanisms (Chapter 5), but also in the range of business strategies employed to 
increase production and profitability. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
13 On insurance costs in the US purse seine fleet, see Campling et al. 2007: 156, 282. 
14 In addition, two sets of vessel data included the disaggregation of insurance costs to specify ‘goods’ 
insurance (assumed to be fish). This was around three percent of total insurance costs for Spanish purse 
seiners and ten percent for Philippine boats (Estudios Biologicos 2006: 46, 50). The difference between 
them is almost certainly due to the Spanish boats being larger: the value of the catch as a proportion of 
the value of the boat would be significantly lower (even taking into account the basic Euro/vessel 
tonnage weighting). 
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APPENDIX 2C:  
Business Strategies of the European Tuna Fleet in the Western Indian Ocean in 
the 2000s 
 
This appendix identifies and explains two business strategies employed by the French 
and Spanish purse seine fleets (‘EU DWF’). It generally narrows these down into one 
geographical area, the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). While most of the following 
business strategies apply to other fleets in other places and at other times, no claims 
for generalisation are made here. The analysis of this set of additional strategies 
allows a deeper understanding of firm activities in the fishing node (Chapter 2) and 
establishes linkages between these and the manufacturing and retail nodes, which are 
addressed in Chapter 3.  This appendix consists of three sub-sections: 
 
2C.1: Canning-grade tuna prices and the catch composition of the EU 
DWF in the Western Indian Ocean  
 
Yellowfin tuna fetches a price premium in the EU-centred canned tuna chain (see 
Figures 2C.1, 2C.2, 2C.3 and Chapter 3). This is an important distinction because 
statistical analyses of the world market for canning-grade skipjack tuna in the period 
1989-2001 have shown that regional ex-vessel markets are globally integrated by 
price (Jeon et al. 2008). The implication is that regional ex-vessel markets for 
canning-grade skipjack do not behave independently, with short-term regional price 
differences converging (in a matter of months) and with long-term price leadership 
exerted by markets with Bangkok and, apparently, the ‘Americas’ (Puerto Rico and 
Ecuador) (Jeon et al. 2008; Squires et al. 2006).15 Subsequent econometric work 
concurred with these findings in specific reference to the relationship between 
European and world markets for frozen skipjack for the period 1995-2006 (Jiménez-
Toribio et al. 2010). As one industry representative put it: ‘There is a world market – 
each region follows each other’; another noted that ‘skipjack is a universal market’ 
(EUInd#11; #13). The difference in raw material prices paid by factories is often due 
to reefer transhipment costs, which are around US$ 200 per ton between oceanic 
regions (EUInd#11; USInd#5; #11; #12). In the statistical analysis of yellowfin price 
movements however, no such convergence was found, leading to the conclusion that 
regional markets for this species are not fully co-integrated (Jeon et al. 2008: 43 and 
46); an explanation of these trends is discussed below. 
  
                                                            
15 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to assess the relative merits of these (and other) econometric 
analyses of tuna price time-series. However, it is important to note that interviews with a very large 
number of industry representatives with operations in the ETA, EPO, WCPO and WIO in 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2009 and 2010 – as well as interview transcripts from Ecuador in 2010 by Elizabeth Havice – all 
cite the Bangkok market as the price leader for skipjack (see also Squires et al. 2006).  
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Figure 2C.1: Total tuna catch by purse seine in the WIO, 1981-2008 (in mt) 
 
Note: data excludes minor volumes of albacore and bycatch 
Source: Pianet et al. 2009: 11 
 
 
Figure 2C.4: Spanish (a) and French (b) purse seiners catch on FADs and free 
schools by species in the Indian Ocean, 1990-2008. 
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Note: The catch data excludes capture of bigeye, which is proportionately very high in some years, and 
all bycatch. 
Sources: de Molina et al. 2009: 3-4; Pianet et al. 2009: 9 
 
In commercial terms, the high ratio of yellowfin to skipjack catch in the WIO is very 
important to the profitability of the EU DWF active there (multiple interviews, 
industry representatives and international fisheries specialists, 2006, 2007 and 2009. 
See also Jiménez-Toribio et al. 2010). Figure 2C.2 shows that there is a significant 
difference between prices for frozen yellowfin landed in Spain and in Bangkok. Over 
the period 1995-2006, the Spain landed price for yellowfin was an annual average of 
US$ 196 (14 percent) higher than Bangkok. Whereas the annual average price over 
the same period for skipjack was only US$ 51 per ton (6 percent) higher than that 
landed in Bangkok.  
 
Two aspects of the price trends for frozen skipjack and yellowfin in Figure 2C.2 
should be noted. First, the destination markets for canned yellowfin produced in the 
EU and Thailand can be very different. On the one hand, there is a high premium on 
canned yellowfin in the EU based on sharp market segmentation; as a result ‘it’s a 
very specific price for yellowfin [in the EU], which cannot be compared with 
Bangkok’ (EUInd#7). Cultures of consumption in Southern Europe show a preference 
for canned yellowfin because of its richer flavour (especially in Italian and Spanish 
markets where it is the dominant product); the consumer ‘preference’ in Northern 
Europe is for canned skipjack. On the other hand, production in Thailand for the US 
(its largest market) mixes skipjack and yellowfin species under the heading 
‘lightmeat’ canned tuna (EUInd#7; see also, Jiménez-Toribio et al. 2010).16  
                                                            
16 Canned lightmeat tuna for the US-centred commodity chain is normally characterised as low cost and 
low quality. US industry executives see canned lightmeat tuna as a ‘mom and pop’ food – i.e. a staple 
for low income households – which competes on the market purely on price; the lowest quality product 
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Second, the managers of EU-based processing facilities – which are in decline 
because of relatively high labour and other costs (Chapter 3) – prefer larger sized fish 
(e.g. yellowfin >10kg) because they allow higher ‘recovery rates’. While larger fish 
are more expensive, the amount of canning-grade meat extracted per fish by workers 
in the process of butchering – i.e. the balance of labour time/cost and fish yield – is a 
major competitive driver in the rate of exploitation by cannery managers in Spain, 
whereas in relative low costs sites of production like Thailand, more effort is placed 
on gaining additional yield by ‘throwing labour’ at the process (Appendix 3B; see also 
Jeon et al. 2008: 34; Jiménez-Toribio et al. 2010: 170; Brus 2002: 98). Similarly, EU-
based processors have a preference for tuna caught in the WIO because – as a biomass 
– they reportedly have a better recovery rate than that from the Pacific Ocean, which 
is Thailand’s primary source of supply.17 These two points about recovery rates mean 
that the yellowfin price data in Figure 2C.2 probably reflects actual quality 
differentials (e.g. fish size and location of capture) (EUInd#35; SGvt#14). 
 
 
 
Figure 2C.2: Comparing Spain and Thailand annual average price for frozen 
skipjack and yellowfin, 1995-2009 (in US$/mt) 
 
 
Note: Annual average prices calculated using monthly average price data.  
Sources: Spanish data (whole frozen, raw material for canning), prices cif, origin EU fleet (FAO 
database 1995 to mid-2006); Bangkok data, skipjack (1.8 – 3.4 kg) and yellowfin (>9kg), prices cif, 
various origin (FFA databases, 1995-2009). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
is informally characterised by industry as ‘tuna soup’ due to the combination of flaked flesh with 
packing media, oil or brine (multiple interviews, US industry representatives 2006; see also Appendix 
3A.2; Campling and Havice 2010b; Guillotreau et al. 2008: 5). 
17 Industry sources estimate a recovery rate of canning-grade tuna of 41 percent for skipjack and 43 
percent for yellowfin from the WIO, and 39 and 42 percent respectively from the Pacific. 
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Appendix 2C.2: European industry associations and the World Tuna Purse Seine 
Organisation (WTPO) 
 
The second business strategy of the EU DWF addressed here is the role of industry 
associations. The French and Spanish purse seine fleets are organised at inter-firm 
level at multiple scales.18  These take several forms which is reflected by differing 
nomenclature, but at the level of general discussion they shall be referred to as 
industry associations. Three sets of industry associations have been identified as 
playing an important role in the activities of the EU DWF and the wider functioning 
of the commodity chain, with membership coalescing, respectively, at the national, 
regional and transnational scales. The first is at the national scale and consists of three 
‘producer organisations’ – one for the French fleet and two for the Spanish (see 
Section 2.5). They play a role in EU policy as well in relationships with Seychelles’ 
and its ‘upgrading’ in the fishing node of the commodity chain (Chapter 6). The 
second (at the regional scale) is Eurothon, which groups the EU DWF and canned 
tuna manufactures and branded-firms. Its activities are addressed in Chapter’s 5 and 7 
on the regulatory mechanism of the EU trade regime and Seychelles’ interactions with 
the canned tuna processing node respectively. Finally, and addressed below, is 
industry collaboration at the transnational scale, which connects with the discussion of 
global crises of oversupply of raw material in Chapter 2 and has implications for the 
processing node of the EU-centred chain in Chapter 3. 
 
On the transnational scale, the EU DWF plays a major role in the World Tuna Purse 
Seine Organisation (WTPO), a grouping of boat owners and industry associations 
from most of the major distant water fishing nations. Accelerated growth in demand 
for canned tuna from the mid-1980s (see Chapter 3) resulted in a boom in boat 
building and the capacity of the global tuna purse seine fleet, especially in the WCPO, 
but also the WIO (see above and also Jiménez-Toribio et al. 2010: 172).19 The 
outcome was a crisis of overcapacity and temporary periods of oversupply canning-
grade tuna – at time of writing (mid-2011), overcapacity has only deepened. This was 
translated into a sharp decline in frozen skipjack prices at the end of 1999 and 
throughout 2000 (Figure 2C.5 below); the year which holds the lowest annual average 
price on record. This situation was compounded in the second half of 2000 when the 
differential between gasoil and canning-grade skipjack prices widened (see Figure 
2B.1 above), further eating into vessel profitability. In short, temporary oversupply 
and higher relative fuel prices created a ‘price-cost squeeze’ (Squires et al. 2006: 748; 
Morón 2002a: 4). The reduced cost of raw material was quickly transmitted into a 
sharp decrease in canned tuna prices (Josupeit 2000: 24; see also Appendices 3A and 
3B). 
 
  
                                                            
18 As Lequesne documents, fishermen and boat owners in Spain began to organise to represent their 
collective interests ‘as early as the Middle Ages’ (2004: 43). 
19 Albeit in the context of a reported decline in real ex-vessel prices of ‘tuna and swordfish’ between 
1950 and 2000 (Sumaila et al. 2007a: 45). This price time series is not available and, importantly, it is 
not disaggregated by type of tuna raw material (e.g. sashimi or canning-grade); however, the broad 
trend is probably accurate. 
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Figure 2C.3: Monthly average frozen skipjack price, Bangkok and ‘Africa’, 
1987- March 2009 (USD/ mt) 
 
 
Notes: Fish are sized from 1.8 kg. It is assumed that ‘Africa’ represents landed price in West Africa 
because this is the only known African region for which FAO holds tuna price data.  
Source: FAO Globefish database 
 
 
The French industry association ORTHONGEL called for a collective and global 
response to the crisis by boat owners. The first actions – by what would in 2001 
become the WTPO – were undertaken in late 2000 to stabilise the collapse in 
international tuna prices, including collective agreement to temporarily reduce fishing 
effort (Morón 2002a: 1, 4; Tsai 2002: 43-5; WTPO 2002; Morón 2003). WTPO 
membership included fleet representatives from Ecuador, France, Japan, Philippines 
and Spain and South Korea who together totalled 65 percent of the global tuna catch 
by purse seiners (Tarte 2002: ftnt 11; Morón 2002b: 22; Tan 2006:28), all of which 
are in the top 12 tuna fishing countries detailed in Table 2.2 above.20 The central aim 
of the WTPO was for members to voluntarily restrict fishing activity by keeping 
vessels in port for longer periods of time thereby reducing supply, with the objective 
of increasing price beyond ‘squeeze’-point levels. The result was an upward trend in 
skipjack prices in 2001 (Honda 2001: 1; Hampton and Williams 2003: 4; Allen 2002: 
11; Josupeit 2003: 13; Moron 2002b).21 As pointed out by Japanese industry 
representatives, the WTPO ‘had a positive impact in improving the prices, most of the 
                                                            
20 See Morón (2003a: 1) for a full list of original WTPO members, revised in Morón (2003:1). The US 
fleet voluntarily stopped fishing in January and for part of February 2001, but is not a member of the 
WTPO because of domestic anti-trust legislation. (Interviews, Japanese and US industry 
representatives, 2006; Joseph 2003) 
21 Note that the American Tuna Sales Association also used to coordinate pricing among the US tuna 
fleet. See Gallick (1984) and Munoz (1993). See also Campling and Havice 2010b; Campling, Havice 
and Ram-Bidesi 2007: 360-362 for a discussion of price stabilisation arrangements in the Pacific for 
canning-grade albacore the US-centred commodity chain. 
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shipowners followed the arrangement because they thought it was best for them in the 
long run’ (JInd#21–#26). 
 
However, several purse seiner fleet owners did not interrupt their fishing effort. In 
particular, interests based in Taiwan and, especially, the Philippines continued to 
expand vessel capacity and fleet size (Tarte 2002: ftnt 13; Tsai 2002: 44; Tiu-Laurel 
2002: 35; IntFS#18; JInd#8; #10–#14; #16–#18).22 In addition, the aggressive entry of 
Spanish-flagged and owned purse seine fleets into the WCPO in 1999 in effect 
cancelled out efforts by the US fleet at the reduction of supply from this oceanic sub-
region.23 In the Western Indian Ocean however, the Spanish and French fleets 
engaged in effective cooperation both to stabilise supply (and eventually price) and to 
block new entrants to the fishery (see Chapter 4; Marguerite 2005).24 However, the 
vessel owners or associations present at future WTPO meetings represented only 50 
percent of global purse seine capacity, which made efforts at coordination less 
effective. Non-attendance at meetings can in part be explained by concerns that the 
organisation was focussed on price setting (e.g. the US fleet was deterred by domestic 
anti-trust legislation) (IntFS#18; USInd#18; Joseph 2003), but it is also likely that 
several vessel owners/associations did not attend for other reasons such as ongoing or 
planned expansion in fishing capacity and/or contravention of prior WTPO 
recommendations (Morón 2003; Foodmarket Exchange, January and June 2002).25 
Nonetheless, a combination of WTPO measures and an apparently ‘natural decline in 
catches’ resulted in a secular increase in skipjack prices from mid-2003 to the end of 
2004 (Catarchi 2004: 53; Figure 2.11).  The internal tensions and contradictions 
within the WTPO and the relative stability of canning-grade skipjack prices after the 
1999-2000 price-cost squeeze26 meant that the WTPO became a less significant player 
in the global commodity chain (JInd#10–#14). Even when fuel prices increased 
sharply away from skipjack prices in 2006 (Figure 2.4) one group of industry 
representatives noted that they ‘don’t see any [WTPO] activities. As fuel costs rose it 
became more fractured’ (JInd#4–#6).  It does continue to play a lobbying role as a 
‘non-governmental organisation’ accredited to the United Nations and regional 
fisheries management organisations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
22 Taiwan was the biggest single national producer in the global purse seine fishery between 1998-2001 
with a catch of over 200,000mt per annum. 
23 Initially organised as a private agreement between OPAGAC and Kiribati, this was followed by the 
European Commission in a break-through government-to-government access agreement, which enabled 
the licensing of 14 Spanish purse seiners in the Kiribati EEZ (interviews, international fisheries 
specialists and industry representatives, 2006; Hunt 2003: 81). 
24 The period of price 
25 Note that the tuna longline industry is far more effective and better organised than the WTPO. The 
creation of the Organisation for Promotion of Responsible Tuna Fisheries (OPRT) in 2000 grouped 
Asia-Pacific longline associations and ‘established a fund from industry and government sources with 
which to buy and retire excess longline capacity’ (Joseph 2003; IntFS#18; NGO#10; JGvt#7–#14; 
Campling, Havice and Ram-Bidesi 2007). The OPRT is comparatively successful because of Japan’s 
market power in the sashimi-grade tuna chain.  
26 Bar the oil price hike of 2007-08, discussed above, reflected in Figure 2C.5 through the sharp 
acceleration in tuna prices in 2006 through to late 2008, but this was not at the same rate as the rise in 
gasoil price (Figure 2B.1).  
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APPENDIX 2D: EU DWF licenced to fish in the Seychelles EEZ in 2008 
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Flag Vessel Name Ownership Producer 
Organisation 
Known vessel 
construction and 
modernisation 
subsidies (in €) 
Port Name Ton Gt Power 
main 
(kW) 
Construction 
Year 
Place of 
construction  
France Glenan Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL 7,365 Concarneau 2,500 4,000 2004 France (Piriou) 
France Gueotec Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL 53,711 Concarneau 2,255 3,640 1989 France 
France Gueriden Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL 53,711 Concarneau 2,255 3,690 1990 France 
France Le Titan Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL - Concarneau 1,609 2,870 1981 France 
France Men Cren Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL - Concarneau 2,119 3,645 1992 Spain 
France Men Goe Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL 53,711 Concarneau 2,119 3,533 1991 Spain 
France Talenduic Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL 53,711 Concarneau 2,109 3,533 1992 Spain 
France Avel Vad Kuhn-Ballery, et al ORTHONGEL 1,877,245 Concarneau 1,598 2,950 1996 France 
France Cap Saint Vincent Kuhn-Ballery, et al ORTHONGEL - Concarneau 1,606 2,950 2000 France 
France Cap Sainte Marie Kuhn-Ballery, et al ORTHONGEL 75,993 Concarneau 1,596 2,950 1997 France 
France Sterenn Kuhn-Ballery, et al ORTHONGEL - Concarneau 1,606 2,950 2000 France 
France Via Avenir Saupiquet ORTHONGEL - Concarneau 1,737 3,091 1989 USA 
France Via Mistral Saupiquet ORTHONGEL 55,079 Concarneau 1,737 3,091 1990 USA 
France Via-Euros Saupiquet ORTHONGEL 67,955 Concarneau 1,737 3,091 1991 USA 
Italy Torre Giulia Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL 155,246 Bari 2,137 3,690 1997 France (Piriou) 
Mayotte Drennec Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL - - 2,319 - - - 
Mayotte Le Trevignon Cobrecaf ORTHONGEL - - - - - - 
Seychelles Intertuna Uno Albacora OPAGAC - Victoria 2,167 - 1980 - 
Seychelles Intertuna Dos Albacora OPAGAC - Victoria 2,058 - 1990 - 
Seychelles Intertuna Tres Albacora OPAGAC - Victoria 4,428 - 2000 - 
Seychelles Intertuna Cuatro Albacora OPAGAC - Victoria 4,164 - 1990 - 
Seychelles Artza Atunsa ANABAC - Victoria 3,870 - - - 
Seychelles Demiku Echebastar ANABAC - Victoria 2,232 - - - 
Seychelles Erroxape Echebastar ANABAC - Victoria 2,232 - - - 
Seychelles Xixili Echebastar ANABAC - Victoria 2,232 - - - 
Seychelles Txori Aundi Inpesca ANABAC - Victoria 2,020 - - - 
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 Flag Vessel Name Ownership Producer 
Organisation 
Known vessel construction 
and modernisation subsidies 
(in €) 
Port Name Ton 
Gt 
Power 
main 
(kW) 
Construction 
Year 
Place of 
construction 
Spain Albacan Albacora OPAGAC 1,383,360 Cadiz 2,347 2,960 1991 Vigo 
Spain Albacora Quince Albacora OPAGAC 1,383,360 Sta. Eugenia Riveira 2,336 3,370 1983 Vigo 
Spain Albatun Dos Albacora OPAGAC 4,935,360 Ceuta 4,406 5,735 2004 Vigo 
Spain Albatun Tres Albacora OPAGAC 4,935,360 Sta. Eugenia Riveira 4,406 4,927 2004 Vigo 
Spain Doniene Atuneros Congeladores ANABAC 3,641,160 Villagarcia 3,507 4,415 1996 Vigo 
Spain Izurdia Atuneros Congeladores ANABAC - Bermeo 4,089 5,660 2004 Murueta 
Spain Zuberoa Atunsa ANABAC 950,487 Bermeo 2,172 3,451 1990 Vigo 
Spain Albacora Cuatro Compania Europea de 
Tunidos 
OPAGAC 610,545 Vigo 2,082 2,943 1974 Vigo 
Spain Alakrana Echebastar ANABAC 4,272,960 Bermeo 3,716 4,532 2005 Vizcayo 
Spain Campolibre Alai Echebastar ANABAC 2,758,300 Bermeo 2,214 2,825 1988 Bilbao 
Spain Elai Alai Echebastar ANABAC 1,783,092 Bermeo 2,217 2,906 1993 Bermeo 
Spain Txori Argi Inpesca ANABAC 4,674,240 Bermeo 4,134 5,854 2004 Murueta 
Spain Txori Berri Inpesca ANABAC 381,429 Bermeo 2,400 3,311 1991 Zumaya 
Spain Txori Urdin Inpesca ANABAC 635,160 Bermeo 1,286 2,133 1976 Bilbao 
Spain Txori Toki Inpesca ANABAC 3,959,283 Bermeo 4,134 5,854 1999 Murueta 
Spain Txori Gorri Inpesca ANABAC - Bermeo 2,937 - - - 
Spain Almadraba Dos Petusa OPAGAC 2,309,439 Cadiz 1,929 3,532 1979 Bilbao 
Spain Felipe Ruano Pevasa ANABAC 1,495,306 Bermeo 2,110 3,449 1989 Zumaya 
Spain Juan Ramon Egãna Pevasa ANABAC 1,109,953 Bermeo 2,107 3,200 1984 Bilbao 
Spain Playa De Anzoras Pevasa ANABAC 234,861 Bermeo 2,446 4,304 1998 Bilbao 
Spain Playa De Aritzatxu Pevasa ANABAC 43,070 Bermeo 2,458 4,304 2001 Murueta 
Spain Playa De Bakio Pevasa ANABAC - Bermeo 2,101 2,902 1990 Zumaya 
Spain Mar De Sergio Tunidos Congelados OPAGAC 1,096,172 Malaga 2,767 3,086 1984 Vigo 
Notes: table includes 38 of the total 57 EU-flagged vessels, and 11 of an estimated total of EU-owned foreign flag boats of 27.Both sets of data for 2007. 
Sources: SFA licensing database, 2008; IOTC online database, accessed 2009; EU Transparency, accessed 2009; Oceanic Développement (2008); multiple interviews, 
various EU industry representatives, and Seychelles fisheries managers and domestic industry representatives, 2006 and 2009.
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CHAPTER 3 APPENDICES 
 
 
APPENDIX 3A 
Canning Tuna: Historical Development and Modern Production Process 
 
 
3A.1   Historical development of canned tuna production 
 
The objectives of this section are two-fold; first, to provide a brief historical narrative of 
the development of the canning process in Western Europe, and; second, to sketch how a 
can of tuna is manufactured, focusing on the degree of capital and/or labour intensive 
elements of production. Both supplement and extend the periodisation of dynamics of 
‘territoriality’ and technological change in French and Spanish canning-grade tuna 
fisheries (1860s-1980s) in Section 2.3. 
 
The canning of food is a relatively simple technological process. It was initially 
developed by Nicolas Appert in the first decade of the nineteenth century through the 
heating of food in air-tight (hermetic) glass containers, which was found to preserve fruit 
and vegetables at ‘“a glorious sweetness that recalls the month of May in the heart of 
winter”’ (Grimod de La Reynière, an important food critique of the day and Appert’s patron, as 
cited by Shephard 2000: 230). Appert’s discovery was undertaken in the context of the 
Napoleonic wars when, because of the cutting-off of the supply of cane sugar (then 
widely used for the preservation of food) and the objective of reducing reliance on 
imported food, the French state promoted investigation of methods for food preservation. 
It provided a 12,000 franc ‘encouragement’ for effective processes that were 
subsequently published with patenting foregone; a prize that Appert went on to win 
(Warne 1988: Section 1.1; Shephard 2000: 231). Interestingly, the report that 
recommended Appert’s receipt of this award specifically noted the implications of his 
invention for international trade, both in terms of the export of French product and for the 
import of preserved food from other countries. The early spark for commercial 
processing was military naval contracts supplied by a small factory attached to Appert’s 
house, but because it used glass containers there were obvious limitations regarding 
durability because the product was more easily broken during rough periods at sea. It was 
only in 1869 when Pasteur found that heat can kill bacteria that the reason behind the 
success of Appert’s innovation was discovered (Diaz 2002: 143). 
 
The world’s first food cannery was set-up in London in 1813 by Donkin, Hall and 
Gamble, the owners having bought the patent in 1810 (Appert probably secretly initiated 
the patent process in Britain having waived it in France). This firm benefited from the 
competitive advantage of Britain’s (then) leading industrial base, including in domestic 
tinplate production (Shephard 2000: 233, 236), which remains an important commercial 
advantage in canned tuna production (see Section 3.2.2). Donkin, Hall and Gamble’s 
‘preservatory’ (or cannery) was boosted by British military contracts (Shephard 2000: 
243). Initially cans were made, sealed and sterilised by hand (two skilled workers could 
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 make 120 cans a day). In the 1830s the steam retort was developed and used to thermally 
sterilise the cans rather than them being boiled in water. In 1849 new plant was 
developed that allowed two unskilled workers to produce 1,500 cans per day (Shephard 
2000: 243-4, 246). Canned sardines were exported from France to supply miners in the 
mid-nineteenth century gold-rushes in California and Australia, and canned salmon was 
supplied from Canada to feed the growing working class in Britain (Dias and Guillotreau 
2005: 65-6; Muszynski 1996: 13). The American Civil War further spurred demand for 
canned food in the US to supply Union and Confederate soldiers. By the 1880s the 
emergence of growing markets for canned tuna and its acceptance in cultures of 
consumption contributed to the expansion of tuna fishing. By the end of the century the 
canning process was highly mechanised in the US and canneries based there were the 
world leaders in the industry (Shephard 2000: 246). 
 
Fish and other forms of meat are particularly prone to spoilage compared to fruit and 
vegetables. Microbial contaminants are present in the gut and skin of all fish, and even if 
these parts are removed fish will rapidly putrefy unless effectively preserved. The 
objective of canning fish is to use heat ‘to kill or inactivate all microbial contaminants, 
irrespective of their source, and to package the product in hermetically sealed containers 
so that it will be protected from recontamination’ (Warne 1988: Section 1.1). Factories to 
can sardines (in oil or butter) emerged in Nantes on the west coast of France and in 
Brittany in the 1820s, and by 1880 the latter region produced nearly 50 million cans, 
including for export (Shephard 2000: 241-2). In the 1860s canned tuna was twice the price 
of canned sardines and was thus an item of luxury consumption (Dias and Guillotreau 
2005: 72). In the US, factories producing canned lobster and salmon were established in 
Boston and Baltimore in the late 1810s. Salmon canning plants were established at the 
mouths of rivers throughout the entire length of the Pacific coast of North America. This 
included British Columbia, where ‘a proletariat was created in order to feed the British 
working classes’ (Muszynski 1996: 13).1  
 
Canning allowed large catches of salmon and other fish species to be preserved during 
high fishing seasons without the significant adulteration of flavour and texture that came 
with earlier methods of preservation such as salting, smoking or drying. Apart from its 
clear use value, canning also enhanced exchange value because of the higher quality and 
increased durability of canned fish relative to prior preservation methods. The extent to 
which canning resulted in higher profits for fish processors is not known, although there 
was certainly less spoilage, a reduced need for more careful transportation and handling 
of cargo (thus reduced risk), and an expansion in the geographical range of markets for 
exporting companies. 
 
 
3A.2  Labour process and productivity in canned tuna production 
 
The first tuna cannery in the US produced 35,000 cans in its first year in 1903 (Chapter 
2); in a modern factory and using only a single preparation line this volume can be 
produced in only two hours (Diaz 2002: 143). Figure 3.1 illustrates the production 
                                                     
1 See pages 106-128 on the historical development of the salmon canning industry in British Columbia. 
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 process in a modern tuna canning factory. Most of the process sketched in the figure is 
self-explanatory and is provided as technical background to the thesis. Several points 
however, require highlighting as they are directly relevant to the later analysis. The first, 
and most important aspect for this thesis, is that the most labour-intensive steps of tuna 
processing are cooking, cleaning, butchering and sorting the meat (‘loining’) (steps 4, 7.a 
and 8 in Figure 3A.1) to produce tuna loins (an intermediate good). Around 80 percent of 
the direct (‘living’) labour costs in manufacturing a can of tuna  are incurred in loining 
the fish (multiple interviews, Japanese, PIC, Thai, US and WIO tuna industry 
representatives, 2006 and 2007; COS 2001: 6).2 To date there is no commercially viable 
mechanical process that can reduce labour time in loining, despite attempts to invent one 
(Iverson 1987a: 277; Buddruss 1998; Diaz 2002: 145). This is simply because tuna come 
in such varied sizes, even within the same species and even within a pre-sorted batch of 
whole fish of the same species. The lack of uniformity in fish size prevents mechanised 
butchering (unlike in salmon processing for example), which is a major technical 
limitation to enhancing labour productivity in the production process in tuna canneries.  
 
A second (interconnected) point is that to save on direct labour costs in high cost sites of 
production, frozen tuna loins are imported from relatively lower cost world-regions. 
Loins are defrosted and the meat is inserted directly into cans (step 7.b). This represents 
an important set of distinctions within the manufacturing node of the canned tuna chain: 
a) factories processing tuna from whole frozen fish to the finished can, b) those involved 
primarily or solely in canning pre-butchered fish (or loins) imported from other sites of 
production, and c) plants specialised in loining only. Canneries based in the EU15, Japan 
and the US, defrost loins and (as a rule) mechanically pack them directly into cans (see 
Chapter 3 for more data and analysis on this).3 The ‘logic of loining’ is based upon the 
international social division of labour between labour-intensive production in developing 
countries and more capital-intensive production in developed countries. There are 
however, quality concerns associated with loins because the fish is handled more often 
than when canned directly and is frozen twice before canning (Munoz 1993: 75). This 
quality concern remains a challenge today (multiple interviews, PIC and US industry 
representatives, 2006). As a reflection of this concern, MW Brands marketed its product 
canned in Ghana and the Seychelles as being ‘from sea to can’. As also noted in the 
figure at 8), canned tuna is produced at different qualities (e.g. steak, chunk, flake) which 
allow firms to compete at different price levels at point-of-retail (Fernandez and Hudgins 
1987: 136). 
 
Finally, depending upon the relative cost and availability of labour-power as well as the 
relative need to ensure fast throughput (i.e. because of limited warehousing space on 
site), several aspects of the production process are either labour- or capital-intensive. For 
example, the cooling of the product after the first (step 6) or second (step 13) cooking 
                                                     
2 The first recorded international trade in tuna loins was imports into the US in the early 1950s (Gallick 
1984: 121-2). 
3 By the early twenty-first century, there was only one tuna cannery on the US mainland – the Bumble Bee 
plant in Santa Fe Springs, Los Angeles – which, despite being able to produce 1,000 cans per minute, only 
employed 220 workers. The very high productivity of this plant (and the Bumble Bee plant in Puerto Rico) 
is because it solely uses tuna loins in the production process and does not process any whole round fish (i.e. 
it is a ‘canning only’ plant). Direct observation and interviews, US industry representatives, May 2006. 
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 operation is done either using natural cooling or via mechanised processes.4 Loading into 
retort trays (step 11) is done either using a machine (with one worker monitoring the 
procedure) or by hand by several workers.5  
 
It is also worth noting an aspect of the canning process that is not explicitly identified in 
Figure 3A.1, the issue of ‘recovery rates’ (see also Chapter 2). This refers to the 
percentage of whole fish that yields useable meat for canning. Not only do ‘[b]ig fish 
clean faster than small fish’,6 but tuna of the same species from different oceanic regions 
have (on average) different recovery rates. For example, industry managers estimate a 
rate of recovery of useable tuna meat relative to the original whole fish of 41% for 
skipjack and 43% for yellowfin from the Indian Ocean, but only 39% for skipjack and 
42% for yellowfin from the Pacific.7 As the tuna itself constitutes around 40% of the total 
cost of a can of tuna, this small difference is commercially significant. 
 
                                                     
4 The determining factor here is not necessarily labour costs. The Hagoromo plant in Japan allows the fish 
to cool overnight in a controlled environment indicating that management strategies can be employed to 
sequence production so as to minimise labour and capital costs. Direct observation, Shida, Japan June 
2006. 
5 Mechanised loading into retort trays was the process at the Bumble Bee plant (Los Angeles) and manual 
loading was undertaken in the Thai Union factory (Bangkok). Direct observation, June and May 2006 
respectively. 
6 Person. Comm.. WIO industry representative, July 2007. 
7 Telephone interview, WIO industry representative, June 2007. 
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 Figure 3A.1: The process of canning tuna 
 
* Fish for thon au naturel (or ‘raw pack’) is not cooked at this stage; ** This four part categorisation 
follows Codex Standard No. 70 (CODEX STAN 70-1981, REV.1-1995, p.1-2); *** Modern cans are pre-
printed with labels, if they are they are packed in cartons directly rather than being palletised.  
Sources: Warne (1988: Sections 1.1 and 4.1); De Santis (1996); Subhapholsiri (2000: 109); direct 
observation in the following factories: Bumble Bee cannery, Sante Fe Springs, CA, USA (May 2006); 
Hagoromo, Shida, Japan (June 2006); Impress (can making plant), Port Victoria, Seychelles (September 
2006); RD Tuna Canners, Madang, Papua New Guinea (March 2006); Thai Union Manufacturing Co., 
Bangkok, Thailand (May 2006); see also Myrseth 1985. 
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11) Cans manually or 
mechanically loaded 
into retort baskets 
 
10) Fish-filled cans 
transferred 
mechanically to packing 
media filler (e.g. brine, 
oil, spring water, sauce, 
etc) 
 
9) Packed into pre-
formed cans manually 
or mechanically 
8) White meat (c.42%) 
sorted into four quality 
grades: steak (solid), 
chunk, flake, 
shredded** 
 
7.a) Skin scraped off. 
White and dark meat 
picked off and 
separated. 
2) Thawing of frozen 
tuna in running water 
3) Heading and gutting 
(H&G) of smaller 
species (e.g. SKJ); 
larger species often 
H&G on deck prior to 
freezing in vessel hold 
5) Trays inserted into 
steam cookers at 100-
105ºC for 1-8 hours 
(depending upon fish 
size)* 
Loss of tuna through 
cooking c.21% 
 
13) Cans cooled (under 
pressure, in air or with 
air blowers) 
14) Cans stacked and 
stored or palletised for 
transfer for labelling*** 
and packing into 
cartons (48 cans per 
carton) and are finally 
boxed 
 
6) Air cooled (often 
overnight) or cooling 
assisted by chilled 
storage. Cooling allows 
the flesh to firm for 
better handling by fish 
workers. 
 
Dark meat (c.12%) used in pet food 
or low-grade product for developing 
country markets. 
‘Scrap’ (c.25%) used in various 
byproducts (e.g. fishmeal, fish oil) 
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APPENDIX 3B 
Comparative cost structure and business strategies in locations of EU-centred 
canned tuna production in the 2000s 
 
The appendix outlines some elements of the basic cost structure of manufacturing canned 
tuna. The rationale is to identify key areas of competition in the ‘input-output structure’ 
(in GCC parlance) of tuna processing between major geographical regions of export-
orientated production. This informs elements of the narrative and analysis in the thesis; 
include the discussion around change in the international division of labour and the EU-
centred commodity chain in Chapter 3.  
 
Three key aspects of the cost structure have been selected here for brief contextual 
analysis, with particular reference to differences between the Indian Ocean ACP 
(including Seychelles) and Southeast Asia (especially Thailand, as the leading export-
orientated location of canned tuna production since the mid-1980s). These are fish costs, 
wages, and can costs. 8  Even marginal cost advantages are highly significant in an 
industry with reportedly low margins of profitability – apparently ranging between 5-10 
percent (PICInd#45–#47; USInd#22), but data on profitability of US canneries between 
1979-1985 indicate that the norm may be at the lower end of the estimate where the 
highest reported pre-tax ‘net income’ was in 1985 with 5.6 percent (Iverson 1987b: 35). 
Before moving to examine cost structure in canned tuna production it is essential to 
emphasise the strategic commercial importance of EU trade preferences to the ACP and 
Andean countries. (This regulatory mechanism is the subject of Chapter 5 and will not be 
discussed further here.) This is made clear when comparing the estimated full 
manufacturing cost per case (48 cans) by region of production with the landed cost in the 
EU (Table 3B.2). On a three-year average, full manufacturing cost per case is around 
US$25 in Southeast Asia and $32 in the Indian Ocean ACP. The average EU customs 
duty of US$6 applied to Southeast Asian product (plus freight) is a fundamental 
competitive advantage for the ACP. As will be argued in detail in Chapter 5, the 
regulatory mechanism of EU trade preferences is perhaps the most important factor in 
explaining the location of canned tuna production in coastal areas of the ACP (their 
‘upgrading’).  
 
 
Fish costs  
As discussed in Appendix 2C.1, regional ex-vessel skipjack markets are globally 
integrated by price with long-term price leadership exerted by firms based in Bangkok.9  
                                                     
8 Other important costs are ocean freight and by-product revenue. Aspects such as utilities, fixed overheads, 
filling and packing materials, etc. have been excluded from the analysis either because of the difficulties 
involved in isolating costs and obtaining reliable data or because of their relative marginality (i.e. the 
proportions of utility inputs such as electricity and water are unlikely to have changed significantly).  
9 For a detailed analysis of Thailand’s historical emergence and competitive advantages in the global 
canned tuna industry, see Campling et al. (2007: 336-350), Campling and Doherty (2007) and Crough 
(1987a, 1987b). 
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 Nonetheless, all processing industry interviewees place considerable emphasis on short-
term tuna raw material price fluctuations, not least as it is by far the most expensive input 
in canned tuna production. Average fish cost as a proportion of full manufacturing cost 
for four major regions of world production was 64 percent (averaged over three years 
2006-8, see Table 3B.2).10 Price negotiations between individual processors and boat 
owners or tuna trading firms depend upon a variety of factors. As one insider put it: ‘If 
you can make the right choice on fish price you make a lot, if not you lose’ (USInd#1). 
The most important dynamics in raw material price negotiations are: 
 Current known catches/available supply and prices: This is where the information 
advantages of the larger branded-firms are of considerable strategic commercial 
importance. (See Section 3.4.1 for more on this.) 
 Fish prices reflect differences between directly landed cost and transhipped cost 
(the fob-cif differential). Processors based in Abidjan, Port Victoria, Pago Pago 
(American Samoa) and General Santos (the Philippines) benefit here because the 
raw material is normally landed directly (see Chapters 2 and 6, as well as Figure 
3B.1 below comparing ‘African’ ACP and Thai skipjack price). Thailand benefits 
from being at the apex of the Indian and Pacific oceans for raw material supply 
and as a hub on the ‘East-West’ seafreight ‘superhighway’ (JInd#4–#6; TInd#8; 
EUInd#53). 
 Cold storage capacity allows processors to warehouse raw material. As one Thai 
processor noted ‘every time of buying is a game: whoever can hold their breath 
longer is better off, but packers have very small lungs’ (TInd#5–#7). That is, most 
processors have a limited ability to wait out in price negotiations because they 
need to keep production running to meet overhead costs, maintain production 
volume, etc. Of course, those processors firms with larger strategic cold storage 
have bigger lungs. 
 Vertical integration, financial control or supply contracts with fishing fleets mean 
that processors will not be subject to arbitrage by tuna trading companies (see 
Chapter 2 and below). 
 On top of their information advantages, the larger branded-manufacturers with 
multiple processing facilities (directly or indirectly controlled) have considerable 
market power due to their huge volumes of repeat raw material purchases. This 
provides them with a significant advantage vis-à-vis relatively more fragmented 
players in the fishing node (Chapter 2 on the fragmented ownership of the EU and 
US purse seine fleets, and on the Japanese, see Matsuda (1987: 87). Medium-
sized processors are aware of their disadvantages here, as one put it: ‘Price is 
controlled by the hand of god, unfortunately we are not a god, we are not even a 
hand!’ (TInd#2–#4). 
 The quality and size of the fish, which combined with relative wage costs and 
labour productivity in the location of production (the balance of labour time/cost 
                                                     
10 The data in Table 3B.2 is unreliable because it was supplied in the public domain by the CEO of MW 
Brands who had a commercial interest in misrepresenting cost data (see Chapter 6 for an explanation). 
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 and fish yield), means that lower-wage locations are able to purchase smaller fish 
and still profitably butcher (loin) them. 
 If a processing firm is locked-in to a commercial relationship with specific fleets 
through rules of origin, boat owners may be able to charge more thereby capturing 
a part of the trade preference. This is believed to be the case for the ACP 
countries (see Chapter 5). 
Given the large number of contingencies affecting raw material costs, processors 
undertake strategies to mitigate short-term price fluctuations. Many processing firms 
spread shifting costs for tuna raw material across their annual accounts based upon 
known seasonal catch/price fluctuations and the factoring-in of retail discounts, 
promotions, etc. (see Section 3.4).11  
 
 
Labour costs 
As tuna loining is so labour-intensive, ‘[w]age rates are especially important’ (COS 2001: 
8). Table 3B.1 provides estimates of basic wages for tuna cannery workers in several 
locations of production in 2001. This data is problematic for several reasons, not least 
because wage rates are not adjusted to reflect relative spending power in the countries 
concerned. It does however, adequately illustrate the motivations of canned tuna 
processing firms in choosing between relatively high and low cost wage locations in the 
global North and South respectively, including decisions around the (re)location of plant 
and/or the outsourcing of the loining process. Other important labour cost differentials 
such as social security payments and the meeting of legal health and safety requirements 
are not factored-in. 
 
Several industry interviewees qualified the importance of the wage differential in the cost 
structure of tuna processing in the global South. While relatively low wage-labour is of 
course a major attraction for processing companies to invest in a given location, when 
choosing between relatively low cost locations the wage costs relative to total net 
production will only range between five and ten percent. This is because of the very high 
proportion of tuna raw material in the cost structure. In fact, wage costs were not a major 
concern for the more serious corporate managers interviewed as potential savings from 
one country to the next were relatively small, but what did concern all corporate 
interviewees was the productivity of local workers. Workers in canneries in Thailand are 
renowned throughout the tuna industry for their degree of specialisation and productivity 
(TInd#1; #5–#7; EUInd#7; #13 USInd#3–#5; #8–#11; #20) and, anecdotally, productivity 
in one Thai factory was observably very high (direct observation in a Thai cannery 
compared with a cannery in PNG, 2006). Quantitative data on comparative labour 
productivity is not available, but, for example, one WIO industry representative noted 
that it ‘is a big difference’ and another noted that, in Mauritius, workers are ‘very low-
skilled’ (EUInd#35).  Another stated that: ‘A skilled tuna cleaner can clean 600kg per 
day. In PNG workers only do 300-350kg per day. A one percent better yield directly 
translates to a one percent increase in profit margin’ (EUInd#11; broadly confirmed by 
                                                     
11 Note that this practice means that the use of annual average whole frozen tuna price data in this thesis (as 
opposed to monthly seasonal data by oceanic sub-region) is a sufficient indication of broad trends. 
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 IntFS#3; #5; PICInd#45–#47). From the perspective of cannery managers, absenteeism is 
a known problem among the local workforce in Mauritius and the Seychelles (Wood 
1997: 204; IDDRA 2004), and was a major concern of existing and prior tuna processing 
managers in Fiji, PNG and the Solomon Islands. In short, while all ACP locations of 
production except for Seychelles had lower wages rates than Thailand in 2001, labour 
productivity was reported to be considerably less. 
 
Migrant workers play a central role in several sites of production. For example, in 2006, 
around 40 percent of fish workers in the Seychelles plant were expatriates, for the Princes 
plant in Mauritius this totalled around 30 percent, and in Thai tuna canneries an estimated 
50 percent of the labour force were workers from Burma, who were reported to be ‘very 
efficient’ (TInd#1; EUInd#13).12 The reported labour productivity of Burmese workers is 
probably due, quite simply, to their desire to stay out of Burma and/or send remittances to 
family. Individual Thai firms sponsored migrant workers in their application to the Thai 
government for a work permit, which is non-transferable between firms (TInd#5–#7).13 
Due to the fact that the work permit stays with the sponsoring firm, if workers do not do 
an ‘efficient’ job they are legally compelled to return home. The employment of migrant 
workers is certainly in practice – albeit not necessarily in intent – an effective disciplinary 
tool for plant managers. Burmese migrant workers are also alleged to be paid a third of 
the wages for Thais (EUInd#13). 
 
  
                                                     
12 It was claimed by one industry interviewee that Thai workers are moving out of factory work towards 
employment with better pay and that is ‘less smelly’ (TInd#1). 
13 Transcripts from interviews with Thai industry representatives by Amanda Hamilton in 2010 report that 
Burmese migrant workers are no longer tied to a specific firm. 
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Table 3B.1: Hourly Wage Comparisons in Tuna Processing, 2001 
Country Hourly wage (USD/hour)* 
Developing Countries  
Ecuador (StarKist plant) 0.69 
Fiji 0.47 ** 
Ghana (StarKist plant) 0.62 
Indonesia 0.14 
Philippines 0.43 
Papua New Guinea  0.27 # 
Seychelles 1.90 ## 
Solomon Islands 0.31 
Thailand14 0.48 
OECD   
France Euro 6.67§ 
USA (California) 11.00 §§ 
Sources: Prehearing statement of StarKist Samoa, Inc. (StarKist 2001: 19). Several items were confirmed 
via data presented in Prehearing statement of COS (Chicken of the Sea) Samoa Packing Company (COS 
2001: Exhibit 2). 
* All data excludes benefits and specific arrangements for expatriate fish workers such as housing and 
airfares. 
** This increased to USD1.53 per hour in 2003 as a result of successful industrial action (interviews, Fiji, 
2006) 
# FFA database (figure does not include additional benefits). 
## Data for 2004. Based upon the assumption of an eight-hour day, five days a week at a minimum 
monthly starting salary of SR2,100 (c.SR52.5 p/h), and conversion using the official exchange rate of 
SR6.3:USD1 (Central Bank of Seychelles, June 2007). Note that, until late 2008, the exchange rate was 
fixed and non-convertible outside of the country. Estimates for the exchange rate in the parallel economy 
are in the region of SR12: USD1. The Nation (Seychelles) 17 February 2004. 
§ Data based upon French minimum wage in 2001 (gross, excluding benefits). National Institute for 
Statistics and Economic Studies, http://www.insee.fr/en/home/home_page.asp 
§§ USITC July 2002. 
 
 
Can costs 
A major area of price competition is on cans, the second most expensive ‘input’ in 
production in the global South and a key point of competition between factories. For the 
                                                     
14 An estimated 48% of workers were paid less than the minimum monthly wage during the initial stages of 
Thailand’s rise to dominance in canned tuna production (Crough 1987b: 12). 
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 ACP (West Africa and Indian Ocean) and Latin American regions of production in 2006, 
the average cost of the empty can as an input in a single can of finished product was 
USD0.09, while the average Southeast Asian cost was USD0.06, or a relative price 
advantage of 30 percent (Table 3B.2). Translating this into full manufacturing cost, 
Southeast Asian producers have a five percent price advantage over ACP producers as a 
result of can cost alone.  
 
Thailand’s competitiveness on can price stems, certainly in part, from economies of 
scale. It was a manufacturer of canned fruit and vegetables prior to the initial emergence 
of the domestic canned tuna industry in the 1970s. This ‘backward integration into can 
production’ (Jaffee 1992: 90; TInd#2–#4; #8; #9; EUInd#57 –#60; USInd#18) helps to 
explain why Thai tuna processors tendering for contracts can offer much cheaper cans as 
part of total manufacturing costs (EUInd#7; USInd#22). In 2005 there were over 30 can 
making companies based in Thailand (Hayes 2005). Canneries that source sheet tinplate 
from a domestically-based steel industry have a competitive advantage because: freight 
costs are much lower over short distances for a fairly heavy product like tinplate, and; 
currency exchange rates are taken out of the equation.15 In contrast, ACP based firms 
import all of the tinplate used in their cans. For example, an outsourcing manager at one 
of the main US brands noted that, when tendering for production of canned tuna in 2005, 
his firm received prices from processors in China, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, 
of which Thailand was the most ‘competitive’ mainly because of the price of cans, which 
‘really stood out in this tender process’ (USInd#1). This has led to some suspicion that a 
hidden subsidy is provided to firms in Thailand, either on the cost of cans or on 
electricity (USInd#22; EUInd#6; #61). 
 
 
 
                                                     
15 Personal communication, Suzanne Christiansen, Managing Editor, CanTech. 
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 Table 3B.2: Comparative canned tuna production costs by major region (all in USD unless otherwise stated), 2006-2008 
 Southeast Asia Indian Ocean ACP* West African ACP Latin America GSP+ 
 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
Fish cost (SKJ >1.8kg) 935 1,280 1,510 1,100 1,462 1,750 1,050 1,275 1,550 1,070 1,495 1,483 
By-product credit** -23 -60 -65 -23 -45 -49 -23 -40 -43 -23 -27 -29 
Net fish cost 912 1,220 1,445 1,077 1,417 1,701 1,027 1,235 1,507 1,047 1,468 1,454 
Recovery rate*** 40% 40% 40% 39% 40% 40% 39% 40% 40% 39% 40% 40% 
Cost per cleaned mt 2,280 3,050 3,613 2,762 3,542 4,252 2,633 3,088 3,768 2,685 3,670 3,634 
Cost per cleaned gram 0.00228 0.0031 0.0036 0.00276 0.0035 0.0043 0.00263 0.0031 0.0038 0.00268 0.0037 0.0036 
Grams per can**** 135 116 116 135 116 116 135 116 116 135 116 116 
Fish cost per case (48 cans) 14.77 16.98 20.11 17.89 19.72 23.68 17.06 17.19 20.98 17.4 20.43 20.23 
Can cost 2.9 3.1 3.36 4.19 4.67 5.3 4.3 5.2 5.8 4.15 5.3 5.3 
Other packaging 0.4 0.41 0.59 0.5 0.73 0.76 0.69 0.6 0.6 0.65 1.15 0.84 
Conversation costs (labour, fixed 
overheads, etc) 
3.2 3.5 4.75 4.8 6.64 7.01 4.8 7.2 7.2 4.8 5.9 5.9 
Full manufacturing per case 21.27 23.99 28.81 27.38 31.75 36.75 26.85 30.19 34.58 27 32.78 32.27 
Ocean freight 0.8 0.96 0.96 0.95 1.21 1.21 0.7 0.9 0.9 1 1.44 1.44 
Customs duty on full manufacturing 
cost and freight 
5.3 5.76 6.92 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Landed cost in EU 27.37 30.71 36.69 28.33 32.96 37.96 27.56 31.09 35.48 28 34.22 33.71 
Notes: 2006 data average for May-July; 2007 data average for entire year; 2008 data average for January-June; * Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles;            
** Assumed to be standard in 2006 data, but this is problematic as is clear for data for 2007 and 2008; *** 2006 data assumes that higher skilled workers in SE 
Asia led to better recovery rates in cleaning process. Data for 2007 and 2008 assume an identical recovery rate; **** Note different assumption for 2006 data 
compared to 2007 and 2008.  
Sources: Valsecchi 2006; Valsecchi 2008. 
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Canned skipjack is probably best conceived of as a truly ‘global’ market with the 
Bangkok price acting as the international benchmark since the late 1980s (as it is for 
skipjack raw material, see Appendix 2C.1), although important product and quality 
differentials factors must be taken into account. As one UK buyer put it ‘We use the 
Bangkok price to gauge the market price’ (EUInd#25; StarKist 2001: 17), although 
important product and quality differentials factors must also be taken into account. As 
one industry analyst put it: ‘All roads lead to Bangkok, or so it seems in the tuna 
world’ (Subhapholsiri 2000a: 110). Canned yellowfin is a very different market 
segment and is dominated by EU-centred considerations. Canned albacore must, 
again, be differentiated, and is dominated by US-centred factors. ACP production of 
core canned product has been consistently more expensive than that of competitors 
based in Southeast Asia, even though it has also reduced in price along with the 
general downward trend (probably driven down by Thai price competition as the Thai 
price is often used as a competitive benchmark). The reasons for Thai dominance in 
the canned tuna industry were touched upon above, but one EU-specific trend of note 
is that Southeast Asian processors’ share of the EU canned tuna market grew from 
24% to 29% between 2004 and 2005 (Valsecchi 2006b: 2). In short, actual (and 
potential) ACP exporters are being hit with a price squeeze horizontally – the 
competitive pressures of other developing country exporters which have a disciplinary 
impact on price – and vertically: the demand for ever lower prices by supermarkets to 
facilitate competitiveness in their respective domestic retail markets . 
 
 
 
431
 Figure 3B.1: Comparing ‘Africa’ and Thai frozen skipjack price (USD/mt) to ACP-EU, Thai-EU and Thai-US canned skipjack import 
price (USD/carton 48x6.5 oz cans) (annual average prices) 
 
 
Notes: SKJ = skipjack.; ACP-EU and Thai-EU data: monthly canned skipjack tuna in brine import prices into Europe per carton (48 x 6.1/2 oz cans), origin Thailand  and 
‘ACP’, in US$/carton; Thai-US data: monthly canned skipjack tuna in brine prices into USA per carton (48x6 oz), origin Thailand, in US$/carton   
 
Source: Databases provided by FAO   
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APPENDIX 3C 
UK import of canned tuna by major supplying country, 1980-2009 (in 1,000 metric tons) 
Country   1980 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 
 Mauritius   0.8 3.0 2.4 3.7 4.1 4.9 5.7 7.0 11.6 22.5 23.1 24.9 27.8 22.9 
 Seychelles   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 3.4 3.7 4.8 0.4* 17.5 23.3 23.9 28.8 23.9 19.7 
 Ghana   ns ns ns 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.9 11.0 13.7 19.6 23.0 20.2 18.4 19.3 
 Thailand   0.0 4.4 19.8 32.8 32.5 10.6 27.5 22.3 19.1 16.9 18.2 15.9 14.9 16.8 
 Philippines   0.0 2.9 2.1 3.0 7.0 6.8 8.6 8.5 11.5 6.0 7.7 9.7 13.0 16.4 
 Ecuador   ns ns ns 0.1 0.7 1.2 0.2 5.3 5.0 8.6 6.4 6.7 7.8 7.4 
 Spain   ns ns ns 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.3 6.4 4.6 9.3 3.3 2.6 1.4 2.2 
 France   ns ns ns 0.0 0.0 1.1 5.0 1.3 2.2 1.3 0.9 1.3 3.0 2.1 
 Indonesia   0.0 0.0 0.4 2.6 2.1 4.2 4.8 5.1 5.4 4.7 4.3 2.8 1.7 0.7 
 Côte d'Ivoire   1.4 3.5 2.4 2.8 1.4 0.3 0.0 1.4 2.2 0.3 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Solomon Is.   0.8 1.0 1.4 1.0 4.1 4.6 7.2 6.7 4.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 Fiji   1.0 2.5 4.1 6.5 5.8 3.4 4.0 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Japan 3.8 3.5 0.6 ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns ns 
 Others   3.2 3.0 2.0 4.9 8.0 30.7 11.9 16.0 11.2 11.5 18.7 19.7 18.6 8.6 
 Total   11.0 23.8 34.7 57.7 69.3 71.6 85.9 94.5 108.6 124.0 130.2 132.6 130.5 116.1 
Notes: ns = not specified, this is because supplying countries listed in the ADB/INFOFISH dataset are not the same as the Globefish data. Japan exports assumed to be zero 
from late-1980s onwards; Seychelles exports known to be zero between 1980 and 1987. Where data is replicated by year and country, the Globefish (2010) data are used 
because it is assumed that they are deliberately revised.  * error in FAO data. 
Sources: ADB/INFOFISH (1991: 101) for 1980, 1985 and 1987; Globefish (2010: 47) 
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 APPENDIX 3D 
A Note on Mitsubishi in the Global Commodity Chain in Canned Tuna 
 
Princes is one of the main three players in the EU-centred commodity chain in the 2000s. 
Princes Group has been a subsidiary of Mitsubishi Corporation – the giant sogo shosha – 
since 1989, which bought it from the firm Buitoni (ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 102). Mitsubishi 
was the first Japanese firm to establish export-orientated activities in the global canned tuna 
chain after World War Two. Like Heinz, Mitsubishi was initially a player in the US-centred 
commodity chain. In 1952 it emerged as Japan’s first tuna trading company, initially 
supplying StarKist with canning-grade fish sourced mainly from Japanese longline fleets 
(Matsuda 1987: 81; Gallick 1984: 40, 119). By the mid-1980s it also procured from South 
Korean and Taiwanese boats (fleets which it had part-financed so as to ensure supply), and 
had a 30 percent share of the total tuna trade in Japan, 40 percent of the total market 
emanating from the Pacific ocean (both including sashimi grade), and a 20-25 percent share 
of canning-grade supply to the canneries in Thailand (Comitini 1987: 263-5).16 By the 1970s 
Mitsubishi was also a minor branded-firm in the US market with its Three-Diamonds brand, 
which had between two and three percent share between 1972-1985 (King 1986: 70).17 This 
product was supplied by a subsidiary cannery in Ponce, Puerto Rico which packed albacore 
(‘whitemeat’) and non-branded manufacturers in Thailand (Iverson 1987a: 272, 1987b: 23; 
Hudgins and Fernandez 1987: 298; Ashenden and Kitson 1986: 15; ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 
84).18 Interestingly, when Mitsubishi closed its Puerto Rico plant, it procured canned tuna 
from StarKist (Munoz 1996: 109), demonstrating the regular shifts between competition and 
collaboration among firms in this industry.  
 
Mitsubishi was also a shareholder with Nikkatsu (Japan Tuna Fisheries Cooperative 
Association) in Kaigai Gyogyo Kabushiki Kasisha (KGKK Overseas Fishing Co. Ltd.), 
established in 1958 to expand the commodity frontier of the Japanese fleet through 
establishing a series of overseas bases throughout the world. One of KGKK’s joint ventures 
was in Mauritius with the creation of a cold-storage facility for the transhipment of tuna and 
an EU-centred cannery, primarily for the UK market, in 1972. The tuna cannery was partly 
supplied by one purse seiner – the pioneer of the Western Indian Ocean purse seine fishery 
(see Section 2.3.4; Ashenden and Kitson 1986: 15; EUInd#34). Nikkatsu withdrew from 
KGKK in 1983, but Mitsubishi maintained the Mauritius cannery, which was apparently 
supplying Princes with canned tuna before 1989 (Comitini 1987: 261-2; Hudgins and 
Fernandez 1987: 298; Michaud 2000: 82).  It eventually sold its purse seiners ‘because it’s a 
different business. You’re chasing, it’s too risky’ (EUInd#11). Until the mid-1980s UK 
retailers bought canned tuna only through sogo shosha (especially Mitsubishi and Mitsui) 
which had investments in canneries in the Pacific Islands and Thailand, but then new 
suppliers emerged and UK buyers procured through other importing firms/ retail brokers, on 
the spot market and direct from canneries (Elsy 1987: 96; ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 102).   
 
                                                     
16 By the 2000s Mitsubishi was only a minor player in the canning-grade tuna trade. As one interviewee put it: 
‘Trading Companies are getting richer and richer, the barriers to entry are very high; even Mitsubishi cannot 
compete’ (TInd#1; see also AInd#12). It was, however, the world’s largest trader in the sashimi-grade chain, 
both fresh and frozen (JInd#4–#6; PICInd#5). 
17 The ‘three diamonds’ symbol is that used by the Mitsubishi Group as a whole. The US subsidiary was called 
Mitsubishi Foods Inc. and canned tuna totalled 50 of its total US sales under the Three-Diamonds brand and for 
US private label(the rest being mainly canned fruit and vegetables) (Iverson 1987b: 9; ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 
84). 
18 Another sogo shosha Mitsui was also a minor player in the US market and had a cannery in Puerto Rico 
(ADB/INFOFISH 1991: 82). 
434
 Mitsubishi went from being primarily a tuna trading firm (including in the canning-grade 
segment),19 to being a minor player in the US market (where it declined in the mid-1980s) 
and a major player in the EU-centred commodity chain, especially with the purchase of 
Princes Group in 1989. Princes falls within Mitsubishi’s ‘Living Essentials Group’, and 
within that the ‘Food (Products) Division’. This division processes and procures a wide range 
of branded canned animal protein, vegetables and tomatoes, soft drinks, edible oils, pasta and 
cooking sauces.  In 2007 Princes had a total share of 16.3 percent in the UK food and drink 
market segments in which it operates, with a retail turnover of £1.2 billion (Princes n.d.). It is 
also MW Brand’s main direct competitor in the canned fish markets in the UK and the 
Netherlands.20 Princes’ main source of supply of standard canned tuna comes from its new 
factory in Mauritius – Princes Tuna Mauritius (PTM) – which was opened in 1999 at a cost 
of around £12 million (EUInd#34). 21  However, unlike MW Brands, it does not have a 
cannery elsewhere and so is reliant on the EU DWF in the WIO and transhipped supply from 
elsewhere for raw material and on various non-branded manufacturers for finished product. 
 
                                                     
19 A position that it solidified through part financing of new fishing capacity, thereby contributing to the crisis of 
overcapacity and subsequent restructuring of the US-centred chain in the early 1980s. 
20 Princes also owns the Vier Diamanten brand which has a 50 percent share of the market in Austria. This is 
touted as a very high quality canned skipjack product (EUInd#11). 
21  Official Princes material states that PTM was bought in 1999 (Princes n.d.: 8), but this was more a 
distribution of assets within Mitsubishi. The cannery ‘wasn’t a core business for Mitsubishi so they asked 
Princes to get in’ (EUInd#34). 
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 CHAPTER 5 APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX 5A 
ACP-EU Preferential Trade Relations: The Rise and Decline of the 
Lomé/Cotonou Agreements 
 
This appendix provides a historical sketch of the emergence and historical 
development of ACP-EU preferential trade relations. It traces the first Lomé 
Convention to the specific historical juncture of the early 1970s and the associated 
turbulence in the world economy and culmination of ‘third worldism’. It then traces 
the evolution of the subsequent Lomé Conventions (including their reflection and 
refraction of shifts in inter-state power relations further in favour of EU interests) to 
their replacement by the Cotonou Agreement in 2000 and the subsequent phasing-out 
of non-reciprocal trade relations with the initialling of Economic Partnership 
Agreements in December 2007 (where the historical coverage of this aspect of the 
thesis ends). The core argument here is that the relative gains afforded to the ACP 
under the first Lomé Convention were products of the political struggles of the 1970s 
and are unlikely to be repeated without a similar configuration of forces in the global 
political economy.  
 
This appendix is not framed as an intervention in debates within the discipline of 
International Political Economy (IPE) or the Development Studies literature on trade 
and development. The influence of these bodies of work is generally implicit, such as 
the discussion of trade preference optimists/pessimists, and it certainly takes seriously 
relations of power in the international political economy (see Cammack 2011 on the 
distinction between this and ‘IPE’). Instead, the purpose is a historical understanding 
of the political economy of EU trade policy to explain why particular policies were 
followed at particular times on behalf of which interests (including their unintended 
effects). 
 
 
5A.1  Historical context to the Lomé Conventions 
 
A central aspect of the institutional context of export-orientated canned tuna industries 
based in the ACP (and elsewhere) was the international economic law that was shaped 
by and, in turn, influenced and regulated these flows, especially regarding the trade in 
goods. The overarching legal framework here was the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) established in 1947 and superseded in 1995 with the formation of 
the World Trade Organisation, which among multiple other new Agreements included 
a reformulation of GATT.1 A fundamental element of WTO law, and GATT (1947) 
before it, is the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) or ‘non-discrimination’ principle. 
Contrary to its literal meaning, the MFN principle stipulates that WTO Members have 
to offer the same tariff treatment to all other WTO members except in the case of a 
regional integration organisation or free trade agreement. Preferential (i.e. non-MFN) 
tariffs can only be offered to certain categories of countries under certain conditions. 
 
                                                     
1 The two legal agreements on tariffs and trade are referred to here as GATT (1947) and GATT (1994), 
the institution of the World Trade Organisation as a whole is referred to as the WTO. 
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A major exception to the MFN principle is the Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP), which is an arrangement that formally allows developed countries to offer 
non-reciprocal and preferential access to their markets for goods from qualifying 
developing countries.2 The GSP in 1971 and the first Lomé Convention in were 
established in a period of global political and economic turbulence, 3  which served to 
provide the global South with increased relative bargaining power in relations with 
the advanced capitalist countries. This was a period of so-called ‘Third Worldism’ 
exemplified by the call for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which was 
passed by the UN General Assembly in 1974.4 As we saw in Chapter 4, this moment 
was also important to the assertion of developing country interests in the negotiation 
on UNCLOS. 
 
The idea of a GSP was initiated at the first United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) in 19645 and was eventually institutionalised through a 
series of offers by eleven developed countries between 1971 and 1976.6 The architects 
of the GSP were heavily influenced by the dominance of structuralist thinking within 
development economics of the time (Leys 1996). The objective was to promote 
developing country exports of manufactured goods so as to ‘help free their heavy 
dependence on trade in primary products, whose slow long-term growth and marked 
price instability contributed to chronic trade deficits’ (OECD 1983: 9).7 The intention 
was to use trade preferences as a mechanism to encourage the export-orientated 
development of infant industries, generate employment and foreign exchange, and 
promote economic diversification in developing countries.8 The GSP, the structuralist 
thought influencing its creation and the wider global context played an important role 
in the formation of the terms of the Lomé Convention. 
 
 
 
                                                     
2 States are self-categorised as developing countries. This contains within it the only other formally 
accepted sub-category at the WTO, the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) as officially defined by the 
UN Development Committee. It is important to stress that ‘“Least Developed” is an official 
classification, not a neutral measure of poverty’ (Page and Hewitt 2002: 91). 
3 For seminal interpretations of this historical moment, see Arrighi (1994), Brenner (2004), Glyn 
(2006). The GSP was initially a temporary agreement, but it was extended for an indefinite period 
through the GATT ‘Enabling Clause’ of 1979 (GATT 1979), which embedded the GSP in international 
trade law and set a key legal precedent for the special and differential treatment (S&DT) of developing 
countries.  
4 See Campling (2006: 257-58) for an overview of factors explaining the rise and decline of the NIEO, 
including a range of references. 
5 UNCTAD was seen as a pro-‘Third World’ agency of the UN in the 1970s and 1980s, not least 
because at its first meeting in 1964 the Group of 77 developing countries (G77) was formed. To 
paraphrase Robert McNamara (then President of the World Bank), the G77 was an alliance that 
attempted to respond to disparities of wealth, that appeared to be widening, between developed and 
developing countries (cited in Cox 1987: 282). 
6 The eleven countries in 1976 were: Australia, Austria, Canada, the EU, Finland, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the US. By 2005, the only countries granting a GSP were Australia, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the EU, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, Switzerland, 
Turkey and the US (UNCTAD 2005). 
7 Otherwise known as the ‘Prebisch thesis’ after the theory’s major proponent, Raul Prebisch (the first 
Secretary-General of UNCTAD).  
8 For a brief and general overview of the scope of the success of the GSP see Gibbon and Ponte (2005: 
50-51, 212 footnote 15); Cernat et al. (2004: 257). See also Grilli (1993: 22). 
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5A.2 Historical development of ACP-EU preferential trade relations  
 
The origins of ACP-EU relations are commonly traced to the Treaty of Rome (1957) 
of which Part IV established an association between the (then) European Economic 
Community (EEC) and (primarily) French colonies and overseas territories.9 This 
association unilaterally imposed reciprocal preferential trade, but also extended 
access for colonies to all EEC markets and provided for a set of aid commitments.10 In 
light of the rapid process of decolonisation and the fact that the association was 
deemed non-compatible with GATT(1947) this was replaced by the negotiated 
Yaoundé Conventions (Yaoundé I 1963-1969 and Yaoundé II 1969-1975),11 
essentially reciprocal arrangements between the EEC and Francophone Africa – the 
Associated African States and Madagascar (AAMS).12 The Yaoundé Conventions 
were frameworks for the protection of EEC economic and geopolitical interests, in 
particular for the cost-sharing of French (post-)colonial mercantilism across the EEC 
as a whole, mainly in return for guaranteed supply of primary commodities and access 
to Francophone Africa’s (very limited) markets by other EEC members (Grilli 1993: 7 
and 156; Nunn and Price 2004: 211). It is no surprise that the Yaoundé Conventions 
were subject to substantial criticism at the time because of the EEC’s perceived 
‘divisive’ and (in the parlance of the time) ‘neo-colonial’ exploitation of Africa 
(Lister 1988: 55). Rhetoric aside, the fact that the AAMS countries’ relative share of 
EEC trade declined between 1958 and 1973, meant that the Yaoundé Conventions 
were viewed with a degree of scepticism by its developing country signatories (Grilli 
1993: 155-161). 
 
The Lomé Conventions I-IV(bis): ACP-EU trade relations and their context 
The first Lomé Convention (Lomé I, 1975-1980) may well represent a high-point in 
modern world history of developing country gains in trade concessions from the 
advanced capitalist countries in inter-state negotiations (Ravenhill 1980: 33). These 
developments must be set in the political context of the Third Worldism of the late 
1960s and early 1970s, including the call for a NIEO. Lomé was the most ‘generous’ 
developed country response to Third World demands for reformist ‘justice’ in 
international trade relations. While this victory by the ACP group was far from 
absolute (the more radical demands were, unsurprisingly, rejected by the EEC)13 and 
it was tempered by onerous rules of origin and related procedures (RoO, see below on 
fisheries RoO), never before (or since) had such extensive non-reciprocal preferential 
                                                     
9 On the history of European ‘Associationism’, including a detailed analysis of French colonial theory, 
see Grilli (1993: Chapter 1). See also Cosgrove Twitchett (1981) and Lister (1988). 
10 The association applied to French West Africa (Dahomey, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, Niger, 
Senegal, Sudan and Upper Volta), French Equatorial Africa (Cameroon, Chad, Middle Congo, Gabon 
and Ubangi-Chari), and other French territories, namely Autonomous Republic of Togo, Madagascar, 
Comoros, French Polynesia, French Southern and Antarctic Territories, Algeria, Réunion, Guyanne, 
Martinique, Guadeloupe, St. Pierre and Miquelon, French Somaliland, New Caledonia and 
Dependencies, Belgian Congo and Ruanda-Urundi, Italian Somaliland, and New Guinea. 
11 Latin America was particularly concerned that the association would lead to trade diversion in favour 
of exports from francophone Africa. Grilli 1993: 12 and 15. 
12 The eighteen Associated African States and Madagascar (AAMS) were: Burundi, Cameroon, Central 
African Republic, Chad, People’s Republic of Congo (formerly Brazzaville), Dahomey, Gabon, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Upper Volta and 
Zaïre (formerly Congo-Kinshasa, Congo Leopoldville. 
13 For example, the EEC refused ACP demands for the inclusion of certain elements of NIEO demands, 
such as ACP national sovereignty over natural resources, adjustment of EU economies and a code of 
conduct for multinational corporations  (Nunn and Price 2004: 212; see also Hurt 2003). 
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treatment been negotiated by a block of developing countries.14 It fact, it is commonly 
argued that the EEC ‘made many more concessions than it was prepared to do during 
the negotiations of Lomé I, and that from Lomé II onwards, the EU has been rolling 
back these concessions’ (Babarinde and Faber 2005: 2).15 The terms of Lomé I and II 
reflected the assumptions of the structuralist economic thinking of the 1970s, for 
example, placing ‘“special emphasis”’ on ‘“the domestic processing of ACP raw 
materials with a view to achieving a larger and equitable share of processed raw 
materials in both production and exports of the ACP states’” (Article 70 of Lomé II as 
cited by Stevens and Weston 1984: 28). Alongside the injection of capital in the form 
of EEC aid, the major policy mechanism for achieving this objective was the 
provision of non-reciprocal trade preferences as a mechanism of competitive 
advantage to support the development of infant industry in the ACP. 
 
The determining factor behind the formation of the Lomé Convention was the 
accession of the UK to the EEC in 1973. In short, the terms of the UK accession made 
it necessary to replace Yaoundé with a new EEC regime that accommodated the trade 
and other relations of Britain with the independent Commonwealth countries.16 This 
brought together the eighteen AAMS (the EEC’s ‘partners’ in the Yaoundé 
Conventions) with former British colonies in sub-Saharan Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific (i.e. the developing country Commonwealth bar Asian members). In short, 
Lomé was the genesis of the ACP group of countries (initially totalling 46 states) and 
its institutional representation through the ACP Secretariat.  
 
Four interrelated factors converged to enable the ACP states to negotiate a relatively 
beneficial non-reciprocal agreement, in positive contrast to the prior (reciprocal) terms 
of the Yaoundé Conventions. First and foremost, because of stagflation in the world 
economy and the perception among developed countries of a ‘threat’ from the Third 
World through ‘commodity power’ (i.e. via cartel-like organisations based on the 
successful model of OPEC), the EEC was willing to negotiate the terms of the 
agreement in order to establish a steady supply of primary commodities from the ACP 
countries in the face of real shortages of raw materials (Arts and Byron 1997: 74-75; 
Grilli 1993: 25-26). Second, the EEC was pushed onto its back-foot by the unity of 
the ‘common front’ of ACP states and its pro-active leadership by the Nigerian 
government. This is interesting because the agreement was non-reciprocal and thus 
the ACP group had little to ‘offer’ the EEC in terms of bargaining power, it was also 
in direct contrast to the terms of the Yaoundé Conventions dictated by the EEC 
despite being reciprocal agreements. One important political lesson from these 
negotiations was that the ACP states united to support particular positions and 
                                                     
14 The principle of reciprocity in GATT(1947) had been a target of Third World critique since the 1955 
Bandung Conference  as they were ‘unsuitable to the special needs of the underdeveloped countries’ 
(Grilli 1993: 30; Parkinson 1956). For example, for Ravenhill, Lomé I was ‘one of the few successfully 
negotiated multilateral agreements in the contentious area of North-South relations’ (1980: 33). For 
Clapham, it was negotiated from ‘something approaching a position of equality’ (1996: 99). For 
Stevens and Weston it was ‘the most important trade agreement between a group of developed market 
economies and a group of developing countries, and is at the summit of the EEC’s hierarchy of trade 
relations with the Third World’ (1984: 29). For Grilli, Lomé I looked ‘at least for a while, like the most 
advanced system of North-South development cooperation and a model for things to come’ (1993: 35). 
15 It is for this historical reason (among others) that this thesis asserts the centrality of historical context 
in understanding international trade relations and the rules that govern it. 
16 Protocol 22 of the UK accession agreement provided for an agreement along the lines of the 
Yaoundé Conventions (Babarinde and Faber 2005: 3; see also Grilli 1993: 21-35). 
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demands of direct interest only to a very small amount of its members (Ravenhill 
1980: 35; Grilli 193: 7).17 This is not to suggest that Lomé I was negotiated as a 
relationship between equals: for example, the export dependence of the ACP on the 
EEC compared to EEC penetration of ACP markets was (and remains) profoundly 
uneven. Instead, it is to claim that successful negotiation tactics in the context of the 
world system of the mid-1970s lessened this asymmetry. Third, the US objected to the 
reciprocity embodied in the Yaoundé Conventions because it offered EEC firms 
preferential access to developing country markets against the interests of US capital 
(Ravenhill 1980: 35). Finally, the GSP had recently been established (in 1971), 
thereby setting a precedent for non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements in 
international economic law. 
 
In contrast to the first Convention, Lomé II (1980-1985) was negotiated in a period of 
deepened relative asymmetry to the detriment of the ACP group. This was due to the 
convergence of a set of interrelated factors:18  non-oil producing ACP economies were 
very hard hit by the two successive OPEC price rises in the 1970s; the initial signals 
of the fast approaching Third World debt crisis were being felt; there was a shift to the 
political right in the capitalist core (not least through the rising dominance of free 
market neoliberal thinking); and the Third World radicalism associated with the NIEO 
began to fade, partly because of divisions between these heterogeneous states 
(including within the ACP group itself, such as between anglophone and francophone 
states),19 which allowed the EEC to pick off certain states in an imperial policy of 
divide and rule (Ravenhill 1980: 45). The outcome of this configuration of structural 
and contingent forces was ‘the re-establishment of the balance of international 
economic and political power in favor of the North’ (Grilli 1993: 36), which 
contributed to the inability on the part of the ACP to pressure the EEC to offer further 
trade concessions under Lomé II. In short, by the late 1970s ACP bargaining power 
had diminished further. One EEC negotiation tactic (or veiled threat) was to stress that 
its existing aid provisions and investment guarantees under Lomé were far higher than 
from other OECD countries; hints were also made that bilateral ODA from individual 
EEC states were also at stake (Ravenhill 1980: 43). The consequence of all of this was 
a general embittering of ACP-EU relations, and, although the non-reciprocal trade 
provisions under Lomé I remained in place, the EEC continued to interpret the 
Convention in a very narrow and legalistic fashion, for example, procedural aspects 
such as rules of origin would be followed to the letter, rather than being interpreted 
with ‘developmental’ outcomes in mind. 
 
By the time of the negotiations of Lomé III (1986-1990) the EU was committed to 
pursuing an agenda of private sector-led development, informed and justified by 
neoliberal ideas; what the EU portrayed as a ‘minimally interventionist, catalytic form 
of assistance’ (EC 1995: 23). This is despite the fact that the only comprehensive 
success story of industrialisation among developing countries since 1945 – the newly 
                                                     
17 At the same time however, it should be noted that the ACP group countered the NIEO call for South-
South unity because of its status as a sub-grouping of developing countries with preferential relations 
with the EEC (Cosgrove Twitchett 1981: 130-31). 
18 For a detailed analysis of the asymmetry in negotiations for Lomé II and the disappointment of the 
ACP states with its outcome, see Ravenhill (1980). 
19 This was not primarily a consequence of the dominance of different European languages and cultural 
influences, but because of the dependence of many francophone ACP on relations with France and the 
EEC in contrast to some of the more radical regimes of the anglophone Caribbean which appeared to 
take the demands of the NIEO more seriously (Ravenhill 1980; Grilli 1993). 
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industrialized countries of East Asia (NICs) – was contingent upon fairly extensive 
(and very well documented) strategic intervention by the state.20 Lomé IV (1990-
2000) extended the EU’s neoliberal policy agenda even further: importantly, the 
‘balancing’ influence of the USSR was no longer significant at the time of 
negotiations, so ACP countries could not use relations with the USSR to temper EU 
demands (Wright 2005: 78). Notable additions to the expanding remit of ACP-EU 
relations were an enhanced ‘participatory’ role for civil society actors within ACP 
countries; and a redefinition of the state as ‘enabling’. The private-sector was the 
driver of development and state reform focused on the effective provision of market-
based regulations that would facilitate investment through implementing, extending 
and enforcing of private property rights. In addition, some Lomé IV aid packages 
were tied to neoliberal adjustment conditionalities (Grilli 1993: 345).21 The 
significance of the terms of Lomé IV was neatly summarised by Grilli as representing: 
a substantial movement in EC-ACP relations away from any pretense of 
partnership and towards a more traditional (and thus inherently unequal) 
North-South relationship in both trade and aid – a relationship strictly 
conditioned by the priorities, ideology and economics of the North 
(Grilli 193: 43). 
By the time of the mid-term review of Lomé IV in 1995 – Lomé IV(bis) – it had 
become clear that the EU was not going to extend non-reciprocal market access to any 
post-Lomé arrangement from 2000 onwards. The primary stated rationale for this was 
that Lomé had never been compatible with GATT(1947), and was not compatible 
with the newly established WTO (McQueen et al. 1998: 12). In addition, in terms of 
changes to the actual agreement, the mid-term review represented a shift by the EC 
even further towards the developmental assumptions associated with neoliberalism 
(albeit in its revised form).22 These included an emphasis on ‘good governance’ as ‘a 
particular aim of cooperation’ (ACP-EC 1996: 33, Amendment to Article 5),23 the 
assignment of an even more prominent role to the private sector in the development 
needs for ACP economies (EC 1996: 8-9; see also ACP-EC 1996), and more 
important in relation to the topic of this appendix, a move from trade policy focused 
on trade preferences to ‘improving the competitiveness of the ACP states’ 
(Directorate General for Development 1996: 7, referring to Article 15a of Lomé IV 
(bis)), by ‘integrating them into the world economy in a harmonious and gradual 
manner’ (Amendment to Article 6 of Lomé IV, ACP-EC 1996: 36. Emphasis 
added).24 
                                                     
20 A dynamic that even the World Bank has since (partially) acknowledged (World Bank 1997). On the 
integral role of state intervention in the economic development of the NICs see the following, now 
classic, texts: Amsden 1989, Chang 2004, Wade 1990. 
21 Grilli does not use the term neoliberal, but he spells out the package of stabilisation and structural 
adjustment measures associated with imposed ‘Washington consensus’ policies. 
22 Neoliberalism cannot be understood as a static ideology. For example, significant shifts in its 
composition of policies away from its ‘orthodox form’ (World Bank 1981) occurred in the late 1980s 
(with the good governance and ‘human face’ agendas) and the in mid-1990s with the ‘enabling state’ 
(WDR 1997). These shifts reflected a combination of the clear failure of the objectives of its initial 
policies, and the influence of NGO agendas, which, paradoxically, had emerged as key players because 
of initial neoliberal reforms of the state in the global South. Nonetheless, several of its core 
assumptions remained, even in its so-called ‘post-Washington consensus’ variant (Rodrik 2001). 
23 And a range of aid conditionalities to facilitate this aim, reflecting the ‘emerging consensus’ in 
mainstream development circles by the mid-1990s ‘on the link between human rights, democracy and 
development’ (Arts and Byron 1997: 83).  
24 The assumption that economies can harmoniously integrate with the neoliberal era of global 
capitalism is one of the many contradictions of the EU agenda here. 
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Why did the Cotonou Agreement Replace the Lomé Conventions?  
In June 2000, the ACP and the (then) 15 member states of the EU signed the Cotonou 
Partnership Agreement (CPA), which would be the major (albeit not only) regime 
governing ACP-EU relations for the period 2000-2020.25 The CPA did not represent a 
significant departure Lomé, although several elements were modified, including WTO 
conformity as an objective of ‘cooperation’ rather than as a principle (Article 34 of the 
CPA as interpreted by Faber 2005: 85; WTO conformity was re-iterated in CPA 
Articles 36 and 37). The most important element for the purposes of this analysis is 
the framework that the CPA laid-out for the reform of preferential trade relations: the 
‘preparatory phase’ (2000-2008) of the CPA allowed eight years to negotiate an end 
to the non-reciprocal trading embodied in Lomé, to be replaced by a legal framework 
establishing separate sub-regional and reciprocal ‘Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPAs). According to the terms of the Cotonou Agreement, EPAs were to ‘enter into 
force by 1 January 2008, unless earlier dates are agreed between the Parties’ (Article 
37. 1). 
 
The primary stated rationale for establishing reciprocal EPAs was to achieve WTO-
compatibility for the ACP-EU preferential trade regime. In short, non-reciprocal 
preferences discriminated between developing countries and as such conflicted with 
the MFN (or non-discrimination) principle. More specifically, preferences under the 
Lomé Conventions and the preparatory period of the Cotonou Agreement were not 
framed under the GSP because there was no ‘objective’ criterion to differentiate the 
ACP from other developing countries, which would have been necessary to meet the 
terms of the Enabling Clause. The ACP is simply a historical legacy of European 
colonialism and the formation of the EEC; it has little other unifying dynamics 
beyond a shared status as ‘developing countries’. To be WTO compatible, non-GSP 
preferential trade arrangements were required to comply with Article XXIV of 
GATT(1994), which is the regulatory framework for all customs unions and free trade 
areas.26 As such, the terms of the Cotonou Agreement stated that EPA negotiations 
were to establish ‘the timetable for the progressive removal of barriers to trade 
between the Parties, in accordance with the relevant WTO rules’ (Article 37.7).27  
 
The EU’s shift to promote a regime of EPAs was also supported by arguments that the 
trade preferences under Lomé had been a decisive failure (the ‘preference pessimist’ 
view in Chapter 5), and the assumption that regional integration among ACP countries 
would kick-start their development and act as a ‘stepping stone’ to full integration 
with the world economy (EC 2002), thereby mirroring (or imposing?) the trajectory of 
regional economic integration among EU members. Although the primary stated 
                                                     
25 By end-2007, the Cotonou Agreement governed relations between 25 EU states and 79 ACP states. 
26 GATT 1994, ‘Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade 1994’. The number of reciprocal trade agreements falling under Article XXIV 
trebled during the 1990s (UNCTAD 2003: ix). 
27 This article also contained flexibilities that recognized the level of development of the ACP: 
‘Negotiations shall take account of the level of development and the socio-economic impact of trade 
measures on ACP countries, and their capacity to adapt and adjust their economies to the liberalization 
process. Negotiations will therefore be as flexible as possible in establishing the duration of a sufficient 
transitional period, the final product coverage, taking into account sensitive sectors, and the degree of 
asymmetry in terms of timetable for tariff dismantlement, while remaining in conformity with WTO 
rules then prevailing’. (Emphases added.) 
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objective of the Cotonou Agreement was poverty reduction, this was conditioned by 
the qualifier that any activities towards this objective must be consistent with the 
integration of ACP countries into the world economy (with reference to Article 1 of 
the Cotonou Agreement; see Dearden 2003: 110). 
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APPENDIX 5B 
Overview of ACP tuna canneries and tuna loining plants in mid-2000s 
Country Company Overview Production and Employment  
 
Fiji Pafco (est. cannery in 1970). Ownership 
98% Fiji Government/ 2% local investors 
and ‘villages’.  Processing agreement to 
supply Bumble Bee (US canned tuna 
company) with tuna loins since 1999. 
Stopped exporting product to the EU due 
to price squeeze by main buyer 
(Sainsbury’s). Previously a joint venture 
with the Japanese firm C. Itoh until 1987. 
155mt/day frozen albacore loins 
(US) 
238,000 cases canned tuna per 
year (80% local and sub-region/ 
20% Canada) 
Direct employment: 800, 
including temporary workers 
 
Ghana The Pioneer Food Cannery (PFC, 
established in 1976). Majority owned by 
Lehman Brothers with some limited local 
ownership, managed by MW Brands. 
Previously owned by Heinz European 
Seafood. 
175mt/day predominantly 
skipjack 
Direct employment: 1,200 
Kenya Kenya-Wanaichi Marine Products Ltd. 
Processing agreement to supply Tri 
Marine (a tuna trading company). 
Annual raw material production 
capacity 20,000mt for loins. 
Direct employment: c.400. 
Côte 
d’Ivoire 
Pêche et Froid Côte d’Ivoire (PFCI). 
Bought by Thunnus Overseas Group 
(TOG) in 2005. 
200mt/day predominantly 
skipjack. Annual raw material 
production capacity 50,000mt 
Société des Conserves de Côte d’Ivoire 
(SCODI). (Owned by Bolton/Saupiquet 
until 2005) 
250mt/day predominantly 
skipjack. 
 
Direct employment in both 
canneries: c.3,000 
Madagascar Thunnus Overseas Group (TOG) owns 
one factory: CTOI (owned by Pêche et 
Froid Océan Indien, PFOI, until 2007). 
Annual raw material production 
capacity 36,000mt for canned and 
pouch28 skipjack/ yellowfin. 
Direct employment: 1,500 
Mauritius Princes Tuna (Mauritius) Ltd (PTM). 
58/59% share bought by Princes Ltd 
(UK) in 1999, which is a subsidiary of 
Mitsubishi Corporation/ 35% Ireland 
Blyth Ltd (IBL, Mauritius)/ 6-7% State 
Investment Corporation (Mauritius).  
Annual raw material production 
capacity 50,000mt for canned 
skipjack. 
Direct employment: 1,950 
Thon des Mascareignes (est. 2005). 
Owned 75% IBL/ 25% Pesqueras 
Echebastar (Spain). 
Annual raw material production 
capacity 55,000mt for albacore, 
skipjack and yellowfin loins 
(90%) cans and pouch. 
Direct employment: 750 
                                                     
28 Tuna packed in aluminium foil pouches. 
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Overview of ACP tuna canneries and tuna loining plants in mid-2000s [cont.] 
Country Company Overview Production and Employment  
 
Papua 
New 
Guinea 
Frabelle (est. 2006) owned by 
Philippine firm Frabelle Market 
Corporation. 
Maximum capacity of 80mt/day that can be 
split between loining and canning. 
80% loins and cans to EU/ 20% of canned 
product to domestic market 
Direct employment: 2,000  
RD Tuna Canners (est. 1997) 
owned by Philippine firm RD 
Corporation. 
150mt/day canned (80% EU/20% local) 
20mt/day frozen loins (EU) 
Direct employment: 3,000 (15% over-
employment to offset high absenteeism) 
South Seas Tuna Corporation 
(SSTC) 
(est. 2003) owned by FCF 
(Taiwanese tuna trading company) 
and Taiwanese purse seine vessel 
owners. 
100mt/day frozen loins (for US market, but 
made attempts to target EU markets) 
Direct employment: 1,300 
Senegal Société nouvelle des conserveries 
du Sénégal (SNDCS) 
Ownership unknown 
Actual annual raw material production 
capacity 20,000mt;  4,200mt finished product 
in 2001. 
Direct employment: 1,340 
Pêcheries frigorifiques du Sénégal 
(PFS) Ownership unknown 
 
Actual annual raw material production 
15,000mt; 4,500mt finished product in 2001. 
Direct employment: 1,100 
Seychelles Indian Ocean Tuna Ltd (IOT) (est. 
1995) owned 60% Lehman 
Brothers/40% government of 
Seychelles, managed by MW 
Brands. Previously owned by Heinz 
European Seafood until 2006. 
Actual annual raw material production 
102,000mt (2006) for canned skipjack/ 
yellowfin and some loins. 
Direct employment: 2,300 
Solomon 
Islands 
Soltai Fishing & Processing Ltd. 
(Soltai) (est. 1973) owned 51% 
National Government/ 49% 
Western Province government. 
Processing agreement to supply Tri 
Marine with tuna loins. Previously a 
joint venture with Japanese firm 
Maruha until 2001. 
 
37mt loins per day 
Developing line for catering cans for France 
and Germany.  
Local/sub-region: c.65,000 cases per year  
Japan: Katsuobushi, 8-10 containers per 
month29  
Direct employment: 800 
Sources: In-country interviews, Fiji, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, Seychelles and Solomon Islands 
(2005-7); Barnes (2006); Golub and Mbaye (2002); IDDRA (2004); Oceanic Développement et al. 
(2005). 
 
  
                                                     
29 Katsuobushi is a boiled, dried, smoked, and fermented skipjack (or bonito) that is a main ingredient 
of dashi (a broth that forms the basis of soups (miso) and sauces) in Japanese cuisine. 
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 APPENDIX 5C 
Demonstrating the Importance of the EU Trade Preference to Canned Tuna 
Production in the ACP 
 
Chapter 5 shows that the Lomé/Cotonou preference was an important incentive to 
capital in the development of a tuna processing industry in the ACP. Can we quantify 
this? And what was its impact on market share of competing sites of production, 
especially in Southeast Asia?30 To answer these questions, the following discusses 
data provided in Table 5C.1 to demonstrate shifts over time in share of the EU market 
for canned tuna between the ACP and competing sites of production in Southeast Asia 
and Latin American GSP+ receiving countries.  
 
Using data for the four most important EU import markets for canned tuna (France, 
Germany, Italy and the UK), Table 5C.1 provides evidence of a growing ACP market 
share, but also by GSP+ countries in Latin American. While the ACP share of the 
French market for imported product declined in relative terms from 99.5 percent in 
1985 to 58 percent in 2005 (with product from processors based in Spain and Latin 
America capturing market share),31  the total volume of ACP canned tuna exports rose 
from 36,800mt in 1985 to 107,900mt in 2005. For the German market, ACP exporters 
expanded their share from 0 percent in 1985 to 24 percent by 2005, which, combined 
with a boom in imports from GSP+ countries by 2005, reduced Southeast Asian 
exporters’ market share from 74 percent in 1985 to only 46 percent in 2005.32 Finally, 
in the largest EU market, the UK, ACP exporters registered a significant expansion in 
market share from 42 percent in 1985 to 61 percent in 2005; as with the German 
market, this has contributed directly to displacing competing product from Southeast 
Asia (from 31 percent in 1985 to 21 percent by 2005). 
 
Shifting the emphasis and re-enforcing the point made in Chapters 3 and 5, among the 
major ‘winners’ from the protection afforded by EU tuna tariff policy were EU-based 
tuna canneries (particular those in Spain). In fact, market share for canned tuna 
produced in Spain has grown substantially in France from 0 percent in 1985 to 27 
percent in 2005. Spain’s share of the other three major EU markets has declined in 
relative terms over the same period, but in absolute terms it has grown steadily in 
Germany (from 1,300mt in 1985 to 6,600mt in 2005), and dramatically in Italy (from 
4,700mt in 1985 to 44,400mt in 2005). Given that the import data for Italy includes 
tuna loins for processing by domestic canneries, Spain’s relative market share is likely 
to be significantly higher for canned tuna. Only the UK market has seen Spanish share 
decline in both relative and absolute terms. 
 
Reform of the ‘standard’ GSP in mid-2005 provided a marginal improvement in 
competitive advantage on paper and, in parallel, represented a degree of preference 
erosion for the ACP (i.e. the ACP margin of preference became less valuable relative 
                                                     
30 In order of productive importance Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. 
31 Spanish firms were deepening their investment base in loining facilities in Latin American GSP+ 
countries and source the vast majority of their supply of loins from there. 
32 It is worth noting that, in absolute volume terms, the Southeast Asian group of countries continued to 
register growth in Germany. Only the UK registered a decline in Southeast Asian volume between 
1995 and 2005. 
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to the standard GSP).33 In practice however, this 3.5 percent difference in tariff is 
unlikely to have provided much increased market access for firms in standard GSP 
recipient countries; at the most it might have served to boost profitability for firms 
based in Southeast Asia that were previously exporting to the EU at 24 percent. A 
major barrier to accessing the preference was the necessity of meeting EU GSP rules 
of origin (RoO) for fish, which is problematic for Thailand (the world’s most 
important exporter of canned tuna) as it had only a very limited domestic fleet and had 
to rely on supply from EU vessels to qualify for only a 3.5 percent preference (CTA 
2005). As a result, since 2006 the Thai government and tuna industry planned to 
expand domestic tuna fishing capacity.34 On the surface, meeting GSP RoO is less 
problematic for Indonesia and the Philippines as both have significant domestic tuna 
fleets that meet EU GSP RoO, but the extent to which all this potential supply 
complies with EU SPS measures for fish and fish products is another question. In light 
of the limited commercial value of the standard GSP for canned tuna it might seem 
unworthy of consideration here, but Southeast Asian tuna exporters made it clear that 
they would push for a further tariff reduction by a minimum of 3 percent during the 
review of the GSP regime.35 Such shifts in the standard GSP represent an important 
source of potential preference erosion for the ACP. 
                                                     
33 The remaining EU GSP scheme – the Everything But Arms (EBA) initiative for LDCs – is far less 
significant in shaping EU market dynamics for imported tuna products. Data for non-ACP EBA 
beneficiary countries are not included in Table 5C.1 because it is marginal and does not appear to have 
impacted the competitiveness of equivalent ACP product. The only significant exporter is the Maldives 
which – while very important to the Maldivian economy – had only 5 percent share of the UK market 
in 1995 and 3.4 percent in 2005. Exports from non-ACP LDCs did not register for any of the three 
other major EU markets for imported canned tuna assessed here. 
34 For example, three purse seine vessels were reportedly purchased by Thai interests in 2006, although 
these were apparently former Russian IUU vessels. (Interviews, Thai industry representatives and 
international fisheries specialist, Bangkok 2006.) Chanintr Chalisarapong, Chairman of the Tuna 
Packers’ Group, stated clearly in May 2006: ‘We want to build-up, step-by-step, our tuna fleet. We 
have many Thai packers who have money to invest in fleets with current distant water fleets’ (Speech 
at the INFOFISH Tuna 2006 conference). This possibility was confirmed in interviews with US 
industry representatives in 2006 and was one of the stated aims of enforcing strict rules of origin in a 
proposed US-Thai FTA (i.e. to protect US industry). In addition to its support for the development of 
an industrial tuna fleet, the Thai government acceded to the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) to 
improve access to Indian Ocean stocks (see Chapter 4); and it supported the rehabilitation of the Fish 
Marketing Organisation of Thailand through financing infrastructure such as expanded wharf space and 
improved capacity to meet SPS requirements. (Speech by Dr Jaranthada Karnasuta, Director General of 
Fisheries, Government of Thailand, at the INFOFISH Tuna 2006 conference.)  
35 Speech by Francisco Tui-Laurel Jr., President of Frabelle Fishing Corporation, Philippines, at the 
INFOFISH Tuna 2006 conference. 
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Table 5C.1: Canned tuna import volumes by major EU importing countries and market share by exporting country groups 
 France Germany Italy (including loins) UK 
1985 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 198536 1995 2005 1985 1995 2005 
Known imports from ACP 
(in 1,000mt)37 
36.6 67.2 62.7 - 2.5 20.2 0.1 5.5 24.5 10 26.6 81.3 
Known imports from Southeast 
Asia (in 1,000mt) 
- - - 14.6 24 38.8 - 1.6 1.7 7.3 36.1 28.2 
Known imports from GSP+ (Latin 
America)  (in 1,000mt) 
- - 7.2 - 0.1 14.6 - 5.5 33.7 - 0.2 6.7 
Known intra-EU imports 
(excluding known re-exports) (in 
1,000mt) 
- 5.3 29.9 1.3 5.8 6.6 4.7 21.8 44.4 - 6.3 3.9 
Total Vol. (in 1,000mt) 
 
36.8 78.8 107.9 19.8 44.7 83.8 4.8 37.9 112.1 23.8 85.9 132.6 
Total ACP share 
 
99.5% 85.3% 58.1% 0% 5.6% 24.1% 2% 14.5% 21.9% 42% 30.9% 61.3% 
Total Southeast Asian share 
 
0% 0% 0% 73.7% 53.7% 46.3% 0% 4% 1.5% 30.7% 42% 21.3% 
Total GSP+ (Latin America) share 
 
0% 0% 6.7% 0% 0.2% 17.4% 0% 14.5% 30% 0% 0.2% 5% 
Total EU (excluding re-exports) 
share 
0% 6.7% 27.7% 6.6% 12.9% 7.9% 97.9% 57.5% 39.6% 0% 7.3% 2.9% 
Source: Globefish (2006: 48, 50, 51 and 54); UK data for 1985 from ADB/INFOFISH (1991: 101). 
                                                     
36 Italy import volumes for 1985 are marginal because supply was dominated by domestic production. The rise in imports correlates with the decline in domestic 
production and (less so) with rising per capita consumption 
37 The table refers to ‘known imports’ because smaller quantities of exports from some of the more minor supplying countries within the four groupings used 
here may be included under ‘Others’ in the original data set. However, the quantities provided here are broadly representative of total trade flows. 
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